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INTRODUCTION
August of 1973 will witness the centenary of an
organization whose involvement in the financial life of
many nations has been substantial, and yet whose role in
these affairs has rarely been fully appreciated.

The in-

stitution under discussion is the Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders, first established in London in 1868 as the
Council of Foreign Bondholders, a body created to champion
the contractual rights of the holders of non-domestic
securities against the caprices of defaulting goveniments.
Potentially the two most important weapons in the
arsenal of the Cotmcil were goveniment interposition and
the support of public opinion.

By determining the degree

of efficacy of these approaches, it will be possible to
appraise the nature of this organization.
tempted to describe it as a pressure group.
be incorrect.,

One might be
But this would

Of course it is true that "politics of

national states is polities not only of the governments
of the states themselves but also of numerous organized
citizens' groups." 1 Yet there is a difference between
an "interest" and a "pressure" group.
1nonald c. Blaisdell, "Pressure Groups, Foreign
Policies and International Politics," Annals of the
American' Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXIX
(Sept., 1958), 150.

2

The pressure group possesses the power of the
"application, or threatened application, of sanctions
should a demand be refused," 1 while the interest group
does not.

For the latter to be successful it must ener-

getically pursue tangible and realistic goals with a
modicum of public approval, and, if possible, in tandem
with organizations having similar ends.

In light of this

definition, it would be proper to say that the Corporation 2
was in fact an interest group.
Unfortunately, the Corporation's situation was
made difficult by internal dissension as well as by the
generally unfavorable climate of feeling in the 1870's
toward Britishers who invested in foreign stocks.

The word

.. bondholder" more often than not evoked great displeasure
both in government and in the population at large,3 while
less controversial bodies (such as the Royal Geographical
1 samuel E. Finer, "Interest Groups and the Political
Process in Great Britain," in Interest Groups on Four Continents, ed. for the International Political Science Association by Henry w. Ehrmann (Pittsburghs University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 118.
2 Throughout this text the words Corporation and
Council will be used interchangeably to refer to the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (formerly the Council of
Foreign Bondholders), When the title 'Council' appears in
this form (i.e. with single quotation marks), it will refer
to the ruling body (the Council) of the Corporation.
Politics
the

Society, the Society of Arts, and the Statistical Society)
engaged in expanding British trade and finance. usually
encountered approbation. 1

Between Government and the City

there existed a positive chill which, reinforced by a social
barrier, set the two apart.

The money market was beyond

the purview of Government's direct influence or close
supervision--Birmingham might be protectionist, but London
was not. 2
Despite these encumbrances the Corporation of
Foreign Bondholders, characterized by "doggedness and
modera.tion, 11 .J managed to make progress as a "stubborn 114
defender of English interests.

In time these character-

istics were appreciated, and it was observed1
In-as-much as this body has had a long and successful experience in the adjustment of bond defaults
and has had the approval if not the support of the
British Government, it has served as a model for
other central national organizations of Bondholders.5
1 Blanchard Jerrold, i•0n the Manufacture of Public

inion," Nineteenth Century, XIII (June, 188,3), 1089.
2

Platt, P• 16.

3Herbert Feis, Europe, the World's Banker, 18~019141 An Account of European Fore!~ Inveetment and t e
Connection o? World Finance with
omacy Before the War
(New Ravena Yale University Press, 9JO), p. 116.
4
lBll•, P• 114.

bf

SEdwin M. Borchard, General PrinciSles, Vol. I of
State Insolvency and Forei€Jf Bondholders, ~Y Edwin M. Borchard and wiiiiam H. Wynne New Ha:veni Yale University
Press, 1951), p. 20J.

4

our conce:rn here, however, is with the Council in its
early years of development, from its
labors in 1868, to 1882,

fou.~der•s

initial

During this period the English

foreign bondholder was beset by an epidemic of defaults
and partial defaults which demonstrated the necessity for
group action.

High on the list of troublesome borrowers

on the London Exchange was Egypt, and to its turbulent
financial scene we are drawn,

Here is found the exception

to the normal pattern of events.

Unlike the cases of

Turkey, Peru, or Spain, the Egyptian bondholders fa.red
comparatively well.

Their exertions brought them palpable

results and even the victory of General Wolseley at Telel-Kebir appeared to some to be the capstone of their
efforts.

However, it does not follow that since a ••pro-

bondholder" policy evolved, it was necessarily the activities of the English investors which were the primary
motivating force.

Our objectives, therefore, will be

to determine the impact of the Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders upon the affairs of Egypt as well as upon
the diplomacy of England, and to estimate its success as
a focal point for disparate bondholder grievances.
The situation was complicated by the often vigorous
intervention of other European states on behalf of their
nationals.

Of these, France was the most vocals the con-

cern for his countrymen expressed by M. de Ring, French
agent in Cairo in 1879, was not an isolated phenomenons

5

The financial measures for the regulating of the
.Egyptian debts must safeguard the credit of our
nationals which form an important part of the
French savings placed abroad.I
Nonetheless, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that
it was English capitalists and stockholders who made the
first "encroachment" into Egypt. 2

In this initial thrust

the Council was a ready instrument, composed of the
largest and most influential bondholders, supported
by a few of the· members of the leading contracting
houses, and thus machinery was created by which
pressure in favor of intervention might be brought
to bear on the British Government.)
The result of the Council's intervention in .Egyptian
finance in 1876 may be observed in the ensuing years when
it merged with a number of other currents forming the
maelstrom which drew the British Government into an
unwanted occupation.

The Goschen Decree, the Commission

of Inquiry, the Wilson-Nubar Ministry, the deposition of
the Khedive Ismail. and the Commission of Liquidation were
the most signal events of the chaotic years from 1876 to
1882, but each was a step which drew Great Britain more

deeply into the mire of .Egyptian indebtedness, hence into
1 Jean Bouvier, "Les Interets financiers

et la
Question d'!gypte (1875-1876)." Revue Historigue, CCXXIV
(July, 1960), 102,

JAbdel Hamza, Public Debt of ~ts 18~4-1876
{Cairoa Egyptian Government Press, 19
, p. l 8.
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an ever closer proximity with the creditors.

At the same

time English policy in the Middle East was being reshaped
as--by fits and starts--a new course was being charted
which no longer relied upon a special relationship with
the Porte.

A so-called "Egyptian policy" began to be

spoken of as a natural alternative to the traditional
British posture in the Levant, particularly as the importance of the Suez Canal was made manifest.

Downing Street

became more alive to the value of British influence in
Egypt and to the fact that economic matters were grist
for the diplomatic mill.

As long as the Khedivial Adminis-

tration could stumble from one financial crisis to another,
major policy decisions could be postponed.

But the Arabi

rising of September, 1881, the result of the Fellah's headlong plunge into the nineteenth-century world of financecapi talism, European legal codes and nationalism, made
procrastination impossible.
The published literature on the Egyptian question
is significant but, unhappily, quite often single-minded.
On the one hand were the apologists, the administrators
such as the Cromers, Milners, and Colvins, who believed
the occupation was an unpleasant but necessary action, while
on the other were the Rothsteins and Blunts who saw an inchoate national movement struggling to free itself from the
trammels of European financiers and officialdom.

The most

celebrated of the genre of books which described the faceless

7

villains--the bondholders--luring the British Government
into unwise policies was John A. Hobson's Imperialism,
A Study.

For this author the victory of the creditors

occurred when they "succeeded in getting their Government to enter a most unprofitable partnership, guaranteeing the payment of the interest, but not sharing in
it." 1

However, to Edward Dicey, a journalist and capi-

talist, there was another morals

"the real permanent

force in Egypt is that of European Capital which either
directly or indirectly is interested in its welfare. 112
Since a wide divergence exists between these perspectives,
we shall take up our ground at an intermediate point.

In

doing so, it is not intended to diminish the importance of
the argument, currently dominant, that it was consideration
of imperial integrity and defense, focused upon the Suez
Canal, which forced Britain's hand in 1882,

What will

be emphasized is the financial aspect of the problem
and with it the triumphs and failures of the Corporation
of Foreign Bondholders as it attempted to provide leadership to a large segment of the investing public--the much
maligned Egyptian bondholders.
1 John A. Hobson, Imperialism, A Study (Jd entirely

rev. and reset ed.s London1 George Allen and Unwin, 1938),
p.

55.

2 Edward Dicey, "The Egyptian Liquidation," .fil:.n.!teenth Century, VIII {Sept., 1880), 471.
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In 1882 Frederic Harrison, in discussing the age
in which he lived, wrote1
Surely no century in all human history was ever
so much praised to its face for its wonderful
achievements, its wealth and its power, its unparalleled ingenuity and its miraculous capacity
for making itself comfortable and generally
enjoying life.l
This boundless confidence and faith in progress must have
undergone a severe trial in the 1870's as the Great Depression slowly deepened in intensity.

The seven good

years which proceeded from the panic of 1866 were followed,
in true Biblical fashion, by a like measure of poor ones,
with 1879 marking the nadir.

The immediate cause of the

initial phase of the Depression, which lasted with intermittent breaks until 1896, was a panic in Vienna which
reverberated through the bourses of Europe.

In the long

view the English dilemma was one of decreasing prices and
shrinking profits,

Though growth continued, increments

were smaller in comparison with her principal rivals.
Though tonnage was up, the 1870's marked the first decade
of the nineteenth century in which Britain did not raise
at least half of the world•s coal supplyr though the
production of iron expanded, steel was making inroads
1 Frederic Harrison, "A Few Words about the
Nineteenth Century," quoted in The Victorian Frame of
Mind, by Walter E. Houghton (New Havens Yale University
Press, 1957), P• J9.

9
into its market1 and cotton, the backbone of her industry, was sluggish due to a decline in demand.

These

factors, combined with an attitude of complacency, a
flight of talent to other shores, and stiff competition,
added to the atmosphere of gloom. 1
Monetary disorders were also in evidence in this
period.

The world's gold output, which had so stimulated

the general prosperity, had dropped from an annual average
of £29,176,ooo in the period 1852-56. to £18,713,000 in
the triennium 1872-74. 2

The unstable financial situation

was reflected by the numerous changes in the rates charged
by the Bank of England--twenty-four in 187J and thirteen
in 1874.3

Trade figures for the decade also told a disappointing tale. 4 Compounding the difficulties in trade
and industry was the condition of agriculture.

More and

more, England's well-being depended upon the importation
of cheap farm commodities,

Due to technical and trans-

portational advancements, these foodstuffs were available
1 Robert c. K. Ensor, ~lands 18~0-1914 (Oxfords
At the Clarendon Press, 1936)~hapter I (pp. 101-135).
Much of the material used in discussing the Great Depression is drawn from this work.
2Bankers Magazine, XXXV (Feb., 1875), 97.
Jibid., 93.

4Ibid., XL (May, 1880), 382.
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at a time when rising population and a series of very
poorharvests found the British agriculturalist unable
to remain a competitor in the free trade market of the
period.

In 1868 Britain had produced 80 per cent of its

food supply, but ~his had fallen to only 50 per cent a
decade later. 1 The result was that as exports slackened,
food imports rose sharply.
The early l870's had also been o! moment to the
London money market, for in these years English capital
attained its pre-eminence in international finance.

Loans

to governments and investments in foreign enterprise be-

came the business of the City to the practical exclusion
of all else. 2 Walter Bagehot estimated that in 1873 the
lending power (as measured by savings deposits) was
£120 million for London, £40 million for New York,

£13 million for Paris, and £8 million for Berlin, the

latter three distant competitors.3

Again it is with

estimates that one must deal when attempting to discover
1 Alexander K. Cairncross. "Did Foreign Investment
Pay?" Review of Economic Studies, II (1935-36), 77.
In-
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the actual amount of capital which Britain exported in
this period.

Depending upon the source, the sum of British

capital assets abroad in 1870 might vary from £700 million
to £1.1 billion.

But whichever set of figures is selected,

the story is the sames

Englishmen were able and willing

to lend their money on a scale which can never be dupliJ. A. Hobson•s widely cited statistics indicate

cated.1

a 45.6 per cent increase in foreign investment from 1862
to 1872, and a 27.5 per cent increment for the next decade. 2
The reasons for the rapid expansion of the English
money market are several, some quite fortuitous indeed,
such as the removal of Paris as a rival a:fter her defeat
in the Franco-Prussian War--from that date the gold
sovereign became the currency of the world.3

Yet the

dramatic event ought not overshadow less glamorous ones,
London for years had been a principal bullion market,
plying its trade to good profit and escaping most of the

2

J. A. Hobson, P• 62,

)Bankers .Magazine, XXXIII (Feb,, 1873), 71.11
\
\

\
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instability and violence which had troubled the Continent.
There were no laws which harassed the Jews from carrying
on business or limited the size of meetings to a certain
number.

The aristocracy was also open to those who would

aspire to it, and in turn the nobleman was not averse to
venture both time and treasure in the hurly-burly of the
market place.

The demand for English funds brought into

existence forty new banks from 1862 to 1863 to handle
foreign securities. 1 Close upon their heels came a crowd
of credit companies--few of which were reliably managed
or legitimate--with vague general aimss 2 but all were
rudely shocked by the panic of 1866.

This financial up-

heaval, like a bad dream, was quickly forgotten, and for
the next seven years there was unbridled enthusiasm among
the British investing public for bonds from abroad.

This

mania was fostered by an expanding and diversifying communications network, new organizational structures, and
the widening attraction of the Stock Exchange.
By the 186o•s the revolution in communications
was so well advanced that it seemed the Earth was all but
1 wilfrid T. c. King, Histo;a of the London Discount M§rket (Londont George Routle ge and Sons, Ltd.,
19j6), P• 2j1.
2some impetus toward foreign investment came from
an organization established in 1863 called the International Financial Society. It desired to stimulate investment
abroad and was composed of such banking men as Fruhling
and Goschen.
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shrinking beneath one's feet.

Trunk lines were being

completed, steem was challenging sail for dominance of
the ocean, gaps in the world's submarine cable system
were being closed, and the engineering pride of the
century--the Suez Canal--was moving toward completion,
With the increasing rapidity of commercial news, the
average businessman perforce needed to be well-informed
to be successful.

In this capacity the telegraph was

vital for supplying journalists with the latest intelligence.

It also tightened the sinews of the diplomatic

corps, bringing the far-flung agent into closer contact
with home and with the business community.

As for modern

commerce, it is said to date from the submarine cable,
which permitted the purchase and sale of goods before
their arrival. 1

Of even greater import to the English

investor was the state of the press,

Technically speaking,

professional journalism was probably of higher quality in
Great Britain than on the Continent, 2 and with the removal
of the paper duty in 1861, as well as the reduced mailing
1 charles E. Carrington, The British 0Verseas1

loits of a Nation of Sho kee ers (Cambrldge1 The
ty Press, 9 0 , P• 7 ,
2Hyde Clarke, Sovereign and Quasi-Sovereign
States1 Their Debts to Foreign Countries (Lonaon1
Effingham Wilson, 1878) 1 p, •
u~1ivers

14
rates for newspapers passed in 1870, the dissemination
of knowledge was greatly enhanced,

Advertisements of

loans, reports of meetings, and price and share lists
were readily available, as was a podium from whi.ch public opinion might be aroused.

By 1876 the United King-

dom maintained 1,642 newspapers (320 of these in London)
and 675 periodicals. 1 The financial press likewise
prospered, joining the Bankers Magazine and the Economist
were a number of journals, the most important of which
were the Money Market Review (1859), the Investor's
Monthly Manual (186J), the Bullionist (1866), and the
Financiar and Bondholders Register at the end of the
decade,
The rising organizational tendencies toward consolidation and concentration were mirrored in the foreign
loan market,

An

innovation in the purchasing of securities

occurred in 1868 with the appearance of the Foreign and
Colonial Government Trust.

The object of this institution

was to tap the potentially vast reserves of the small investors by offering shares at a moderate price and investing
this capital in blocks of securities purchased in the open
market.

In the first two years the Trust paid 7 per cent

1 Money Market Review. XXXII (Feb. 19, 1876), J20.
The growth of journalism is illustrated in the comparison
of the figures above with those of thirty years earlier;
in 1846 the United Kingdom possessed 551 newspapers, 14
of which were daily publications.
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and was so well received that in 1871 a second issue
for £1 million in £10 shares, guaranteeing 6 per cent,
was offered. 1 The success of this enterprise was due
both to the eagerness of the English public to reap large
profits in a hurry, and to the Board which was selected
to manage the organization's affairs.

Among the most

prominent of these gentlemen were Bertram Woodehouse
Currie (of the private bank of Glyn, Mills, Currie and
Company), Lord Westbury (a famous jurist), Philip Rose,
and Eustice Cecil, M.P. 2
Emulation being the hallmark of success, it is
not to be wondered that imitators soon appeared on the
scene in spite of the deep suspicion on the part of the
Exchange,

In 1872 the Government Stock Investment Trust

was born, with a seasoned leadership at the helm and a
responsible body of trustees.J

While the Standard Trust

XXXI (May, 1871), 469-70,
Currie are discussed in

Investment Trust included two
(a member of the
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Investment Corporation of the same year was floundering
in obscurity, another company, the Government and Guaranteed Securities Permanent Trust, was making headway. 1
With 1873 the loan market entered upon a downward course,
but the trust movement persisted for some time longer.
The Mortgage Debenture Govenunent Securities Trust was
set on foot in l87J, and was followed a year later by the
Omnium Trust.
Here, of course, we are only enumerating the most
important companies which dealt in non-domestic governmental
stocks.

There were many groups set into motion during these

years involved in specialized investments, such as railways, deep-sea cables and municipal improvements.

It will

be necessary to return to these institutions again, for
not only did their portfolios contain Egyptian securities,
but their directors, in many cases, had ties with the
Council of Foreign Bondholders.
Another stimulant to the British market, already
touched upon. was the credit and discount companies through
which the small investors could save the expenses of the
contractor and deal directly with the borrower,

Joint

stock ventures were aided by a widening of the limited
liability legislation.

These brash young firms bullied

1 A principal figure in this trust was Arthur
John Otway, M.P., a man with large financial interests in
Turkey who also served as a director of the Foreign and
Colonial Government Trust.
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their way onto the scene with abundant capital and
offered the old regime, the "haute banque," competition.
However, lacking the experience, the international connections, and the image of confidence and discretion of
the older firms, these new associations usually embarked
upon more risky operations which did not interest the
prestigious houses.
As the l86o•s drew to a close, London's financial
strength was being underpinned by the rising number of
well-known Continental banking names which began to adorn
City doorposts.

Joining Fruhling and Goschen, the London

House of Rothschild, the Baring Brothers. and others, were
such newcomers as branches of Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt,
Erlanger•s, and de Worms.

These merchant banks were usual-

ly family affairs with ties throughout Europe--their
clientele select, their reputation worth money, and their
demean.or cosmopolitan, which usually made the English
suspicious.
Although dealings in commodities might still be
made to good profit, the real rewards lay in the floating
of various government loans on Europe's bourses.

Competi-

tion for these plums would have caused internecine struggles
therefore, the contractors also began to draw together to
form syndicates. The pressure to syndicate a loan also
came from the increasing frequency of major operations,
which made it hazardous for one house to gamble its position

,,'

·\
! \

I\ \\
~\
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on the reception of a single issue.

By means of a syn-

dicate, several financial institutions would contract
with a government to place its securities before the
public at a certain price.

The difference between this

issuing price and the contract price formed the profit
for the syndicate.

Naturally enough, the disparity of

the two prices was in direct proportion to the credit of
the borrower.

The syndicate would itself pledge to take

a percentage of the securities "firm," as their responsibility, but no member could negotiate his allotment
until the combination disbanded.

Initially, however,

the loan was offered simultaneously on several bourses,
with all transactions being carried out through the
manager.

At the conclusion of a stipulated period, the

unsold stocks were divided among the participants, after
which the price would begin to drop as each attempted to
unload his shares for what they could fetch. 1

With 1873

came the realization that the London market was saturated,
and this method of governmental finance faded under the
glare of notoriety.

The Bankers Magazine declared that

the process of issuing them [loans] under the auspices of a syndicate has only recently come to the
1 "A Sketch of the History of Foreign Loaris,"

Bankers lVJ!gazine, XXXVI (July, 1876), 519. This is one
of the few articles on syndicates, and much of the above
material is drawn from it.

19
knowledge of the public, and it is now no secret
• • • that many of these bodies have yet on their
hands large amounts of the various foreign loans
of modern issue.l
The Economist also frowned upon this modis operandi:
A Syndicate issue is probably tainted in itself1
there is some intrinsic vices and if it were not,
the existence of the Syndicate ~ises a presumption
that the price is much too high.
To a great extent, the financial plight of Egypt in
these years was traceable to this baneful mode of
raising capital.
At bottom it was the rapid maturation of the stock
market which drew to itself an ever larger public interest.
In 1825 the official list of the Exchange encompassed
thirty-four issues, and the operation of the institution
was under the control of a handful of brokers and jobbers.J
The railway boom, the Limited Liability Acts of 1855 and
1862, and the new demands for English capital had greatly

altered the character of Capel Court.

By the 186o•s, for

many people Consols gave the temperature of the British
Empire.

It was to the Funds that the middle class first

l~., XXXIII (Nov., 1873) t 1000.
2Economist, XXXII (Jan. 17, 1874), 64.
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looked for a secure investment.

The Victorian bourgeoisie

was a frugal lot, as the figures of the savings banks
bear witnesss 1 they considered money placed beyond the
pale of banks and Consols as nothing if not speculation. 2
Advanced elements of the middle class were, however, being
drawn into a wide range of investments, and this trend

continued to broaden into the 1870's as new legislation
in education and property rights began to take effect.J
By prudent selection one could have purchased
securities in the home market with an income equaling
that to be derived from foreign stocks.

But this mania

which developed in the late 186o•s was not a matter of
logic.

It was difficult to resist the alluring prospects

held out by such offerings as the "Iquique and la Noria,
Pizagua and Obispo and J'W1.ction Railway," "Colorado
Terrible Load Mining Company," or the "New Sombrero
Phosphate Company."

As competition increased, so did the

risk to the buyer.

This "unappeasable appetite for foreign
stocks and securities" 4 might be indulged in by private
1 Leland H. Jenks, Migration of British Capital
to +_8,P (New Yorka Alfred A. Knopf, l9JB), p. 23:5. In
1830ank deposits stood at £30 million, while in 1866
they were £350 million.
2

Powell, P• 465.

)Ibid., P• 466.

4 "English Capital and Foreign Securities," Bankers
............................_
Magazine. XXIX (J'W1.e, 1869), 626.
'\
~:

!

.
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individuals, but was not to be countenanced as a safe
banking practice. 1 The Economist also warned of the
serious danger of rash foreign lending, 2 and thought
the businessman should be content with 5 per cent instead of potentially larger profits on the Exchange.
Although deception and fraud were rife and many suffered,
the figures for the 1870's show that one did not become
rich by treading the safest paths.

High risk brought

high interest, and "despite the extensive def2ults of
foreign government loans, it is probable that, prior to
World War I, if not since, this expectation was on the
whole realized."J

Although the decade of the seventies

was not particularly good for the investors, the average
yield on non-domestic government bonds was 4.4 per cent,
while the Funds paid J.8 per cent. 4
As is so often the case, it is not the rule that
beckons to one's interests, but the exception.

Defaulting

governments there were, ready enough to break faith, and in
that knowledge lay the !:!l.son d'etre of the Council of
Foreign Bondholders.
1

~ •• 627.

2Economist, XXVII (April JO, 1870), 529.

3Borchard, p. xxvi.
4cairncross,Home and Foreign Investment, P• 230.

CHAP'rER I

THE CORPORATION OF FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS:
FORMATION AND OPERATION (1868-1876)
The first foreign loan raised in England was done
in the name of the Emperor of Austria in 1706 for £500,000
at 8 per cent.1 Britain's purse was not at the disposal of
every borrower, for under Walpole it became a crime to lend
money abroad without Governmental authorization.

This proved

no particular handicap since, in balance, England was a
debtor nation in the eighteenth century and was herself
importing capital. 2
The decade of the 1820's was a significant era for
the foreign government securities market.

From 1818 to 1830

twenty-five government loans were enthusiastically received
in London; this was the age of the triumph of nationalism
1 Money Market Review, XXX (March lJ, 1875), 310.
2charles K. Hobson, "British oversea Investments,
Their Growth and Importance," Annals of the American Academ*
of Political and Social Science, LXVIII, No. 157 (Nov., 191 ),
•
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and liberalism, towards which Britishers were sympathetic.
As matters fell out, sixteen of these loans went into
default, with the result that this mode of investment
sank into disfavor for many years. 1

This distrust was

such that the policy of most savings institutions was to
avoid the purchase of foreign securities, and in the case
of the London Joint Stock Banking Company, the prohibition
was included in its charter of 18J6. 2
Until the advent of the Council of Foreign Bondholders the only recourse which

~reditors

possessed in

dealing with defaulting states was to unite behind a
committee of defense.J

These self-appointed bodies had

little knowledge at their disposals being temporary, they
usually commanded little backing and were often dominated
by the contractor of the loan who, naturally enough, was
torn between the holders' complaints and the defaulters,
from whom future business was expected.

In addition, the

1 Albert H. Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax

Britannica1 Studies in British Foreign Trade in the
Nineteenth Centu1 (Cambridge. Mass,,1 Harvard University
Press, 1958), P• 2.
2 wilfred F, Crick a~d John E. Wadsworth, A Hundred
Years of Joint Stock Banking (Londona Hodder and Staughton.
!9j6), P• 280.
JMost defaults, at leas·t in these years, were not
total abrogations of contractual responsibility by the
borrowing state, but rather a partial default involving
modifications or deletion of particular clauses.
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contracting agent felt most fit to handle the problem,
and wished to be on the spot to discourage any legal
action involving his house.

In other instances the bond-

holder might find more than one committee acting in his
behalf.

Speculators for the fall, often possessing none

of the securities in question, might establish a committee
sprinkled with a few well-known names, and attempt to
come to an agreement which would bring profit only to
the coterie whose scheme it was and to the defaulter.
At any event, the decline in the value of stock which
accompanied any suspension or irregularity in the payment of the dividends worked to the advantage of the
speculator and debtor, who could make large purchases
at low prices.

Ad hoc committee solutions had shown

themselves unsatisfactory, and the Money Market Review
voiced the general belief that
there are many objections to the system of relying
exclusively upon special committees formed, from
time to time, of holders of some special class of
security. Such committees are rarely brought into
existence until the evil which they are instituted
to redress has been already done.l
This dissatisfaction with the system of independent
committees was the central consideration of the founder of
the Council of Foreign Bondholders, Mr. Isadore J, Gerstenberg.

While gathering support for his projected organization,
1 Money Market Review, XVII (Nov. 7, 1868), 424.
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Mr. Gerstenberg plumbed the attitudes of the investing
community on several issues,

The remarks upon the old

methods of protection were pointed.

In

a letter of

October 13, 1866, to Mr. Gerstenberg, William Hartridge
remarked a
Of Bondholding Committees, as ordinarily constituted,
I may say that thirty years• observation has led me
to the conclusion that they were merely representatives of speculators.l
Mr. Maxwell Turnbull, an erstwhile chairman of a Venezuelan Committee of Holders, related how his efforts were
made nugatory by internal dissension. 2

No wonder, then,

that when the call went out for the framing of a bondholders• institution, these special committees should be
characterized as bodies which "frequently failed to exercise that influence on Foreign States, or obtain that
attention, from the Home Government, which are indispensable conditions in the complete fulfillment of their aims."3
The growing importance to the nation of investments
abroad, including those in government stocks, was becoming
obvious, and the future members of the Council were ever
1 Isadore J. Gerstenberg, Suggestions for Forming
a Council of Forei~ Bondholders (Londons Mann, Nephews
and Co., 1869), P• 5.
2Maxwell Turnbull to I. Gerstenberg, Dec. 9, 1867,
~., P• SJ.

Jill.!!•• P• J,
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prepared to expound, by means of statistics. the considerable interests which they claimed to represent.
Considering the scope of foreign investments, 1 it
would have been most unusual had not some central
society been erected,
The year of the Council's birth, 1868, was marked
by an in.tensive wave of speculation, 2 which doubtlessly
aided the efforts of Mr. Gerstenberg.

Not all of these

offerings were sounds in fact, "there had taken place in
a few years before 1872 1 frequent issues of loans for
foreign countries so-called, which were only disguises
to plunder the public ... 3

Matters were confused by a

spectrum of opinion expressed by the journals, which
perplexed rather than clarified, and by the woeful dearth
of information possessed by the public on the existing
loans. 4 For some holders, 1868 proved an educational
experience as Italy and, more importantly, Austria took
steps to alter unilaterally their contractual obligations.
The Money Market Review adviseda
1 Imlah, P• 75. The author has compiled a table
for British foreign investments from 1815 to 1914, including
estimates on yearly dividends,
2 Powell, P• 533,
)Robert Giffin, Exchange, quoted in Clarke (p. 32).
4Money Market Review, XVII (Nov. 14, 1868), 449.
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Under any circumstances, we ought for the time to
button up our pockets. We have been far too free
with our money, as this growing spirit of repudiation clearly shows, and we must teach the foreign
debtor that there is a limit to our endurance.,
But this was merely knotting the purse-strings after
the pound was gone.

The remedy which was shortly to

emerge was the Council of Foreign Bondholders.
To the onlooker of 1868, it might have seemed
surprising that the impetus behind a bondholders• society
should be a man whose bread was ea:rned on the Stock Exchange. 2

Few then or later have impuned the sincerity

of Mr. Gerstenberg•s motives, though subsequent experiments in reshaping the lineaments of the organization
were to generate hostile criticism.

For some time

Mr. Gerstenberg had been caught up in the plight of the
English creditors, energetically championing their cause
both in the press and at their meetings,3 Acquaintanceships
1 Ibid., XVI (JW'le, 1868), 659.

3As Chairman of the 1862 Venezuela Bondholders'
Committee, Mr. Gerstenberg vigorously defended the creditors with techniques which were anticipations of those to
be used later. In these years prior to 1868~ ,.Gerstenberg
and Mr. George Joachim Goschen first became acquainted
when the latter took up the cause of the holders in
Parliament (Money Market Review, XIV [May 18, 1867], 598).

1111'"'"
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with investors, fellow brokers and contractors were
obvious assets when he began to gauge opinion as to
the feasibility of establishing his proposed institution.
The means of garnering support took the form of a letterwri ting campaign launched in July of 1866.

From the mass

of correspondence which was exchanged during the next two
years, a pair of overriding questions thrust their way
into the foreground, namely1

how was the Council to be

financed, and what would be the character and nature of
those who would fill an executive capacity.

Mr. s. Vardon,

in a letter to Mr. Gerstenberg, stated that despite the
shortage of talented individuals who could donate their
time to a bondholders• society. the problem of obtaining
adequate funds would be worse. 1

Eventually the thorny

matter of money did become a most destructive issue in
the Council's history, and led to deep division and open
hostility, which greatly hampered the association's
power of action.
The suggestions which Mr, Gerstenberg reaped from
his harvest of missives exhibited the broad scope of
thinking on this topic.

It was recognized by many that a
general fund might be a necessity, 2 and that an obligatory
1 s. Vardon to I. Ger.stenberg, Sept. l. 1866,
Gerstenberg, p, 39.
2Lawford Richardson to I, Gerstenberg, July 19,
1866, .!h19.·· p. 24.
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"penny in the pound" might be "cheerfully" given to a
Council as a good investment. 1 Less optimistic appraisals were advanced by the Rothschilds as they warned
that voluntary contributions by the holders would be the
wisest policyr 2 from Paris, M. Maurice Aubry advised that
a tax for services rendered ought only to be resorted
to when a loan had floundered.3

In the years that fol-

lowed, all of these ideas were adopted at one time or
another, as the disbursement of funds for the Council•s
operations grew ever greater.
Those who addressed themselves to the question
of the personnel of the contemplated organization agreed
that there should be no remuneration for the staff.
Mr. Moxon, himself a member of the original Council,
argued for absolute honesty and no "jobbing", 4 others
envisioned the executive body as a "court of' honor,"5
1 w. T. Ingall to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 22, 1866,
~·• P• 37.
2Baron Rothschild to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 9, 1866,

ill.!S.•• P• JO.

)Maurice Aubry (of Price and Devot) to I. Gerstenberg, Sept. 29, 1866, ibid., p. 43.
4 Thomas Moxon to I, Gerstenberg, Aug, 14, 1866,
ibid •• p. 33.
5Maurice Aubry to I. Gerstenberg, Sept. 29, 1866,
ill.!S.•• P• 4J.
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or as "trustees" 1 for all bondholders.

Nurtured by hopes

such as these, sentiments for the projected society

began to mount.
By the autumn of 1868 Mr. Gerstenberg had produced
enough interest to warrant a general meeting to discuss
the implementation of his plan,

The tempo of events in

this year had graphically illustrated the vulnerability
of the English creditors.

Spain, Venezuela, and Mexico,

along with others, had already violated their bonds, and
joining the parade were Italy and Austria, who had arbitrarily modified their

loa.~

contracts and had imposed

special taxes of 8 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively,
upon their

These partial defaults
excited a general call for action. 2 Italian and Austrian
fo~eign

bondholdgrs•

creditors.

c~mmittees

were formed, and they, in concert

with existing independgnt committees, fo\llld themselves at
least temporarily in agreement with the concept of a unified authority,

The Foreign and Colonial Government Trust,

which held £1 million in securities of various descriptions (including Austrian), also encouraged the formation

1 Edward Redman to I. Gerstenberg, Sept. 29,
1866, ibid., P• 51.
2

Mr. Gerstenberg was personally interested in the
Dual Monarchy and sat as a director of the newly-formed
Anglo-H\lllgarian Bank (D. Morier Evans, ed., The Bankin
Almanac Directo
Yearbook and Dia for l
Lon ona
chard Groombr e and Sons, l 73 , P• 50 •
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of the Council, and the collaboration between these two
was such that the former was always heavily represented
in the Council. 1
Another possible ally to the Council lay in the
contracting houses and their agents,

But to some of

these gentlemen a bondholders' association posed a threat
which could damage business.

They wondered what pretensions

Mr. Gerstenberg entertained.

Mr. Edward Redman, one of those

whose opinions had been solicited, wanied that it was tm.reasonable to require approval of loans by the Cotm.cil before issuance to the public. 2 This view was strongly
seconded by Charles Bell3 of I. Thomson and N. Bonar and
Company, a contracting establishments
The Council would be beneficial, provided it were
composed of influential persons, and • • • that
interference with the nusiness Of loan contractors
would be inadmissible.
1 In addition to Philip Rose, the Foreign and·.
Colonial Goveniment Trust supplied such Council me~bers as
Francis Bennoch, Augustus Abraham, and George Bentinck.
2 Edward Redman to I. Gerstenberg, Oct. 19, 1867,
Gerstenberg, P• 51.
3charles Bell (1805-69), a Conservative M.P• for
London, was chosen as a member of the first 'CounQil• for
the bondholders (1~e Times of London, Feb. 11, 1869, P• 6),
4Money Market Review, XVII (Nov., 14, 1868 H 45?.
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Although such an idea had never been entertained openly
by Mr. Gerstenberg, he was nevertheless looked upon with
misgiving by many in the issuing business.

The air was

at last cleared when Gerstenberg wrote an open letter
to The Times in which he statedt

I

c

The cause of the Council has met with almost unanimous support, only some of the loan contracting
houses seem to fear that it might interfere with
them and look upon it fS a kind of supervision
over their operations.This, he

declared~

was not their objective•

It was

decided to invite all finns who would, to close ranks
with the bondholders, and a motion to that effect was
presented and assented to at the initial meeting on
November 11, 1868, 2 Such a decision was both wise and
imperative, since several of these City men were sympathetic to the aims of the new group, or if not that,
considered it prudent to remain on amicable tenns with,
or even to join with the bondholders, until the general
drift of public opinion could be

ascertained~

As a would-be organizer of an investors• protec-

l~he Times, Nov. 14, 1868, P• 8•
2Money Market Review, XVII (Nov. 14, 1868), 457.
This joumil covered In detail the General Courts of the

~t~~f;t~~~ ~~i~!J.c~~~!~~~do~Yt~;·c~~~ii·~iwi~Yi~
Henryl3ishop~ The Corporation of Forei8£ Bondholderse
A Narrative LLondon1 Effingham Wilson, 9oi], P• 10).
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tive society, Mr. Gerstenberg recognized that the cooperation of the "great" in the world of finance would as•
sure success.

On July 11, 1866, he sent a draft copy of

his proposals to the House of Baring for their perusal.
In

two days their response arrived1
As contractors of loans, and rerresentatives in
many cases of Foreign Governments and of Bondholders, we do not think it is desirable for us to
off er an opinion as to the expediency of the plan
suggested or to make any observations which might
in any way influance the decision of a matter which
we think should be left to the spontanoous action
of the Bondholders.!

Despite this reply, Mr. Thomas Baring promoted equity
for the bondholders and assisted them both before and
after 1868. 2 There was hope of much assistance from the
London Rothschilds, but here too caution prevailed.
While affirming their belief that many of the terms
1 Baring Brothers to I. Gerstenberg, July lJ, 1866,
Gerstenberg, p. 2J.
2For a time Thomas Baring was the chairman of the
New Granada Bondholders• Committee, and in addition, his
firm had aided Mr. Gerstenberg•s Venezuelan Committee by
enlisting the Dutch Government in its behalf in 1866.
Upon the death of Thomas Baring in l87J, the Council
praised the assistance he had rendered in the formation
of the Corporation (Corporation of Foreign Bond.holders,
First Report of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders for 187~ [hereafter this and succeedli?*g
annual reports of t e Council will be abbrevi
·
·
For, Bondh, Rep,, date][London, 1874], P• 5 .~
0
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forced upon the creditors "would never have been listened
to if such a Committee as you suggest had existed," 1 the
head of this illustrious firm declined at the eleventh
hour to chair the opening session of the Council~ But
where the giants dared not walk the lesser came more
readily.

George A. de Worms,3 of the house of the same

name, saw the projected association as a force to "strengthen the hand of the contractor," 4 and hence he openly supported Mr. Gerstenberg.

By late autumn of 1868, more

backing had been gained by the adhesion of the General
Credit and Discount Company, represented by Mr. J. Macdonald, its General Manager, as well as

r. Thomson and

N. Bonar and Company, Louis Cohen and Sons, and Messrs.
1 Baron Rothschild to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 9,
1866, Gerstenberg, p. 30,
2 The Times, Nov. 5, 1868, p. 5. The paper remarked
that up to this date it had been expected that Baron Rothschild would hold the seat of honor.
3aeorge A• de Worms was selected to sit upon the
first Council of Foreign Bondholders but was forced to
withdraw when the Government sent him on a mission to
Austria in 1869, From this vantage, he continued to
help the bondholders by transmitting messages to the
London Committee from Vienna, (In all cases where source
material is not indicated for biographical sketches of
'Council' members, information has been drawn together
from financial journals of the time,)
4 a. A. de Worms to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 17,
1866, Gerstenberg, p. 30.
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Horstman and Company. 1

Participation in the Council's

activities did not mean that the loans which these houses
had issued, or would issue, were any safer for the bondholding public. 2
The greatest buttress, without exception, was
the Stock Exchanger from its ranks came the majority of
the organization's membership.

The brokers certainly

could provide needed information, wrote one of their
number to Mr. Gerstenberg,3 and on November 12, 1866,
the plan was laid before the Committee of the Stock
Exchange.

Mr. Francis Levien, Secretary of the Com-

mittee for General Purposes, respondeda
Your communication enclosing a copy of your letter
to Mssrs. Baring Brothers has been duly considered
by the Committee for General Purposes. who have
directed me to inform you that, in their opinion,
the proposed council if properly organised and
supported by influential capitalists, is calculated
to be of very great advantage to the interests of
the holders of foreign bonds. 4
1 Money Market Review, XVII (Nov. 14, 1868), 457,
Thomson, Bonar ana Company was well represented on the
Council, with Mr, Gerstenberg himself having close business connections with them.
2 Thomson, Bonar and Company had a discredited
Peruvian loan on their hands, as well as the Guatemala
6 per cent loans of 1869 which also went into default.
Mr. Gerstenberg•s name appeared on the advertisement
for this latter offering.

)F. Campion to I. Gerstenberg, July 24, 1866,
Gerstenberg, P• 28.

4Mr. Francis Levien to I. Gerstenberg, Nov. 21,
1866, ~., P• 47•
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Since much of the new association's labor was complementary
to that of the Exchange, and considering the number of
brokers who were to hold positions on the Council, 1 it
was only by chance that the Corporation was not completely
absorbed by Capel Court.

"Nothing but positive want of

space," wrote the Money Market Review, "can have prevented
the Stock Exchange from making necessary provision from
its cwn staff, and on its own premises." 2
In one other direction, aid was to be found for
Mr. Gerstenberg•s scheme, but although this assistance
could be powerful, it was also mercurial.

The financial

press in this period was in general accord regarding the
necessity for some protective society for English creditors
of foreign governments.

The Money Market Review, the most

tenacious of the Council's defenders, first advocated a
bondholders' league in 1867.3

When the Council became

a reality, no other journal devoted more space to its
affairs or stirred up more flagging enthusiasm than did
this periodical.
The

~conomist

gave grudging approbation, although

1 see Table 1 in the Appendix.
2Money Market Re~iew, XXIV (Jan., 1867), 64-65.

31J?.!!!., XV (Sept. 28, 1867), J2J.
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it feared that the holders' bellicosity might drag the
nation into war. 1

Even The Times appeared in the bond-

holders' camp and observed that honest countries would
benefit from any measures which kept defaulters from the
market. 2 Generally speaking, Mr. Gerstenberg was pleased
with the publicity and acknowledged this by moving a
resolution to thank the press at the meeting on November 11, 1868.
All the principal publications had carried the
announcement of the forthcoming assemblage of bondholders
for November 11, and consequently the throng was such
that many had to be turned away.

Chairing the meeting

was a man who had befriended the English creditors in
the past, and whose path was to cross theirs again,
Mr. George J, Goschen, M.P. J

Having entered the family

concern of Fruhling and Goschen in 1858, he acquitted
himself so well in financial affairs that he was made a
member of the Bank of England at the age of twenty-seven.
1Economist, XXVI (Nov. 14, 1868), lJOO,
2 The Times, Jan, 26, 1869, p.

5.

JGeorge Joachim Goschen (18Jl-1907} was born in
England of German Jewish parentage. After graduating
from Oxford in 185J, he spent two years in Granada before returning to London to enter into business. But
his calling lay in politics. By 1868 he had already
held the posts of Secretary of the Board of Trade, Chancellor of the Dl.Jchy of Lancashire! and Secreta~ pf the
Poor Law Board (Dictiona
of Nat onal B1o ra
Lhereafter D~B] Sup~. 2, Vol. II Londona Oxford Un versity
Press, 917- J, 134-40).
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In 186J, he successfully contested a City seat in
Parliament and politically supported Lord Palmerston.
While in Commons he demonstrated his sympathy with the
Venezuelan holdersi thus, in all respects, the appearance
of Mr. Goschen boded well for the nascent society.
The outcome of this opening session was the
unanimous adoption of four resolutions which set the
machinery into motion for the creation of the bondholders' league.

The first resolution, aptly enough, was

proposed by the founder and chairman-to-be, Mr. Gerstenberg, and reada
That in the opinion of this meeting, the formation
of a council for the purpose of watching over and
protecting the interests of holders of foreign
bonds is extremely necessary and desirable.l
The next motion was proffered by Mr. H. B. Sheridan2 and
called for the loan contractors to be welcomed into the
new league.

The third resolution which was presented by

the most venerable of the advocates of creditor unity,
Sir Provo Wallis, dealt with the financial aspect of the
scheme under debate, and stated1
1 The Times. Nov. 12, 1868, p.

4.

2 Henry Brindsley Sheridan, M.P., had assumed the
Chairmanship of the Mexican Bondholders• Committee in
1867. In the following year he was one of the key
individuals who came forth to support tho Council.
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That this meeting recommends and will support the
adoption of any reasonable and practical plan for
defraying the necessary expenses that may be submitted by the council hereafter and the holders
of foreign bonds, when such council shall have
been duly constituted.l
Finally, Colonel Beaumont2 moved that those who had
summoned them should constitute themselves as the first
•council' with power to add to their number, and that
they should set to work to prepare rules and regulations
for the governing of the projected institution.3
On

February 2, 1869, the bondholders reconvened

to approve the measures which had been educed from the
resolutions of the previous year.
on this occasion was Mr. Robert

w.

The honorary chairman
Crawfordcwho, like

Mr. Goschen, was an M.P. for London.

The major items

on the agenda were the ratifications of the by-laws and
the confirmation of the first governing 'Council.'

This

1 The Times, Nov. 12, 1868, p. 4. Sir Provo
William Parry Wallis (1791-1892) was a naval hero of
the Napoleonic Wars who lent color, solid respectablity,
and a title to the makeup of the Council. he ran away
to sea in 1804, and by 1877 he had risen to Admiral of
the Fleet. Although he remained on the Executive Committee of the 'Council' until his eighty-seventh year,
he seldom put in an appearance in London after 1870
{DNB, XX, oOJ-604r see also John G. Brighton, Admiral
oft'he Fleet Sir Provo w P, Wa.llisa A Memoir Londona
9
•
Hutch nson and co.,
2 colonel (later Major General) R. H. I. Beaumont
was another who added stature, to the first •council,'
although not a City man. He did not participate actively
in its functions but remained at his post until his death
in 1874.

3The Times, Nov. 12, 1868, p. 4.
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was speedily accomplished.

The •council' contained

fourteen members, three of whom were Members of Parliament, and was a representative sampling of the main
elements in the organization--large investors, brokers,
and contractors--with the chairmanship accorded to
Mr. Gerstenberg. 1
For the next few years until incorporation in

1873. the Council tasted both success and discomfiture
as it discovered the extent of its influence.

Optimism

and energy of purpose marked this period, as various techniques and services to assist the bondholders were developed.

Circumstances also reinforced the idea that in

defending a particular interest, "ultimately a group seeks
to influence those institutions which carry the power of
decision upon its demands." 2 But the influence necessary
1 The Times, Feb. J, 1869, p. 5.
was composed of the following membersa
Col. R. Beaumont
Charles Bell, M.P.
G. Bentinck, M.P.
E. Philip Cazenove
George de Worms
*Isadore J. Gerstenberg
H. R. Jameson

The first 'Council'

*Sir Francis Lycett
Thomas Moxon
Philip Rose
*George Schlotel
H. B. Sheridan, M.P.
*Admiral Provo Wallis
Thomas M. Weguelin

Those with an asterisk were on the Executive Committee
of the •council't Mr. Weguelin was added later in 1869.
2 John David Stewart, British Pressure Groupst
Their Role in Relation to the House of Commons (Oxfordr
Clarendon Press, 1958), P• 28.
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to treat with a sovereign state removed the problem to
the rarefied atmosphere of international law.

The

Bankers Magazine had definite ideas on the power to
be exercised by the English holders1

No more than moral pressure can ever be brought
to bears yet this pressure, concentrated and intelligently directed, is likely to achieve better
results than threats or official action could
accomplish.l
Being the

0

conscience of the loanmongers" 2 no doubt

lent prestige to the body, but being pragmatic men,
they also knew tthat self-interest caused defaults and
only a larger draught from the same cup could alter
affairs.

To achieve this end, a variety of procedures,

none of them foolproof, were available and upon these
some time will now be spent.

At first glance one might expect, as did many
who purchased the bonds of foreign ';ove:nments, that
the payment of the yearly dividends rested on a legal
base and not merely upon the good faith of the borrower.
In fact, however, the loan was only a debt of honor, for
the contract could not supersede the sovereignty of the
1 Bankers W.iagazine, XXXII (Feb., 1872), 79.
2
Jenks, P• 288.
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1
.
na t ion.

Other lines of argument (some of which were

discussed at Council meetings) were advanced on the
legal nature of such government borrowings, but all
foundered on the shoals of state sovereignty. 2 Even
the prospectus, although fraudulent, was adjudged an
advertisement rather than a contract. and caveat emptor
was in force.

A state could, of course, allow itself

to be sued in England, but in all particulars of the
case, the law in the debtor country would be applicable.J
But in the last analysis, no court decision can bind a
country to any action it chooses not to take. 4

The most

solid claims could be rejected by English courts on jurisdictional grounds, while the cost incurred in obtaining
the occasional victory over a broker. or agent, was repaid
•

only by the satisfaction of bringing a swindler to book.5
Legal options were possible, however, where the borrower
..

1 rn 1877, the Court of Chancery supported this

view in Twycross vs. Dreyfus. This decision was to have
a direct impact on the Egyptian creditors (Borchard,
PP• 155-56).
2

A discussion of this topic is available in the
volume by Borchard (pp. 161-72).

JThis was decided in 1869 in c. Weguelin {of
I. Thomson and N. Bonar and Company) vs. Smiths see
Bankers Magazine, XXIX (July, 1869), 762.

4 The case of Egypt which created much trouble

for the Khedive Ismail is a peculiar exception to this
rule.
5Macmillan's Magazine, XXXII (May, 1875), 94,
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was a municipality or other national political subdivision.

Many American states were counted among the

defaulters in these years, which meant the Council
could defend the holders• interests by appealing their
cause as far as the United States Supreme Court.

In

such matters, Mr. Hugh McCulloch, who became a member
of the •council' in 1873, and who was described as
"unquestionably one of the highest f ina.'1cial authorities
in the United States," was prepared to represent the
English creditors. 1 When incorporation came, the group's
concern in this direction was illustrated by its creating
the post of Foreign Legal Advisor and appointing to it
Mr. Aubrey Mauriarty of the Inner Temple.

The following
year the position of Standing Law Advisor was added. 2
Of more immediate import to the Council was the
success of the press in producing a favorable milieu in
which the Corporation could operate.

Upon the default

1 Mr. Hugh McCulloch {1808-95) was born in America
and served as secretary of the Treasury under both Presidents Andrew Johnson and Chester Arthur. He came to London in 1870 where he established a banking firm, and, having
joined the Council, made several trips to his homeland for
the English creditors (The Times, May 27, 1895t p. 6).
2 rn 1864 Thomas w. Snagge {1837-1914) passed the
bar. Ten years later he became Standing Law Advisor to
the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, and from 1881 to
1883 was junior counsel to the Board of Trade.
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of a country, 1 the English creditors would make application to the Council to take up the matter.

Should

these petitioners constitute a significant number of the
holders, a meeting of protest would be convened, if size
permitted at the Council headquarters.

At these gatherings

a committee of bondholders would be elected in conjunction with the Council which would guide their efforts
towards a settlement, be they appeals on moral grounds,
attempts at negotiations, or resorts to sterner measures.
Through all of these phases the press played a vital role.
By giving notice of meetings, by publishing letters and
articles on the erring borrower, by reproducing the complaints of the investors in full, and by supporting the
decisions arrived at, the journals, if not supplying the
bite, at least provided the bark for the creditors.
Albeit special pamphlets and publications might
be resorted to, the Council never forgot its vote of
thanks to the press, and at the General Court of the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, February 29, 1876,
the Deputy Chairman Sir John Lubbock observed that without
1 Max Winkler, "Defaults and Repudiations of
Foreign Loans," Foreiftj Polic3 Association Information
Service, J.V, No. 11 ( 928), 2 8. The author enumerates
eleven types of default based mainly on modifications of
either the interest, principal, or sinking fund.
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journalistic exposure, the organization's usefulness
would be greatly impaired. 1 "Society cannot capitulate
to one group," 2 but the "campaign," or appeal to general
sentiment, was a natural aspect of interest group tactics.
Channels of communication did not exist in the nineteenth
century between Parliament or the Cabinet and the interest
group, and therefore a greater emphasis was placed upon
this mode of indirect pressure than was the case later.J
The most injurious weapon the defaulter had been
able to wield upon the ranks of its creditors was the
sword of divisiveness.

National organizations of bond-

holders generally were disinclined to act in harmony with
their confreres in other lands, and so the borrower could
play group against group, often with remarkable success.
If international unity could be achieved and the wayward
debtor be confronted by a phalanx of determined lnvestors,
an agreement would be that much closer.

Accordingly,

Mr. Gerstenberg sought to prepare the soil on the Continent for movements similar to that which he was sowing
1Money Market Review. XXXII (March 4, 1876), 28J.
2 Stewart, p. 12J.

J~.,pp. 120-25. Mr. Stewart argues that the
"campaign" or appeal to the public is something which nowadays is only undertaken as a last resort where large issues
hang in the balance.

,....
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in England.

Initial inquiries were promising.

Mr. Prosper Vanda Velde of Paris thought the concept
of a league of bondholders would meet with universal
approval in France and elsewhere, 1 and in fact Le Financier in 1868 urged that Frenchmen should heartily
support the London endeavor. 2

Of greater value was

the endorsement of the principles of the contemplated
council by L. H. Weetzen, Chairman of the General Committee of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange,3

Less sanguine

news arrived from Berlin where Mr. Gerstenberg•s correspondent lamented that at the moment it was impossible
to obtain either men or contributions1 nevertheless,
as soon as a default to Prussian creditors should occur,
a committee would no doubt be established and be placed

in contact with London. 4 As time was to prove. national
differences between fellow creditors were not to be removed, and organizations similar to the Corporation were
1 aerstenberg, p. Jl.

Prosper Vanda Velde, of
the House of N. Herbault, !Bent du chan~e, Paris, wrote
to Gerstenberg on August 11, 1866, to t ls effect.
2
Hamza, P• 158.

JL. H. Weetzen to I. Gerstenberg, Sept. 9, 1866,
Gerstenberg, p. 41.
4 Julius Alexander to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 21,

1866, ibid., p. J8.
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not to take root on the Continent for many years. 1
Although bondholder co-operation was not customary,
still the Council continued its efforts in that direction.

As it reported in 18731

The Council have not been unmindful of invoking
the attention of their continental allies to the
common danger, and they believe that they are
justified in stating that there will be full
accord in dealing stringently with those who do
not meet the claims upon th~m in a fair spirit
to the best of their power.
Within the reach of the vigilant creditors of
a defaulted loan was always the possibility of closing
the world's money supply to the offending nation.

If

achieved, this action could be extremely effective.

In

many cases default had occurred because poverty-ridden
states had been duped by promoters, in others, the willful violation of contract was the cause, and here the
likelihood of settlement was in proportion to the damage
done by the breach of contract.

If internal pressures

caused by the suffering of home commerce were severe, or
if another loan was desired, an obstinate borrower would
see the wisdom of removing the heretofore immovable
1 A Chamber similar to that of the Council of
Foreign Bondholders was set up in Paris at the request of
the Finance Minister in 1898, while in the same year a
similar institution was established in Belgium. Germany
did not acquire such an organization, however, until World
War I (Borchard, p. 212).
2

Corp. For. Bondh. Rep., 1873, p. 26.
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obstacles to a rapprochement betvreen himself and the
bondholders.

This assumed, of course, that the British

Stock Exchange would co-operate and that other bourses
would follow suit, neither of which could be counted
upon.

Article 6J of the Rules of the Stock Exchange

did provide the bondholders with a remedya
The Committee will not recognize new bonds, stocks,
or other securities issued by any foreign government that has violated the conditions of any previous
public loan raised in this country, unless it shall
appear to the Committee that a settlement of existing
claims has been consented to by the general body of
bondholders. Companies issuing such securities ~ill
be liable to be excluded from the official list,l
As a matter of fact, the Exchange had been closed
to certain offenders in the years preceding 1868. 2 But
on balance these seizures of activity were rare and
occurred after much publicity or when it suited the
brokers to intervene.

Pleading a dearth of information,

the sanctity of contracts, or the undesirability of their
passing judgment upon the merits of a loan, the Stock
Exchange Committee permitted states who had already
broken faith to offer their wares to the British public,
and only with the sudden demise of the loan mania did
1 norchard, P• 173.
2Powell, P• 618. In 1866 Russia was dropped from
the official list of the Exchange for tampering with the
loan of 1859. In 1867 the State of Massachusetts was also
refused a quotation.
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Capel Court come under widespread criticism.

As the

British money market grew in stature, the weight of
the Stock Exchange likewise grew in importance, and in
the case of Egypt, the bondholders• position vis-a-vis
the

~-chedive

Ismail was greatly strengthened merely by

the co-operation of Capel Court alone among the world's
bourses. 1
Finally, the ultimate authority from whom the
investors might expect aid against the defaulter was
Her Majesty's Government.

Unlike present-day politics

with its proliferation of vocal interest groups, the
nineteenth century did not afford any machinery for
consulting with various factions of English opinion
before embarking upon a chosen policy.

In these cir-

cumstances, the Council was obliged to carry its cause
to the Government's doorsill as well as it could.

Per-

sonal interviews at the Foreign Office, correspondence
with the secretaries, questions in the House, and publicity
given to meetings of protest all were employed to catch
1 Nonetheless, should a country choose to defy
its creditors, it could do so without retribution as long
as an external loan was not needed. An illustration is
the case of Mexico, who was closed out of the world's
money markets by the Council's efforts from 1876 to
1886 (Edgar w. Turlington, Mexico and Her Forei~
Creditors (New Yorks Columbia UniversltY Press, 9JO], p. 11.
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the Government's attention.

There were even plans for

creating a permanent Parliamentary Committee to represent
the holders, but this idea was never fully implemented. 1
In general, the resort to Government was a step taken
only after careful consideration; for the Council was of
two minds as to what role, if any, Downing Street should
assume in bondholder affairs.

The Corporation usually

requested introductions for bondholder representatives
to foreign dignitaries preliminary to negotiations, and
the transmission of memorials to defaulting states, and,
on special occasions, importuned the Foreign Office to
take up the cause of the English creditors in earnest. 2
The latter course was definitely the exception, but deepseated clan and communal feelings made the individual
bondholder believe that his government at the last would
not turn its back on his distress, should trouble arise
over a loan.
Hence, the Council in 1868 could not entertain
very hopeful views on the assistance which would be afforded from Her Majesty's Ministers, on the other hand,
1 Money Market Review, XXIV (Jan. 20, 1872), 90.
2 Many other services might also be provided by

British agents abroad, such as collecting hypothecated
funds for their nationals, or even acting as representatives for bondholder committees, For a list of the officials
whom the Corporation found most helpful, see Corp, For. Bondh.
Rep., 1873, P• 50.
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neither was pessimism in order.

Although it was true

that England's "response has been none too sympathetic,"
still "it has seldom remained completely indifferent to
the treatment of its nationals by a defaulting foreign
government."1 At the very least the Government normally
wished to be kept informed of developments, and could even
be induced to assume a decisive stance when it appeared
that English creditors had been singled out as recipients
of flagrant acts of injustice. 2 It was clearly understood that these interpositions were unique, and that
the British investor ought not turn to the Foreign Office
every time a contract was violated.

The attitude of the

Government in these years was spelled out in the famous
Palmerston Circular of 1848, which read in parts
It is therefore simply a question of discretion with
the British Government whether this matter should or
should not be taken up by diplomatic negotiation,
and the decision of that question of discretion turns
entirely on British domestic considerations •• , •
The British Government has considered that the losses
of imprudent men who have placed mistaken confidence
in the good faith of foreign governments would prove
a salutary warning to others. and would prevent any
foreign loans being raised in Great Britain, except
by governments of lmown good faith and ascertained
solvency.J
1 Borchard, p, xxiv.
2Examples of British action on behalf of her creditors can be cited in regard to Spain in 1824, Mexico in
1861, and Venezuela in 1862.
JBorchard, p. 2J4.
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In the face of this situation, many adherents to the
Council still felt that through the intercession of their
new organization, Government would become more hospitable
to investors' requests.
Some representative opinions were reflected in
letters to Mr. Gerstenberg by J. A. Franklin, Hyde Clarke,
and E. Jeggins.

Mr. Franklin was a firm proponent of

"timely" appeal to Government and used his personal influence in behalf of the bondholders. 1

Mr. Jeggins, who

was to become one of the perennial figures at Corporation

meetings, expected that a watchful Council would assure
that "British representatives at Foreign Governments
would be more likely to render us energetic assistance,
in compliance with the instructions from our Government. 112
Mr. Hyde Clarke was not as confident, and thought more
in terms of self-help, as he argueda
Nothing can be a greater mistake than to rely too
much on the sole exertions of Her Britannic Majesty's
diplomatic agents, however able,~however willing, or
however influential they may be.J
Those most eager for diplomatic aid were men of strong
character who had won their spurs by grappling with de1 J. A. Franklin to I. Gerstenberg, July 5, 1866,

Gerstenberg, p. 25.
2E. Jeggins to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 18, 1866,
.!ill,., P• J6,
)Hyde Clarke to I. Gerstenberg, Jan, 5, 1867,
ibid., P• 48.
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faulters in persons

H. B. Sheridan, M.P. for Dudley,

at the November, 1868, meeting termed "listless .. the
Government's policy in defense of her subjects who had
invested in foreign securities. 1 Seconding Mr. Sheridan,
and bringing the audience to life, Mr. Gerstenberg said
that
he certainly thought the rights of English bondholders
ought to be protected by the Government of this co'W1.try,
and he was sure such protection would be granted if the
bondholders continued to demand it with perseverance
and W1.animity.2
Mr. Goschen, in his closing remarks as chairman of the
meeting, said he believed that moral influence was all
very well and good, but felt constrained to state that
it would be dama.ging as regarded the result of the
meeting if it was considered that the meeting had
endorsed the opinion that it was the duty of the
English Government to compel foreign governments
to pay debts which they had incurred to British
subjects.3
With this remark the afternoon's activities terminated,
leaving with the members the
was off on a proper tack.

impres~ion

that the Co'W1.cil

Mr. Sheridan, however, fearing

lukewarm support from the new association, withdrew his
1 Economist, XXVI (Nov. 14, 1868), 1300.
2

Monei rv'Iarket Review, XVII (Nov. 14. 1868), 457 •

.3~ •• 458.
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Mexican Bondholders Committee within a few months
and launched his own vigorous campaign.
over the next several years a number of bondholder
grievances were brought to the Council's notice and were
handled with varying success.

Government taxes upon

stock purchases and the periodic rash of canards publ

ically telegraphed and posted to affect the securities

market were matters which naturally interested the investor1
but, as expected, the defaulted loan was the primary bugbear. 1
In 1872, the Council compiled its first report,
in which were outlined its achievements, as part of its
propaganda effort to win .support for incorpGration. 2
The most successful of these operations was the settlement of the Austrian loan.
were theres

All the elements for a triumph

an energetic and experienced committee,J

the closing of the Stock Exchange to the Dual Monarchy, 4

1 Winkler, P• 237. Writing in 1928, the author
states that over half a century earlier, 50 per cent of
the foreign government loans on the London Exchange were
in some state of default.
2A summary of the report m@.Y be found in the Money
Market Review (XXVI [Jan. 18, 1873], 67).

JThe chairman was rYir. Gerstenberg•s second-incommand, Thomas M. Weguelin, and also present w. H. Bishop
of the Exchange, and Drummond Wolff of Primrose League
and Fourth Party fame, who was an able financier interested
in Egypt.
4 Money Market Review, XVIII (June 5, 1869), 579,
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a nation which was willing to negotiate, 1 and a person
who devoted time and money to gain an arrangement. 2
In

addition, the aid of the Foreign Offlce was enlisted.

The Counciltransmitted a memorial to Government asking
for "friendly representations" at Vienna, which were
given.J

The arrangements were also quite remunerative

to the Council, which received a commission, and this in
turn had a direct bearing upon the reorganization of
the society and its incorporation, for it was evident
that protecting bondholders could bring handsome rewards.
But this led to the tacky problem of which investors the
Council represented.

In an open letter Hyde Clarke laid

the problem before the public. 4

One million pounds sterling

of the Austrian securities were held in England, yet only
half of the holders had come forward to help in the common
cause.5

Those who had been content with taking whatever

1 Actually it was half a state--Hungary wanted a
settlement, for it wished to float a new loan immediately.
2 The hero of this episode was Mr. w. H. Bishop,
who received profuse thanks from the Council for the part
he played (Bishop. P• J6).
)Money Market Review, XVIII (March lJ, 1869), 271.
4 The Times, Dec. 21. 1871, P• 5.
S"Certificates of claim" against the amount withheld by the Austrian Government were given to those who
participateds by presenting these later, the holder received a cash payment.

the Dual fi'Ionarchy gave now wished to share in the gained
benefits.

The resultant hard feelings all around were

to be experienced again by other casts of characters,
for financial necessity, spiced with a soup9on of avarice
(according to the Council's detractors), forced the association generally to act as an agent on commission in behalf
of a minority of the holders.
Other noteworthy successes were also won.

In 1872,

the hypothecatiOi.!S on two Turkish loans, guaranteed by
the Porte in accordance with the contracts but ignored
since their signing, were successfully contested by the
Council, and a Commlssion was set up to assure that the
breach would not be repeated. 1 In this struggle the firm
support of The Times was of great assistance. 2 In addition. a Roumanian Rail,Nay loan was settled with Bismarck's
help, and an 18 per cent tax en Spanish securities was
forestalled.3

Efforts also had been made in behalf of

1 committees for the Turkish 1858 and 1862 loans
were to remain in London and be given the reports of the
hypothecated revenues from the Imperial Ottoman Bank.
Council members, including the secretary Hyde Clarke, were
represented.
2 The Times, Aug. 2, 1872, p. 10.

Jibid., Nov. 18, 1871, p. 7. Clarke was able to
bring the"'iiii'jority of European bourses into line for joint
action against Spain.
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the holders of Venezuelan, Liberian, 1 Italian, and
Greek bonds, with little to show,
If steady financial support was the dominant
concern of the Council, the next highest requisite was
the reorganization of the institution into a legal entity.
The case of the Honduran Ship Railway Loan of 1872 provided an example of the sort of accusations which could
be levelled at the Council upon this head.

In

May

of

1872, Mr, Clarke publically questioned the feasibility
of the construction of a railway line across Honduras for
the purpos$ of transporting steamships from ocean to ocean. 2
Captain Bedford Pym,3 special commissioner for the Honduran
Government, angrily attacked the Council at an assembly of
holders which saw Mr. Clarke shouted down by those in attendance.

The glib Captain made the most of his situation

and declared:
Gentlemen, you must see which way your interests
are served, and I have no earthly doubt you will
1 The activities of Mr. Clarke upon this loan are
laid out in a series of letters between the Council and
the contractors, Messrs. Holderness and Nott, which are
reprinted in The Times (Dec, 25, 1871, P• 7).
2

~.,

May

25, 1872, P• 7,

3captain Bedford Pym was shortly to be placed in a
French prison for representing this loan in Paris. By the
summer of 1872 most of the south American offerings were
'beginning their downward trend.
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act accordingly, but Gentlemen, I should not be
acting with perfect frankness if I did not point
out to you--painful as is the subject--the great
mischief which has been inflicted on your property
by the action of a self-constituted body styled the
"Council of Foreign Bondholders."!
But long before the summer of 1872, the machinery for
change had been set in motion towards incorporation.
As 1871 drew to a close Mr. Gerstenberg and
company were busily engaged in the task of renovating
their institution.

The handicap of being a private

group, coupled with the trickle of dependable income,
forced the Council to the decision that a fund or trust
must be created to meet the needs of the organization. 2
1 Money Market Review, XXV (July 27, 1872), lOJ.
This criticism was expanded in a letter from the Honduran
Minister Plenipotentiary, s. Carlos Gutierrez, to Mr.
Clarke in which he said1
·~beg to inquire whether the Council of Foreign
Bondholders is an institution established or recognised by the English law as having ex officio or
otherwise a right to call for information from the
representatives or the agents of any foreign Government in regard to financial operations, or is it a
mere private trading enterprise? Of whom does the
Council consist? By whom, when, and how, is the
Council elected? Are the duties and responsibilities
of the members and the Council governed by any Royal
Charter or other instrument to which the public can
have access?"
2 The prospectus for the new society was published
in 1871 and gives the regular income as three pence in the
pound voted by the New Granada Committee, and one penny in
the pound from the Turkish 1862 Committee.
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A new sign was hung out-- Foreign Bondholders
11

Association"--and to advertise its altered character,
a prospectus was issued in which subscriptions to the
new league were solicited.

A Councilhouse was also

selected at 17 Moorgate Street, which was to remain
the headquarters of the Corporation for almost a century.1

The prospectus was an appeal for the laudable

goal of bondholder solidarity, and indicated that all
profits from loan settlements, commissions, and the like
might be divided among the members. 2 The shares were
offered at £100 apiece, definitely not for the small
investor, and brought with them lifetime membership in
the organization.

A statement was procured from Lord

Granville, the Foreign Secretary, that the Association
would "be of great utility to the Foreign Office, by
enabling it to treat with a responsible body,"3 and
the financial press considered it a good thing.

But

subscriptions were slow in coming in, and only 10 per
cent of the goal of 1000 members had been reached by late
1 The Times, Jan. 15, 1872, p. 7. The building
was taken from Huth and Company on a forty-five year lease.
2Money Market Review, XXIV (Jan. 20, 1872), 90.
The prospectus pointed to the windfall received from the
Austro-Hungarian arrangement and to a possible Spanish
settlement which might produce as much as £75,000 for
the Council's coffers.
J~.
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January of 1872.

As in the past, the stock brokers,

viewing this as a speculative venture, were the primary
participants and as such stimulated the general tendency
toward multiple purchases by partnerships and fwnily
concerns.

When it became known, however, that the

Association was seeking a Royal Charter, interest in
the shares immediately grew apace.
Incorporation by Royal Charter was not to be
realized, for although Lord Ripon (the Lord president),
as well as other ministers, was disposed to help, the
scheme perished in Cabinet. 1

Despite this disappoint-

ment, another option was suggesteda

that the Council

might retain its profit-making intentions if a private
bill providing limited liability could be gotten through
Commons.

Here, too, the way was blocked.

As the solici-

tors reported to Gerstenberg1
On one point, which was a sine gua non, viz., that
th11 liability of the Members of the Corporation should
be limited, we came to the conclusion that Parliament
would not sanction such a condition, and after very
careful search for precedents of any such conditions
having ever been incorporated in a Private Bill, none
could be found, and we are of opinion that such a
1

Co~f

ment, quote

For. Bondht Re~., 1872, p. 7, This docun Borchardp.05, n. 31), stated that

"ihe petition was presented to Her Majesty, and referred
to the Privy Council, but although severa: 'Tlinisters were
in favor of granting it, the Cabinet dec!ctad agaiust 1 t,
being unwilling to establish a precedent. "
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condition will not be likely to be permitted
by Parliament, 1
Affairs were now deteriorating rapidly.

It was obvious

to the Council that incorporation could only come about
by constituting themselves a non-profit organization and
notifying all subscribers to that effect. As the list of
members shortened, 2 the founders quickly moved to save the
situation,

A license was procured from the Board of Trade

under Section 23 of the Companies Act of 1867,

By this

means the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was established
for the public good and thus was allowed to enjoy a limited
liability position without the word "liability" actually
appearing.
On

August 1, 1873 1 the Corporation came into exist-

ence, replacing the old Foreign Bondholders Association.
In many respects nothing had changed.

Familiar faces still

dominated the key posts, the powers of the new body were
in no way enhanced by incorporation, and the meager assets
with their concomitant claims, plus the Moorgate Street
address, formed the patrimony.

In

general, then, the

l ~·• p. 9 (quoted in Borchard, p. 205, n. 32),

2According to w. H. Bishop (p. 16), one third of
the subscribers withdrew on the rumor of a negative decision on the promised Royal Charter.
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Corporation was the old Council writ large.

The dif-

ferences which appeared lay in organizational form, the
expansion of personnel, and the acquisition of the fund
composed of the £100 subscriptions, each of these will
be dealt with in turn.
The documents which defined the objectives and
organizational structure of the Corporation were the
"Memorandum and Articles of Association," and the "Rules
and Regulations" for 1873. 1 The Memorandum enumerated
the objects for which the society had been formed and
included a restatement of the posture of 1868.

The

first priority was still
watching over and protecting the rights of the holders
of Bonde, Obligations, Debentures, and other Securities
of a similar character issued by Foreign Colonial Governments, Municipalities, Public Companies, and especially
of Foreign Bonds negotiated and issued in London.
Since adequate information was crucial to wise investment,
a second object was "collecting and preserving full information with reference to such securities, in the form best
calculated to be clear and accessible to the public."

The

1 corporation of Foreign Bondholders, "Memorandum
and Articles of Association," Great Britain, Public Record
Office (hereafter PRO), Board of Trade (hereafter BT)
Jl/1884/7528. All references to the Memorandum or Articles
are found in the source above. The "Rul~s and Regulations"
of the Corporation for 1873 are to be found in the British
Museum,, and, of' course, ref'erences to Rules are f'ound in
this document (Col1?oration of Foreign Bondh"Jlders, "Rules
and Regulations," LLondon, 187:3]).
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Corporation undertook to collect money for the creditors
and to obtain settlements with the help of the press and
the Stock Exchange, and also intended to map out principles
for future loans and for conversion of issues in default. 1
At the heart of the Corporation was the governing
'Council,' which was expanded from a dozen or so under the
old system to a maximum of thirty members (Article J2).
The Articles and Rules of the organization spelled out
and fortified its dominant positiont

the 'Council' was

to be directed by a chairman and two deputy chairrren
(Article 32) and was to remain in office for five years
(Article J4), after which time half of its number were to
retire, although all might be re-elected (Article JS),
and thenceforth four of them must be reaffirmed each year.
The •council' possessed the authority to fill its own
vacancies, as long as thirty days' notice was allowed for
the presentation of objections (Article J8).

Aside from

the General Court held annually, the •council' met quarterly for transacting ordinary business. Absenteeism was
such that a quorum of seven was sufficient to carry on
1 The Memorandum contained six points, and they
appear in various states of completeness in the financial
press. The Money Market Review published a good account
(Aug. 16, 1873, P• 21~).
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the business of the 'Council' (Article 40).

Under these

circumstances the Executive Committee, consisting of no
more than fifteen, with a quorum of five (Rule 10), had
a virtual stranglehold on all aspects of the Corporation's
activities,
The 'Council' decided when a meeting of bondholders
should be summoned (Rule J2), and possessed a preponderant
influence upon the committee which was selected at such a
gathering.

Control over the committees was complete, and

no independence of action was permitted,

Men who wished

to sit upon these bondholder committees had to submit
their names in advance (Rule 39), so that the Corporation
fathers could make their selection (Rule 40).

To promote

unity of purpose, the chairman of the organization was
ex officio chairman over all committees (Rule 4l)s if
this prerogative was not exercised, the chair was occupied
by a gentleman appointed to that duty by the 'Council' (Rule
4J).

Tranquillity was further insured by the placing of

'Council' members on all committees under its jurisdiction, usually matching the financial interests of the man
with the particular loan in default. Table 1 illustrates
this system in practice. 1 The average committee size
was eighteen members--twenty or more if the group had
1All tables appear in the Appendix.
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been constituted outside the organization. closer to
twelve when established by the Councils and with the
chairmanship preordained and the ubiquitous Hyde Clarke
as secretary, and the fact that all assemblages were
held, when possible, at the Councilhouse, a fairly firm
control over affairs could be maintained.

In these

isolated instances where committee opinion appeared
mutinous, formal appeals could be made to the 'Council,'
to a meeting of the holders involved, and if necessary,
to a General Court of the Corporation (Rule 50). 1
By maintaining an appearance of unity and by
quieting their own carping committees, the Council hoped
to entice the remaining independent bondholders• groups
under the roof of Moorgate Street. 2 Some of the independent committees did prefer to remain alocf, but

by

1872

the Council had made common cause with nine committees.
and this figure grew as the number of defaults
1 A rare example of the defeat of the wishes of
the •council' occurred at a meeting of the Spanish bondholders. Mr. Gerstenberg and the committee were overruled
by a vote of 700 to 9 on the issue of accepting half payment on three coupons in arrears (The Times, Jan. 2,
1875t P• 7) •

co~. For. Bondh. ReR•• 1873, P• 51. The •council'
did not ope y attack the Independent committees, but did
warn the public of their drawbacks (as described above,
2

p. 23).
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multiplied. 1
The addition of personnel, as the second important modification of the Foreign Bondholders Association, was accomplished by creating several posts which,
albeit not demanding in their labors. could be useful to
the membership.

Of these the most important were the

Advising Engineer, the Standing Law Advioor and Draftsman, the Notary, and some staff for the Secretary. 2

In

the latter instance, by adding to the secretariat a
greatly prized objective could be attained. namely the
establishment of a Reading Room which would contain information, valuable to the members, on all descriptions
of loans-.

Countries were asked to donate any books,

pamphlets, or other materials of interest to investors.
to the Council's library, which in time received quite
l Mone* Market Review, XXIV (Jan,. 20., 1872 )., 90.

Among those wIch remained apart were the Erie Shareholders•
Protection Committee, the Peruvian Bondholders'' Committee
(chaired by Sir Charles Russell, staunch friend of the
English holders), and the Mexican Bondholders• Committee
which had withdrawn from the bosom of the Corporation
for a time.
2Thomas Rumball initially held the position of
Advising Engineer, but in 1874 he was also given the
appellation of Legal Advisor. As a member of the staff
he worked closely with the 'Council' and sat on bondholder
committees.
The first Standing Law Advisor and Draftsman was
Thomas w. Snagge (see above, p. 11-3, n. 2).
s. H. Schergis was made Translator and Superintendent of Records, while two amanuenses were provided
for Mr. C1a:r.·rn.
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an extensive collection.

This facility alone should

have been sufficient to win the good will of the
investing public, who were generally welcome.
Abroad, too, the Corporation set about to extend
its network of paid agents so that information could be
made available to the membership as quickly as possible.
With the aid of such gentlemen, letters of introduction
might be obtained for those having business overseas,
and if necessary, the agents might also serve as sentinels over the creditors• interests.

In several in-

stances, as in those of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Spain,
agents of the British Government also assisted the bondholders by giving advice, transmitting communications, and
even collecting money due on coupons.

Votes of thanks to

various Government officials were a regular occurrence,
though only a few in the diplomatic service were conversant \Vi th or greatly interested in financial aff'alrs. 1
The agent for the Levant, including F..gypt, was a private
person, Captain Stab.

A former English officer in the

Crimean War who had become a land owner in Smyrna, he
1 0ne of the exceptions was A. H. Layard, the
Ambassador for England to Spain during the early years
of the Corporation. He helped found the Imperial Ottoman Bank, then served as its first chairman, and while in
Madrid he gave his fellow nationals helpful support in
financial matters.
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already had assisted the Council for some years.

A

later Chairman of the Corporation, Mr. Bouverie, described
Stab as one who was "familiar with all the inner life and
machinery of the Porte." 1 It was from this source that
the •council' gained local news of the Ottoman Empire.
The greatest change in the Council's prospects
lay in the financial condition of the institution.

The

Corporation came into existence with a fund of £60,280
and every intention of husbanding their resources for
the future. 2 As with all else in the Corporation, the
'Council' had a tight grip on the common assets which
were obtained from the sale of the £100 permanent memberships in the organization, which would be redeemed at

5 per cent per annum when surplus allowed.

As indicated

in Rules 8 and 23 through 25, the Finance Committee of
the Corporation would be chosen from the 'Council,'
would include the chairman of the organization, who had
an extra vote in case of ties, and would meet monthly to
administer the balance sheet.

In addition (Rule 51), no

debt could be contracted by a committee without the permission of the 'Council.'
1 Bouverie to Granville, May 18, 1880, Great
Britain, Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/148.
2

Corp. For. Bondh, Rep,, 1873, P• 4.

It was hoped that ordinary expenses might be
met, and a profit might also accrue to the Corporation,
from various means.

One idea was to offer lifetime and

annual memberships at £120 and £10 respectively, although
these would be in all ways inferior to the original per-

mar.ent certificates. 1

A good return was also looked

for by investing the fund in what Mr. Gerstenberg called
"high class sAcuri ties. 112 The-:3e investments were r..ever

itemized on the skimpy balance sheets laid annually before
the General Court. and only after intensive questioning
were facts pried from the tight-lipped executives.

The

•council• based its silence upon an unwillingness to be
questioned on the merits of one security over another, as
well as the potential repercussions in the investing community at large should it be known what lay in the Corporation's portfolio.

What emerged in time was that part of

the stock held by the Council was obtained as payment from
defaulters for the settlement of bondholder grievances,J
as will be noted elsewhere.

Although the investments

8
8
At the
only £266 had been realized through lifetime and annual
subscriptions up to that date.

G!~~~!t ft'~~~to¥ Mi;w~ Xf~§, (~v~~i~ i~{A ~~t
2!2.!£.., XXVIII (Feb. 28, 1874),

275•

JAmong those securities held by the Council were
Spanish 4 lJer cent, Colombian, and Venezuelan stocks.
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seemed to produce a favorable remuneration, still the
institution did possess its share of poor stock. 1
Other services which were also to produce
revenue were the hiring out of meeting rooms and staff.
and agency work for loans done on commission.
portant,

of

Most im-

course, were the rewards to be reaped for

the settlement of bondholder claims.

The question of

payment was set forth in Rule 641
The expenses incurred by the Corporation in the
arrangement of a foreign loan under default, and
a fair and moderate commission (applicable towards
the public objects of the Corporation, and the
gradual re-payment of the funds advanced by the
permanent members of the Corporation), shall be
paid by the Government with which the arrangement
has been effected. In cases where that condition
cannot be fully obtained from such Government,
the Council will urge its partial compliance,
failing therein, the expenses and commission shall
be paid by the bondholders, by pro rata contributions. 2
This was the seed of eventual weakness.

How were the

holders to be prevailed upon to be eleemosynary when
the defaulting government could not pay1 what was to be
done with those bondholders who would not cooperate with

1Money Market Review, XXXVI (May 4, 1878), 435.
It was disclosed at the meeting of May 2, 1878, that the

Corporation had suffered a loss of ~4,966 on its Peruvian
holdings. Five years later at the March 1 General Court
of 1883 the Chairman stated that three of seven securities
they held were below par--Hungarian Bonds. Metropolitan
3 Per Cent Stock, and Spanish 4 Per Cent.
2 corporation of Foreign Bondholders, "Rules and
Regulations," p. 10.
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the Corporation but would share in victorys and, should
there be a profit, what was to become of it?

But in 1873

these problems were still at a distance, and the membership were willing to wait and to read what they liked into
the language of their leadership.
Despite the legal obsta.cles to any division of
profits under the arrangement of incorporation, some members still believed that eventually a regular dividend
would be forthcoming.

This misunderstanding had stemmed,

no doubt, from the Council's prospectus of 1872 which had
proclaimed that the organization would be "not only selfsupporting, but [would] amply repay the members, 01 Although
fully aware of the situation, Gerstenberg and others were
not always clear upon the future of the organization's
capital. 2
Thus far we have interested ourselves with the
early history of the Council before 1868, the powers
1 circular issued by the Foreign Bondholders
Association, London, 1872, quoted in Borchard, p. 204.
2Money Market Review, XXVI (Nov. 29, 1873), 615.
The chairman at the meeting on November 27, 1873, saids
'''rhe question had been asked, •suppose a large
amount should flow into the hands of the association,
a.fter haYing paid off the original subscriptions with
interest, what would you do with the money?' Well, the
Council acted generally on this principle--'First catch
your hare, and then eat it.'"
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available to it for defending the English investments
in foreign countries, its successes in the first four
years of operation, and finally, the move to incorporate
with its concomitant financial and structural effects.
From time to time it has been necessary to introduce
certain members of the 'Council' of the Corporation,
but a closer inspection of its membership would now
be useful.
When the Corporation came into being in August
of 187), there were 667 members1 with a single share per
person, the stipulated maximum allotment, but, given the
option, 119 had withdrawn by November. 2 With bonds of
£100 each, the appeals of the association were not directed

toward the general public or the small investor but toward
an influential minority who would compose the cadres of
leaders behind whom the ranks of the bondholders could
form in case of default.

To be a permanent member was now

characterized as an honor,3 with the tender question of
1 Money Market Review, XLVI (March J, 1883), 357.
The chairman at the 1881 General Court said there were
658 ~ermanent certificate holders (ibid., XLII [March 5,
1881J, 316).

2corp. For. Bondh. Rep., 187J, p. 7. All those

who had purchased more than one share or certificate of
permanent membership were given the choice of electing
another individual for each additional share, or returning
the surplus shares to the Council for refund. Upon incorporation, 119 certificates were returned for refund.
)Ibid.
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undivided profits put well into the background1 membership
was perpetual, transferable, and remained even after the
bond had been drawn and the principal and 5 per cent interest had been paid.

Mr. Gerstenberg was optimistic in

his goal of 5,000 additional annual and lifetime subscribers for the near future. 1

No doubt this would have

demonstrated real grassroots support within the investing
community.

The decline of the securities market which had

already begun, the inquiries into the Exchange, and uncomplimentary publicity all were to dash such hopes.

No

attempt at a.n analysis of the entire membership of the
Corpor-ation will be undertaken at this time.

In the

mai~·

this body was comprised of brokers and private gentlemen,
with clerics, doctors and retired military men being well
in evidence.

Real power did not reside in the general

body, but in the 'Council,' and hence a discussion of
its make-up would be more to the point.
From 1869 to 1882, a total of forty-seven men sat
on the governing body of the bondholders• organization.
Before incorporation the leadership was maintained at about
a dozen men, while the 1873 by-laws permitted an expansion
to thirty.
1

As the 1870's progresEed, the 'Council' was

The Times, Nov. 28, 1873, p. 6.
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slowly reduced again in size to about twenty, which
seemed, by common agreement, to be a comfortable number with which to work.

The average length of service

was slightly over six years for the thirteen-year period,
while the average age of a new member was fifty-four years,
a time of life which could offer physical vigor with an
admixture of experience. 1 In selecting men for the 'Council,' the organization sought out those persons who would
be most helpful in the accomplishment of the goals of the
society,
ters

Influence, a knowledge of the City, good charac-

these were the qualities which were most highly prized.

In addition, a sympathy with the 'Council's' policy was also
desirable so that internal friction could be kept at a minimum.

Table 2 indicates various careers to which •council'

members had devoted their lives--where no occupation could
be discovered, or where long retirement existed, the term
"gentleman" has been used.

Private investment bankers were

the most numerous, with a total of seventeen, equalling the
sum of the next two professions, gentlemen (nine) and stock
brokers (eight).

Roundh1,g out the list were five military

men, three each in law and commerce, two government officials, and a railway contractor,

The table further suggests

1 Table 2 in the Appendix lists the 'Council' members
and their terms of service in this period. Mr. Clarke is
also included, for after the chairmanship, his position
was next in importance.
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the level of influence and responsibility which was attained by many on the 'Council' in finance, as reflected
by the number of posts which were delegated to their
authority, the table also encompasses their membership in
related non-profit organizations.

Such connections with

other societies demonstrated a diversity of interest and
a potential for extension of influence and group cooperation. 1
Another aspect of the 'Council' in these years that
illustrated its potential weight was the high percentage
of M.P.'s present at its board.

As Table 2 shows, four-

teen of the 'Council' sat in Parliament between 1869 and
1882.

Determining the political complexion of the Cor-

poration fathers is difficult, but of those who can be
identified, the Conservatives held an eleven to seven
edge over the Liberals, with one Whig and one Unionistto-be, and two apoliticals from Canada and the United States.
Interest groups then, even more than today, appreciated men with governmental experience who could provide
most valuable service to a society if for no other reason
than by the prestige which redounded to the group.

Unfor-

tunately, the parliamentary oratory of these M.P.'s was rather
spare and was rarely addressed to issues which interested
the Corporation.
1 such cooperation was evidenced at the end of the
century when the Corporation was reorganizedr the London
Chamber of Commerce as well as the London Bankers' Association elected representatives to the 'Council.'
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From the discussion of the development of the
corporation of Foreign Bondholders thus far, it is clear
that both in inception and in organization the group was
instigated and maintained by a few individuals of energy
who believed in the utility of what they did.

Bearing in
mind the anti-group feeling in the nineteenth century, 1
and particularly the antipathy shown towards bondholders,
it is not strange that a few members should hold a paramount position in an age when solidarity hinged upon the
presence of strong personalities,

Every association has

its dominant spirits, a minority who contribute the driving
force and who
usually possess the intensive perspectives of their
group, whereas the rank and file usually have significanilY varied and split involvements in their
groups,
Albeit equality existed as far as the number of shares
we~t,

the concept of primo inter pares was at work.

At

the General Court of 1876, Mr. Dickson, a permanent certificate holder, took umbrage at the Chairman's assertion
that some in the society had more influence than others,
1 Alfred de Grazia, "Nature and Prospects of Poli-

tical Interest Groups,"
s
American Academ
Pol~tical and Social Science, CCCXIX Sept., 195
, 1
2

Ibid.' llJ.

of
•
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whereupon a deputy chairman, Sir John Lubbock, replied
that those who labored most unceasingly for the organization, and who consequently knew the most about international
loans, did possess greater weight. 1 For no other person
than their Secretary was this a more fitting description.
Hyde Clarke (1815-95) was born in London, and was
employed at an early age in diplomatic missions to Spain
and Portugal.

In 18J6 he turned his considerable talents

to the planning. surveying, and engineering of the Glasgow
and Southwestern Railway. and in the same year founded the
London and County Bank.

His interest in telegraphy led him

in 1849 to accept a mission, from the East India Company,
to India to report upon the subcontinent's communications
network, where he not only became a supporter of AngloIndian solidarity but also advanced his studies in langua,~es.

His travels, which were extensive, led him many

times through the Middle East, an area to which he devoted
much attention in his writings (which included works on
languages, political economy, statistics, railways, finance,
and international law) and in his linguistic studies. 2

1Money Market Review, XXXII (Feb. 24, 1876), 28J.
2The Times, March 7, 1895, p. 10. It was said that
Mr. Clarke was familiar with approximately 100 languages,
and that those of the American Indians and the "Orient"
were his specialties.

r

78

Fully a decade before the Council was to become
a reality, Mr. Gerstenberg had confided in Mr. Clarke
his plans for a bondholders• association and had stated
his conviction that the assistance of the latter in that
event would be essential. 1 Clarke's interest in the protection of investors was not exclusively linked to the
purchases of bonds, for in 1868 he joined the short-lived
Shareholders' Protective Association, designed to safeguard the rights of owners of joint stock company shares.
In early 1869, Clarke assumed his post as Secretary of
the Council of Foreign Bondholders--replacing the temporary office-holder, s. H. Schergis--and held it for over
fifteen years.

His labors on behalf of the bondholders

were extensive 2 and his letters were frequently seen in
the financial columns of the press.

With advancing years

Clarke became less vocal, though he still strove for the
protection of the English creditors, and on his leaving
the office of Secretary in 1884, he still felt strongly
about the organization's aimsa

"An institution of this

kind could not depend on any individual, but on the ap1 Money Market Review, XLVIII (Feb. 23, 1884), 290.
2For example, at the General Court of 1875 Mr.
Gerstenberg remarked that their secretary had not had a
holiday in the last year.
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plication and observance of great principles." 1
Another member who played a large part in formula ting the decisions of the Corporation was Francis
Bennoch.

He joined the 'Council' in 1873, and was im-

mediately admitted to the Executive Committee.

This

gentleman had pursued a literary career, having been
on close terms with several of the famous poets of the
previous generation, 2 and had successfully combined
finance with belles lettres. as the catalog of his
directorships bears witness.

By 1874, it was apparent

that Mr. Gerstenberg's health was fast giving way, and
at the General Court of 1875 the Chairman announced his
retirement.

The burden, although shared by the Executive

Committee, was in the main assumed by Mr. Bennoch, who was
appointed Acting Chairman.
tL~til

This situation was not altered

1876 when a new chairman was selected.

Unhappily

for the Council, it was during these years (1875-76)
that a solid, dynamic, and unified hegemony was most
needed.
From 1873 to 1882, the two positions of Deputy
Chairman were held by three individuals, all of whom sat
in the House of Commons.

Thomas M. Weguelin (1809-85) had

1 Money Market Review, XLVIII (Feb. 23, 1884), 290.
2 The Times, July 2, 1889, p. 5.
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allied himself with Mr. Gerstenberg•s group in its
infancy, taking a place on the Executive Committees
upon incorporation, he was made an officer of the new
organization.

For years Mr. Weguelin had been a mer-

chant in the Russian trade, and had served as director
of the Bank of England as well as Governor of that institution from 1855 to 1856.

On

retiring from Thread-

needle Street in 1866, he took a position in the bank
of Robarts and Lubbock, where his generosity to the
clerks was long re~embered. 1

From 1861 to 1880, he

represented Wolverhampton in Commons for the Liberal
interest and was magistrate in Surrey. 2 When the
'Council's' motives were attacked from within by dissident members, or whan castigated from without by the
journals, Weguelin was ever vehement in the defense of
the organization and its aims.
By 1876 Weguelin's prolonged periods of illness
made it necessar;y to select a replacement, which was done
with the appointment of Richard Biddulph Martin (1838-1916)
of the bank of Messrs. Martin and Company.

He joined in

1875, replacing his father Robert who retired from the
l

.l12.!5!•• April 9, 1885, P• 11.

2 Ibid,, April 8, 1885, P• 10.
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•council,' bringing to the society wide business experience, a diversity of interest and civic and social connections.1

In 1880 Mr. Martin was elected M.P. for

Tewkesbury2 and where possible used his influence, especially after the occupation, to assist Egyptian holders.
The last of this group to be mentioned is the
second Deputy Chairman, Sir John Lubbock (1834-1913).
Here, too, one finds a multi-talented individual whose
interests ranged from finance to science.

As a boy, he

came into continual contact with Darwin, a friend of his
father, and was employed at the age of fifteen in the
family firm, Robarts and Lubbock.

Lubbock's experience

in the introduction of foreign loans via the family firm,
combined with the difficulties encountered in his several
capacities as representative of English capitalists abroad,
led him, after long consultation with Mr. Gerstenberg, to
utilize his influence for the formation of the Council of
Foreign Bondholders.

Robarts and Lubbock became the Cor-

poration• s bankers, and even tided the society over the
1 Richard Biddulph Martin was a member of the Anthropological Institute (as was Hyde Clarke), was involved in
the city administration in London, and was a member of
the Executive Committee of the City and Guilds of London
Institute.
2

The Times, Aug. 4, 1916, P• 8,
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hardships of 1872.

Upon incorporation, Lubbock assumed

his office, and hence forward was to "exercise a preponderant influence in • • • large and important operations
••• undertaken by the Council of Foreign Bondholders." 1
He devoted much of his attention to the creditors• welfare and was angry when the disgruntled membership made
sallies upon his reputation.

He would not have joined

the Council, said the Deputy Chairman at the 1876 General
court, if it was a profit making group. 2 Lubbock maintained this opposition to a division of the profits despite the fact that he

a.~d

his relatives would benefit

directly since they held between one-fifth and one-sixth
of the original shares.J

But personal attacks upon Lub-

bock were rare, for he was well-liked and, as an opposition M.P. affirmed, "the honourable baronet was one of
the most popular members of the House of Commons," 4 where
he sat for Maidstone from 1870 to 1874, and then for the
1 sir John Lubbock, later the first baron Avebury,
became famous for his articles and books dealing with insects and plants. His correspondence throughout life was
often with the most eminent men of science (Horatio Gordon Hutchinson, Life of Sir John Lubbock~ Lord Avebury
[Londona Macmillan and Co., 1914], I, 11 •
2Money Market Review, XXXII (March 4, 1876), 282.

3rbid., LII (March 6, 1886), 401.
4spectator, XLVIII (May 9, 1875), 587.
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university of London, where he was also Chancellor.
politically he has been described as a "right-wing
Liberal intellectual," 1 while Lord Acton gave the
following impressions
He has astonishing attainments and a power of
various work that I always envy. And he is
gentle to the verge of weakness,2
Such, then, were the men who, along with the
Chairman and the others on the Executive Committee,
made the major decisions for the Corporation.
A faction of the membership which almost always
was in unison with the 'Council's' policy was the philanthropists,

Such individuals were often accused, in this

period, of deriving their greatest satisfaction from seeing
their names on lists of numerous worthy associations, rather
than from actual participation,J

But there is no need to

impugn their motives, for indeed charitable activities were
pursued by most of the Executive Committee members.

Mr.

Clarke, for example, was thetreasurer of a fund for needy
journalists, John Lubbock was famous for his efforts to
1 Donald Southgate, The Passin! of the Whigsa 18321886 (Londonr Niacmillan and Co,, 1962 , p. J81.
2Lord Acton to Mary Gladstone, Feb. 10, 1881,
Herbert Paul, ed., Letters of Lord Acton to Mary Gladstone (New Yorks Macmillan co., 1964), p. 169.
JJerrold, P• 1086.
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improve the lot of the clerks and, by securing a Bank
Holidays Act (providing one holiday per quarter), heard
the resultant days proclaimed st. Lubbock's Day in the
City for many years.

Any testimonials of cash value

which Lubbock received he donated to educational institutions.

E. Philip Cazenove (1799-1880), who founded

his own brokerage firm and was a friend of the Rothschilds,
was another •council' member who devoted his later life
to philanthropy. 1
in dimension. 2

Sir Samuel Montagu•s labors were global

To round out the list was Arthur Kinnaird,

tenth baron Kinnaird (1814-87), who was described by the
Corporation as "one of the oldest and most valued members
of the Council."J

He sat in Parliament until 1878, on

the Liberal benches for Perth, and then entered the Lords
where in philanthropy he was considered by many to be the
successor to Lord Shaftesbury, 4
1 The Times, Jan. 22, 1880, P• 8,
2.m:m_, Supp, 2 , Vol. II , 640,

Sir Samuel Montagu,
first baron Swaythling (18J2-l9llh made his fortune by
establishing a foreign exchange bank in London in 1862.
He vied with the Rothschilds in eleemosynary feats in the
Jewish community L'l'l London, and Jews in many lands benefited
from his generosity also.
Jco;rp. For. Bondh, ReE•• 1887, P• 12.

4The Times, April 27, 1887, P• 9.
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Many of the Corporation members also viewed this
organization as a non-profit institution for the public
good.

A resolution was approved at the 1880 General

court allowing those who wished to forego their accumulated
interest to come forward and receive their original £1001
twenty-nine chose this course. 1
At the first Corporation meeting on November 27,
1873, Mr. Gerstenberg

complime~ted

the society upon its

leadership and said that "if they searched through the
whole City of London they could no+. easily find men of
greater weight and influence." 2 It is impossible to
gauge the social influence a particular group commands,
but if titular distinctions were mean.ingful, then certainly the •council' was well endowed.

Political in-

fluence can be almost as eth3real as social connection,
and the two are ofter. intertwined.
importance as

capital~sts

that whatever

politic~

Setting aside their

in the City, one might assert

influence the •council' possessed,

and it never appeared to be considerable, was likely to
be felt more by the Conservatives than by the Liberalsa
this, even assuming that Gladstone had no antipathy toward
1 Money Market Review, XLII {March 5, 1881), 316.
Sixteen others only took 5 per cent of their interest,
while eleven were satisfied with 10 per cent.
21B.!9.•t XXVII (Nov. 29, 1873), 616.

r

86

Lombard Street.

Mr. Bouverie, a future chairman of the

Corporation, though a Whig, was closer to the Conservatives in sentiment, as the summer of 1882 was to prove,
while Sir John Lubbock, another who might be counted a
Liberal, was to become a Unionist in 1886.
Turning from the converts, one can draw from the
ranks of the "legitimate" Conservatives such men as Sir
Robert N. Fowler (1828-91), who not only served as Alderman
and Lord Mayor of London, and sat in Commons, but also
reorganized the Conservative Party in the Metropolis. 1
Joining the Corporation in 1880 was another important
Conservative, Robert Bourke, who had served as Under
secretary of Foreign Affairs for Derby and Salisbury. 2
His talents were used by the Council in 1881 when he
was sent to Constantinople for the Turkish holders in
the belief that a success akin to that which had occurred
in Egypt might be the result.

A more direct connection

with Government was exhibited by the M.P. for Whitehaven,
l DNB, Supp. 1 , VolJCXII, 660-61.
2

-

Ibid., Supp. 1, Vol.XXJI, 199. Robert Bourke
(1827-l902}W'a.s born in Ireland and held his peerage in
that country. He occupied a seat in Commons for Kingslynn,
which he represented for eighteen years. Bourke was a
staunch opponent of Gladstone•s policy from 1880 to 1885,
and on the victory of the Conservatives in 1886 he was
made Governor of Madras.

George Cavendish Bentinck. 1

In 1874 he became Parlia-

mentary Secretary for the Board of Trade, and in the
following year was made Judge Advocates he was one of
those under the protective wing of the Prime Minister
and could count on preferment.

2

Two other men very close to Lord Beaconsfield also
had contact with the Council, one indirectly through financial dealings, the second more obviously.

The former was

Montagu Corry,J private secretary to Benjamin Disraeli,
who, because of the great man's distaste for detail, had
very great power indeed. 4 Mr. Corry, the main "social
link" connecting the Prime Minister with the world, brought

1 George A. F. c. Bentinck (1821-91) was a lawyer
and art buff, and held a seat in the House for the Conservative interest from 1865 to 1891. He rarely spoke
in Parliament, and ought not be confused with George "Big
Ben" Bentinck, a colorful personage of the period (The Times,
April 10, 1891, P• 7).
Of
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him

all the gossi1J from :;11e clubs and all the chatter
from the d::t-awing-rooms • 111 In 1874 fYlr, Corry became a
0

trustee of the Foreign and Colonial Government Trust and
joined a number of Corporation members in their task of
safeguarding several million po1mds of investments.

At

the least, the head of state from 1874 to 1880 could have
heard first-hand of the impact of political decisions upon
the investor, as well as the views of a society which claimed
to represent him.
The second individual was Sir Philip Rose (1816-SJ),
a neighbor of the Disraeli family in early days, and a personal friend, solicitor and executor to the British Prime
Minister. 2 Beginning in 1852, he became an electoral agent
for the Conservatives, organizing support outside Parliament.
He retired from this activity in 1859, under a cloud of scandal centering on corruption of election petitions.J

Gener-

ally a prudent and good advisor, Mr, Rose was rewarded in

1874 with a baronetcy as part of the spoils of victory.
In recommending this distinction to the Queen, the Prime
Minister saida
1 T(homas] H(ay] S(weet] Escott, "Lord Carnarvon•s
Resignation," Gentleman's Magazine, CCXII (March, 1878),

357-58.

2The Times, April 18, 188J, P• 12.
JHarold J Hanham Elections and Party Manaaementa
Politics in the T!me of nlsrae!! and Gladstone {Lon on1
Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1959}, P• 277.
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Mr. Philip Rose is the son of a h1rgher family of
Bucks, which has e:dsted in reputo for more than
two centuries. Mr. Rose is now the possessor of a
fine estate in that county, of which he is a magistrate. He is a man of education, but entirely the
creator of his own fortune. His life has been of
singular prosperity, mainly owing to his combined
energy and integri"tY, and to a brilliant quickness of perception.l
Mr. Rose was an early supporter of Mr. Gerstenberg1 in
1873 he was one of the three men

~··1ho

set their hands to

the Board of Trade document which brought the Corporation
into being.

He was a director of the Foreign and Colonial

Government Trust, and took an active part in bondholder
affairs.

When it was necessary, his influence and talents
were available. 2
Taking all into account, however, the sum of
the combined influence of all the individuals mentioned,
were they to act in unison, would have dwarfed the power
which the Council itself could exert for any cause.

In-

fluence in the nineteenth century was most often a matter

1 Disraeli to Queen Victoria, April 17, 1874,
Buckle and Monypenny, V, 297.
2Money Market Review, XXX (Dec. 11, 1875), 639.
At the meeting of the Turkish creditors on December 6,
1875, the chairman remarked that "Sir Philip Rose was
instructed to prepare a draft letter to Lord Derby • • •
and the consequence was that instructions were sent by
Lord Derby to Constantinople to give every co-operation."
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between individuals, too valuable and sensitive a link
to abuse by constant stress, resort to it was reserved
for cases of default in which there were either overriding personal or public ends to be served.

Aside from

this, even if the Corporation had represented a unanimity
of purpose, which they did not, other factors such as
public attitudes, national and international politics,
and

the like, would have given members pause before using

private connections to gain Government support.

In its

first report, the Corporation stated thats
The Council have continued to receive from the
Foreign Off ice favourable attention on the few
occasions when they have requested assistance or
information. These applications are made as sel•
dom as circumstances compel, because it ls not
desirable to either cause trouble for Her Majesty's
Government, or to seek its intervention for trivial
purposes,l
These guidelines were adhered to, and whatever benefits
the Council gained from Government were sought via the
front door,
This then was the 'Council' in broad reliefs its
organization, officers, and membership.

To them were en-

trusted the cudgels for defense of the English creditors,
The reports for the first three years after incorporation indicated that there was much to occupy the
1 corp.

For, Bondh, Rep •• 1873, p. 49.
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new organization, since defaults rose from thirty-four
in 1873 to thirty-eight in 1875. 1 The first year boded
especially well for the Council.

There were promising

signs that a sister organization might be erected in
New York, 2 while on the Continent close cooperation
with Belgian and Dutch holders had barred Greek loans,
both public and private, from being raised.
were also won in Americaa

Successes

an Arkansas railway loan was

blocked when the Council showed there were no provisions
for repayments Minnesota was sued in the

u.s.

Supreme

Court and the English creditors were victorious, and
ardor for investment in the Mississippi Valley states
was cooled by a letter from Clarke to the Manchester
Chamber of Commerce, in 1874, describing the credit posture of this area.

The Council was requested by a large

number of banks, including the Bank of England and Rothschilds, J to aid in pressuring Italy to live up to her
1 Powell, p. 501. In 1873 Professor Leon Levy
estimated that £JJ2,J99,800 worth of loans were in full
or partial default,
2

Mo~ IY.larket Review. XXVIII (Feb. 28, 1874), 273.
At the Gene
Court on February 25, 1874, the chairman
announced that progress in this direction was being made
and that Duncan, Sherman and Company was taking the lead.
3The London Rothschilds had remained sympathetic
to the objectives of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders.
Their decision not to join the Council in 1868 (suggests
Jenks, P• 289) was due to the firm's deep involvement in
both the Austrian and Italian defaults.
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engagements.

The Corporation library also fared very

well, with its complete listing of drawn bonds proving
most beneficial.
But the same period saw a rising wave of public
hostility toward foreign government loans, the Stock
Exchange, and loan contractors.

At bottom this disen-

chantment was due to the promoters, with their bulging
sack of tricks, who played hob with the gullible English
speculators.

Since there was a financial advantage in
having a loan brought out in London, 1 large sums were
expended to have the name of some important Britishhouse
as agent on the prospectus, a practice which in fact victimized the investor.

The bondholders quickly learned that

in case of trouble, the agent was only the middleman and
knew nothing of the country involved nor anything else
about the loan.

In this way. promoters (quite often

syndicates) brought forth loans, ! la Augustus Melmotte, 2
which they knew were worthless.

City editors might be won

1 c1arke, p. ?. The author cites a German syndicate
which profited by releasing its Hungarian loan at an issuing
price 2 per cent higher on the prestigious London market than
it would have fetched on the Continent.
2 This character was created by Anthony Trollope in
his novel The W~ We Live Now, of 1875. Melmotte is a
caricature of tE'i Continental promoter who rose from obscurity to wealth and social standing by defrauding the
public.
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to the cause, 1 banking friends and associates might buy
and sell some of the old securities of the nation in question to create the impression of vitality, forged telegrams
might even be posted at the Exchange to encourage sales, 2
and most importantly, as much of the stock as possible had
to be placed, both to avoid future lawsuits and to obtain
a quotation on the official list.

If needed, brokerage

houses could be found, at a handsome price, to suggest the
stock to their clients, or to hold the securities for a
specific term in order to demonstrate to the Exchange that
a market for the security existed.

It was usually expedient

to pay one or two coupons to the holders while the stock was
being unloaded, but this was like feeding a famished dog a
joint of its own tail.

In this fashion £9.2 million (face

value) of South American stock was lost to Englishmen by
18753 after the panic of the first quarter of the previous
year. 4
1 westminster Review, XLIX (Jan. 1876), 8. Occasionally editors lost their jobs for "puffing" certain
stocks too vigorously. An instance of this was alleged to
have forced the resignation of a City editor of The Times.
Jenks (p. 399) points out that in the 1870's The Times was
often called the .. Jew's harp" because of its favoritism toward Rothschild stocks.
2 Money Market Review, XXVIII (Jan. J, 1874), 4.
By 1874 the number of these fraudulent messages was increasing as the foreign securities market drifted lower.
3cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment, p. 228.
4 "A Sketch of the History of Foreign Loans," Bankers
Magazine, XXXVI (July, 1876), 521.

The Times observed that the promoters had, in
the English investor, an Aladdin's lamp, 1 while the
Economist blamed the publica
This set of peculiarly crafty sellers finds ready
to its hand a race of peculiarly foolish buyers such
as is not to be found in other markets.2
Punch, in a cartoon entitled "Pickpocketing in the 'City,'"
depicts the business of Foreign Loans and Accomodation Paper
as they rob Mr. Englishman.3

There was even a sinister tone

from Macmillan's Magazinea
You may abuse Her Majesty's Government, but the
"City" is sacreds the "City" can pay for silence,
if need be, as well as coerce refractory critics
by methods of its own. and by legal terr~rs that
are all the greater for being undefined.
To some the Council might have seemed part of a conspiracy;
to others the Corporation seemed useless since it had neither
stopped nor immediately retrieved the situation.

People

were calling for an investigations with the number of
brokers as members, the Corporation's position was a
delicate one.
1 The Times. Aug. 2, 1875, P• 9.
2Economist, XXXIII (March 27, 1875), 362,
3Punch, LXIX (July, 1875), 60.

4 °Foreign Loans Committee," Macmillan's Magazine,

XXXII (May, 1875), 94,

r
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Less than a week after incorporation in 187J,
Mr. Sheridan told a meeting of bondholders that there
was not sufficient protection for the English investors
in foreign securities, and that he proposed to bring the
matter up in Parliament next session. 1 Such a proposal
raised many eyebrows, for it meant a possible interposition by Government in the sacrosanct precincts of free
trade.

But even the Economist, the old crusader for

liberal economics, believed that where deliberate fraud
was being used to mulct the public of their money, Government was obliged to act. 2

The long-awaited investigation

finally came in early 1875, when on February 23 Mr. Henry
James moved
to enquire into the circumstances attending the
making of Contracts for Loans with certain Foreign
States and also the causes which have led to the
non-payment of these Loans.J
The resultant Parliamentary Committee, chaired by Robert
Lowe, generally muddied the waters by summoning witnesses
to public hearings which led to dirty linen becoming more
1 Money Market Review, XXVII (Aug. 9, 1873), 193.

2Economist,

xxxrrr

(Feb. 27, 1875), 237.

3charles UUguid, The Story of the Stock Exchan,e,
Its History and Position (Londons Grant Richards, !961 , P•
237. For the investigation, see Bankers Ma~azine, XXXIII
(Oct., 1875), PP• 796 and 834, and (Nov., 1 7S), pp. 878
and 905.
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soiled.

The death knell for the loan mania was sounded.

Brokerage firms, notably those of Mullins and Marshall,
and of E. Cazenove, who had connections with the Corporation, were involved in the questioning.

Mr. Clarke was

also called to give testimony, with a sheaf of prospectuses, he illustrated the mischief that could be done by
false advertising.

Regarding the Committee of the Stock

Exchange, he was of two minds, for as he later wrotea
While the Stock Exchange has justly earned the con•
fidence of Continental investors by its severity on
foreign governments guilty of breach of engagements,
it has afforded facility and eren countenance to
the operations of adventurers,
Such opinions were not taken kindly by the denizens of
Capel Court who found their livelihood the center of so
much unwanted attention.

On

stepping down as Secretary

in 1884, Mr. Clarke spoke of the great unpopularity which
was his over the years as a result of his defense of the
bondholders.

He also strongly denied that he or any

'Council' member had ever speculated upon the knowledge
they had gained from their positions of trust. 2
In the end, the investigation accomplished little
and, as a magazine of the day observed, "throughout the
report there runs, like a thread, the feeling that the
1 Quoted in Clarke, P• 8.
2 Money N.iarket Review, XLVIII (Feb. 23, 1884), 290.
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powers of Parliament are unable to grapple with these
protean forms of fraud. 111
Thus by the autumn of 1875, the Council, though
well established, was undergoing both internal and external stresses, moving toward a period which would tax its
resources.

For the next half-dozen years or more, no area

was to provide more fuel for discussion or printed matter
than that encompassed by the Ottoman Empire.

A part of

this supposedly moribund state, Egypt, was a frequent borrower on the London money market, and a land whose fiscal
irresponsibility was to bring it ver-y shortly into contact
with the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders.
1 westminster Review, XLIX (Jan., 1876), 9.

CHAPTER II
EGYPT, 1863 TO 18761

BACKGROUND TO BANKRUPTCY

Between Golden Hook and Golden Horn
To epitomize the problems of the Egyptian
Viceroy, Ismail Pasha, only two phrases are necessarya
the "golden hook" of foreign finance with its attractive
bait of ready money, and the "Golden Horn," a synonym for
Constantinople, the seat of his suzerain.

The former was

an allurement which led to a series of ruinous loans, while
the political grip of the latter led to a desire for independence, which could most easily be attained through
baksheesh {gratuity).

Thus, with two such lesions on the

economic body of the state, little wonder that bankruptcy
was the result.

Before embarking upon this topic, it would

be well to note the condition of Egypt, and the extent of
English involvement there, at the time of the accession
of its prodigal prince in 1863.
As the tide of battle slowly ebbed from the shores
of Egypt at the opening of the nineteenth century, a new
figure appeared, Mehemet Ali, who ruled from 1807 to 1849.
He strove to bring prosperity to his land and set the
Pashalik on an independent course.
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Although failure at-
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tended his attempt to raise Egypt directly from a
subsistence to a complex economy, nevertheless through
the introduction of agricultural improvements, the intermediary export-oriented stage of development was reached. 1
In Egypt's case the exported commodity was cotton.
Diplomatically, Mehemet Ali was supported by
France, who viewed Egypt as an area for her penetration.

I

Since the Napoleonic Wars French had replaced Italian as

.11

the language of the educated and the foreigners it was to
Paris that the Egyptian ruler looked in 1840 when Europe
stripped him of Syria, his prize of battle. 2 Following

.11

her traditional policy, England supported Turkey, leaving
France isolated.

The resulting arrangement of 1841 left

Egypt to the dynasty of Mehemet Ali in exchange for a
yearly tribute of £400,000.
Egypt was important to England as a place to get
around and through rather than as an area for future expansion.

It has been observed that India was the barracks

1 charles Issawi, "Egypt Since 18001 A Study in
Lop-sided Developments," Journal of Economic History, XXI
(March, 1961), 4. The drain of capital abroad as well as
the rising population meant that Egypt did not attain a
"complex" economy until the 19JO's.
2For further reading on the period, consult
Charles w. Hallberg, The Suez Canal, Its Historic and
Diplomatic Importance (New York• Columbia University
Press, 1931), Chapter 5.

I

,,

. I
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for the Empire1 in addition it was a dependency into
which much English capital had been poured by 1880-£270 million. 1 At an early date, Englishmen in the
subcontinent urged upon the Home Government the expediency of occupying Egypt, since it lay athwart< the
lifeline of the Empire. 2

Such suggestions were dis-

missed, as the Sultan was an old ally.
It was in the late 18JO's, with the advent of
a regular mail service to India, that the small English
colony in Egypt made its appearance.

In the following

decade the British Government began pushing for the construction of a railway to connect the Mediterranean with
the Red Sea, which met with solid French opposition.J
British influence reached its apogee in 18511 despite
I!

French objections. Robert Stephenson and Abbas, grandson

I

of Mehemet Ali, signed the contract for the line which was
to extend from Alexandria to Suez via Cairo.
Egypt possessed 376 miles of track.

By 186J,

Following this vic-

tory, the English obtained the concession for a telegraph
1 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and

the Victorians (Garden City, N.Y.1 Doubleday and Co., Inc.,

1961), P• 6.

2 Hallberg, p. 75,

3Ibid., pp. 103-104.

11,

lii,i
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network in 1856, and in six years the Nile Valley was
linked to Europe. 1 Britain took a deep interest in
telegraphy 1 and in 1859 invested directly in a Red Sea
cable and another from Alexandria to Malta, and in 186364, in a line in the Persian Gulf. 2 But another project
which envisioned rapid trans-isthmian communication was to
cause a setback in English preponderance, and a sharpening
of rivalry between the two Western Powers.
Tradition had it that on a still night in a certain
part of the desert, one could hear the lapping of both the
Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

The mingling of these

waters was the dream of a young French engineer, Ferdinand
de Lesseps, and his success in the teeth of John Bull's opposition has been story enough for many books.

The scheme

was set afoot in 1854, but the bulk of the bills and the
glory were left as a legacy for Said's heir.
On

January 18, 1863, Ismail Pasha became Viceroy

of Egypt at the age of thirty-three.

He had been educated

in Paris and spoke French fluently.

Cunning, intelligence,

1 zvi Yehuda Hershlag, Introduction to the Modern
Economic History of the Middle East {Leidenr E. J. Brice,

1964),

p.

98.

2 "Imperial Telegraphs," Quarterly Review, CXCVII
(April, 1903), 378.
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and an ability to master detail were his, especially
where personal gain was involved.

He

also possessed

congeniality, a high level of personal courage, and a
hospitable nature,

Before his assumption to power,

which was made possible by a series of unexpected deaths,
he had lived as a wealthy landowner engaged in bringing
new machinery and methods to his estates. 1

Such ac-

tivities were to give Ismail the reputation of being

a progressive

man.

Outwardly he appeared successful,

for he was counted as one of the world's richest inhabitants, which was useful when public trust was
needed in raising loans, 2
The Province of Egypt was passed down according
to Muslem law--to the eldest of the family--but by the
time of the reign of Ismail this provision had been waived.
The Viceroy was little better than a

!!!:.!:.!. (governor), for

Egypt was solidly implanted in the Ottoman Empire,

The

Firman of 1841 stated that the taxes were to be collected
in

the~

name of the Sultan, that the Egyptian navy was to

A Secret History of the English
a Personal Narrative of Events
New Yorkt Alfre

A. Knopf,

lOJ

fly the Turkish colors, that treaties and laws of the
Porte were binding, and that the Divan acted as diplomatic
representative for all political subdivisions.

All major

decisions were liable to veto and the annual tribute was
requisite.

If Egyptian independence could be achieved

by bribery, diplomatic pressure from friendly European
states, or even warfare, Ismail was not the sort to draw
back.

It was to France that the Viceroy turned, and with

gold won the adherence of Morny and others in the entourage
of Napoleon III. 1

The Fourth Estate was not ignored, and

one Parisian journal was paid
treatment. 2

£6,ooo a year for favorable

From Russia, too, help was expected, in fact,

a draft treaty of alliance was initialed by the Viceroy
and Count Paul Ignatiev, the Panslav Russian Ambassador
to Constantinople (1864-76), in 1869, though time proved
the effort abortive.J

Yet if one commanded wealth, all

else was unnecessary, for baksheesh could oil the hinges
of any door, even the Porte.
1 sir Henry G. Elliot, Some Revolutions and Other
Diplomatic Experiences (London t John Murray, 1922), P• 189.
For a further opinion on this matter, see Landes, Bankers
and Pashas, pp. 196-97.
2 Hamza, p, 106,

JFrederick J. Cox, "Khedive Ismail and Panslavism,"
Slavonic and East Euroiean Review, XXXII (1953-54), 156. The
fUI! details of thesenteresting negotiations are related
in this article.
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The first alteration in the Viceroy's position
came in 1866, when a Firman granted that the eldest son
of Ismail might succeed to his father's dignity, this event
was celebrated by a rise to £681,818 in Egypt•s tribute.
In the following year the Viceroy received the title of
Khedive1 for himself and his successors, an honor whose
cost may never be known.

Wider administrative powers were

likewise granted commensurate with the new rank.

Never-

theless, as the decade closed, it became evident that there
was friction between Constantinople and Cairo due to Ismail' s military and naval build-up, planned legal reforms,
the adoption of monarchic pretensions, and financial
dealings.

In September of 1869, the Sultan advised the

Khedive to reverse these policies at onces tensions rose,
and the Powers. particularly Britain, stepped in to smooth
matters over.

The Firmans of November 1872 and June 187J

restored those powers to Ismail Pasha which had been suspended since 1869, and he was given even broader control
over law, the army, and the right to negotiate trade
agreements with any nation. 2 With these documents many
1 The word "Khedive" comes from the Persian "Khidiv"
or sovereign.
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of rsmail's desires were satisfied.

However, diplomatic

representation was still vested in the Sultans in addition, the tribute was still collected in his name and
forwarded to Constantinople, and the Turkish flag remained the Egyptian naval ensign.
These political triumphs, unfortunately, were
adumbrated by the financial course the Khedive pursued.
The causes of Egypt's economic collapse were not far to
seek, and they form an instructive backdrop for the activities of a later date.
The annual tribute to the Porte, as well as the
baksheesh expended for political gain and for the maintenance of a coterie of friends and spies at Constantinople,
were heavy drains on the Egyptian Malieh (Treasury).
Sultan also set a very poor example

financ~Ily,

The

for he

had discovered the next best thing to the Midas Touch-the eager Europeans who offered gold now for payment in
the future.

What was worse for F.gypt, the Porte had

secured debts upon the Egyptian tribute which drew the
Nile Valley into the sphere of international finance.

In

all, three loans were pledged to the Egyptian tributes the
first, in 1854, utilized £282,000, while in the following
year France and England guaranteed a loan to Turkey which
consumed the remainder of the tribute as pledge for
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repayraent. 1

The guarantee. an unusual step for the British

Government, only passed Parliament by 1J5 to 132, with both
Gladstone and Disraeli dissenting. 2 On.e other loan, that o:f
1871, was also secured by the Tribute, which had since been
increased.J

When Egypt began to stagger under her debt,

these bondholders were as anxious as any of the Khedive•s
other creditors that default might not occur, and were
quick to take protective steps.

A more crippling blow to Egyptian finance was dealt
by

the influx of Europeans which attended the opening up G:f

the cou..itry in the 1850's.

The population of Egypt stood

at approximately 4.5 million in 1846, and rose to 5.2 million in 1873, and to 6.8 million in 1882. 4 The small

1 Egyptian Tribute Bondholders' League, The ~~tian
Tribute: A Short Historx of the Tribute Loans, 1854~ 55,
i8z1, as Affecting the English and French Governments, the
Khedive and the Bondholders. Compiled from Official Documents, Proceedings of Parliament, Etc. (London, Feb., 1876),
p, 4. The Crimean War Loans were those of 185~ and 18551
the latter was signed on June 7, 1855, for £5 million.
The Rothschilds handled the details, and most of the issue
was taken up in England.
2William H, Wynne, Selected case Histories of
Governmental Foreign Bond DefaUlts and Debt Readjustments,
Vol. II of State Insolvenc an~ Fore! 1 Bondholders, by
Edwin M. Borcha
and W l am H. in;y-nne New Havens Yale
University Press, 1951), p, 396, n. 12.
3Egyptian Tribute Bondholders' League, pp. 11·12.
The 1871 loan was for £5.7 million and was to pay 6 per
cent interest.

4Arthur E. Crouchley, The Economic Development of
~odern Egypt (Londona Longma.ns, Green and Co., 1938),
p, 125. Hershlag (p. 107) cites lower figures--4,8JJ,OOO
for 1862, and 5,518,000 for 1879.
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European colony in 1845 was estimated at 6,ooo, 1 but this
figure increased to 79,696 in 1871, and to 90,886 by the
time of the British oceupation. 2 Since the natives looked
to the civil service for advancement, and only occasionally
invested in business, the foreigners had a monopoly in
trade and finance.

Consequently, Europeans were concen-

traded in the large towns,3 the great majority of them in
Alexandria (through which 94 per cent of the area's exports
passed by 1874), 4 and here, as in Cairo, they formed a vocal
and substantial minority which could make its wishes known
to the local government.

The largest single group were

the Greeks, with the Italians as a distant second.

The

French bloc was considerable and their chief rival,
the English, though economically strong, were numerically
weak.5

The

picture

is

confused,

since

both

the

1 The Hour, Nov. 9, 1873, Archives of the Corporation
of Foreign Bondholders (hereafter ACFB), .Egypt, I, 322.
2crouchley, p. 125. Most other estimates of the
European population range somewhat higher.
JJames c. McCoan, .Egypt as It Is (New Yorka Henry
Holt and Co., 1877), P• 35. His estimates give Alexandria
a foreign population of 50,000, Cairo, 25,000, and the
rest of the country, 15,000.
4Bankers Magazine, XXXIV (July, 1874), 550.
5Tbe Times, Feb. 10, 1876, P• 7. Their Alexandria
correspondent est!ma.ted that, of the 47.000 Europeans in
the city. 4.500 were British subjects. McCoan {pp. 35-36)
gives the following estimates for 1877• 40,000 Greekss
16,ooo Italians1 15,000 French1 7,000 British, 7,000 AustroHtmga.rianss 1,500 Germans, and 4,ooo others.
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Greeks and Maltese placed themselves under British
protection.

To the Englishmen who felt that influence

in Egypt was to be fostered, it appeared by 1870 that the
foreign community of Alexandria was being Gallicized and
that all eyes were caught by the dynamic, turbulent policy
of the Quai d'Orsay. 1
On both Ismail Pasha and his land the foreigners

were to leave an imprint impossible to efface.

Those who

swarmed to Egypt were often loaf ere and r1ff-raff 2 hoping
to make their fortunes from the Canal, thG Khedive•s Government. or anything else.

Moneylenders, second-rate finan-

cial men, and swindlers vied for what was available.

c.

James

McCoan, who for years was the editor of the Levant Herald,

and lived in the Middle East, said it was "no libel to say
that a minority (of the foreigners] at least are the very
dregs of the Levant."J

From this social strata came many

of those who would conduct the Viceroy into impecuniosity
and monopolize the gains despite the outcries of the smaller
entrepreneurs. 4
1

~ ••

Of immediate consequence was the extra-

Jan. 17, 1870, p. 6,

2

Sir Edmund Grimani Hornby, Sir Edmund HornbI, an
Autobiograph.y (Londona Constable and Co., 1929), p.77.
JMcCoan, P• 35.

4An excellent treatment of the financial types that

poured into Egypt in the 186o•s is to be found in Landes,
Bankers and Pashas, Chapter J, "Klondike on the Nile."
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territoriality which Europeans enjoyed.

The Government

lost much revenue through smuggling, for as soon as
contraband reached premises owned by a European, the
authorities were powerless.

This illicit traffic was
the most profitable trade in the land. 1 The Western

community was even free from taxation upon legitimate
trade.

Finally, the use of fraud by the foreigners was

estimated to have cost Ismail Pasha £1.4 million through
suits in the consular courts. 2

On one occasion the Vice-

roy was reported to have told a servant, "Please shut that
window, for if this gentleman catches cold it will cost
me £10,000."J
But most of the debt of F.gypt was acquired with
the participation of the Khedive.

vast sums were expended

for public works, and improvements were considerable, 112
new canals were dug, 430 bridges were built, 150 lighthouses were erected, a.1d 5,200 miles of telegraph lines
were strung.

Yorka

Also, £1),)61,000 was expended on 910 miles

1

Edward Dtcey,_ The Stor; of the Khedivate (New
Scribner s Soas, l902 • P• 121, .

2

Hamza, P• 104.

c.

;Pierre Crabitls, Ismail the Ma.li~ed Khedive
(Londona George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 9jj), P• ~16,

ii
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of railway. 1

The cost for these projects probably ex-

ceeded £E51 million, though somewhat lower figures can
be cited. 2 In spite of having his own engineer and the
use of corvee labor, the Khedive still found himself
overcharged by the European contractors.J

The greatest

public work of all was the Suez CanalJ here, also, exact
figures on cost have been debated, and have varied from
£6.7 million to over £16 million. 4 The cost to Ismail
I

1 crouchley, P• 117. Contractors fared so well that
men such as Frederick Krupp visited Egypt to see what profits might be made (William R. Manchester, The Arms of
Krupp• 1587-1268 [New Yorks Bantam Books, 1970], p. 95).
2crouchley, P• 117. A writer of the time stated
that the public works cost £4.6,264,ooo (M. G. Mulhall,
"Egyptian Finance," Contemporary Review, XLII (Oct., 1882],
532). This opinion Is also baekea up by William L. Langer
{Euro ean Alliances and Ali
ents 1871-18 O [2d ed.a
New Yorks
red A. Knop , 9 0 , p, 5 • The :Egyptian
pound (£E) was equal to £1 Os. d, sterling during this
period.
Jsir John Fowler (1817-98) was rsmail's resident
engineer from 1871 to 1879. In 1873 he began the construction of the Sudan railway, which was halted three years later
due to a lack of funds {Richard Hill, A Biographical Dictionary of the Anglo-~!tian Sudan [Oxfordt At the Clarendon
Press, 1951], p. ~ • He arranged purchases of equipment
in the United Kingdom, and when necessary wrote letters to
the press emphasizing his employer's sagacity and good
faith as a borrower.
An example of the padding of contracts can be seen
in the agreement with Greenfield and Company. On March lJ,
1870, the Viceroy ordered the commencement of construction
on the harbor of Alexandria. The firm, represented by Sir
George Elliot, M.P., estimated the job at £2,540,000, or,
as has been suggested. at a sum which was excessive by
eighty per cent (Mulhall, p. 5JO).
4 Pierre Crabites, The sfoli~ion of Suez (Londona
Routledge and Sons, 1940,, pp. 35- •

I

I,,1
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Pasha and his state was considerable, £6,770,000, in
lost revenue from the land left idle through corvee, 1
as well as the diversion of most of the carrying trade,
which now passed through Egypt without pause.

Although

admirable in themselves, the public works of the Khedive
were, in execution, less of an advantage to the fellah
than to the foreigner.
Another area of expense which can never be calculated was the debt incurred in the military arena.

As

a vassal the Viceroy was obliged at his own expense to
answer the Sultan's call to combat.

For a time the Khe-

dive contemplated a violent rupture with Turkey, and consequently lavished much upon his navy and army.

He hired

four Confederate generals for his army, and in February
of 1874 purchased a consignment of 500 Krupp guns. 2 Since
the cost of keeping a standing army of J0,000 was heavy,
and since the Khedive had visions of a greatly enlarged
realm, expansion into the Sudan began, and by 1873 a
secret war with Abyssinia had erupted which was to culminate in three disastrous defeats for Egypt between 1875
and 1876.
1

Mulhall, P• 528.

2 The Times, June 16, 1874, p. 14. Manchester
(p. 95) points out that Abbas was the first purchaser
of the new Krupp cannons, buying twenty-six at the Exposition of 1855·
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Wasteful, inefficient, and corrupt were the
proverbial adjectives describing the Egyptian Government, with peculation and self-aggrandizement at every
level.

In all of this the Khedive set the tempo.

When

Ismail came to the headship of Egypt he owned a few
thousand acres of land--by 1878 this sum had swollen to
916,000 acres. 1 Some of this was reclaimed desert land
or purchased real estate, but a portion had been obtained from f ellaheen who had had the misfortune of
falling into debt.

It was the Vioeroy•s Daira (literally,

administration) or personal estate towards which the railways ran, and which were most plentifully irrigated,

In

addition, many millions were unsuccessfully expended in
the contruction of sixty-four sugar mills on the Khedive•s
property, 2
Here is a man whose extravagance was legendary
in his own time,

Cairo was to be a Paris on the Nile,

and if it could not be built in a day, the next fastest
time would do,

Elegant palaces, public edifices, and

1 Gabriel Baer, -..A~Hi--..st...o.......__o_f~Lpai.,,.n....d.,..o~wn.,.....e...r,_s.h.............,i....
n
Modern Egypt, 1800-1950 Lon ons Oxford Un vers y
Press, 1902), p. 41.
2crouchley, P• 117.
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thoroughfares which even Haussmann would envy were to
be constructed.

Jewels, carriages, horses, and opera

bouffe there were in abundance, and on his stage was
held the world premiere of "Aida" which the Khedive
had commissioned. 1 Visitors to the country, even those
of minor importance, were graciously welcomed, housed in
palaces, banqueted and given private rail and steamship
accommodations. 2 Of all his fates, however, the one
remembered most vividly was that celebrating the opening
of the Suez Canal in 1869, when crowned heads and world
dignitaries met, with the Viceroy as host.

To place a

price tag on all these luxuries and fillips of fancy is
impossible, but Mr. Dicey, not an admirer of the Khedive,
estimated that £El00 million were unaccounted for by 1879.J
The introduction of European financial techniques
and especially the use of treasury bills was most pernicious to the economic well-being of Egypt.

The 1850's

1 The Opera House at Cairo was one of the great
works of Ismail's reigns unhappily, it was destroyed by
fire in 1971. However, the national anthem which Verdi
wrote for Egypt is still in use (Landes, Bankers and
Pashas, pp. 154 and 209).
2 The Times, Aug. 19, 1874, p. 6. Letters describing
Ismail's open-handedness made frequent reading in the journals of the day, and brought rage from the unpaid creditors
at a later date.
)Dicey, The Story of the Khedivate, p. 107.

I
i.
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witnessed almost a speculative boom in Anglo-Egyptian
ventures, 1 which was fed by a legal rate of interest of

6 per cent per month which remained as law throughout
our period. 2 Under Ismail, "banking" Egyptian-style

j:

I'

flourished so that most European houses in Egypt were
connected in some way with khedivial finance,3

and by

1877 eight banks in the Nilotic had direct telegraphic
communication with London and Paris. 4

Banking in these

years in Egypt had nothing to do with investments in
industry, for there was virtually nonei what it did mean
was the business of serving as a middleman by acquiring
funds for the Khedive in exchange for treasury bills
bearing high interest.

Until about 1870, this lucrative

trade was in the hands of the haute bangue of Europe, at
which time the commercial and deposite banks entered the
lists in numbers.

Such a system could only be short-

lived, and by 1874 speculation had slowed to a point where
large reservoirs of capital were idle,
The Viceroy found that by means of treasury bills
he could have ready money for establishing enterprises,
purchasing land and administering government.

Having the

1 sidney George Checkland, The Rise of Industrial

Society in England1 1815 to 1885 (Londona
P• 207.
2 The Times, Jan. 19, 1876, p. 7.
3 Hershlag, p. 99.
4 rssawi, p. 9.

Longmans, 1964),
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Khedive as a partner in a venture (which was often
the case) usually spelled doom for the project.

The

societe General d':agypte of Alexandria floundered in
187ls the Societe Financiere

d'~te

strove until 1877

to obtain a judgment against the Cairo Government and
failed, 1 the F.gyptian Commercial and Trading Company
(which had promised 10 per cent interest) was in liquidation by the end of the decade, 2 the Societe Agricole et
Industrielle d't.gypte was bankrupt after two years of
operation3--these were but a few of the institutions which
enjoyed khedivial connections.

Where possible, Ismail

used his investment to bleed the firm white and always
1 Morninf Post, Oct. 24, 1877, ACFB, Egy-pt, VIII,
128. SeventY-f ve per cent of this company's capital was
in English hands, the Tribunal refused to uphold their
claims.
2Landes, Bankers and Pashas, pp. lC51-54. This
firm, with £2 million capital, 25 per cent of it from
public subscription, was to lend meney to the cultivators
and had as its directors Henry Oppenheim, John Cater of
the Bank of F.gypt, and John Wingfield Larking, the special
representative of the Khedive. The London agents were
Frilhling and Goschen.
Jibid., p. 261. This was a joint stock enterprise
which attracted little interest in England. The Viceroy
owed the company five million francs, which he finally
paid after the Western Powers were forced to a,ply pressure.
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tried to have agents on hand to protect his interest,
while at the same time the organization attempted to
prosper from its Viceregal affiliation.
Casualties such as these did not deter the zeal
of those desiring to profit by the Khedive•s unwise
fiscal measures.

In 1869 the Franco-Austrian Jank

and a branch of the Anglo-Austrian Bank, each with £1
million nominal capital, opened their doors in Alexandria, 1
followed the next year by the Franco-Egyptian Bank with
Charles Ferry, the brother of the statesman, as Director,
and in 1873 came the Bank of Constantinople which paid
24-1/J per cent interest per annum. 2 The Austrian Consul
General reported (1875) that in the period from June, 1874,
to June, 1875, thirteen new banks with a combined paid-up
capital of £5,870,000 and a reserve of £1.2 million had
been opened in Egypt, paying from 10 per cent to 59 per
cent interest,J

Table J lists the most important financial

institutions in Egypt on the eve of defaultr numerous
1 The Times, June 22, 1869, p.

6.

2Bankers Magazine, XXXIII (May, 1873), 429. This
organization, like the Franco-Egyptian, was established
by Bischoffsheim, and was merged with the reorganized
Imperial Ottoman Bank in 1874.
JACFB, ~. I, J44. The Austrian Brown Book
added that many---pr!Vate banks were also set up, upon which
no statistics were available.
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private banks also existed, such as Oppenheim and
Nephew, Dervieu et Compagnie, and Bravay.

A dearth

of capital was obviously not one of the problems of
the moment.
Since English concerns helped stimulate the unhealthy banking practices of Egypt, were involved in the
flurry of negotiations in 1876, and were also represented
by Goschen, their activities are of interest.
Of those members of la haute finance most conearned with the reign of Ismail, none were more involved
than the Oppenheims.

The family was English by adoptior,;

having left Windecken and Oberhessen where they had been
moneylenders, the brothers Hermann and Simon, with the
latter's son Henry, were forced to keep up their peregrinations until 1850, when they opened a bank in London.

At

this point their history becomes hazy, for in the next
vignette Henrywas reportedly seen in the Levant, watching
over the paternal ships as they brought stores for the
British troops in the Crimea. 1 However, according to
the Archives of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders,
the German family arrived ln London somewhat earlier than
generally thought, met the same problems as elsewhere, and
1 Landes, Bankers and Pashas, p. 111.
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left very suddenly in 1849 with a compatriot, when some
dispute over banking and bill operations occurred.

After

a South African business of theirs went to bankruptcy
court, their next port of call was the Levant, where as
street money-changers and watch repairmen their situation
remained static until the Crimean war gave them the opportunity for profits from usuriously changing currency
for the British troops at Balaklava and elsewhere. 1
The Oppenheims' first try in opening a firm in
Alexandria failed, but, persevering, Oppenheim and Nephew,
with Henry in charge, hung out its sign in 1862.

This

bank, in association with Hermann's other new enterprises
(Alberti, Pinto, Oppenheim et Compagnie of Paris, and
Oppenheim-Alberti of Constantinople) gave the new business broad ties with Europe.

Henry set about making his

house useful to the Viceroys, and particularly Ismail.
Their success began with the negotiation of a public
loan in 1862, 2 but they also accrued great profits on
10 Loans to Foreign States," 1875, ACFB, Ep;ypt,
I, 207 (insert).
2 rn 1862 they arranged a ~2.4 milL1on loan for
thirty years, of which Egypt got 65 per 6ent1 the contract
price was 62,5 and the issue price was twenty points higher.
Fruhling and Goschen were the London agents, and the loan
reportedly was over-subscribed (Landes, Bankers and Pashas,
p. 117).
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private arrangements, especially under Ismail Pasha.
After once dealing with the Oppenheims, the Khedive
found that it was financially imprudent, and often
impossible, to change contractors, so that this combination of ruler and banker remained even though "the breath
of scandal was to stick to the Oppenheims throughout their
career in Egypt." 1 Henry took up residence in London in

1868, and before his death in 1912 had been accepted into
the highest circles.

Hermann died on July 14, 1876, and

his house went into liquidation.

Of the joint stock banks which gained from dealings
with the Khedivial Administration, three were English institutions.

Through these banlts the small investor could

share in the yield of high interest which liquid capital
commanded in the area.

Table 4 indicates the amount of

interest which these English banks paid their shareholders
from 1869 to 1876.
The Anglo-Egyptian Bank was formed in 1864, and
was reorganized, in 1867, as the Anglo-Egyptian Banking
Company.

Despite the name, the direction of the firm was

in French hands, but included an Alexandrian banker and
representatives from the Agra and Masterman•s Bank. 2 The
1ill£!,., p. 116.
2Barclays Bank,
Dominion Colonial and overseas

s Bank

By
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driving forces among the directors1 and staff were1
Octave Foa, the Secretary1 Jean Baptiste Pastre, founder
of the Credit Society of Marseilles, and resident and
merchant in Egypt since the 1820's1 and his brother
Jules, a member of the Conseil Superieur du Commerce
of France, and the President of the Marseilles Chamber of
Commerce.

This French grip on the institution, albeit

1 The directors of the .Anglo-Egyptian Banking
Company were as follows, according to the Share List for
1869 (BT Jl/1JJ4/469)a
Directors

Shares Held (1869)

George G. McPherson (Chairman, Agra
and Masterman's Bank1 Director,
Mercantile Credit Association)

100

Edward Masterman (Director, Agra
and Masterman's Bank)

250

Robert E. Morrice

475

Charles L. Devaux (Director, General
Credit and Discount Company)

1,063

Jean Baptiste Pastre

2,272

Jules Pastre (of Messrs. Pastre
Freres, of Alexandria)

2,171

G. Sinadino (of the banking firm,
G. Sinadino of Alexandria)

l,JOO

Octave Foa

38

I

,

I
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weakened in time. 1 was not appreciated by the English
holders, and by 1871 there were calls to add more Britishers
to the directorship. 2 The number of stockholders steadily
grew, reaching l,OJ8 in 1872, and 2,128 by 1875,J and this

I·

and the high rate of interest were reflec·ted in the price

I.

of shares, which rose from 22-7/8 in March of 1871, to
J8-l/4 in August of 1872.

Both 1873 and 1874 saw the

shares depressed, but by the summer of 1875 they had
reached £39 per share. 4 By 1874 the Anglo-Egyptian was
the major supplier of the Khedive•s liquid capital and
held £l,JJ7,446 in Egyptian securities in August of that
year, and £1,590,271 a year later.5
One firm backed by English capital was the Bank
of Egypt, established in 1855.

The Board was solid and

conservative, with such men as Mr.

w.

Tite, M.P., John

1

~10-~yptian Banking Company, Share Lists
(BT Jl/1334/3496) showed that by 1877 Jean Baptiste Pastre
held only JOO shares, while his brother Jules had but 200.
2Bankers Magazine, XXXI (June. 1871), 544.
J The Times, Nov.
.
2J, 1875. p. 6 •
4 Monthly price lists in the Bankers Magazine have
been consulted for the quotation of bank shires.

5Bankers Magazine, XX.XV (Jan., 1875), 46, and

XX.XVI (Jan,

1876), 37.
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Cater, and John Bramley-Moore in control, 1 but has been
described as
small in vision and scope. Its British directors
were not cut out for royal finance. They were
sober, conservative men who liked regularity in
their dividends and orthodoxy in their transactions. 2
Nonetheless, from 1866 to 1871, the five years following
the panic, the bank earned profits totaling 90 per cent
of its capital,J and its stock was consequently sought.
With par at £25, the shares were quoted at £45 in October
of 1871, reached £52 a year later, and were over £53 in
January, 187J, before a decline ensued.

Though weak in
the early 186o•s, the bank managed to keep afloat4 and
seemed to have had a substantial amount of Egyptian
treasury bills in its keeping.5
1 The Chainnan of
was also the director of
Company, deputy chairman
Company, and chairman of
Company.
2Landes, Banke:z:s

The total number of

the bank, John Bramley-Moore,
the Rio de Janeiro Improvements
of the East Argentine Railroad
the General Credit and Discount
and Pashas, p. 1.38 •

.)Bankers Magazine, XXXI (March, 1871), 2J4.
4Gordon Waterfield, La.yard of Nineveh (Londona
John Murray, 196J), p. 297. In the early 186o•s, A. H.
Layard, as Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, was
charged with using his position to assist the Bank of Egypt.
5The balance sheets for the Bank of Egypt listed
its holdings of F.gyptian securities as1 £)56,584 in 18701
£J57,216 in 187ls £371.691 in 18721 £48),625 in l87Ja and
£297,J47 in 1874.
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holders was small, 415 in 1871 and only 4JJ the following
year when the price of the stock demonstrated some of its
greatest gains. 1
The

last of these English organizations to be

created was the Bank of Alexandria. in 1872.

As Table 4

indicates, its shares were within the reach of the small
investor, though not receiving a great deal of publicity.
Since over fifty per cent of F.gyptian cotton was delivered
to Manchester, 2 many Lancashire operatives who had an
interest were drawn into investing in Egypt and especially
in a firm which would promote the business they knew best.
The reorganized Board of Directors in 1876 showed this
predominance, as it included, among other manufacturers
of importance, Jacob Bright, M.P., brother of the statesman,
who joined the business in 1875 with 700 shares.J

Hermann

1 Bankers Magazine, XXXII (Aug., 1872), 694.
2 Arthur Redford, .Manchester Merchants and Foreiiy;:

Trade (Manchestert Manchester university Press, 19J4-56~
II, l83-84.

3commercial Bank of Alexandria, List of Directors
The directors of the Commercial Bank
of Alexandria, as of 1876, were1
(BT Jl/2257/l078J),

Name
Jacob Bright
Joseph Mellor
John Agelasto
Constantine Sinadino
Thomas Richardson
John Cow
John Record

Occupation
W.anufacturer
Bolton Cotton Spinner
Merchant
Gentleman
Bill Broker
l\llanager of the Bank of Alexandria
Secretary of the Bank of
Alexandria
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Oppenheim and the Bank of Constantinople were among the
largest shareholders, with 2,000 shares each, and it was
also well-subscribed in Cairo. 1

But, as will be noted,

the bank could not resist the high interest on Government bills which, like a Siren's call, led the organization
to join the Anglo-Egyptian in 1874 to lend Ismail a reported £4 million. 2
Banking, then, had a direct bearing on the accumulation of Egypt's floating debt.

Other contributors to

the elephantine debt of 1876 have been touched upon, but
one further culprit remains, the series of public loans
which were raised by Ismail Pasha.
The Viceroy, had he ever opened Thackeray•s
Vanity Fair, would have appreciated Chapter J6, "How to
Live Well on Nothing a Year," for although his income was

1Bank of Alexandria, Share List for 1872, BT
31/1735/6398. Some subscribers came from the Khedive•s
entourage a

Name
Barrot Bey
Burgieres Bey
Julius Blum
John Finni Bey
Ignace Ismalun

Post
Secretary to Khedive
Physician to Khedive
Financial Secretary to
Khedive
Dentist to Khedive
"Commissionaire" and
confidant of Khedive

2 The Times, Ju.1e 24. 1874, p. 14.

Shares Held
200
200

100
200

500
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shrinking, he was usually able to obtain credit at
some price, and as he borrowed more, the number of those
pressing money upon him increased.

On

assuming the Gover-

norship of Egypt, Ismail found a debt which by most authorities stood at £J.J million. 1 In the previous year, 1862,
Egypt had floated its first public loan, with Oppenheim
as contractor and Frilhling and Goschen as London agentsr
this expediency for acquiring funds was shortly to be
repeated.
In 1861 the revenue of Egypt was approximately

£E2,154,ooo, but by 1864 this had climbed to £E6,972,ooo. 2
The source of this prosperity was the cotton boom brought
about by the American Civil War, which drove British manufacturers to search elsewhere for their raw material.
palmy days stimulated the Viceroy•s appetites.

These

Exports

soared from £4,454,425 in 1861-62 to £14,416,661 in 186J-64,J
1 Landes, Bankers and Pashas, p. 128., n. 1.

Bl'Wlt
(Secret History, p. 12) agrees with Landes. Hamza (pp. 6164) giving LE6.5 million1 Crabites (Ismail the Maligned
Khedive, PP• 20-25), £15 million1 and Baer (p, 34), £!15 million, are some exceptions. Hershlag (p. 96, n. 2) states
that "the differences in estimates as to the size of the
debt stem mainly from the non-inclusion of the current debt
in the lower estimates,"
2Landes, Bankers and Pashas, p. JJ?, Appendix D,
Table 1.
J Ibid., P• 329, Appendix A.
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so that the new prince felt most expansive and ready to
undertake a host of schemes.

To obtain the amounts of

liquid capital necessary for implementation, Ismail
emulated his sovereign and was drawn into a dreary round
of larger loans to pay the mounting interest on previous
borrowings.

Table 5 indicates the essential features of

the various loans.

These figures are approximations, but

they represent the most accurate estimates available.
From 1866 on, the pressures of finance began to
mount upon the Cairo Government.

While England was sub-

jected to the effects of a European war, panic, and high
bank rates, the Viceroy had two loans on the exchanges,
both of which were in difficulty.

FrUhling himself came

to Egypt to advise the removal of securities from the
market--but refused the request for a personal loan. 1
Prospects grew even darker in 1867, as cotton prices hit
bottom, 2 and a new loan bearing 9 per cent interest was
floated.

Ismail was to find that there were gradations

of bleakness.
agent, J,

w.

Despite the soothing rhetoric of his London
Larking, 1868 for the Khedive was a most

lugubrious year.
1

Revenues equalled £E5,0ll,OOO while

Hamza, pp. 98-99.

2 Hershlag, P• 100.

:I
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II'
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expenditures reached £El6,637,ooo, 1 and again there was a
wild casting about for capital.

Internal taxes were in-

creased, and the Chamber was told by Ismail Sadyk, the
Khedive•s Minister, that income vastly exceeded outgo. 2
While indulging in this charade, the Viceroy signed another contract with the Oppenheims for a new offering.
This issue for £12 million was probably the first ayndica ted loan of any kind.J

In this way, £95J,J28 was

added yearly to F.gypt's debt, but a clause in the document stipulated that the Viceroy was not to resort to
another public loan for five years.

The clause was

inserted on the behest of Great Britain, who pressured
the Divan to intervene, 4 which indicated the concern
Downing Street entertained for her investors.

To the

outsider it appeared that the F.gyptian situation had
stabilized,

·rable l.

1 Landes, Bankers and Pashas, p. JJ7, Appendix D,

2 Jaeob M. Landau. Parliaments and Parties in .Egypt
(New Yorks Frederick Prager and Co., 1954), pp. 16-17.
Jcairncross, Home and Foreign Investment, p. 93.
4 Jenks, p, Jl6. The Porte did not need much coaxing,
for the Khedive•s borrowing was helping to dry up London
capital. He formalized his prohibition on loans in a firman of November 29, 1869.
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The Egyptian Government was already living from
hand to mouth on foreign capital. so that although
baksheesh could eventually eradicate the Sultan•s edict,
evasions had to be contrived for the moment,
When the Chamber was assembled for their annual
rubber-stamping session, the Khedive congratulated them
upon the prosperity of the country and announced that the
debt was now lower than when his predecessor had reigned. 1
Meanwhile, Ismail had arranged for a second Da.ira loan,
supposedly a private affair which would not violate the
contract of 1868--so argued the Viceroy.

But i l l fortune

was again in evidence, for the panic generated by the
Franco-Prussian War led to only 70 per cent of the stock
being taken up.

The London journals were likewise un-

happy, the Economist remarked that the Khedive was using
a ploy in claiming the Da.ira a non-government loan and
warned that "a half civilised Government once finding its
hand, to use a vulgar saying, 'in the pocket of Lombard
Street,• would keep it there," 2
1 The Times, Jan. 28, 1870, P• 10,
20 The Serious Danger of Rash Foreign Loans,"

Economist, XXVIII (April JO, 1870), 529.
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Also rouEed to action in this affair was the
Council of Foreign Bondholders.

No sooner had the

tenns been announced than the Council took up the case of
the 1868 holders.

Since the bond had stated explicitly

that no loans could be raised for five years, as they
would undoubtedly depress existing securities, the organization called for either a halt to the proceedings, or compensation.

In the latter case, the 1868 bondholders might

accept either a greater sinking fund, or Cairo could repurchase a portion of that stock.

In April, 1870, Hyde

Clarke took the matter up with the agents of the 1868
loan (the Franco-Egyptian Bank, which was controlled by
Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt, who were also the n!l! loan
contractors), in a letter which read in parts
It would be of interest to the bondholders to
learn the amount of the loan, and some further
particulars as regards the application of the
proceeds, showing that they are intended solely
for private purposes. Leaving aside for the
present the question whether, according to the
letter of the bond of 1868, his Highness is in
equity enabled to issue a private loan, there
can be no doubt that such an issue would be felt
as a grievance by the subscribers to the loan of
1868.I
1 The Times, April 28, 1870, p. 6. The correspondence by Secretary Clarke on the issue of the Daira
loan of 1870 appeared here.
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The Franco-Egyptian Bank insisted in its correspondence
with the Council that this was a private matter and they

ought to take it up with the Oppenheims and other contractors of the 1868 issue.

The final response of April

23, 1870, suggested that correspondence cease:
We doubt not that in due season, and upon every
fitting occasion, his Highness the Khedive of Egypt
will, as hitherto, prove to the bondholders of the
existing loans, oath for his Government and his private service, that neither his dignity nor his reputation for good faith requires any protection or
preservation other than his own and that every
guarantee accepted by his Highness or his Government will be duly and faithfully performed.!
At this juncture it became known that the Porte
had protested the Daira. loan. 2 These months saw the
peak of Turko-Egyptian ill will, but Bisohoffsheim
remained undaunted, and on May 5 announced that the firm
had transferred the Sultan's protest to the Khedive,

sales went forward.

The

By September, however, the Sultan

had reversed himself• bribery having been utilized,J
and the Council's ally fell away.

In surveying the year

in November, the Secretary of the Council warned that

l~.

2 wynne, p. 5a1. n. 11.

)Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentaty Papers
(House of Commons and Command) (hereafter Piirllamenta.R
Papers), LXXVIII, Egypt No. 4 (1879}, c. 2J9'5, Append ces
6 and 8.
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under all circumstances it will become necessary
to exact more forms from all borrowing states,
even if we cannot obtain more securities.l
The use of treasury bills continued, swelling
the F.gyptian unsecured debt, for although the loan of
1868 was to consolidate finances, it was soon obvious
that the floating debt was as inextinguishable as the
burning bush of Moses.

As Khedivial credit slipped,

renewal rates and interest on further advances rose
sharply, but all were aware that in 1873 another public
loan would be required which would be profitable for
everyone.

It was estimated that from 1868 to 1873 the

floating debt rose £4 million a year, and had reached
£JO million by the latter date. 2
Internal taxes continued to mount, so that in
1876 the fellah paid J5s. to his government, while the
citizen of France and England paid 18s. and 8s. 6d, respectively,J

Such being the case, Ismail offered a new

inducement in order to draw gold from the natives, especially from the wealthy landownersa
1 The Times, Jan. 26, 1870, p.

on August 3, 1871,

6.

2 Economist, XXXI (Nov. 8, 187J), 1J54. In 1873
the Khedive's personal floating debt was placed at £6 million
while that of the nation was estimated at £24 million.
)Hamza, p. 276. By 1878, the tax load on the
f ellaheen had risen to £2 per head (Spectator, LII
[March 29, 1879], 394-95).
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the Law of Moukabala (compensation) came into existence,
Though ruinous in the long run, it was designed to provide
£28 million in but a few years.

In exchange for an addi-

tional six years• taxation, which could be paid either in
one payment or spread over twelve years, the landowner
was to gain a fifty per cent reduction in land taxes
in perpetuity, and-an indefeasible title to the property.
The law remained in effect until January 6, 1880, after
Ismail's deposition, but it is doubtful whether the Viceroy would have permitted the benefits of the law to be
enacted.
years. 1

The Moukabala was a success in its first three

Of all the public loans of Ismail's reign, the
floatation of 1873 was the largest, £32 million, and the
most damaging, as the Khedive was "unmercifully fleeced
by the loan-contractors. 02 Already by 1872 :Egyptian
currency had been weakening,3 and in oarly October a
1 Hamza, PP• 20A and 212, The income for these years
was £5.1 million, £3.2 million, and £1,6 million. By 1880
the tax had yielded £E9.5 million, according to Crouchley
(p, 121), and between £12 and £15 million, according to
Hershlag {p• 100).
2 The Times, April 4, 1876, p. 5.
JBankers Magazine, XXXIII (July, 1873), 588, The
official rate of exchirigeof 97.5 piastres to the pound
sterling had risen to 195 among tradesmen, and to 410 copper
piastres per pound sterling in the market places.

1.3.3

major crisis had occurred on the Alexandria bourse, with
ensuing failures.

The Viceroy pilU1ed his hopes upon the

new loan to reduce the mountain of unsecured debt. while
those in the syndicate, nominally led by Bischoffsheim,
one o:f ·\~he "less reputable firms, .. l were also eager.

The

attitude of the financiers could be summed up by these
words of a shareholder of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, inquiring of his chairman at a meeting, "I believe there is
a new Egyptian Loan in contemplation. are we likely to
have any good pickings out of that?
audience])." 2
be done.

{A

laugh [from the

But before the harvest there was labor to

The prospectus was released in London in July and

was greeted coolly by the financial press.

Since another

£1,282,835 was to be added to the annual charge on the
Egyptian revenue (not including the sinking fund), Ismail
made the offering more attractive by inserting a clause in
the bond which prohibited the raising of another loan by
Egypt until 1878.

Sir John Fowler, the engineer, was sent

to England where he bustled about, negotiating contracts
for railway and telegraph equipment and generally trying
to show how wisely the Khedive spent his money • .3
1 cairncross, Heme and Foreigp. Investment, p. 20.
2

Bankers Magazine, XX.XIII {June, 1873), 558.

3The Times, Sept. 16, 187.3, p. 5,

One of the contracts which Fowler negotiated was with Shaw and Thomson
for fifty miles of railway.

1.34
The Levant Herald, along with other journals,
published complimentary articles on progress in Egypt,
but in England, at least, it was an uphill struggle.
In

May

the Economist carried an article by Edward Mirzan,

a man conversant with Egyptian finance, who set her debt
at that point at £6J,102,4oo. 1

The faux pas of the Khedi-

vial campaign was made by the usually astute Henry Oppenheim, who had given up Egypt's climate for that of London
in 1868.

In September of 187J, he released a budget for

the upcoming year in Egypt which showed a surplus of
£1.2 million.

The British press was not the Cairo Chamber,

and this document was quickly withdrawn in lieu of another,
which was also in error as to fact, and which in turn was
superseded by a third estimate.
sened matters, 2
An

Such activities only wor-

attempt to retrieve the situation with a pamphlet

defending the budget was undertaken, but half of the loan had
already been placed and the remuneration was so gratifying
that there was no doubt that the remainder of the loan
1Edward Mirzan, "The Egyptian Debt," Economist,
XXXI (July 5, 1873), 809.
2Articles on the budgets appear in The Times
{Oct. 17j 1873, P• 6) 1 a11d the Economist (XX.XI (Sept.
20, 1873 , 11441 .. Egyptian Budgets," XXXI [Oct. 18,
1873]~ 12.59-611 and "The Turkish Financial Reforms,"
XXXI L0ct. 2.5, 1873], 1294-95),
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would be subscribed. 1

When the syndicate for this loan

parted company in early 1874, it had a reported £1.6 million to divide,
to tumble.3

2

but upon its retirement the stocks began

In May of 1874 a new syndicate was formed

(including the Oppenheims) to dispose of the second moiety
of the loan, which stimulated a rally in Egyptian securities.
Nonetheless, by this time only £932,000, or less than l/J2
of the stock, had been purchased by Englishmen. 4
1 0ppenheim had divided the loan into two blocks
of £16 million each, with the option to take up the second
lot if all went well. Much of the syndicate's profits came
from remitting the Khedive•s share to him in his own treasury
bills at inflated prices. In all, the Khedive received less
than £20 million of the £.32 million issue (Jenks, pp. Jl8-19).
2
1!2,g., P• .319 •
.3"The Dissolution of the Egyptian Synclicate,"
Econom:tst, XXXII (Jan. 17, 1874), 63. The decline in
prices !s illustrated belows
Loan
1862
1864
1867
1868
1870
1873

Price in January
1874
187.3
96

100

105.5

§g

84

84
93.5
98.5
77
70
64 -

Percentage
of Decline
12.5

6.5
6.6

19.0
18.6
23.,8

Total Depreelation (£)
274,400
.370,800
l.37,.300
2,259,100
l,J.38,500
J,708,000

4tinancier• IVIay 25, 1874, ACFB, Egypt, I, 126.

i
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As the quicksand of insolvency closed over the
struggling Viceroy, one further internal loan, the
Rouznameh, for £5 million at 9 per cent, was attempted
in 1874, but even the Mufettish (Chief Steward), Sadyk
Pasha, with all his Eastern ingenuity, could only squeeze
£El.8 million out of the inhabitants. 1 Thus Ismail found
himself on the verge of bankruptcy, driven thence by political and military ambition, the desire for luxurious environs, an array of public works, and entanglements with
Europeans and international finance.

No Solution for the F.gyptian Riddle
October 1875 to May 1876
The Creditors of Egypt
Before resuming the wayward path of Egyptian
finance, it might be well to point out some of the general
impressions made by Egypt upon the British public.

Cer-

tainly by the early 1870's the proliferation of books and
articles on Egypt was evident.

The Suez Canal had contri-

buted to this, as had generally improved communications,
letters from London to Cairo were lOd. each by 1871, and
shipping lines of several nations served Egyptian ports
1 cromer, the Earl of [Evelyn Baring, First Earl of
Cromer], Modern EgYpt (New Yorks Macmillan Co., 1908), I, 53.
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regularly. 1

For all that, and despite the fact that the
area of the country in 1876 was 659,081 square miles, 2
its cultivable size was but slightly larger than Wales,
a rather small parcel of real estate to generate so great
an interest on the part of investors, especially when agri-

culture was the only industry.
An anecdote, related by Lord Granville in the

Upper House. told of a Frenchman who declared that he
would invest in Suez shares because he felt that a railway on the Island of Sweden would be a good thing.

It

is doubtful that the English investor was quite so unenlightened, but his knowledge of things .Egyptian was
shallow.

It was thought that ninety per cent of the

bondholders were ignorant in Egyptian matters,J and even
in the City there were many hazy ideas afloat. 4 This did
not mean that certain basic conceptions, easy to grasp
and

vague in dimension, were not present.

One such axiom

was that Egypt was rich, very rich, and could pay the interest on her debts.

Such a belief rested not only upon

the knowledge that the land was some of the most fertile

1 crouchley. p. 142.
2 Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXII

(Feb, 20, 1874), 26j.

)The Times, Oct. 27 1 1875. P• 6,

4A. J, Wilson. ttFinancial Position of Egypt,"
Fraser•s Magazine, XCII (June, 1876), 786.

1J8

of the Earth--that, as the saying went, "one need only
tickle the soil with a hoe to obtain fine harvests"-but also upon a belief in her store of precious metals.
Upon this head also there was a maxim:
gold was burj_ed in Egyptian sand • .,l

"Australian

It was generally

known that Egypt supplied cotton for English mills, purchased much of her industrial goods from the United Kingdom, and possessed a favorable balance of trade, 2 Finally,
there was a general opinion that the East did not know how
to govern itself .3

Englishmen were assured that the progress

they had achieved was induced by their superior constitution
and methods of approaching things.

They were willing to

invest time and money in backward areas and to provide
the lead for advancement, but had little sympathy with
the morality, religion, or culture of the natives,

Nothing

good could be said of Middle Eastern off ieialdom, and as

1ttamza. p. 242.

The flow of gold bullion gave credence to this point of view. :r·or example. in 1875 bullion
import into Egypt was £5,868,403, outflow was £2,014,049.

2Landes, Bankers and Pashas, pp, 329-JB,

Landes'
Appendices A and B give cotton prices as well as a general
import/export table. Appendix A, "Egyptian Exports and Imports, t• indicates a surplus ranging from £7 • OJ.5, 37.5 to
£9,478,748 in the years 1871-72 and 1874-75.
3Richard Faber, The Vision and the Needs Late
Victorian Imperialist Aims {Londons Faber and Faber,
196li), p. 60.
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long as the interest was paid, the myopic investor was
content.

All positive factors were belabored by those

whose job it was to "puff" Egyptian securities, and insofar as the administration was corrupt, this was combatted by representing the Khedive as the exception, not
the norm--a man of progress and modernity.

Thus the

investor found it difficult to obtain an unbiased opinion
of Egypt or its stock.

Most journals were complimentary

to the Viceroy, often because of misinformation, and
their advice certainly stimulated the sale of securities.
As the Council struggled against the Daira loan
of 1870, Bankers Magazine wrotea
English and French capitalists see distinctly that
the proceeds of former loans have been honestly
applied to the development of the great national
wealth of the country, and they justly conclude
that his highness will continue in the same course
of strict observance of his engagements.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • What, then, is the real state of Egyptian
finance? We answer that it would be well if many
of the older pow~rs of Europe could show as good
a balance-sheet,l
Their enthusiasm did not wane, for in 1873 they informed
their readers,

Egypt may be regarded as one of the most
progressive countries in the world, 02 Encomiums to Ismail
0

111 Progress of Egypt," Bankers Magazine, XXX

{June, 1870), 504 and 506.

211 The New Egyptian Loan," ibid., XXXIII (Aug,,

l87J), 648.
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and advice to purchase "F.gyptians" were not confined to a
single journal, but could be found in the Money Market
Review, the Levant Hera1d, 1 and Herapath•s Railway Journal,
to name a few.

As 1875 drew to a close, the campaign to

masquerade Khedivial finance became frantic, with critics
calling for the publication of an authentic budget.
Those journals which had resisted being mesmerized
by the Egyptian financiers, most notably the Economist and
The Times, were attacked as bears looking for the fallr
and rsmail's defenders insisted that Egypt and Turkey
should not be coupled in the investor's mind. 2
Egyptian securities were also purchased because
the buyer felt he knew something about them, had lived in
Egypt or knew a relative who had, or perhaps had heard of
those whose bonds had been drawn quickly and hence had done
well.

There was also the belief that England would support

him in a crisis, for there was the precedent of the Societe
Agricole d'!gypte.3
1 Levant Herald, reprinted in The Times, Jan. 1, 1875,
p, 7, The long-time editor of the Levant Herald and con•
tributor to the press on Middle Eastern affairs, Mr. J. c. :.:cCoan, was himself a holder of Egyptian securities.
2 see the letter of Sir Samuel Baker to The Times,
Oct. 27, 1875, P• 6.
3navid s. Landes, "Some Thoughts on the Nature of
Economic Imt>erialism," Journal of Economic History, XXI
(Oct., 1961), 511. Landes discusses the importance of the
British defense of the Agricole in this article.
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As will be recalled, one of the objectives of
the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was to supply the
investor with information on loans which were floated on
the London Exchange, and generally speaking, the Executive
Committee of the •council' did evince an interest in this
province of the Ottoman Empire.

E. P. Cazenove and Sons,

in 1867, and I. Thomson and N. Bonar, in 1868, acted as
agents for Egyptian loans and were connected with the
Council, while Sir John Lubbock was acquainted with Egyptian
finance through his son Neville.

The younger Lubbock was

a partner in Cavan, Lubbock and Company of Alexandria, which
had supported the ill-fated Agricole to the extent of some
JOOO shares, 1
It cannot easily be determined whether any of the
'Council' members chose to purchase :Egyptian bonds1 however, it is certain that a few at least bought shares in
banks doing business in the Nile Valley.

Among the share-

holders of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, for example, one finds
the names of I. J. Gerstenberg (fifteen shares), General
Sir George Balfour (twenty-five shares), and Sir Francis
1 The firm played a role in its own defense, for in

1866 Neville Lubbock arrived in Cairo with a note from

Lortl Clarendon to the British Consul General, urging the
maintenance of pressure upon Ismail for a settlement
(Landes, Bankers and Pashas, p. 294),

,',,
t1
,!'
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Lycett (JOO shares). 1

I

1!:

f'.1,

The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders contributed

I'
111

to the new attention being paid by Englishmen to this area
i

of the globe.

Many of those at the Councilhouse were en-

11

'I

,:.11. I!I

'I'
1:1,1.•

rolled in the Royal Society of Arts, which by 1874 had
over 4,000 members.

,I•

ii

The organization was subdivided into

a number of sections devoted to various aspects of trade
and industry.

The Indian Section of the Society included

Balfour, Clarke, and others from Moorgate Streets this
interest in the subcontinent gave an imperial hue to their
views as to the importance of the Levant.

But they also

appreciated the significance of the IUlotic and Africa in
general.

In 1873 Hyde Clarke. in conjunction with a number

of important merchants from the Royal Geographical Society,
proposed and was given authorization to establish an African
Section within the Royal Society of Arts. 2

Its first meeting

was held February 6, 1874, at which time the objectives of
the Society's African and Indian Sections and their committees
were stated1

(To serve] as centres for taking action, and as a
rallying point for merchants, traders, and others,

3496.

1 Anglo-F.gyptian Bank, Share List for 1872, BT Jl/1334/

2 Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXII {Feb.
6, 1874), 201,

j
I

'l' 1i1
ii.iii
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where they might concert measures for the benefit
of trade, and bring their views before the Gorern•
ment when imperial action appeared necessary.
Egypt was periodically the subject of papers and dis-

cussions, and from these the sentiments of Corporation
members could be gauged,

Mr. Clarke also lobbied for an

Oriental Institute to meet annually, 2 but here he met with
some difficulties,
At the time of the formation of the Council in

1868, the indebtedness of F.gypt had reached £E26.714,ooo,
with an additional floating liability of £El0,08o,ooo,J
but aside from the unsuccessful attempt to block the 1870
Daira

loan~

the Council took no other action, for its

general tenet was not to interfere unless a default had
occurred and the bondholders had summoned their aid.

Secre-

tary Clarke, however, did look with disfavor upon the activities of the nouveaux riches financiers who penetrated
areas such as Egypt under false pretenses, for, as he wrotea
The new competitors for this business also assumed
an English garbs abroad they passed as English
bankers and merchants, in reckless scheming, they
were abetted by unprincipled adventurers.4

ll!?.!!!·

.!.21£.•

2 clarke to the Council of the Royal Society of Arts,

(Sept, 18, 1874), 902.
)Hamza., P• 127.
4 cla.rke, P• 9.
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Investors who cared to peruse the Council's materials
might have profited therefrom,

A memorandum of early

1875, marked "private and confidential," dealing with
Egyptian finance, observeds
Those states which manage. by hook or by crook • • •
to remit the sufficient amount, in ample time, to
meet their approaching coupons, are not considered
as "defaulting States," but may not they, perhaps,
soon be included in that category? , • • So long as
the Khedive and his worthy advisors and agents feel
sure of encountering the credulity of the British
public, and they continue to evince their readiness
to give up their gold against his representations
and elaborately engraved scrip, so long will the
Khedive doubtless, graciously favor them by accepting their all, or any voluntary contributions: 1
The Council Under Pressure
Wednesdays in the Levant were considered unlucky,
and the news which was flashed from Constantinople on
October 6, 1875, seemed to bear this out,

Turkey, which

had accumulated a bonded debt of over £200 million, a
moiety of it in the previous four years, had abruptly
defaulted by announcing a 50 per cent reduction of interest
(the balance repayable in 5 per cent scrip) on all loans
except the Guaranteed Loan of 1855. 2 For Englishmen this
1 F.

c. (pseud. ), "Egyptian Finance," ACFB, Egypt,
I, 207 (insert).
2 The Turkish debt stood at £217 million, out of
which the Sultan had received £107 million (Wynne, P• 415).
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meant that some £85 million of investments were in
jeopardy, 1 Unwise financial procedures, 2 floods, famine,
and internal uprisings and revolutions had driven the
"Sick Man" to the wall, and default was urged by Ignatiev.3
But the British investors did not much care about the reasons
for bankruptcy.

They had the best securities of any of

the Turkish creditors, and they meant to see them honored. 4
But, by assuming an adamant posture, they were forced to
wait six years for a settlement, while the Egyptian bondholders received attention.

The success of the latter was

1 Financier (Feb. 18, 1876, P• 4) estimated the disbursement of Turkish securities as followsa England,
£85 millions France, £50 millions Italy, £20 to £25 milliona
Turkey, £25 millions Dual Monarchy and Germany, £20 millions
Belgium, £7 million. The Times (Dec. 14, 1875, p. 6) believed that £60 million was owned by Englishmen and that
Franco-Italian holdings were £130 million. Figures on
English holdings at the settlement of the debt are available
in the Co;rporation of Foreign Bondholders Report for 188)
(p.

94).

2

Donald c. Blaisdell, Eurotean Financial Control
in the Ottoman Eqmire1 a Stu~ ofhe Establlshiiient, Activl ties and Si~!?!cance o the Adlrilnlstratlon of the
Ottoman f>ubi!c DiJt (New Yorke Coiumb!a University Press,
1929), P• 6. Turkish loans were raised at 5 or 6 per cent
interest and issued at an aYerage of 50 or 60.

J~•• PP• 78-79•
411ttle evidence of the "philosophical attitude
tovre.rds the Turkish repudiation," suggested by Dwight
E. Lee (Great Britain and the C rus Convention Polic of
187~ [Cam ri ge, Mass.1
rvar
vers y
ss, 9
,
P• O), presents itself in the financial press of the day.
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partially due to the activities of the Corporation of
Foreign Bondholders, which eventually was able, despite
the heavy pressure, to assist in a solution after London
had washed its hands of the F.gyptian affair,
The Turkish collapse came at an inopportune
moment for the Council, with its leadership in disarray
because of the illness of the chairman, Mr. Gerstenberg,
the decline of the foreign government securities market,
and internal division.

The organization had heretofore

enjoyed favorable publicity, with support from the Bankers
Magazine and Money Market Review,

The sour notes which

were to presage the full onslaught against the Corporation
were first sounded in the "Thunderer.. l in early 1875, when
it leveled a broadside at the Council•s annual statementi
"We confess, however, that we hardly think that this report
justifies the existence of the Corporation."

The erup-

tion continued:
Little is done by it [the Council], and not much good
has come of that littie for the creditors of the
States and comm\ll'lities which have fallen into
bankruptcy or who defy their creditors, • •• and
in n~arly all other instances, what the Council has
done has been to carry on voluminous correspondence,
entar intc relations with diplomatic agents of its
own abroad and generally to make a good deal of fuss
with very little solid results ••• , It does not
appear to us, therefore. that this body has as yet
justified its existence in any instance. and it
1 Reginald Baliol Brett, Second Viscount Esher
(Cloud-galp'd Towers [Londona John Murray, 1927], P• 61)
affixedth s name to The Times.
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cannot but entail considerable expense to those
bondholders who give it their support. 1
The Money Market Review rejoined in short orders
We consider such remarks, to say the least,
frivolous • • • • As for twitting the Corporation
with not being more successful in at once dragging
money out of the empty coffers of the bankrupt
States, or suddenly instilling financial probity into
the minds of disreputable Governments, it is to be
regretted that The Times, with all its powers of
advocacy has not been able to do better itselfs
and we should say that this alone should "justify
the existence" of such a body as the Corporation,
who at any rate h!!!, accomplished something.2
This same journal published Mr. Weguelin's remarks when
he addressed t'-:e General Court of the Corporation in
February of 1875 on the suddenly altered affections of
the press,

However, the Economist likewise pronounced

the society a failures
We fear it can hardly be said that this body has
achieved the position, as an agency for protecting
the holders of foreign bonds, which it was hoped
it would achieve.
The reasoning of the journal went as follows1
It was originally, and is nothing if it does not
remain, an association of capitalists largely in•
terested in loans to foreign stetesa but we doubt
if the best capitalist class in the City has not
long ago ceased to be very much interested in ·the
kind of loans where the bondholders most need protection. Hence the association is apt to become
unreal, many who may be largely interested not

1 The Times, Feb. 16, 1875, P• 10.
2Money Market R§View, XXX (Feb. 20, 1875), 217-18.
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being influential in the City ••• , while
other gentlemen who have the City influence and possession may have no sufficient interest to indu!e
them to take an active part in the proceedings.
It was therefore incumbent upon the Council to demonstrate
graphically its vitality in meeting the challenge of the
moment.
A wave of anger swept the City on news of the Sultan's
decree, with opprobrium being heaped on Turkey, the contractors, and any others who could be implicated, while
rumors filled the air, obscuring a proper view of the
situation. 2 For some time the Council had publicly aired
its misgivings on Turkish finances,3 this despite Gerstenberg•s position as a shareholder of the Imperial Ottoman
Bank. 4 The Corporation's efforts began with a meeting
chaired by John Lubbock, where it was decided to call a
general assemblage of Turkish holders for October 19, 1875.
at the City Terminus Hotel, to formulate a policy.

The

1 Economist. XXXIV (Feb. 26, 1876), 245.
2 one such story reported that Mr. Gladstone had
accepted an invitation from the Sultan to go to Turkey
where he would be given a free hand to untangle that
country's finances (Money Market Review, XXX [Oct. 16,
1875]. 421).

3~,, XXVIII (Feb. 28, 1874), 273.

4Bankers Magazine, XXXII (July, 1872), 593.
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attendance was excellent, the chair was occupied by
Hugh Childers, M.P., who urged both unity and moderation
toward an ancient ally,

Tempers were high. so that after

Mr, Galloway (a holder of £450,000 in "Turks") had resolved that the Council should handle matters, the volley
of verbiage began in earnest.

A •council' member, Mr.

Cornelius Surgey, drew cheers from the throng when he
saids
He thought they should take this opportunity of
calling on the Great Powers of Europe to do what
he considered it was their duty to do, and that was
merely to support the bondholders to the utmost with
the Turkish Government, and as old allies offer her
wise advice.l
~ir.

F.

c.

Hamond summoned the Government to stand up for

the bondholders and made dark threats against the Porte
should it misappropriate the Egyptian tribute•
Woe be to his suzerain if he tried to stop the
Khedive from performing an honourable duty, for
the first thing he would do wo~d be to declare
his independence of the Porte.
It was decided that each loan should keep its individual
securities and that a protest would be lodged with the
Foreign Office, which was delivered in person by a committee on November 5.3

Protests were also sent to the

1 Money Market Review, XXXI (Oct. 23, 1875), 438.
A full account of the meeting of October 19 may be found here.
2

Ibid., 439.

3wynne, p. 420.
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Grand Vizier and to the contractors of the 1858 and 1862
loans which the Council represented.

From October 26

to November 1 the Councilhouse hummed with activity as
holders of the several Turkish issues met to select, under
the 'Council's' aegis, committees which would then send
representatives to a general body which would act for all. 1
Four loans were not includeds the 1855 Guaranteed, which
had not been disturbed by the Sultans the l858s and two
others, the 1854 and 1871, both of which were pledged to
the Egyptian tribute.

The contractors for the latter

three issues, Dent, Palmer and Company, had already entered the lists on behalf of these creditors and soon
wished to assume a wider role.

On October 21 that house

held a meeting at which a committee was set up, including
Philip Rose from the Corporation. and a mission was directed
to Constantinople to appraise the situation. 2 In the meantime the Palmer group invited Messrs. Bennoch and EykynJ
to join their committee in its planned protests.

The ad-

hesion of these two men was accomplished but was short1 For reports of these meetings, consult the City
pages of The Times for October 27 through November 2, 1875.
2wynne, p. 421, n. 6.
)Roger Eykyn (1828-96) had married the daughter of
another 'Council' member, George Schlotel. Eykyn was a
Justice of the Peace for Berkshire and from 1860 to 1874
was Liberal M.P. for Windsor. (The Times, Nov. 16, 1896,
p. 6.)

"i
I
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lived, as they wished to keep their freedom of action,
The fragile arrangement flew apart at the December 6
meeting of the contractor's group, where E, H. Palmer
advised giving up individual securities and asserted
that his committee now spoke for all of the holders,
He also proposed a contribution of 2s. 6d.per hundred
pounds' worth of stock, and when IJ.Ir, Bennoch rose to
respond, the chairman (Mr, Palmer) declared his own
motion affirmed and fled, leaving all in confusion, 1
Of the sixteen plans being circulated, the
•council' decided to back Mr, Hamond's, even to the exclusion of those propounded by Philip Rose and Cornelius
Surgey, and this course was adopted by a gathering of
holders on December 10, 2
The organization's initial efforts in October
had been appreciated by many, and the Spectator, for
example, urged1

1 riioney Market Review, XXXI (Dec. 11, 187.5), 638-40.
2 rn accordance with the wishes of this meeting•
another deputation was sent to Downing Street on December
13, led by F, c. Hamond and including representatives from
Moorgate Street. The Foreign Secretary, decidedly piqued
that the bondholders now supported another plan, said he
would read their suggestions {ill,g_,, [Dec. 18, 1875]. 670).
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The best course for the Turkish bondholders is to
empower the Council of Foreign Bondholders, which is
composed of men of experience, to make the best
bargain they can at Constantinople, by persuasion,
or menace, or offer of some acceptable plan.l
The Times did not share this opinion1
Without in any way questioning the good intentions of
the Council of Foreign Bondholders, we must still
point out that its position towards Turkey is that
of an entire outsider. It is little likely, therefore, to obtain any consideration from the Turkish
Government, which will inevitably look upon its
protests and representations as the acts of 2a
troublesome and insignificant intermeddler.
By December the Corporation was being treated as a
villain• The Times refused to publish the particulars
of the Council's plan and warned that if no settlement
were reached it would be the fault of Moorgate Street.
Further, this journal endorsedthe Palmer Committee,
judging that representation by them would be superior
to that of "the chairmen of the various noisy and
separatist committees got together by the Council of
Foreign Bondholders."3

Mr. Hamond left for the Ea.st

but the press attacks continued. so that a meeting of the
Turkish holders was convened on December JO merely to
pass a resolution reaffirming faith in the Corporation
1 sRectator, XLVIII (Oct. 2J, 1875), 1319.
2 The Tiples, Oct. 18, 1875, P• 7.

3112.!!i.•• Dec. 8, 1875, P• 7.
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and registering surprise at the animadversions cast upon
their group. 1
At a meeting on January 10,

1876. convoked by

E. H. Palmer, it was announced that his efforts had been
paralyzed and that the Council was to blame.

Still. the

fragmentation of the bondholders had not run its course,
for although Palmer boasted that the combination represented between £600,000 and

~700,000

of tribute loan

securities, a new group had sprung up which would eventually join ranks with the Council--the Egyptian Tribute
Bondholders League.

.The new oommi ttee felt, as did the

Corporation, that each loan should keep its individual
security, and well might they argue this, for the Khedive
had lived up to the letter of the bond by forwarding the
tribute to the Bank of England, where it lay awaiting
the

~ignature

of the Turkish ambassador for its release.

But the ambassador approved the remittance of only hal:f'
of the funds, in accordance with the Sultan's decree of
October, l:J7.5. 2
Members of the Tribute League were present at the
Palmer conclave of Janua.r; 10 only to distribute copies of
1 Money Market Review, XXXII (Jan. 8, 1876), 31.
2 Wyn..11e, p. 419.
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their protest and of a statement of their raison d'etre. 1
They claimed to have the backing of £682,000 worth of
tribute stock holdings and felt confident that British
interest in the Levant was rising.

On

January 16 the

League put forth a pamphlet designed to garner adherents.
and on March 6 they held a private meeting.

Their ob-

jective was to obtain the release of the funds via the
courts, and if necessary, to call upon the Western Powers
should the Sultan attempt to appropriate the Khedive•s
payments.

Throughout the first half of 1876 the Tribute

League ran an independent course from the Corporation,
but on its governing committee sat Mr. George Taylor.
a •council' members thus a channel of communication existed
between the two bodies.

Reference will be made again to

the League and to the tribute loans since they are related
to both the debt of Egypt and to the development of the
Council.
Abusive exchanges with Dent, Palmer and Company
persisted but the Council met with as little result as
the contractor.

In late February Mr. Hamond reported on

1standard, Jan. 11, 1876, ACFB, Turkey, VIII, 26.
The points of the Tribute League•s objections may be
found here. An account of the meeting is given in the
Money Market Review (XXXII (Jan. 15, 1876], 65).
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the negative outcome of his journey to the Golden Horn. 1
The Council decided that efforts toward a settlement
should be continued, but for those securities not having
the :Egyptian tribute as hypothecated revenue, effective
action had ground to a halt.

With the revocation of the

decree of October, 1875. although no agreement was reached
it appeared to the Corporation that its own usefulness had
ended. 2 Turkey•s desperate position and intransigence
militated against a settlement, but bondholder disunity
was just as damaging.

Notables. philanthropists, and

financial practitioners, representing various groups or
no one in particular, poiulated Constantinople and badgered
the local English officials and buttonholed members of the
Sultan's entourage for support.
The Corporation, as well as the English holders
in general, soon realized that their French compatriots,
possessing poorer security for their money, were in no mood
to cooperate in maintaining the old arrangements.

Mr. Hamond

remarked with heat that M. Bour,e, leader of the French
bondholders, had telegraphed ahead to the Porte announcing
that they did not support his mission,3 while Palmer wrote1
1 For an account of the meeting, see the Money Market Review (XXXII [Feb. 26, 1876], 248-50).
2

~., XXXIV (April 14, 1877), J8J,

3Financier. Feb. 25, 1876, P• 5.
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The Minister most opposed to any exceptional
consideration for the Tribute loan was Youssouf
Pasha, the then Minister of Finance, possibly at
the instigation of the French section of the
General Bondholders.l
This lack of unity, and a stricture from the press,
placed the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders on the
defensive and colored its approach to the Egyptian
problem which was unraveling itself at the same time.
The Council's report for 1873 had stated:
It is now sufficiently recognisable that defaulting
states so far co-operate together that they take
example from each other's misdeeds, and it needs a
thorough union of Bondholders to resist their aggressions, and to bring to their minds the conviction that neglect of obligation to any one class of
holders will bel')met by certain exclusion from the
united markets,'
The hope for unity was to fade, but there seemed to be
substance in the idea that nations would emulate the malpractices of the defaulter, and this possibility, fearful
as it was, rose before the eyes of many, in respect to
Egypt, upon the news of the October decree of the Sultan,
Egyptian sacurities began to decline rapidly, as did the
price of bank shares.
1 Pamphlet enclosed in ACFB, T;urkey, x.
2 co;r:e, For, Bondh, Rep., 1873, p, 4o,
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By late October, 1876, the Globe reported that
railway construction in the Sudan had been curtailed to
save money, 1 and telegrams became more gloomy by the day.
The Alexandria correspondent for The Times bore witness
to the economic deline1
Certain, however, it is that heaps of people will
be cleaned out: The losses are enormous, and the
place has been in a state of the most complete
panic all the week.2
The floating debt was snowballing, and was estimated by the French agent to be between four and six
hundred million francs by December.J

With the situation

decaying rapidly, Ismail decided to take his plight to the
Western Powers, and by carefully treading the line dividing
France and .England, and the secured and unsecured creditors,
this Oriental funambulist aspired to emerge financially
rejuvenated, with his power intact.

The Egyptian Policy of the British
Governments November 1875
to May 1876
The English Prime Minister of the day, Benjamin
Disraeli, had taken office in February of 1874 with a

1Globe, Oct. 27, 1875, ACFB, Egypt, I, 296.
2The Times, Nov. 4, 1875, p. 6.
JBouvier, p. 75.

158

majority of J68 to 250 over the Liberals, excluding the
fifty-four Irish members.

The anti-colonial feeling of

an earlier day had peaked by the mid-186o•s, and Disraeli's
victory was due, in great measure, to his emphasis on Empire and security.

His appeal found a response which had

been prepared by a decline in British prestige on the Continent and a vague pessimism caused by economic depression.
For some time the more influential journals, the Money
Market Review, for example, had called. for Government
assistance on behalf of .the English bondholders 1
It need scarcely be said that the attitude of our
Foreign Office has been weak, and that the principle
of non-intervention, used up in Europe, and worn out
to a rag, has been a means of weakening English diplomacy, by an avowal of incompetency and of an indisposition to resist fraud and oppression. This
has to be stayed, and the steady action of the Council
of Foreign Bondholders, and of the Committees in cooperation with it, will be well directed in helping
to restore the functions of the Foreign Office to a
healthful exercise.l
Many members of the 'Council' looked with satisfaction
upon the Conservative triumph, and at the General Court
of 1874, General Sir George Balfour, M.P. for Kincardineshire, opined that "the new Government would give greater
attention to foreign matters," which, translated into the
needs of the bondholders, meant "influence which might
be exercised by the British Ministers in various ways." 2
1 Money Market Review, XXI (Sept. 10, 1870). 251.

2 Ibid., XXVIII (Feb. 28, 1874), 27J-74.
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Disraeli's imperial policy has been characterized
as the product of an "impossible romancer • • • an irresponsible novelist, 111 with policy in the East held up as
an example.

Egypt, which had hitherto occupied but a

modest corner of the world's stage, had been slowly
edging into the spotlight.

Nowhere more keenly than in

London was this alteration felt.

Although the amount of

trade between the United Kingdom and Africa was not significant in these years, that with Egypt was not to be
despised, seventy-fi"re per cent of the Nile Valley's imports came from the United Kingdom, a level which remained
fairly stable for the entire decade. 2 Cotton was the
1

John Lyle Morison, "The Imperial Ideas of Benjamin
Disraeli," Canadian Historical Heview, I n.s. (Sept., 1920),
278.
2Ashworth, PP• 143 and 146. The trade of the United
Kingdom with Africa is cited in the above work as follows1
Period

Percentage of Exports to Africa

Percentage of Imports from Africa

1860-69
1870-79
1880-89

5.9
5.5
5.5

6.o

8.4

4.8

A table of British trade with Egypt (1860-74) may be found
in an article, entitled "Recent Foreign Loans, Their Influence on Trade and the Rate of Discount," in Bankers
Magazine (XXXVI (June, 18761, 40J). Another source,
the Statist (I (March 2J, ie7a], 6) discussed the difficulties and cited statistics on trade with Egypt. There
was much faith in the yearly statistical summary of Egyptian
commerce released by R. J. Mosse of Alexandria.
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Nilotic region's chief export and with the end of the
boom in 1865, the country sank back to the position of
a third-rate contributor to the English looms. 1

Further-

more, Egyptian cotton became so notorious for its poor
quality that in 1874 a deputation of M.P.'s from the
textile towns presented the Foreign Secretary a memorial
on the subject. 2 Such publicity, coupled with the sluggish British economy, helped to pull down Egyptian cotton
prices 19 per cent from March 1875 to the spring of 1879.3
In addition, in 1873 there was a collapse of the market
for English plain and printed goods. 4
It was not her commerce, nor yet the rising level
of .English capital being drawn into Egypt, but rather the
Suez Canal which most interested London.

While the empire

of Louis Napoleon toyed with the idea of creating de Lesseps
the Duke of Suez, a team of British naval officers from
the India Office were inspecting the new waterway with
1 "The Distress of the Cotton Trade and the Future

Cotton Supply," Economist, XXVII (Nov. 6, 1869), 1)08.
By this date Egypt, Brazil and others together supplied
one-sixth of British cotton needs.
2 The Times, June 12, 1874, p.

5.

Jstatist, III (April 5, 1879), 111.
4 samuel B. Saul, Studies in British overseas Trade,
1870-1914 {Liverpool1 Liverpool University Press, 1960),
p.

101.
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regard for its military usefulness.

The importance of

the "Great Ditch" to the trade of the United Kingdom was
soon evident.

In 187.5, 1,494 vessels passed through the

Canal, paying £1,1.51,000r of these, 1,061 ships were
British and supplied £844,680 in tolls. 1 The transisthmian route also reduced the journey from London to
Calcutta by J,200 miles--thirteen days by steamer--which
affected a savings to the shippers as well. 2 The completion
of the Canal and the linking of London with Bombay by cable
in 1870 drew the Empire that much closer together.

But

Egypt was a part of the ottoman Empire despite its quasiindependent status, and the Compagnie Universelle du Canal
Maritime de Suez was a French operation headed by a man
with a score to evens
The Canal had been attacked so bitterly and so constantly by English interests that de Lesseps took an
almost fiendish delight in putting the thumb-screws
on British shipowners.J
Both Liberal and Conservative Ministries had staunchly
championed the cause of the shippers, 4 and several abortive schemes to buy the waterway or even to dig another
1 "The Suez Canal an International Highway,"
Quarterly Review, CXLII (Oct., 1876), 454.
2 Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXIV
(March J, 1876), 279.80.
3crabitas, The Spoliation of Suez, p. 141.

4Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold T. Wilson, The Suez Cana.la

Its Past, Present and Future (Oxfordt OXford University
Press, 19JJ), pp. 46-50.
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came to nothing, including the negotiations carried on
in 1874-75 by Disraeli in Paris through his friends the
Rothschilds. 1
Important as Egypt was to Great Britain, she contented herself with relying upon influence in Cairo to
achieve her wishes, and, when necessary, applying to the
Sultan

for his added authority.

France believed that

England was following a policy which would bind the Nile
Valley closely to England, 2 yet at Downing Street, Egyptian dispatches were still subsumed with the Turkish
documents, and the antediluvian consular machinery for
the Levant was to creak on until 1877, when it was reformed.

The English press was also quiescent on the topic

of a British penetration of Egypt, although there was the
occasional article which speculated on the division of
the "Sick Man's" effects once he should succumb.3

The

1 Hallberg, P• 222. Offers were extended from
several quarters, including one from a private group led
by Sir John Pender and the Duke of Sutherland, two indi7iduals much involved in Egyptian enterprise.

2nuc Decazes to Pellissier. Dec. 3, 1875, quoted
in Bouvier, p. SJ. The French Foreign Minister gave as

an example England's monopolizing the key positions in
agriculture, commerce, and public works.
JFor example, see Lepel Griffin, "·!'he Present
State of the Eastern Question," Fortnightly Review,
X:V n.s. (Jan., 1874), 21-42.
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situation was drastically altered between October, 1875,
and late spring, 1876, when it seemed an "Egyptian policy"
was unfolding.

Anti-Turk sentiment, exacerbated by the

recent default, merged with anti-Russian feeling which
counseled laying claim to Egypt before it was permanently
lost.

Even the Conservative papers began to think that

the dismemberment of Turkey might be advisable. 1

Sig-

nificance was seen in the Khediva•s son receiving the
Star of Indias at the same time, in early November a rash
of articles appeared, such as the Pall Mall Gazette's
"Egypt for the English," which heightened expectations. 2
We have already alluded to the unsuccessful struggle
of the Corporation on behalf of the Turkish bondholders,
and to the adverse publicity which damaged its reputation
in certain circles.

The Council, like the Egyptian bond-

holders in general, watched the bewildering turbulence of
Egyptian affairs, unable to penetrate the froth and foam
of the surface to determine the direction of the current
of events.

As long as Ismail paid his coupons, nothing

could be done.

Thus the holders remained apart, relying

on the letter of their bonds, eaeh searching for signs,
1

Lee, P• 9,

2George c. Thompson, Public o inion and Lord
Beaconsfieldt 1875-80 (Londona Macmillan Co., 1886), I,
238. Many o her articles are cited in this work to show
the lively interest generated by Egypt in the period.
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while behind closed doors the Khedive strained to fend
off bankruptcy, and foreign capitalists and their governments were to concoct scheme after scheme to solve the
problem and bring Ismail under control.

Therefore,

the actions of the Government were eagerly monitored by
the English creditors, for it was axiomatic that the more
deeply Britain became embroiled in Egyptian finance, the
better it was for the holders,

As long as it appeared

that the Government was interested in staving off Khedivial
bankruptcy, which they were, there was no need for bondholder activity.
Cabinet solidarity upon the Egyptian question unfortunately did not exist, or as Punch interpreted it.
"the Cabinet coach had the Derby drag on, and showy
driving from Ben on the box. "l

Foreign Secretary Derby,

who was assessed by a journalist of the day as thoughtful,
cautious, lacking in oratorical skill but possessing a wide
aptitude for business, 2 held the least popular view that
1 Punch, LXXI (Aug. 12, 1876), 70. By early March,
1876, both Carnarvon and Northcote had become concerned
over the effects upon France of divergent telegrams being
sent by Derby and Disraeli (Hardinge, II, 93).
Street
R. Ro

83.

• pp. 81-
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there was no interest which would force England into
Egypt, while the Prime Minister•s "imagination cannot

have been so limited, .. although "he used none but vague
phrases .. on the subject. 1 At the Lord Mayor's banquet on
November 10, 1875. Disraeli spoke of England•s stake in
the Middle East, and even the Khedive and his court began
purchasing stock for the rise, through Parisian houses. 2
Disraeli's coup de th4!tre which would widen the dichotomy
of views within the Government was indeed close at hand.

One of the last salable assets possessed by Isma.11

Pasha was the block of 176,602 shares of the Suez Canal
Company.

Upon learning of their availability for purchase,

Disraeli obtained the Cabinet's reluctant approval on
November 17 to tender an offer, despite Lord Derby's
opinion that such an action would lead to "disagreeable
correspondence both with France and the Porte."J
On November 12 the Khedive had signed a contract

with a French banker in which a one-week option was given
to arrange a loan with the Suez shares as collateral.
1 Buckle and Monypenny, V, 45J.
2

~, Nov. 19, 1875, ACFB, Egypt, I, 224.

3Derby to Lyons, Nov. 19, 1875, Lord Newton,
Lord Lyons, a Reeord of British Diplomacy (Londons
Edward Arnold, 1913), Il, 87.

While
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these sub rosa negotiations were being carried on between several French houses, the news was leaked to the
British Government, and Derby inquired of his agent in
Paris, Lord Lyons, if he had heard such rumors, since
England viewed them as serious and would herself be prepared to make the purchase. 1 .Although the correspondence
between the houses of Rothschilds was generally "extraordinarily uninteresting." 2 it may be that one o:f' that
family•s agents did catch wind o:f' the negotiations in
Paris or Cairo.

Perhaps more plausible was the sugges-

tion that it was Henry Oppenheim, acting on his own or
on the Viceroy's authority, who wished London involved in
the salvaging of Egyptian fortunes.

If so, his choice of

Frederick Greenwood, the editor of the solidly conserva•
tive Pall Mall Gazette, was the right one, for on being
told of the contemplated sale on the evening of November

14, he went directly to Downing Street.J Disraeli enthusiastically wrote his Sovereign, "Tis an affair of
millions, about four at leasts but would give the possessor
an immense, not to say preponderating, influence in the
1 Derby to Lyons, Nov. 17, 1875, ibid., p. 86,
2stephen L. Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell,

The Life of the Rt Hon Sir Charles W Di ke
Lon on1 John Murray, 9 7 , I,
•
3-::uckle and M.onypenny, V, 439-40,

Bart

M.P.
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management of the Canal,"1 but the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, never a convert to
bold action in Egypt, feared that "suspicion will be
excited that we mean quietly to buy ourselves a preponderating position, then turn the whole thing into
an English property." 2 Decisiveness seemed imperative,
for Sir John Rose, a member of the •counci1.•3 had
informed the Government that there were now several
French parties bidding for the shares. 4 Under these
circumstances the attitude of the Quai d'Orsay had to
be determined.

London had made it clear to the French charge
that Britain could not allow the Khedive's shares to fall

~.,

1 01sraeli to Queen Victoria, Nov. 18, 1875,
P• 443.

2Northcote to Disraeli, Nov. 26, 1875, Great

Britain, Iddesleigh Papers, British Museum Additional
Yianuscripts (hereafter BM Add MSS) 50017, p. 129 (copy).
3s1r John Rose (1820-88) was born in Scotland but
Amigrated to Canada, where he engaged successfully in
commerce and entered government in 1857. He held several
posts and proved useful to Downing Street. In 1868 he
came to London to float a railway loan1 there, in 1870,
he joined an investment bank and, shortly thereafter, the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, where he could look
after Canadian interests (~, XVII, 242).

4w. H. Smith to Northcote, Nov. 2.3, 187.5.

Iddesleigh Papers BM Add WJSS 50017, P• 118.
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into French hands 1 1 and notified General Stan.ton. the
English agent in Cairo. to advise the Viceroy not to
finalize an arrangement without listening to London first,
Confronted in this manner, the French Foreign Minister,
the Due Decazes, presented no serious objections to the
purchase 2 despite his angry histrionics before The Times
correspondent Blowitz.3

There was no doubt that the

Third Republic placed great value upon the friendship
of Great Britain, which would explain their policy, but
in addition there were personal motives,

The Credit

Foncier of Paris, which formed the focal point of all
combinations willing to purchase the shares, suddenly
opposed the entire scheme and in doing so, left the
United Kingdom alone in the field, 4 The French houses
1 Hallberg, p, 238,

2 Robert Blake, Disraeli (Garden City, N,Y.a Anchor
Book, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1968), p. 557. Any displeasure of the Quai d'Orsay was not evident in the press
{Lucien E, Roberts, "Egypt as a Factor in European. Power
Politics, 1875-1878," in Power, Public ff1nionb and Diplomacy, ed. by Lillian P. Wallace and W !lam • Askew
[Durham, N,C,1 Duke University Press, 1959], pp. 49-50),
3crabit&s, The Spoliation of Suez, pp. 173-74.
4 charles Lesage, L'Invasion an laise in
tes
L'Achat des Actions de Suez novem re
Parsi P onNourrit, Cie., 190 • P• 55.

hoped to unburden themselves od Khedivial paper by
utilizing the prestige which would accrue from the
involvement of the British Government.

The Due Decazes,

a man knowledgeable in Middle Ea.stern affairs through his
membership in the Imperial Ottoman Bank, 1 and greatly
immersed in the activities of the Credit Foneier, 2 also
had a stake in these negotiations.
The transaction was closed on November 23, and
in three days the stock was delivereds the Rothschilds
advanced the almost £4 million purchase price (at 2.5
per cent commission), un'til Parliament could approve the
proceedings, which it did on February 20, 1876.

In the

long run this speculation with public money in a private
venture was most profitable,J but it made England also
another creditor of the Khedive, for he and his minister
Nubar Pasha had carefully hidden the fact that the stock
was not free from encumbrance.

The Viceroy had lost the

revenue upon his shares until 1895, and at a meeting on
1Bouvier, P• 101.
2charles R. Wilson to Disraeli. April l, 1876,
quoted in Rich~r~ A. t}ffiRsa P~rbti~f Polict1 Towangf
~~fty1 ~r 6 c~ifo~l~ atsB:rkel;y: i96~)~ :. 5~: n JHallberg, p. 2J8. The shares were purchased at
£2J each, slightly above prevailing market ~rices, but
by 1881 ~hey were quoted at £78, and by 1905 the English
block was worth £JJ million.
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August 24, 1871, the Canal Company had also stripped the
shares of all voting power for the same periods thus the
Khedive was liable to England for an annual payment of
£200,000, and any role in Canal management which Britain
might play had to be negotiated with de Lesseps. 1
Great was the surprise and general approval of
the populace on learning of their Prime Minister's

~

de forces led by The Times (which usually opposed Disraeli, though perhaps less so on imperial policy) 2
England's journals paid their court.

Mr. Gladstone, who

assumed a negative stance,3 admitted that

0

a storm of

approbation seems to swell, almost to rage, on every side." 4

1 rn an arrangement signed on February 3, 1876,
between Stokes , representing England, and the Canal Company, the United Kingdom received three of the twenty-four
seats on the Board of Directors, along with a promised increase in their representation in 1895. Charles Rivers
Wilson was one of the men deputed by the Government to
represent London (Hallberg, pp~ 247~9). see Crabites
(The Spoliation of Suez, p. 184) for the text of the agreement.
2Lord Esher (p. 61) viewed The Times as usually
hostile to Disraeli, while Paul Knaplund (Gladstone's
Forei~ Policy (New Yorks Harper and Bros., l9J5], p. 66)
noted his sympathy toward the Prime Minister on imperial
matters.
JThis opposition was forgotten, for on September
27, 1882, Mr. Gladstone suggested to Lord Granville that
the Government make an additional purchase (Knaplund,
P• 165).
4 a1adstone to Granville, Nov. 28, 1875, Agatha
Ramm, ed., The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone
and Lord Granville~ l868-z6, Camden Third Series, LXXXII
(Londona Buttler, anner and Co., 1952), II, 473.
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No evidence exists that Disraeli actually designed to
throw over Turkey for a new Egyptian policy, 1 but he
certainly realized the importance of this route to
India and defended his actions in Commons as follows1
I have never recommended this purchase as a f inancial investment • • • • I do not recommend it either
as a commercial speculation. • • • I have always and
do now recommend it to the country as a political
transaction.2
The Prime Minister had obtained a counter in the diploma tic game, while the press had labeled Egypt terra
Britannica, should Turkey collapse.

To investors in

Egyptian securities such prospects were most welcome.
Sir George Elliot, M.P. for North Durham (and deeply
involved in. Egypt) voiced his support of the purchase,.3
Goschen took the same view--considering it a wise political stratagem4--while the Chairman of the Bank of Egypt
remarkedi
It [the step taken by England] appears to have
commanded the general approbation of the country.
and I have no doubt whatever that our Government
1 B1ake, P• 561.

2 Quoted in Roberts, "Egypt as a Factor," p, 55 •
.3areat Britain, Parliament, Hansard•s Parliamentary
Debates (hereafter Hansard), Jd ser., Vol. 231 (Aug. 5,
i876), col. 6Jl.
4 Goschen to Granville, Dec. 7, 1875, Lord Edmond
Fitzmaurice, Life of George Leveson Gower, Second Earl
Granville' K.G., lBl5-lB9l (London: Longmans, Green and
Co., 1905 , II, 158.
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has been well
and that they
step, and one
great benefit

informed of what they are about,
have taken a cautious and prudent
that h~reafter we shall find of
to us.l

The Corporation also looked with favor on the
Government•s policy and saw in it a potential advantage
to the bondholders1
The recent policy of the British Government in
acquiring the Viceroy's interest in the shares of
the Suez Canal may be made, it is to be hoped, the
basis for founding a system of administration better
adapted to the real development of the resources ~f
the country, and the establishment of its credit.
Some •council' members, the Deputy Chairman John Lubbock
among them, favored the purchase but disliked the arcane
way in which it had been brought about, since it had

caused much speculation on the Exchange.3

But another

member, Mr. Philip Rose, was pleased that negotiations
had succeeded at all, for as he reminded Corryt

rs it not curious that the arrangement which I
was urging upon Mr. D. 18 months ago, to secure
the Suez Canal for the English Govt., should have
been brought about, tho• in a much better way,
as my plan contemplated an arrangement with
Lesseps and his Company, whereas they have now
got a title from the Sovereign, f.Tld have helped
that sovereign at the same time?'¥
1 Bankers Magazine, XX.XVI (March, 1876), 219.
2corp, For, Bondh. Rep., 1875. P• 16.
3Hansard, Jd ser., Vol. 231 (Aug. 8, 1876), col. 855,

4Philip Rose to Corry, Dec. l, 1875, Buckle and

Monypenny,

v,

~51.
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If the shares purchase was to be a signal for Jritish
expansion, there were certainly many on the •council'
who could look with approbation upon the fact, 1
As encomiums poured in from all sides; the Conservative Government contemplated its next move.

Bismarck

was quick to congratulate Britain warmly on its demarch,
and on November 29, 1875, broached the subject of an
eventual division of the Ottoman Ernpire. 2 To mollify

France, however, on November 27 the British Foreign
Secretary informed the French Ambassador that England
was not averse to the establishment of an International
Commission to manage the Canal•

This ignited the vigorous

opposition of Lord Carna.rvon, the Colonial Secretary,
the only Minister of Government who actively promoted an
aggressive posture in Egypt.3

On November 29, 1875, he

1 Aside

from the societies already mentioned, several
'Council' members were enrolled in the Royal Colonial Institute, established in 1868• and they included two of its
trustees, Sir John Rose and Lord Kinnaird, as well as
Augustus B. Abraham, Hyde Clarke, and Sir John Lubbock.
Other members of the Royal Colonial Institute interested
in F.gypt included Stephen Cave,, George Goschen, Sir Henry
Drmnmond Wolff, and, interestingly, Hermann Oppenheim. The
Royal Asiatic Society, a more scholarly group, included
among its membership General Sir George Balfour and William
Trotter, also from Moorgate Street.
2

Lee, P• 20.

JThe Secretary for India also expressed a willingness to see Britain intervene in~~he. Turkish Empire <Salisbw::':'l. to Mal~t Jan 14 18?6 La~ Gwendolen Ce~li, L1:re
01· "Rooer-c;- i•1ia~u1s• oI' !>aJ.isbLry [London a Hodder and Staughton, Ltd,, 19 -J2], II, 86).

r
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laid his views before the Prime Minister, arguing that
they should pause over their success and study the temper
of Europe and of the British people, since "the control of
the Canal is valuable as a step to the control of Egypt." 1

For the English public, the policy which emerged was a confusing affair:

while Lord Derby gave speeches designed to

dampen public ardor, a mission was sent forth to Cairo to
look into the financial affairs of the Khedive.

The gentle-

man selected to make the inquiry for the Government was
Stephen Cave, M.P., a Bristol banker who held the post
of Paymaster General. 2
On October JO, and again on November 16,

1875,

the Viceroy had requested England to send out financial
experts to assist in the modernization of the Egyptian administration; but red tape held matters up, for by Novem-

ber 26, the day of the shares purchase, the Treasury reported that not enough information ha.d been given.:3

On

1 carnarvon to Disraeli, Nov. 29, 1875, Carnarvon
Papers PRO FO J0/6/11.
·
2 sir Stephen Cave (1820-80) passed the bar in
1846, and from 1859 until his death sat for Shoreham in
the Conservative interest. He was both a traveler and a
linguist, and possessed much financial experience, since
he was a member of the Bank of England and was placed on
the Parliamentary Committee to investigate foreign loans
in 1875 (m:ill,., III, 1250).

c.

3Parliamentary Papers. LXXXII, Egypt No. 4 (1876),
lJ96, Nos. 1-5.
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the same day Mr. Stephen Cave was selected, 1 and three
days later General Stanton was apprised of the mission's
early departure for Egypt. 2

Although no written in-

structions to Cave survive, the objective of the journey was to determine if Egypt could continue to meet her
obligations, 3 if necessary with the aid of a financial
advisor, and, if the Khedive could be convinced that such
a need existed, to arrange for the arrival of a second
emissary.

The wishes of France were not consulted, for

it was feared that Paris would use the Viceroy's pecuniary
embarrassments to obtain control over the Cairo Government.
The public looked on with interest as a high officer of
the Crown prepared to vacate his duties for several months,
and. accompanied by a staff drawn from the Foreign Off ice
and War Department, departed for Egypt, all in response
to Ismail's desire for two clerks,
1 On November 26 the Prime Minister suggested

Cave for the Egyptian mission (Buckle and Monypenny,
.

v. 454).
Papers,

lo-
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On arriving in F.gypt on December 16, Cave folmd
himself surrounded by intrigants, 1 mountebanks, money-

lenders, and groups of major capitalists, and in the
midst of it all, an agitated prince who disliked the
precedent for foreign interference which was being set. 2
De Lesseps soon appeared on the scene and busily engaged
in persuading the Khedive to part with his founder's

,I
,111

i1

'·II
111

rights to 15 per cent of the profits of the Canal Company
(which was now beginning to produce revenue) for a loan of

I:
'I
11

:

£2 million at 9 per cent.J

Henry Oppenheim informed the

British Foreign Office that de Lesseps had come to Cairo

11

I'!
Iii
1

'I
I

with a plan to form a company "to lease the Egyptian railways, the harbour of Alexandria and tobacco dues and thus
to furnish the money for paying off the floating debt." 4
1 0ne of the arch-intrigants in a land of artifice

was Nubar Pasha, who fancied himself the Bismarck of Egypt.
He worked against Mr. Cave's investigation, but when Ismail
discovered he was leaking information to the Greek Consul
General, and was in touch with the Russian agent as well,
Nubar was exiled (Stanton to Derby, Dec. 2J, 1872. Great
Britain, PRO Foreign Office Confidential Prints Lhereafter
PRO FOCP1 407/7, No. JO, P• lls Atkins, P• 116). For a
sketch of Nubar, see Cromer, II, 335-40.
2

cave to Derby, Dec. 2J, 1875, PRO FOCP 407/7,
No. 18, P• 8.
Jcave to Derby, Dec. 20, 1875, ~•• No. 17, p. B.

4 0ppenheim to Corry, Dec. Jl, 1875, quoted in
Atkins, P• 65.

I
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If such were the case, English capitalists (principally
those connected with Sir George Elliot who, as contractor for the new dock facilities, was still owed £1.4 million, 1 and many bondholders, especially those of 1873)
would have much to complain of, since these securities
had already been hypothecated,
Oppenheim was not a neutral observer, for he
himself was trying to gain support for a project of his
own contrivance to prop up Egyptian finance. 2 The Duke
of Sutherland,

at~other

personage with economic ties in

Egypt, also had a solution to the Viceregal embarrassments, but he contented himself with personally carrying
his cause to the Prime Minister,J

such was not the case

with the combination represented by Sir George Elliot.

As

the director of the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance
l

p. 66.

Edward Valet to Salisbury, Feb. 18, 1880,

~ ••

2 Northcote to Cave, Jan. J, 1876, Iddesleigh
Papers BM Add MSS )0063/185 {copy).
JGeorge Granville William Sutherland LevesonGower, Third Duke of Sutherland (1828-92), represented
sutherlandshire in Parliament from 1851 to 1801. He
was not politically minded, and preferred travel, railway buil4ing. land reclamation, and the development of
his urban holdings. such as those in Cairo (DNB, rr.
1026-27; Atkins. P• 661 Baron Samuel Selig de Kusel,
An English.Iran's Recollections of Egypt, 1863 to 188
London1 John Lane, 1951 , p. 9

.i,I
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Company, this gentleman had for years been deeply
interested in Egypt's communication system, and
appreciated its importance to Britain.

While Elliot

betook himself to the Levant to promote his scheme and
to obtain the adherence of Mr. Cave, J.

c.

Parkinson,

his son-in-law, remained in London to cultivate Government support.

Backing Elliot was the Imperial ottoman

Bank, Glyn Mills, and most likely Friihling and Goschen. 1
The Government gave no official cognizance to any of
these would-be nostrums.
For the M.P. for Shoreham far from home and under
great pressure, matters became less clear, and he was soon
admitting to the Foreign Office that he liked the Elliot
proposals, and reported on January 22 that Ismail preferred
them too. 2

More disquieting to Downing Street was the news

that Cave had used his influence with Stanton to gain
additional time for the British capitalists,3 whereupon
Derby demanded an immediate denial1 a few days later the
Elliot plan collapsed.

The plan was actually doomed when
the Rothschilds chose to remain aloor. 4 a fact which.
1 Bouvier, P• 8.5.

2cave to Derby, Jan. 22, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/7,
No. 77, P• 38.
JElliot to Parkinson, Feb. 1, 1876, ~ ••
No. 81, P• 44.
4Northcote to Disraeli, Feb. 2, 1876, Iddesleigh
Papers BM Add MSS 50017, P• 158 {copy).
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when communicated to the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
did not surprise him since he had felt for weeks that
Egyp,tian bankruptcy was a foregone matter. 1
More anxious for a settlement than the English
groups and more heedless. too. of the rights of the
bondholders, were the French bankers who banded together in early 1876 as the Grand Syndicate, 2 which
included Oppenheim-Alberti, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank,
and the bulwark of the combination, the Credit Foncier,
under the nominal leadership of Edouard Hentsch of the
Comptoir d'Escompte.

The immediate objectives of the

Syndicate were to maintain market prices of Egyptian
securities by purchase on the open market, and to grant

l·.11,

'!!I

w

extensions on Khedivial paper so that they would have time

:1,1

to devise a project to allow them to transfer their share

~"I

of the debt to the public.

They anticipated imposing

their will upon the Viceroy in order to obtain solid
hypothecations, and placing the necessary loan for the debt
consolidation in a preferential position.

In

short, the

ii::'

~

'I',

iN1~

~A
I

I
'

bonds of all other issues were to be abridged insofar as
they impinged upon the new arrangement.

Such an attitude
I

.1'1
i I

1 Hardinge, II, 93.
2Eighteen banks constituting the Grand Syndicate
are listed in the Bouvier article (p. 94).
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seemed to them justified by the situation.

By February
the Anglo-Egyptian had lost £444,ooo on its holdings, 1
but in Paris, where holdings of F.gyptian paper were conservatively estimated at e7.6 million2 (and which probably
well exceeded £20 million), nerves were frayed.

The Credit

Foncier, whose bylaws forbade investment in such securities.
and who.se billcase could be examined only by its Governor
and De?uty Governor--both of whom were chosen by the French

Government--and the Finance Minister, had acquired £5.75 million (141 million francs) in Egyptian paper.3
Since it appeared that Cave was in Cairo to support
English capitalists, the ex-Finance Minister of Italy,

s, Soialoja, was also dispatched, while the Due Decazes
sent the tactless and abrasive Maxim Outrey, who had been
removed as agent in Egypt in 1867 at the behest of th4
Viceroy.

outrey•s sojourn probably did more harm than

goods one of his favorite themes was that "l!hgland was
trying to obtain possession of Egypt," 4

Jules Pasttf,

the Syndicate's man on the scene, pressed vigorously for
the creation of a National Bank of

Egyp~

with his institu•

tion as lts nucleus, which could consolidate the debt into
1 Barclays Bank, P• 80.

2 The Times, April 12, 1876, P• 8.

'Ibid., May a, 1876. P• a.
4stanton to Derby, Jan. 15, 1876,

No, 47, P• 20.

PRO FOCP 407/7 1
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salable obligations.

By the time of Cave's departure,

a contract had been signed, but the British Foreign Office refused to be a party to it or to send a commissioner
to partieipate, 1 thereby ruining its chances for success.
While plans to send Wilson went ahead, Derby rejected France's suggestion of restricting Viceregal. responsibility by arguing that Her Majesty's Government "have
no reason to suppose that the Khedive desires the establishment of any system of control over his finances by
foreign governments. 112

Cave was alive to the power which

an English financial adviser might wield in Cairo.3

His

report, released in April, 1876, emphasized En.gland's
desire to use financial influence to guide Eo"71Jt, for it
advised that the Khedive "should place a person who would
command general confidence, such, for instance, as the
financial agent sent out by Her Majesty•s Govemment
to take employment under his Highness. 114 Again there was
1 Derby to Stanton, March 6, 1876, ibid., No. 141,
P• 77. The Foreign Secretary stated that !f"the bank commissioners had the power to eontrol revenue, England might
reconsider its decision. This was reiterated in Parliament by the Prime Minister as well.
2Derby to Lyons, Feb. 19, 1876, Pa~iamentary
Papers, LXXXIII, F.gypt No. 8 (1876), c. 14 , No. 2• P• l,
Jcave to Derby, Jan. 5, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/7,
No. 49, P• 21.
4 Parliamenta§ Papers, LXXXIII, F.gypt No. 7
(1876), No, 7, C. 14 , P• §.
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no allusion to Paris.

When the document was eventually

published, a periodical of the day remarkedt
His whole Report is framed on the supposition
that Egypt would somehow be treated for the
future like a native Indian State. He does not
say this in so many words1 but he continually points
out that what is really wanted in Egypt is the presence of a body of officials like those who administer
in India.1
Ismail•s strategy was still to play the foreigners off
against one another and to rest in the belief that his
collapse would not be permitted,

The French people,

stirred by chauvinism engendered by the shares purchase,
supported a strong stance in F.gypt. 2 In turn, their
government worked closely with the Parisian bankers to
present a solid front to the Viceroy.3

Ismail had been

forced to mortgage his founder's rights in the Suez Canal
in early February for a

£)

million loan, which was ab-

sorbed in Paris to meet interest due.
English public opinion towards Egypt had begun
to cool by early spring, with fewer journals speaking
out as Government's policy became more ambiguous.

But

the Cabinet had not lost sight of Egypt's importance,

1Saturd.a.y Review, XLI (April 8, 1876), 446.
2Lyons to Derby, March 21, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9,
No. l, P• l.
JBouvier, PP• 89-90.
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and as Cave busied himself in completing his report,
Downing Street prepared to carry into effect the second
phase of its program.

The Observer, edited by Edward

Dicey, announced on February 12, 1876, that Charles
Rivers Wilson, Comptroller General of the National Debt
Office, had been selected as the financial expert to
travel to Cairo, 1

Two days before, Northcote had laid

the off er before Wilson, promising him a six-month leave
of absence, which the latter accepted. 2 Wilson's personal
secretary on this mission described his chief as intelligent and able to extricate himself from a tight corner.
but "in all circumstances, his first consideration was
for himself."J
Wilson arrived in the Egyptian capital late in
February after pausing en route to discuss matters with
1 charles Rivers Wilson (1831-1916) came of a financial background and in 1856 entered the Treasury as private
secretary to the Financial Secretary. In 1874 he took up
the duties of the National Debt Office, and in early February of 1876 was chosen to represent England at the Canal
Board• which he did until 1896, when he retired from Government, He maintained his connection with private enterprise
and directed the Alliance Assurance Company {DNB, 1912-21, p.
581-82).
--Wilson,
Arnold,

2Northcote to Wilson, Feb. 10, 1876, Charles Rivers
Cha~ters from .My Official Life (London1 Edward

i9l ),

p.

84.

JFleetwood Guy Wilson, Letters to Somebody
(Londons Cassell and Co., 1922), P• 51.
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Cave in Paris.

His task was to secure a settlement of

the Egyptian floating debt which would be just both to
the creditors and to the Viceroy, 1 while at the same time
representing English capitalists.

Among the latter were

Baring Brothers, and his friends, the Rothschilds, with
whom he communicated by cyphered messages.

The arrival

of Wilson elicited the same response from Italy and France
as had the Cave Missions from the former came s.

Baravelli

to render the Khedive wiser with his sage counsel, and
from Paris came M. Villet, 2

Again the Frenchman had the

Quai d'Orsay behind him while, as Wilson complained, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer gave Jl!!B. only "platonic"
support.J

The Viceroy persisted in requesting Britain

to approve the national bank scheme, while opening conversations with the London Rothschilds through Wilson. 4
The interest of the "great house" merely redoubled French
1 Derby to Lyons, rJia.rch 25, 1876, Parliamentar::y
Pa;eers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 8 (1876), C. 14821-, No, jl, p, 2J.

Theodore Rothstein, ~t•s Ruin 1 a Finrc5c1al and
Administrative Rteord (Londonl: ~. ~l?Ield, 190). p. 26.
M. V!!!e~ brough a scheme, from the French Syndicate,
which included the outlines for a Commission of the Public
Debt.
2

3c. R. Wilson, p. 86,

4stanton to Derby, March 18, 1876, PRO FOCP

407/7, No, 168, P• 86.

'
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determination to impose a settlement on Ismail with its
concomitant restraints on spending, even without British
adhesion. 1
positions

Ismail found himself in a most uncomfortable
the European community in Egypt favored the

. t ' 2 p as t re, th rea t ene d a cessa ti on of f un d s, J
Frenc h proJec
the Cave Report, though not yet published, hung like an
albatross about his neck, prohibiting freedom of actions
and Treasury bills which could not be met were again rapidly falling due.
A

But temporary relief was at hand.

meoting of members of the major French houses was con-

voked, at which the necessary funds to meet the Khedive's
Treasury bills were promised, after which Decazes personally
thanked those on hand for their patriotic action that day. 4
But the Viceroy was not out of the woods by any means, for
on April J the Cave Report was released.
As soon as Cave touched English soil, the financial
press began to call for publication of his figures, and in
1 such threats to act without England were voiced

in a letter by Decazes to Outrey on March Jl, 1876 (Bouvier,
p. 90), and were passed along to Derby by Lyons on March 21
(PRO FOCP 407/9, No. 1, P• l}.
2 The Times, March 20, 1876, P• 8.
Jstanton to Derby, March 21, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/7 1
No. 189, P• 90.
4 Lyons to Derby, April 1, 1876, ibid. 407/9, No. 28,

p. 17.
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Parliament, City men were continually asking questions of
the Government.

The investigation had cost the people of

England £22,200, 1 and there had been much speculation in
Egyptian bonds.

On

March 23 the Report was submitted to

the Government but was withheld from publication, Disraeli
explained, because such was the Khedive•s desire, 2 therefore the feeling arose that something was being concealed,
and stocks plunged.

The Viceroy complained bitterly about

the handling of the affair, and some have argued (unlikely
as it seems) that Derby had used the threat of publication
of the Report as blackmail to offset mounting French pressure.J
Ismail could not resist for long, and in ten days• time he
asked that the document be released.
The Cave Report gave the revenue of Egypt, with the
Moukabala, at £10,7 million, from which £7 million was needed
for interest on the total debt which was estimated at £75 million (the floating obligation being placed at £24 million,
including the Daira bills).

This situation could not con-

tinue, even though the author waxed confident that with ad•
justments the creditors might be repaid.
vocated was•

The solution ad-

(1) to combine the I.aira and national debts

sinca the latter could not pay its ways (2) to consolidate
1 The Times. Anril 1, 1876, p. 7.
2 Hansard, 3d ser., Vol. 288, col. 480.
)Rothstein, P• 21.
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all into a seven per cent debt to be paid in fifty years,
(J) to raise a loan on favorable termsi

(4) to reduce cor-

ruption and waste by employing European officials, 1

All

of these conclusions had been arrived at after careful
inspection of the chaotic accounts of the Malieh,

The

Report served as yet another depressant on the slumping
Egyptian market.

On April 6 Ismail promulgated a decree

suspending all payments on Treasury bills for three months,
effectively admitting bankruptcy.
The Viceroy still hoped to use the Rothschilds, who
had decided to pursue the problem of Egyptian finance. 2
At the same time, although it had abandoned the bank scheme
the Syndicate had another settlement to propose.
remained solidly behind the French capitalists and

Decazes
by

the

end of March had persuaded the Parisian branch of Rothschilds
not to support the London house,J

This being the case, the

British concern decided not to move except with Government
support.

c. 1425.

Wilson was sanguine about what might be accomplished,
1 Parliamentary PaEers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 7 (1876),
2

J·, Pauncefote to Tenterden, March 13, 1876, quoted
in Atkins, p. 72.

3w11son to Disraeli, April 1, 1876, ~•• p, 75.
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even after the Khedive's decree1
It certainly does strike me, as it struck very
forcibly Lord Lytton and Lord B. Frere when they were
here, that a very remarkable opportunity has been af·
forded and is I think still available for England, if
it is her interest to do so, to acquire by honourable
means a preponderating influence in F.gypt.l
The Government still opposed a total default by Egypt. 2
but they could not give the Rothschilds the sort of backing
which they requested.

The "opinion out of doors" tht:tt

there was no consistent foreign policy being followed3
seemed to be borne out as the Cabinet looked on while
French bankers won the field and dictated terms.

The

Syndicate and the French Government wished for English
participation, and Alfred Rothschild informed Northcote
at the eleventh hour that France was willing to listen to
any arrangement London might propose. 4

With the atmos-

phere becoming more threatening in the Middle Ea.st,
Downing Street wished to keep its freedom of action and
refused to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt.

1 c. R. Wilson to w. H. Smith, April 9, 1876,
Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50017, P• 196,
2Northcote to Tenterden, April 18, 1876, Tenterden
Papers PRO FO J6J/2,

>w. H. Smith to Northcote, April 17, 1876,
Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50017, P• 194.
4Northcote to Disraeli, May 1, 1876, !.!?J:.s!., P• 204.
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The arrangement between Ismail and his floating
debt creditors (the unsecured debt having reached
£27

million) was concluded in a series of three de-

crees, 1

On May 2 the Viceroy proclaimed the creation

of a Commission of the Public Debt (Caisse de la Dette
PUbligue) which would have representatives from France,
Italy, and England (should she choose to participate),
and which would control the collection and disbursement
of public money.

The second decree, issued on May 7,

dealt with the conversion of the debt.

Under its pro-

visions the debt was set at £91 million, inclusive of
the glut of paper in French portfolios which was to be
paid off in sixty-five years at 7 per cent.

All old bonds

were to be turned in for the new Unifieds. with the 1862,
1868, 1870, and 1873 holders exchanging at par, while the
so-called short loans of 1864, 1866, and 1867 (whose maturity dates were relatively near) received a bonus. 2 But
the largest bonus was reserved for the Syndicate, and
was equivalent to 25 per cent, that is, £80 o:f' the
Khedive•s Treasury bills would entitle the holder to
£100

of the new scrip.
1 wynne,

Ismail was granted a £5 million

pp. 588-91.

2 The loans of 1864 and 1866 received a 5,25 per
cent bonus, while the 9 per cent issue of 1867 was granted
an 11.75 per cent advantage,
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loa.n, 1 and altogether approximately £6.5 million would
be necessary to service the consolidated debt.

On May ll

a third decree was promulgated establishing a Supreme

Council of the Treasury to oversee all state revenue
collection and expenditure. 2
Wilson strongly protested these proceedings.
and on May 8 asked London's permission to return home,
which was granted.J

The Foreign Office informed the

Khedive in clear terms that the new settlement was unsatisfactory and that they would not participate in itr 4
the astounding rise in the floating debt (£6,5 million
per month), the terms of the conversion, and a desire to
avoid responsibilities of every sort were all reasons for
this course.

so the English exodus began, General Stanton,
who had acted as agent since 1865, was removed to Munich,
1 The loan was issued at 72, which added £6 670,000
1
to the debt and cost the nation £950,000 a year, a rate
of 19 per cent for the entire transaction.
2 Th1s body--unlike the Caisse which handled only
funds springing from sources guaranteed to the creditors
and used to pay coupons--was to have power encompassing
all state finances. It was replaced later in the year by
the controllers under the Gosehen scheme.

)Derby to Stanton, May 18, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9,
No. 109, p, 70,
p, 75.

4 nerby to Stanton,

lV'ay

2J, 1876, ibid., No. 115,
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and Wilson departed after creating antipathy in the
European community. 1 The French bankers had won, but it
was a Pyrrhic triumph, for pressure was still severe since
the bondholder, like the quadruped in the saying, had been
brought to the water but could not be made to drink.

The

investors, confronted by the new arrangements, refused
to purchase or exchange their old scrip for the new, a
situation which had not been fully considered.

Thus by

the end of May the bondholders were in an uproar, the
English Government was disengaged, and a new initiative
by the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was about to
begin.
1 Baring wrote that Wilson, during his stay, had
run up petty debts, which the Viceroy was later forced
to pay, and had thought only of his own position (Baring
to Gosohen, March 22, 18?8, Cromer Papers PRO FO 633/2).

CHAPTER III
THE COUNCIL ACTS IN EGYPT
MAY 1876 TO MAY 1877
Egyptian securities began to slump in July, 1875,
depreciating 15 per cent in value in four months, prompting
The Times to begin its policy of steering investors away
from Khedivial bonds. 1 This dolorous view of the situation proved correct, for F.gyptian securities suffered
heavily throughout the period of the negotiations in
Cairo.

The Economist presented the facts arrayed in

Table 7.

The general decline was punctuated by occasional

rallies, as when Britain made the shares purchase. which
caused the 187J issue to jump from 52 to 69 in but a few
days, 2 The Suez stock rose in Paris from 690£ to 706f,
as people placed their money in securities which were
felt now to be more reliable.3

Optimism was sustained by

1 The Times, Oct. 27. 1875, p. 6.
2

Ibid,, Dec. 6, 1875, P• 6,

Jstand.ard, Nov, 27, 1875, ACFB, ~. II• JO.
A letter, signed "W.H.P.", stated that th&Writer had

bought ''Egyptians" at the time of the Canal shares purchase in the belief that England would soon occupy that
area {Statist, I (April 13, 1878], 129).
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the departure of Mr, Cave for the Easts to many, Ismail
was beginning to resemble an English client,
including those possessing the tribute

Bondholders--

loans~-expected

that British financiers in Cairo would improve matters.
Throughout the winter sundry rumors and imprudent utterances by those in the Government sent the market leaping
and plunging. 1 The most chronic Egyptophiles were finding
their mettle being tested, and even the great coup of
November was suspect1
'What are we to do with these four boxes of scrip
brought home from Egypt in the Matybap?' an eminent
civil servant asked an eminent cl
man. •no with
them?' answered the cynical banker, 'Paper one of
your offices--say, by preference, the Bankruptcy
Court. •2
By mid-March, 1876, twenty-one brokers had failed at
Capel Court, and it was openly surmised that without
the continual French purchases, Khedivial bonds would
probably drop 20 per cent in value.3

With the release

of the Cave Report, there were wild fluctuations on the
Paris Bourse, and the ill effects in England were such
1 The Economist chided the Chancellor of the
Exchequer for say!~ tha:t Ismail could pay his debts
without producing a shred of evidence to substantiate
this claim ("New Information on Mr. Cave•s Mission,"
Economist, XXXIV [Feb, 19, 1876], 214),
2

·w. Hepworth Dixon,

0

The Way to Egypt," Gentle-

man's M§l;gaZine, X:VI n,s. (Feb,, 1870), 166,
JThe Times, March 25, 1876, P• 7•

194

that those speculators who profited from the decline were
called "Cave Bears" by Punch. 1 The Bµllionist placed the
blame for this state of affairs on the Government's
shoulders a
The enormous fluctuations that have gone on from

day to day in Egyptian bonds are largely due to the

bungling action of the Government, who by the course
they have taken in the whole matter have inflicted
a maximum of injury upon the holders of Egyptian bond~,
without banefitting in any degree the ruler of Egypt,
The Corporation's quiescence on Egyptian affairs
has been partially explained by the loss of its chairman,
the dearth of success in defending the Turkish bondholders.
the attacks by the press, and the form of its bylaws which
prevented its taking action before a de facto default.

In

addition, the initiatives of the Government forestalled
the Council's action, since the latter assumed that Downing
Street was working if not for its own nationals, then at
least not against them.

However, by Vi.arch the Corporation

(now faced with the defaults o:f' Peru and Mexico), as well
as the investing community in general, was becoming exasperated with the Foreign Secretary.

The Economist remarked•

It is fairness, moderation. and above all, steadiness,
which impress these hand-to-mouth Governments. Lord
Derby is always fair, always moderate, but he is
not always firm.J
1

Puncht LXX (April 22, 1876) • 161.

2 Bullionist, April 8, 1876, ACFB, Egypt, III, 292.

J .. The Difficulty of Dealing with Bad Governments,"
Economist, XXXIV (~'larch 25, 1876). J66.
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But hampering the Corporation's actions was the
lingering question of the finances of the organizati on.

According to

w,

H. Bishop• a leader of the dis-

sidents within the Corporation after 1880• and himself
elected to the •council' in 1889; the conflict arose
when
those original subscribers were not consulted as to
the change effected, but were; in 187J; informed
that the 'Corporation• had been registered under
the Limited Liabilij;y Acts, without the addition of
the word 'Limited, 1 1
Mr, Gerstenbere was of another opinion, and argued that
subscriptions • • • by persons who had joined the
association for objects other than the protection
of the interests of foreign. bondholders had • • ,
been returned_.2
As long as there was nothing to divide; the question was
moot.

In 1874 the Corporation generated enough revenue

to meet expenses,J but in the following year experienced
a loss exceeding

£6,ooo, 4 this, after the Council reported

that a circular would be sent to all bankers with an eye
1 Bishop, P• 1,
2 The Times, Feb. 26, 1874, p. 7,.

3corn.

For. Bondh 1 Rep., 1874• p.

7•

4Money Mar}tet Review, XXXII (March 4, 1876), 282.

to increasing life memberships. 1

The repayment of the

certificates was a burden on the Chairman, 2 and in fact
the circumstances that the Council were too desirous,
at the present time, to repay the advances as quickly
as possible, rather hampered their action occasionally.J
At the General Court of 1876 it was disclosed that £18,726
had been earned in commissions by the society for the
settlement of Colombian and Spanish defaults. 4

Again the

cry for dividing profits arose, and one member, Mr. Dickson,
opined that the institution had accomplished nothing that
would not have occurred anyway, and that the group should
liquidate,

It was even necessary for Lubbock to assure

his listeners that no •council' member was in receipt of
any

remun~ration

and that the mission of Roger Eykyn to

Spain upon their behalf was not primarily a business trip
for his own benefit at their expense.5

Such being the

atmosphere at Councilhouse, concerted action was difficult.
Nevertheless, the •council' was rebuked by an irate member
on just those grounds:
1 Corp, For. Bondh. Rep., 1875, p. 6,

2 rbid., 1885, p. 5. By this date the entire amount
of the original permanent certificates was repaid.
)Money Market Review, XXX (Feb. 20, 1875). 220.

4 rbid., XXXII (March 4, 1876), 282.
5Ibid., 28).

I,\
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The Council might have long ago intervened with
the Egyptian Government, initiated some plan in
connexion with the Egyptian debt, and seen whether
something could not be done to prevent the catastrophe which had occurred.l
The Corporation was sensitive to the plight of
the Egyptian bondholders and undervalued neither their
importance nor that of the Nile Valley.

As will be

remembered, several who sat upon the 'Council' also
participated in the investment trust movement,

Acting

Chairman Francis Bennoch. General Vaughan, and Albert

w.

Ray, a Corporation member, were all involved in the

direction of the Omnium Stock Trust, which possessed blocks
of Egyptian 1873, Daira 1866, Egyptian Tribute of 1871, and
other investments in the Nilotic. 2

Bennoch was also the

chairman, and Mr. Ray the manager, of the Government Stock
Investment Company, this organization possessed a large
number of shares of the 1871 tribute loan among its "ragged
lot of wretches ... .3

Finally, the Foreign and Colonial Govern-

ment Trust was well represented at Moorgate Street, and
among its extremely large holdings were most descriptions
of Egyptian bonds.

The interest of the •council' members in imperial
matters was also great 1 as attested by their activities in
1 rbid., 282.

2 rbid., XXVIII (June 27, 1874), 840.

Jin 18?6, £137,000 out of the £150,000 of this
trust's securities were in default (ibid., XXXIV [Feb. 17,
1877], 174),
----
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the Royal Colonial Institute, the Royal Geographical
Society, and related orga.~izations. 1

Sir John Rose. for

example, believed in maintaining the ties between .England
and Canada. 2

Lubbock bolted the Liberal Party over home

rule for Ireland,

'3.J.!d

was a dominant figure in the reor-

ganization of the Royal Colonial Institute, he felt that
the i.mperial relationship with India was ideal.J

Upon

the •council' there were many others who were interested
in, or who had spent a portion of their lives in the subcontinent--Clarke, Wythes, 4 Vaughan.5 Balfour, Kinnaird,
and Tyler, 6 to mention the most important.

Egypt, the

1 Refer to Table 2 in the Appendix.
2 navid NI. L. Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada,
1867-1887 (Torontos Universlty of Toronto Press, 1955),
pp. 20-21.
JJohn Lubbock, First Raron Avebury, Addresses,
Political and Educational (Londona Macmillan, 1879),
p. 170.
4 aeorge A. Wythes (1811-83) was a railroad contractor who aided in the construction of the Indian and Penin•
sular Railway. He joined the Council in 1873 and served
on the Spanish Bondholders' Committee (The Times. ~iarch 7,
188J, p. 7).
5.Major General John Luther Vaughan (1820-1911)
served in India with great distinction. Upon retirement,
he entered the world of investment, joined the men of
Moorgate Street. and participated on various committees
(~ •• May 4, 1911, P• 11).

6capta.in Henry W. Tyler (1827-1908) was Government

Inspector of Railways in 1853. climbing to Chief Inspector
in 1867, which post he held for ten years. He was involved
in Indian railways, and brought much experience in this
form of transportation to the •council' when he joined in
1875 (~ •• Jan. Jl, 1908, P• 14).
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portal to the East, and the Suez Canal, its key, were to
remain of significance to the Corporation, but the protection of the investments of English bondholders there
was a primary concern.

In the long haul, it would be

easier to arouse public support on these imperial considerations rather than on behalf of the bondholders.
On February 25, and also on March

J, 1876, the

Royal Society of Arts (Indian Section) heard and discussed
a paper on "The Suez Canal and English Trade," presented by

Charles Magniao. 1

The proceedings received wide publicity,

and some of those present complained that too much consideration for British interests was evinced by the author.

Hyde

Clarke, in supporting Mr. Magniao, remarked on the history
of the Canal, that the "design of M. de Lesseps was dis-

tinctly of a political character, and it was Lord
Palmerston's duty to oppose it in the manner he did. 02
In the ensuing discussion, the Secretary of the Corporation
of Foreign Bondholders expressed a hope that

rdr. Cave's

1 Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXIV
(Feb, 25, 1876), paper presented (~SJ-61)1 (March J,
1876), discussion of the paper (277-84).
Charles Magniac was a partner in Matheson and
Company, and was elected to Parliament for St. Ives from
1868 to 18?4. In 188), after leaving the Corporation, he
was elected to the presidency of the London Chamber of
Commerce {The Times, Nov. 24, 1891, p. 6),
2 Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXIV
(March J, 1876), 280-81.
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mission would be successful. although he would rather
have seen an Indian civil servant sent out to deal with
the Khedive. 1 Aside from these observations, the •council'
remained silent on Egypt's debt until Way, when it appeared that the Cabinet had become disinterested. 2
Opposition to the Viceroy's May 7 decree was
generated in Parisi M. Naquet,J a radical firebrand in
the Chamber, called for a general investigation of the
Fancier.

The English journals were also perturbed, com-

plaining that the Cave Report had not really been incorporated in the new arrangements, 4 that the safeguards
provided by the Caisse were illusory,5

and that Ismail

still would not honor his engagements. or, as the 1:!2.!ll: put it,
the best friends and greatest admirers of the Khedive
do not venture to express any cgnridence that Egypt
will be able to pay 7 per cent.
But most nettling of all was the favored treatment given
holders of the unfunded debt.

1 Ibid,, 281.

The Times declared that if

2Bouvier, P• 96,

J"Tho Credit Foneier and the Paris Money Market,"
Economist, XXXIV (May 27, 1876), 621.
~·,

40 The First Composition of Egypt with Her Creditors,"
(May

13, 1876), 561.

5standard, Wiay 18, 1876, ACFB, E&Y;pt. IV, 106.

6ttour, May 9, 1876, ibid,, 6.

-

-

201

those holding Treasury bills were to lose 60 per cent of
their face value, they would still turn a profit, 1 while
the

~

warned 1

Egypt is insolvent, and the circumstances under which
she makes her first offer of a composition, and the
torms by which she gives advantages to her unsecured
over her secured creditors, preclude the hope of
anything like a real improvement in the Khedive•s
financial administra.tion.2
The sharp rise in the floating debt from a reported
£12 million in September, 1875, to the £28 million of
May, 1876, lent weight to the words of the Economists
The Khedive has never yet paid any material annual
sum out of' his revenue towards the interest of his
debts he has always been able to borrow, and has
borrowed about the whole amount of that interest. 3
Although it was true for the moment, as Punch quipped,
"Paynim pay nix," many British journals counseled actions
again it was The Times which advised the holders not to
exchange their old bonds for new, and the Monetacy Gazette
concurred:

"If our readers have any confidence in our

advice, they will leave these ingenious gentlemen to
their own deviees. 04

For some investors there was

1 The Times. April 28, 1876, P• 7.
2

~, May 16, 1876, ACFB, ;Eg;tpt, IV, 78.

JEconomist, XXXIV (May lJ, 1876), 561.
4 The Times, June 21, 1876, P• 9J Monet@;!'.j!
Gazette, Jlme ~1. 1876, ACFB, .EttYEt, rv. ~50.
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comfort in knowing that those responsible for their
plight were also suffering1
The only matter for satisfaction is that the holders
of the Treasury bills who did the bad finance, and
who trusted to an endless series of loans to relieve
them. have been many of them 'caught' in the end
and cannot dispose of their rubbish,l

As might be expected, the first steps ta.ken on
behalf of the British creditors were formal protests to
Downing Street.

On the morning of May 11, Goschen paid

a visit to the Foreign Secretary, and on the following
day a memorial on behalf of the holders of the 1862 and

1864 loans was presented by the contractors Fril.hling and
Goschen to be transmitted to Egypt,

In pa.rt, the docu-

ment read:
We shall be greatly obliged to your Lordship if you
will urge on General Stanton. to support our protest,
a~d to point out to the Government of the Khedive
how unfairly the holders of the bonds of these
loans have been dealt with. 2
Lord Tenterden,3 responding to these requests for support,
replied a
1 "The Financial Effect of the Egyptian Debt Consolidation," Economist, XXXIV (May 20. 1876), 593.
2Frii.hling and Goschen to Lord Derby, May 12, 1876
Parliamentar.i Papers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 8 {1870), c. 1484,
No. 72, P• 57.
3charles Stuart Aubrey Abbott, Third Lord Tenterden,
(1834-82) entered the Foreign Office as a precis writer for
Lord Stanley, and from 1871 to 1873 was Assistant Under
Secretary and then Permanent Under secretary at Downing
Street (~. I, JO).
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I am to inform you that copies of your letter with
its inclosures will be sent to H.M.G.'s agent and
Consul General in Egypt, but his Lordship fears he
cannot do more than instruct him to give unofficial
assistance to the agents of the persons interested in
bringing their representations to the knowledge of
the Khedive for his Highness' consideration.l
A few days later, the Imperial Ottoman also lodged a

protest against Egypt with the Foreign Office, for its
loan of 1867, and argued the priority of their claims and
the special nature of the Khedive•s obligations to the

creditors. 2
The Co:rporation of Foreign Bondholders was still
the soi-disant champion of the British investors and it
was to this organization that many bondholders immediately

applied for aid.

Therefore, on May 22, Hyde Clarke also

submitted a protest to Lord Derby which pointed out:

One circumstance which is regarded as very serious,
is that a government like that of Egypt, which is of
ambiguous constitution and only guasi sovereign, the
claims of which sovereignty are not recognized by our
legal Tribunals, should attempt by arbitrary decrees
to alter and cancel contracts, and to divert securities,
without reference to the wishes, interests, and feelings
of the other contracting parties. An example like this
cannot fail to exercise a ver-J prejudicial influence
in many cases.3
1 Lord Tenterden to Fruhling and Goschen, May 19,
1876, Parliamentary Papers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 8 (1876),
C. 1484, No. 77t P• 68,
2 William Lander (Secretary, London Office for the
Imperial ottoman Bank) to Derby, May 18, 1876, !PM,., No. 75,
p. 72.

p. 76.

3Hyde Clarke to Derby, Ma.y 22, 1876, ~·• No. 82,
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Lord Derby found the language of this missive too strong,
and refused to send it on to General Stanton.

Neverthe-

less, the Foreign Secretary indicated that "he would be
willing to instruct General Stanton to give such unofficial
assistance as he properly can to any representative of
the bondholders in bringing their views before the Khedive," 1
It must be admitted that this action by the Council
was made with some reluctance,

There seemed to reign among

many holders a feeling of apathy, and at Councilhouse there
was less than eagerness to enter the Egyptian fray.

But

a vocal minority of investors who were alive to the dangers
of the present situation, and who saw their plans for a

steady income jeopardized, were in a bellicose frame of
mind.

Of course, in the last analysis the individual

holder was the master of his own fater he might send his
bonds in for conversion and receive the interest due him,
or stand out and hope that most others did the same.

Time.

therefore, was important. for although the press might
advise a firm stand. there had to be a palpable movement
under way for their defense.

The Corporation certainly

believed in the just cause of the Egyptian holders, for
as it observed. "interests, at variance with those claims
[of the bondholders], were assuming undue prominence, and

p.

85.

1 Tenterden to Clarke, May 29, 1876,

11?..!.s!·• No. 88,
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were likely to obtain undue preferenoe. 01

For some time

Egypt had been in the thoughts of the 'Council.' since,

as Lubbock later recalled, "we were pressed by many
holders to do something, but there was no consensus of
opinion what steps should be taken. 02
Pressure mounted on the institution as letters
began to appear in the press, questioning the Council's
inactivity.J

Perhaps even more disquieting was the possi-

bility that the holders would act independently and, perchance, successfully, which would be a blow to the organization.

In Alexandria a committee of bondholders had been

formed, 4 and Daira creditors from Egypt and England, buoyed
up by persistent rumors of a British ooeupation,5 suggested
the confiscation and sale of Isma11•s property, as would
1 CofR, For. Bondh. Rep., 1876, P• 8.
2Money Market Review, LX (March 1, 1890), 509.
JFor example, in a letter to The Times (May 17,
1876, p. 12) a holder said that the Egyptian situation was
even more pressing than the Turkish and called for the
Council's good offices.
4~. May 5, 1876, ACFB, ;Egypt, III, 408.

5Lee, P• 2J.

Rumors had persisted throughout
April that the Sultan had given Britain a free hand in
the Nile Valley, this topic continued to appear in print,
as in the News of the World of June 4, 1870 (ACFB, .E;gypt,
IV, 216) •
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be done with any other debtor,

More disturbing still

was the effort of two stock and share dealers, Williams
and Jones, to organize an Egyptian Bondholders' Committee, 1
With so much afoot, Clarke registered his protest
and the Council announced that a meeting of Egyptian secured creditors would be called in the near future, 2
At the last moment, however, there came a postponement
which in some quarters was greeted with satisfaction.
The Daily Telegraph. a supporter of the Khedive and a
foe of the speculators, wrote1
As we opposed the design of this meeting from the
first we quite approve of the postponement. and only
hope that it will be for an indefinite period. This
unquestionably will be the view of the immense majority
of bona-fide bondholders,3
The Monetary Gazette was less strident1
The interests of bondholders are not best promoted
in noisy meetings where discussion is apt to run
into partisanship, but by prudent and concerted
action, •• , the creditors of a defaulting State
when soured by disappointment are not in the fittest
mood for debate on the methods of actiop which are
most advisable under the circumstances.4
This obvious reference to the handling of the TUrkish
default perhaps coincided with views held by the 'Council'
itself, as they began casting about for a solution which

1 The Times, May 22, 1876. P• 5,
21£!g_,, May 24, 1876, P• 8,
JDaily Telegra2h, May Jl, 1876, ACFB• Egypt, IV, 202.
4 Monetary Gazette, June 7, 1876, ibid., 226.
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would be popular, prudent, and efficacious.

A month

passed, however, before the Council took action at a

time calculated for its salutary effect upon the enterprise.1

In the meantime. excuses had to be made. such

as that in Cornelius Surgey•s open letter in the Money
Market Review.

Surgey argued that the Corporation,

faced with default. could do little without some assistance from the Government.

"Why," he asked, "should she

[England] not address a mild remonstrance to a defaulting
State and suggest a just and honourable arrangement with
its cred1tors?" 2

Egypt was, as Lubbock said, a cause of

much anxiety to the Council, but decisive action by the
Corporation would be facilitated by the appointment of a
permanent chairman.
Since 1874 a great share of Council business had
devolved onto the shoulders of Francis Bennoch who, as
Acting Chairman, had tried to bring the organization
through the turmoil of 187$-76.

He had served well as

a stop-gap, he was a self-made man, an example for the age
1

Corp. For, Bondh. Rei•• 1876, P• 8. The Council
felt that the favorable momen had arrived at the expiration of the Khedive•s decree of April 6 (the decree suspending Treasury bill payments for three months), which
placed pressure on the Cairo Government to come to terms
with her creditors.
2Money Market Review, XXXII (June 17, 1876), 682,
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who had entered a mercantile establishment at sixteen
and was a partner in his own firm by twenty-five.

This

concern, Bennoch, Twentymen and Rigg--wholesalers and
manufacturers--maintained a good reputation in London,
and Bennoch personally played an important role on the
Common Council and in City developments generally.l
As temporary chairman he had provided the Corporation a
broad knowledge of United States and European affairs
and a zeal for the defense of principle, the latter
quality bringing him into sharp verbal and epistolary
combat with those who wished to bar the Corporation from
the Turkish debt settlement.

But his enthusiasm had

won him enemies both among the bondholdors and on the
Stock Excha.."'lge.
A change was therefore thought necessary, so
that at the General Court of 1876 the •council' announced
its determination to seek outside the society for a salaried
chairman.

Such a step was deemed correct because of the

power of the office.

As Lubbock later said, although the

'Council' was there to help,

the threads of all negotiations pass through the chairman's hands ... 2 The post
0

1 charles Rogers, The Mgdern Scottish Minstrelsr or

the Son.gs of Scotland of the Past Ifilf Century. with Memoirs
Charles Black, lBSS-57

of the Poets (Edinburgh1 Adam
v. 1.

ana

2Money Market Review, LX (March 1, 1890), 510.
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required full-time attention (a vice chairman was
appointed only in 1896 to ease the burden); the stipend
to be paid was £1200 a year. 1 The authority for this
decision to pay the chairman lay in Rule 20, which permitted the disbursement of funds to individuals engaged
in Council workr nonetheless, the move was attacked by
the dissidents as illegal. 2 The decision had its drawbacks, which were illuminated

by

the press.

Besides

weakening the esprit of the •council' and introducing a
monetary nexus, the proposal would cause the philanthropic
aspects of the association to suffer, and as the Economist
observed.
the appointment of a paid Chairman will be no remedy.
• • • We should certainly like to see a different
constitution from what is proposed for the Council
of Foreign Bondholders. though we are quite aware
how difficult a proper organisation will be.3
Nevertheless, the man selected, Edward Pleydell
Bouverie (1818-89), was well known to the members of the
•council' through his City connections and his lifelong
friendship with George Bentinck,

The new chairman was

1 Bishop, p. 12
2 Rule 20 was also applied in the presentation of
a £500 testimonial, in November of 1876, to Francis Bennoch
for his service to the institution as temporary chairman
(Bishop, p. 12).
)Economist, XXXIV (Feb. 26, 1876), 245.
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the second son of the third Earl of Radnor, and was a
Whig in his politics, having entered Parliament in 1844
for Kilmarnock, which seat he held for thirty years. 1
In that period Bouverie occupied several posts 2 but high
office was never his, for he was "prone to independence
ascribed to thwarted ambition,"3 which led him afoul of
the Party leadership, as on the Irish Education Bill of
1873, when he broke with the Liberals.

While in Parlia-

ment, Bouverie had irritated Lord Granville, among others,
with his personal attacks on Gladstone. 4 which Disraeli
used to disport the House.5

Although other appointments

and honors would follow, Bouverie was never again to sit
in Commons after his departure in 1874.
Perhaps the new chairman's independence struck a
1

.m.m.. x:v

t

1309.

2Bankers Magazine, L (Jan., 1890), 75. Bouverie
held the following postsc Under Secretary of State for
the Home Department, Chairman of Committees, Vice-President
of the Board of Trade, President of the Poor Law Board,
Member of the Committee of Council on Education, Second
Church Estates Commissioner, and Ecclesiastical Commis·
sioner.
3Southgate, p. Jll, n. 1.

4Fitzmaurice, I, 500; Bright to Granville, Jan. 15,
1875. ibid,, rr. 14J.

- 5Buckle and Monypenny,

IV, 12.
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responsive chord among the 'Council,' or his City influence 0r government experience might have been the
deciding factors, at an;y· event, in July of 1876 the
selection was made, 1 and the formal announcement came
in early August.

Bouverie, who was to be the "life and
soul to this institution" 2 for the auc~eeding thirteen
years, stated his views at the General Court of 1877,
including a strong posture against defaulters, a disposition toward expansion of Corporation activities,
and

the conviction that the institution was no philan-

thropic body and needed funds to exist.

In addition,

Mr. Bouverie believed in the weight of moral pressure
and did not desire the Government to look after the
bondholders' interest when there were alternatives, such
as those present in the case of F.gypt,J
Although the Council was still very sensitive
over the Turkish debacle (which J. B. Martin mentioned
in a letter to The Times on June 21), still the "Thunderer" was for the moment less antagonistic towards
Councilhouse than heretofore.

Two sources of aid for

1 cor:p, For. Bondh. Rep,, 1876, p. 9,
2 The Times, Dec. 17, 1889, P• 11,
JMoney Niarket Review, XXXIV (March

J, 1877), 227,
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the bondholders the paper immediately eliminateda
It is quite useless to look for help to loan
agents, they are too deeply involved for the most
part in the treasury bill deadlock, Neither ought
a.D outer~ to be raised for Government help which
cannot be given,l
Martin exhibited surprise at the holders• passivity1

The bondholders, as might be expected, were at
first staggered by the preposterous nature of the
terms offered to them; but it might reasonably have
been presumed that they would not be long content
to stand quietly by and allow the proposed measures
to be carried through without a protest.2
On the following day a holder of the 1868 loan reported

that he had received a letter from Hyde Clarke in which
the

Secretar-~

said the Council was at present canvassing

the views of English investors,3 and on the twentyseventh a small number of bondholders met at Councilhouse and decided to apply to Mr. Goschen to represent
them. 4
The idea of securing the services of Goschen had
first been rumored in the previous year and had met with
general satisfaction.5

The credit for winning over the

new emissarJ (for whom the project might result in unpleasant political overtones), and for preparing the way
1 The Times, June 21, 1876, p. 9.
Jibid., June 22 • 1876, P• 7.

4 Cory. For. Bondh. Rep., 1876, p, 22.

5;rioney Market Review, XXXI (Nov. lJ, 187.5). 527.
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with both the Khedive and the French capitalists, belonged
to two men, Hyde Clarke and Henry Oppenheim, 1
The Norns had been good to Mr. Goschen in the
intervening years since he chaired the first meeting of
the Council in 1868,

With the Liberal victory, he had

entered Government as President of the Poor Law Board
and in 1871 was named First Lord of the Admiralty.

Al-

though the Conservatives carried the day in 1874, Goschen
retained his London seat, riding a wave of hero worship
in the City, which for a time perhaps overrated him.
Disenchantment would set in, but he was "nonetheless
among the greatest financiers of the time and one of
the ablest men of the age," 2

In 1866 the M.P. for London

had been viewed as a radical by the Conservatives,3 and

was soon an intimate friend of Gladstone. 4

But a strain

developed between Goschen and his chief, for the former
was strong-principled, and in 1874 had opposed Gladstone
11:!2!:!£, July lJi 1876, ACFB, ?ll;ypt, IV, J62t

The Times, July 8, 18?0, P• 9.
20 The Right Hon. George Joachim Goschen, M.P.,"
Bankers .Magazine, XLVIII (Aug., 1888), 808,
3Buckle and Monypenny, rv, 427.
4 awynn and Tuckwell, I, 179.
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on the naval estimates. 1

The appraisal of Mr. Goschen

by Lord Acton is interestinga
Goschen is above sordid motives. He dreads the
radicals, • • • and, if left to himself and the
nearest influences, he will drift away. His lips
have never been touched with the sacred fire of
Liberty. His international soul has never glowed
with the zeal of the good old cause. He is moved
by the fears to which city men are prone, and there
are people more calculating than he is, who work
those fears.2
In fact, Goschen refused office in the Gladstone Government of 1880 and eventually joined the Conservatives.
Mr, Goschen had also kept up his City connections)
and had watched Egyptian developments as well, joining
with Hardington to support the shares purchase.

The

Egyptian loans which the family concern had sold in
England were those enjoying some of the best security,
and had also been those least onerous to the Viceroy1 4
perhaps it was as much an antipathy to rsmail's dealings
of late as a desire to protect his reputation that moved
1 Lord George Francis Hamilton, Parliamentary

Reminiscences and Reflections (Londona John Murray,

l9l7-22), I,

J7.

2Lord Acton to

Mary

Paul. P• 165.

Gladstone, Feb. 2, 1881,

JGoschen was a director of the Alliance Insurance
Company (sharing the board with Rothschild), a Governor of
the Hudson's Bay Company, and a member of the directorate
of the Marine Assurance Company.

4Mulhall, P• 526.
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Goschen to assume the cause of the bondholders.
Drummond Wolff• who accompanied Goschen,

0

Henry

the parent of

Egyptian loans," thought that it was a question of conscience and that the M.P. probably felt a moral responsibility to those who had placed their trust in stocks
which he had helped introduce to the market. 1
On

the morning of July

J,

a deputation of bankers,

holders, and •council' members met with Mr. Goschen and
obtained his assent, in general terms, to the group's
request for his assistance in the present Egyptian difficulties.

This solicitation was formalized immediately

by a letter from Councilhousea
The variety and complications of the different
Egyptian Loans. render it absolutely necessary that
English interests should be represented by some man
of sufficient influence and known name to secure
attention, and to protest those interests during
this crisis in Egyptian finance.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The object of this letter is to obtain your
formal assent and to enable you to make such stipulations as, under the circumstances, you may think
desirable, which will, in due course, be submitted
to the Bondholders.2
1 sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Rambling Recollections

(London: Macmillan and Co,, 1908), II, i4I and 138.
2 Hyde Clarke to Goschen, July 3, 1876, Council of
Foreign Bondholders, The Egyptian Debt! Mission of the
Right Hon. G. J. Goschen, M.P. (hereafter Council, ~
tian Debt. Mission)(London, Dec. 1876), Appendix,
pp. I-ii.
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Goschen's reply on the following day reaffirmed the
agreement but set conditions, beginning with a vote
of confidence from the English investors1
The responsibility of giving any advice, or taking
any steps in the present crisis of Eg;,rptian finance
is so great, that nothing could induce me to incur
it except an almost unanimous wish on the part of
those interested, so far as their views can be made
known.l
He also desired the cordial backing of the contractors
so that he might truly speak for all parties.
were other preconditionsa

There

he would have full control

over negotiationss he would in no way be involved in
any financial transactions or combinations, his position
would be honoraryr a trip to Egypt under any circumstances
would be out of the question, and no policy would be pressed
on Government if politically inexpedient,

Upon this final

point alone Goschen felt the bondholders had enough ground
to refuse his services.

The financier-turned-politician

foresaw no easy solution to the Egyptian dilemmas
It would be a great satisfaction to me if I
could succeed in any degree in mitigating the sacrifices which are asked of the English Creditors of
Egypt, and of removing in part the injustice to
which they have been ~xposed, but the difficulties
appear to me extreme.
To implement Goschen's wishes it was decided that
holders of Egyptian securities might register their views
on the subject either at Councilhouse or at their banks,
although the process would be slow, it would avoid the

1Goschen to Clarke, July 4, 1876, ~·• p. ii.
2 rbid,, P• iv.

217

possible embarrassments of a general meeting.

With the

appearance of a champion for the English creditors, the
Stock Exchange Committee also took action, and after a
discussion with the Comptoir, exercised its Rule 59.
Therefore, on July 7 it was announced that quotations on
the new Egyptian stock would be denied until the bondholders had given their assent to a se·ttlement and had
turned in their old scrip for new, which few had done to
that date.

As expected. this action had an immediate im-

pact, closing the London market to the Syndicate. 1
But even at this point affairs might have gone
awry, for suddenly there was an announcement that a meeting
of Egyptian bondholders would be convened on July 14.

Both

the sponsors of the assemblage and its objectives were obscure, but the Corporation's antagonists in the journalistic
world proclaimed it a probable inspiration of Moorgate
Street 2 in an attempt to establish some control over Goschen.
A highly pejorative tone was struck by J.

c.

McCoan, who

staunchly supported Ismail and harbored an abiding dislike
for the Council,
whose unsolicited intervention in our affairs we
utterly deprecate. • • • we desire that this commission [Goschen•s] should be of the most authoritative
kind, emanating directly from the bondholders them1 The Times, July 8, 1876, P• 9.
2

~·•

July 13, 1876, P• 7.
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selves in meeting assembled, without the endorsement
or counter-signatur~ of Mr. Hyde Clarke and his colleagues in any way.l
Such a meeting was also frowned upon by those numbered
among the bondholders• friends, such as the Financier,
which assumed a somewhat pedagogic air1

We would suggest the advisability of a large and
influential attendance at Friday's meeting combined
with due circumspection and a business-like moderation of tone on the part of those who propose to
take part in the proceedings.2
Two hundred holders appeared at the Westminster
Palace Hotel on the appointed date, and, there being no
one who would commence the proceedings, Sir John Lubbock
was prevailed upon to take the chair.J

The Deputy Chair-

man of the 'Council' expressed his ignorance of the cause
of the meeting, which the Corporation had publicly disavowed, but he supposed it was meant to strengthen Mr.
Goschen•s hand.

As the meeting progressed, however, it

became clear that the holders had been summoned not simply
to affirm freedom of action for Goschen, but to circumvallate his effort with a higher authority, a committee
of creditors which would advise him.

Mr. John Horatio Lloyd,

l~.

2Financier, July llt 1876, ACFB, Egypt, IV, 356.
JMoney Market Review, XXXIII (July 15, 1876), 59.
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chairman of the Government and Guaranteed Securities
Permanent Trust, and the admitted sponsor of this meeting,
moved that such a committee be established, but it was
rejected amidst a great outburst of indignation. 1

With

this danger averted, it was but a matter of days before
Clarke repo1..ted to the M. P. for London that,

as to the number of Holders in Egyptian Securities
who had signed the documents placed in your hands
by the Deputation which waited on you this morning,
I am directed to inform you that nearly three thousand Holders of Stock in the various Egyptian Loans
have requested you to represent their interests, in
the manner and under the stipulations of your letter
of the 4th instant.2
Gosehen was satisfied, and on July 20 he formally undertook the project which was to link him to the cause of
the English creditors for many years.
No word of approbation came from Gladstone at
this time, but later he wrotes
I did not, for reasons which I will exnlain to
you (Goschen], send my good wishes on your assumption of your heavy task in connection with Egyptian
finance, but I admired your courage and public spirit.J
Of more importance was the attitude of the Government.

l~·
Debt.

2 clarke to Goschen, July 19, 1876, Council, :Egyptian

Mission, Appendix, P• iv.

JGladstone to Goschen, Nov, 29, 1876, quoted in
Arthur R. D. Elliot, Life of George Joachim Goschen, First
Viscount Goschen, 18Jl•l207 (Londons Longman's, Green and
Co,, 19ll), I, 174,
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Disraeli had a benevolent view of Goschen's
position, 1 but to the Foreign Secretary an Egyptian
default appeared on the cards. although there was some
satisfaction that Englishmen would not suffer alonea
Neither Mr. Cookson's f consul at Alexandria] suggestions nor any others will prevent a hopeless smashs
and as the loss will fall chiefly on French creditors,
who have been trying to swindle us throughout, we can
bear it with resignation.2
For the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. at least, it
had been a successful maneuver and had certainly created
an auspicious atmosphere for the debut of their new
chairman.

For good or ill, the bondholders had taken

their affairs in hand, and the Council had assisted in
launching a mission which would have far-reaching impact
on relations vis-a-vis Egypt, the Powers, and her creditors.
Throughout the spring Egypt had been a beehive of
activity, for the European creditors on the scene were
vocal in the protestation of their rights.

No thought

of kismet impeded their efforts. for as soon as the Khedive's
decree of April 6 was promulgated, the European community
blazed up in anger.

The holders of Treasury bills naturally

were in the vanguard of the protesters, although the value
of secured stock was also eroded with celerity.

On

April 11,

1 Buckle and Monypenny, VI, 58.
2Northcote to Tenterden. July 15, 1876, Tenterden
Papers PRO FO 36J/2 (enclosure).
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a meeting of creditors was convened in Alexandria at
the Imperial Ottoman Bank, at which time a committee
was named to meet with the Viceroy.

~he

following day

the influential French colony met, and on April 13 an

international conclave was held to ask the Powers for
assistance. 1

Thirty-two of the most important English

citizens, headed by Barker and Company, submitted a
petition to General Stanton for British support, in
keeping with the demands of the committee of creditors, 2
but the Foreign Office replied that it could not interfere in the matter.J
Cairo's censorship of the press was severe, 4 yet
attacks on the Khedive were made frequently and placards
appeared on April 13 calling for the abdication of Ismail
and the accession of Halim.5

Amidst this clamor, the

1 The Times, April lJ, 1876, p. 5.
2 General Stanton to Derby, April 18, 1876,
Parliamentaf* Papers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 8 (1876),
No. 59, p.
(enclosure).
p. 59.

JDerby to Stanton, May 12, 1876,

~.,

c.

1484,

No. 69,

4 rt was not until 1880 that an English daily paper,
the Egyptian Gazette, appeared in Alexandria, run in part
by Charles Bell, an occasional correspondent for The Times
of London (Enid H. c. M. Bell, The Life and Letters of
c. F. Moberly Bell [Londont The Richards Press, 1927], p. 46).
5The Times, April 25, 1876, p. 8. Ismail Pasha's
uncle, Halim, had been forced to leave Egypt in 1868, with
a pension of £60 1 000 a year1 when he was implicated in an
assassination at~empt
upon ~he life of his nephew.
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holders met with Egypt's Finance Minister, Sadyk Pasha,
as often happens, the two sides came away with differing
impressions of what had been said, so that the committee
of creditors was further embittered when a letter from
sadyk was read before a second meeting, on April 20,

"denying that at Saturday's interview he promised the
admission of the bondholders' delegates to discuss the
financial measures to be adopted. 111

A second foray on

Cairo was launched with the object of obtaining the
Khedive•s written assurance that no arrangement would
be made without first soliciting their views1 the rejection of this proposition by the Finance Minister was
complete a
As to your request to be called in to join in the
discussions of measures concerning bondholders • • •
allow me to tell you that the promise you put in
my mouth can only be a misunderstanding on your
part, for, pardon me, gentlemen, the request is
at present inopportune in every way. Your persistence could only have been justified if we were
treating a financial operation with you.2
One avenue that still remained open to the
creditors was an appeal to the newly-constituted Mixed
Tribunals, and through this Khedivial Aohille's heel,
Europe could be drawn into the imbroglio.
1

~., April 21, 1876, p. 5.

2Ibid., May 8, 1876, P• 10.
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Since Egypt was a province of the Ottoman
dominion, foreigners enjoyed the privileges of extraterritoriality.

The Consular Courts had bent the law

to favor fellow nationals, and Justice, with her blind-

fold a bit askew, could see her way well enough to find
for Europeans in cases involving natives.

An

alteration

in this situation was one of rsmail's fondest desires,
beginning in the mid-l860's• Nubar Pasha, 1 charged by
the Khedive with the reformation of the judiciary, commenced a campaign which was crowned with success a decade
later.

The European colony of Alexandria was almost unani-

mously opposed to the creation of new courts, arguing
that justice was already being meted out, 2 and this attitude remained unchanged among the English residents through

1869,J when the impact of the Canal was first felt.

It

could be argued that the Europeans, and especially the
Powers, had nothing to fear, for they would dominate the
institution, that the local colonies would be involved,
1 Nubar Pasha was an Armenian Christian (two reasons

why native Egyptians would dislike him} who had arrived in
Cairo in 1840 at the age of eighteen. From a position of
secretary and translator in the ruling household he rose
in importance, obtaining ministerial rank under Ismail.
2 The Times, oct. 21, 1868, P• 4.
)Jasper Y. Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt
(New Havens Yale University Press, 19JO), P• ~5.

r
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that the system would be given a five-year trial and
could be ended at any time if a signatory so desired, 1
and that the Consular Courts would remain to deal with
violent crimes involving foreigners. 2

England gave her

consent, perhaps believing it was an enlightened thing
to do, but also in order to trim French influence which
had flourished shamelessly under the old capitulations.
Other continental capitals eventually followed suit,
including Paris. which by holding aloof had delayed the
inauguration of the Mixed Courts for several years.

Nubar

did not rely solely upon forensic eloquence, or upon the
merits of the project to win the adhesion of the Powers,
but on the time-honored bribe as well.

It has been sug-

gested that the "judicial reform and autonomy" from Turkey
cost Ismail at least £289,421,3 a sum suspicious because
of its exactitude.

In 1873 Ignatiev did receive £100,000

1 The first term of the Tribunals ran from 1876
to 1881, after which three consecutive annual extensions
were granted within our period.
2

.Egypt, by these arrangements, would be administered by four types of courts1 l) nonsular, for criminal
cases involving Europeans or prot4ges of a governments
2) religious courts handling wills, marriages, etc.a
t> native courts, dispensing law for the fellaheen1 and
L!-) the new European Tribunals, having jurisdiction over
civil claims involving foreigners, (Tignor, Moderniza1!2.n., pp. 12)-24)
Jcrabit,s, Ismail the Malig_n.ed Khedive, p. 215,
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for his support of the courts, 1 and Tissot, when he was
Political Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
obtained £50,000, while other Frenchmen also had their
names inscribed on the Viceregal dole for the same
purpose. 2
The Tribunals, though opened in 1875. did not
commence work until February of the following year.
The new institution was divided into Courts of First
Instance and of Appeals. with two-thirds of the judges
European and the remainder nativer the Powers were in
control of the Court of Appeals, while each of the participating nations held a place upon the lower oourt,3
Each of the Courts selected a president from among its
jurists, 4 and all judges held their posts from the Khedive
and were paid out of court fees supplemented by the Malieh.
In addition to these thirty-one judges, there were twentyfour assessors, elected from the eream of the mercantile
society, who joined the jurists on oases of a commercial

1 cox, p. 160.
2w.alet to Granville, Jmie 6, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO 30/29/160,
3 Scott, p. 210.

4 Janson, a Belgian, was the first president of the

Court of First Instance, and Lapenna, of Austria-Hungary,
held the same honor for the Court of Appeals,

r
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nature in the ratio of three judges to two assessors. 1
Instead of curbing French influence, these Mixed Courts
provided another outlet for her expansion, for they
introduced the Code Napoleon to the country and conducted
most of their proceedings in French.

The court was not

only a gallicizer but also a Westernizer, for one of its
functions was to register property owned by foreigners
within the state, and as will be seen later, this procedure altered property relations for the fellaheen which
stimulated the economic up-turn in the early 1880's.
For Ismail, his highly-prized Tribunals were to
be the bane of his tranquillity, for he discovered that both
his personal property and the finances of the state were
under the aegis of the International Courts.

Article 11

of the new arrangement stated1
The Courts may not give decisions affecting the
ownership of the public domains. They may not
entertain jurisdiction over acts of Sovereignty
nor over measures taken by the Government in the
execution of and in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the public administration. However,
without being permitted to interpret an act of
administration or to interfere with its execution,
they shall have jurisdiction over all cases involving
an infringement arising from such act of the vested
rights of any foreigner, as recognized either by
treaties. by law or by contract.2
1 Brinton, p. 25.

2 Wynne, p. 600. n. 89.

227

It is probable that Nubar did not fully inform his master
on these points, for Ismail seemed genuinely surprised
when informed of the fact by Mr. J. H. Lloyd when he
visited Cairo. 1

The quality of the jurists, it seems,

was not of the highest, for European governments viewed
these positions as sinecures, a sort of "happy hunting
grounds," to which superannuated judges might be sent. 2
No sooner had ·the Khedive decreed a three-month
moratorium on payment of Treasury bills than shoals of
creditors besieged the Tribunals for full and immediate
payment.

The Viceroy argued that his decrees possessed

the weight of law, and therefore could not be restricted
in any way, since that would impair his sovereignty.

The

first of these cases to emerge was that of Cesare Carpi,
who received a favorable decision on Wednesday, May J,

1876.J

In so doing, the Court of First Instance ruled

that the Viceroy's decrees were acts of administration
rather than laws because the Powers were not party to
them.

The state refused to grant execution, and the

1 Dicey, The Stoti of the Khadivate, p. 129. This
John Horatio Lloyd, a h gh legil authority, of Lloyd's
Bonds, was the same gentleman who called the meeting of
Egyptian holders on July 14.
2wable Gaillard, A Lifetime in .pta 1876 to 1935
(London1 Grant Richards, 1935), pp. 83- •

JThe Times, May 6, 1876, p. 5.
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matter was referred to the Court of Appeals in Alexandria.
By J·une, one hundred cases had been won by the creditors
and were awaiting the outcome of the Carpi case. 1 On
suly 22, two days after Mr. Goschen•s formal agreement
to represent the holders, the Court of Appeals upheld the
lower court, placing the Viceroy in a most difficult position.

As a last resort, he applied to the Powers who had

been signatories to the judicial arrangements, and declared
that he would let them decide if the ruling was correct.
To one jurist on the Mixed Courts this evasive tactic was
reprehensible.

A Dutch member of the Alexandria Court of

First Instance, Herr Haakan, remanded all government cases
and closed his court, arguing that, since the Cairo government refused to execute legal decisions, there was no point
in continuing to sit.

His compeers, however, felt this was

too rash an act, and he was suspended from the bench until
October 28 and eventually removed.
overnight Haakan became a local herot and inspired
much parading and anti-government propaganda. 2 The remainder of the hot months in Egypt saw no slackening in
the running squabbles between creditors and the Khedive,
A number of Italians were driven from the palace at Ramleh
1 rbid,, June 21, 1876, p. 12.
2 Ibid., July 24, 1876, p. 4.

see Wynne-rp:"' 600, n. 90).

For the Carpi case,
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by guards when they attempted to remove furniture in
lieu of the sums due themr fifty-three Europeans owing
rent to Ismail refused to pay and had their cases postponed by Haakan to October 20, but worst of all for the
Viceroy, in late September the English Government joined
with the rest of Europe in upholding the decision of the
Mixed Courts, so that the Khedive was faced with a desperate situation when the International Tribunals reopened their doors on October 10.

The summer did not

bring a volt-face in rsmail's imprudence, for taxes were
collected in advance, 1 waste and extravagance continued.
and the war with Abyssinia was prosecuted although an
unmitigated disaster.

By August the Khedive had resorted

to what has been called the "Ismalun" loan, a scheme where•
by old bonds were ante-dated and mortgaged for what they
would bring. 2
The Syndicate and the French Government tried
throughout to put the best countenance they could on
Egyptian affairs.

On June 10 the Caisse began functioning

1 The year 1876 witnessed a good Nile, hence an
abundant harvest in Egyptian staples--cotton, sugar, wheat,
and beans. Figures for these quantities are given in the
Jo~al of the Rotal Societ~ of Arts (XXVI (March 22.
18
, )37). Inhis sftua Ion, the ruinous system of
advanced tax collection was carried out with less hardship
than in a lean year.
2 Bouvier, p.

97.
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without the 3ritish member, but with M. de Blignieres
(a former prefect and at one time the Inspector of
Finance) representing France. Herr von Kremer (a counselor
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) from Austria-Hungary,
and

s. Baravelli (Inspector General of Finance)

Italian member.

as the

In practice they had no access to funds

and at this point exercised little power.

Since Egyptian

stocks continued to slip in June, Parisian houses once more
had to resort to large-scale purchasing on the open market, 1
but this trend was somewhat slowed with the appearance of
Mr. Goschen.

The Quai d'Orsay, in its attempts to help the

Syndicate, requested M. Villet to remain in Cairo to make
a financial report.

In so doing. he described the railways

as flourishing {while, in fact, they were near total col•

lapse) 2 and the newly-published budget as producing a
surplus.J

It is doubtful that anyone, least of all the

bourses of Europe, were convinced by these ebullient observations, it being as likely that Ismail had a surplus
of revenue as that he had stumbled upon the Philosopher's

Stone.

On

September 19 Villet was recalled.

1 The Times, June 20, 1876, p. 10.
2

Cromer, II, 312.

JThe Times, Aug. 9, 1876, pp. 5 and 9.
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were mere shadows, for the events of substance were being
enacted in Paris and London by the representatives of the
Khedive•s creditors.
Ismail had never thrown down the gauntlet to
the bondholders by stating that upon a certain date all
old stock must be turned in for new on pain of forfeiture
of the investment, but until things were settled, all
payments to the secured holders ceased.

The Council re-

ported that by year's end, £998,280 of Egyptian securities
were in default. 1
Upon the selection of Mr. Goschen, the French
Syndicate also chose a representative, Edmond Joubert,
director of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas.

Little

is known of the exchanges between these two, which got
underway promptly after Goschen arrived in the French
capital on July 22 amidst the tidings of the Carpi decision.
Joubert visited London for the next meeting, and these
trans-channel negotiations continued for two months.
1 corp, For~ Bondht Rep., 1876, pp, 58 and 6J.
The situation of t e Egyp !an securities was summed up by
the Council as follows&
To Be Held
Status
Loan
Drawing
1862
1867
1870
1864
1866
1868
1873

29th
10th
14th
2 th
22nd
17th
6th

July 24
November 22
September
August
November
October
July

unpaid
outstanding
nothing
nothing done
also suspended
not held
not held
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The Khedive was also involved in these discussions, and
notes to him were entrusted to England's Consul in Alexandria, Mr. Cookson. 1

The slow pace of these proceedings

resulted in irritation in certain quarters, as with
Mr. Legge, the editor of the Whitehall Review. "a violently Conservative journal," 2 who said aloud what others
murmured sotto voce, that Prince Halim had a good right
to the throne and ought to press his claims in the International Tribunals.J

Perhaps The Times was correct when

it observed that the English public was not very interested

in Egypt, 4 but Mr, Goschen remarked, at the completion of
his mission, that "the strength of public opinion on the
subject of Egyptian finance, was of incalculable use to
us in our negotiations."5

Not all the organs reflecting

and molding general sentiment sounded the same key, which
must have given some little difficulty to Goschen.

-Hera-

path's Railway Journal, for example, took the Viceroy's
word as truth and was "quite at a loss to perceive any

1 cookson to Derby, Aug. 18, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9,
No. 148, P• 91.

ACFB, Egypt, V, 92.
10.
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substantial grievance in the new terms for Egyptian
bondholders."1 The Daily News, a third of which was
owned by Henry Oppenheim, declared, with doubtful validity,
that the exchange of bonds had picked up and that "the
unification must now be accepted as an accomplished fact,
subject to such modifications • • • as can be obtained. •• 2
The Daily Telegraph also urged holders to acquiesce and
said that it was untrue that the new stocks would be unsalable.J

The vast majority of investors did not heed

these counsels and chose to wait.
'rhe English banks which had 'dealt so long and so

profitably in Viceregal paper had also reached a crisis
by the summer, and no doubt made their views known to
Goschen.

Of these institutions, the

Ba.~k

of Egypt was

most fortunate, holding £l5J,96J of its total capital of
£250,000 in Treasury bills and Daira bonds which, valued

at their market price plus the 25 per cent bonus, still
represented a loss of £77,000 on the balance sheet at
mid-year. 4 Regarding the pending discussions, their
chairman Mr. Bramley-Moor assured the holders that their
1 Herapath's Rail!f!Y Journal, July 8, 1876, ACFB,
Egypt, IV, j5o.
2naily News, July 25, 1876, ~ •• v, 16.

JDaily Telegraph, Aug. 10, 1876, .!.l2.!i!•• 80.
4 The Times, July 21, 1876, p. 6.
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bank had not joined the French conversion plan. 1

For

the Bank of Alexandria the crash of Egyptian paper meant
a reorganization into the Commercial Bank of Alexandria
with £3 of liability per share.

Their August meeting

grew quite stormy when a number of holders registered
their indignation upon learning that the bank had involved itself in the Egyptian floating debt.
men, T.

The chair-

s. Richardson, told the assembly that the market

value of their securities was £512,000 out of a total capital of £800,000, and that if the Khedive's plan were implemented, it would raise the former sum to £640,000. 2
Mr. Fergusson, a holder of 300 shares, who had invested
in the institution because he had thought it was a purely
mercantile venture, was outraged to think he had been
led astrays
Lancashire men were induced to invest in the bank.
He [Fergusson] had come to London, and had been told
that the business was based entirely on cotton, • • • •
Instead of carrYing on the business of the bank, they
(the directors] had invested the money of the bank in
Treasury bills to the amount of £512,000, which were
worth nothing, and were the same as dishonoured bills,
in this country,J
His call for liquidation was overwhelmingly defeated,

leaving the bank extant but dependent upon the Syndicate
1IQ!g, •• July 27, 1876, P• 6.
2Money Market Review, XXXIII (Sept. 2, 1876), 2J6.
JThe Times, Sept. 1, 1876, p. 4.
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to obtain a favorable settlement.
The largest of the banks was the Anglo-Egyptian,
which held £1.2 million in Treasury bills though its
total capital was only £1.6 million. 1 As individuals,
some directors had suffered considerable financial loss, 2
and as of August Jl, 1876, the market value of its
"securities" including the bonus was only £44 in the
hundred.3

As a member of the Syndicate, the Anglo-

Egyptian had contributed £500,000 in the spring towards
the maintenance of the stock prices by purchases the
November balance sheet showed the holders that depreciation had cost them, in all, £620,000 upon their investments.

With so much at stake, it was necessary that

Goschen be apprised of the bank's views, and, in fact,
on his mission he was accompanied by a director of this

institution. 4
September came and still the plenipotentiaries of
the creditors seemed no closer together.

On September 8,

M. Mazerat, agent for the Cntdit Lyonnais, stated that
1

.ll2!,g,•• June 1, 1877, p. 6.

2An instance of this is the case of P. Lutcher, a
director and Egyptian merchant who was forced to liquidate
his business in early March, 1876. with a debt of half a
million pounds.
;The Times, Nov. 22, 1876, P• 7.
4
~·• Dec. 1, 1876, P• 7.
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"the combinations of the groups are coming up against
inextricable difficulties. 01
situation had altered.

On

In three weeks' time the

receiving the views of the

Powers upon the question of the Mixed Courts, the Viceroy
found that a settlement with his creditors was imperative.
Ismail telegraphed invitations to the emissaries
of the creditors to come to Egypt and, after a first-hand
investigation, to join with him in reaching a settlement. 2
The Council quickly summoned the bondholders to a meeting

at the Cannonstreet Hotel on October

J, and in an opening

statement, Mr. Bouverie referred to the Cave Report and
how it demonstrated that prudent administration of Egypt
would enable that country to meet its engagements.

This

belief was basic to the Council's position and was also
a dominant theme in Mr. Goschen's thinking.

In his presen-

tation, which was punctuated by voluble signs of support,
Na-. Goschen announced his intention to go to Egypt if the
bondholders desired it.

The enormous interests involved,

the suffering of English families, the present critical
stage of Egyptian finances, and his desire to complete
the task were cited as reasons for his decision.

Although

lB1 ouv1er,
.
p. 96.
2 council, _T_h_e_....;Egy.....,_p_t_i_an
___o_e_b_t_•...__M_i_s_s_i_o.....
n, Appendix,

pp. vii-viii.
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the modis operandi for an arrangement could not be
divulged, it being open to modification, still Goschen
insisted that the Caisse with the authority of the Mixed
Courts behind it would be an ingredient, and since Downing
Street had not appointed a commissioner, the bondholders
could do so and would have the cordial backing of the
French Government.

After an admonition not to believe

rumors, the speaker received a unanimous vote of confidence and the meeting closed. 1
The attitude of the British Government toward the
ensuing mission was naturally of prime significance.

Events

in the Balkan Peninsula in the previous months had riveted
the eyes of Europe upon this portion of the Ottoman Empire
and had thrust Egypt into the background.

Disraeli had

been but a lukewarm Turkophile and had once told Derby,
"All the Turks may be in the Propontis, so far as I am
concerned, 112 but as tempers sharpened, honed razor-thin
by Gladstone's pamphletry, mass meetings, and the division
of society into "Russians" and "Turks," the Prime Minister
was forced to assume an ever more pro-Turkish position.
Between May JO and June 14 a revolution boiled up in
1 The information on this meeting is drawn from
Council, The Egyptian Debt. Mission (Appendix, pp. vixix).
2

Buckle and Monypenny, VI, 53.
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Constantinople, and by July Serbia was at war with the
new Sultan.

In England the anti-Turk furor broke in

the press on August 26, fanned by accounts of the Bulgarian horrors.

Since the integrity of the Ottoman

Empire was a sensitive issue, the Beaconsfield Government did not want to make any provocative moves upon
Egypt for fear of initiating a general division of the
Turkish possessions.

On

JUne 24, the Cabinet had as-

sured st. Petersburg that Great Britain did not wish to occupy Egypt, 1 but Bismarck, who still sought to separate
London and Paris and in the bargain further alienate the
former from Russia, continued to press England to accept
real estate which was not his to render.

The German Chan-

cellor, while assuring England on October 2J, 1876, that
Turkey was not worth a European war, again urged Britain
to take Egypt, 2

Disraeli was piqued at these continuous

references and thought he knew where British interests lay,
should Russia attempt to take Constantinoplet
Not even the command of the sea could help us U."'tder
such circumstances. People who talk in this manner
must be utterly ignorant of geography. Our strength

and
Po

cs
2

-rbid.,

P• 98.
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is on the sea. Constantinople is the key to India,
and not Egypt and the Suez Cana1.1
But Bismarck, who was persistent, presented the topic once
more before year•s end, this time to Salisbury when he
visited Berlin on his tour of Continental capitals preceding the conference in Constantinople,

The Prime Minister

had not altered his opinionss
I am surprised that Bismarck should go on harping
about Egypt. Its occupation by us would embitter
France, and I don't see it would at all benefit us,
if Russia possessed Constanti~ople. I would sooner
we had Asia Minor than Egypt.
Since the abandonment in May, 1876. of the
"Egyptian policy," or an economic protectorate of the
Nilotic. England had become circumspect in her relations
with Egypt.

Yet the Goschen mission manifested British

interest in Egyptian affairs.

The prime movers of this

phenomenon were two, the French Government, and the
English bondholders.

From Deeazes came the diplomatic

pressure, while Goschen and Joubert were the architects.
Shortly after accepting his new duties, Goschen
paid a visit to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to discuss the matter and received encouragement when he inquired
into the possibility of some support from the Government.
1 Disraeli to Barrington, Oct. 23, 1876, Buckle
and Monypenny, VI, 84.
2Disrael1 to Salisbury, Nov. 29, 1876. SetonWatson, p. 109.
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Northcote wrote to Salisbury1
They [Goschen's proposals] may succeed or fails but
at worst they can do no harm. I shall be ready to
certify through our Consul-General, if desired,
that Mr. G. is a man who can be trusted, and who
commands general respect in England.l
Goschen next addressed himself to the Foreign Office:
I shall be greatly indebted to your Lordship if,
in the interests of the English bondholders, I may
receive such moral support as your Lordship may feel
yourself at liberty to afford, in my endeavor to obtain a more equitable settlement,2

In only a few days an affirmative reply for unofficial
support was received.J

Derby's willingness has been

attributed to pressure applied by Decazes who, still
desirous of an arrangement, had persuaded the timid
Foreign Secretary to take this step. 4 Both Western
Powers took the opportunity to send out new ConsulsGeneral, Hussey Vivian for England and Baron des Michels
for France.

These selections proved salutary for the

mission, since, as

iV'i.r.

Goschen told the creditors, "the

English Consul-General and the French Consul-General

1 Northcote to Salisbury, July 25, 1876, quoted in
A. R. D. Elliot, p. 173·
2Goschen to Derby, July 26, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9,
No. 141, P• 89.
3Tenterden to Goschen, Aug. J, 1876, ~.,
No. 144, p. 90.
4Atkins, pp. 92-93. This appraisal of the situation
is drawn from the memoirs of des Michels.
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worked together harmoniously," 1

At bottom much of this

amity was based on familiarity.

The two agents had

labored successfully in Bucharest before their present
assignment, and the strong personality o1 the Frenchmen
somewhat drew his English counterpart in its wake.
Goschen had informed those pre3ent at the meeting
of October J that if they wished him to represent them,
he could leave England in forty-eight hours and be in
Egypt in ten days, his offer was enthusiastically accepted.

Cairenes had become accustomed to European

dignitaries in their city. but the inundation of financial
medicinemen in the autumn of 18?6 would have made one wonder
who was Europe• s "Sick wian."

The Englishmen who appeared

in Cairo included Sir George Elliot and the Deputy Chairman
of the Bank of Egypt, Mr. Cater. Accompanying the M.P.
for London was Mr, Romaine 2 as well as Henry Drummond
Wolff, who, having told the holders that "we must give
Mr. Goschen our blind con:f'idence, .. J chose to make the
journey with him.

Mr. Wolff, a Conservative M.P. who

1 counc11. The EgYptian Debt.

Mission, p, 22.

2 The Times, Oct. 10, 1876, p. 7. It was announced that Mr, Romaine was en route to Egypt to take
his place as President of the Superior Council of the
Treasury.

J.I£!1!., Oct, 4, 1876, P• 7,
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had supported the shares purchase and the Cave Mission, 1
in late September, 1876, became a stockholder2 and director of the .Anglo-Egyptian Bank.

He had obtained the un-

official support of the Government and loyally seconded
Mr. Goschen in the negotiations • .3
It has been suggested that Goschen actively worked
for British political gain through the plan he negotiated,
and hia visit with Salisbury and Northcote preceding his
departure 4 can be explained in these terms.

Certainly

the so-called .,Goschen Decree" appeared to have this
result, but it is clear enough that the Foreign Office
entertained no such thoughts.

Goschen's efforts at all

times were to arrange the best terms possible for the

1 Hansard, Jd ser* Vol. 231 (Aug. 5, 1876), ool, 650.
2 Henry Drummond Wolff (1830•1908) entered the

Foreign Off ice in 1849 and held a number of minor diploma tic posts, In 1864 he resigned and became a traveler
and financier by assisting in the floatation of various
companies. In 1876 he was a director in the General Credit
and Discount Company, and also in the British and Foreign
Exchange Investment Bank. He returned to the Foreign Office in 1878 for two years. during which he sat upon a
commission which involved itself in the Balkan boundary
disputes (Q!':lli., Supp. 2t III, 699-7021 see also Wolff's
Rambling Recollections J.
1he shire !!st of the Anglo•Egyptian Banking
Company for June 14• 1877, shows Wolff holding 100 shares
in that bank.
3Tenterden to Masterman, Oct. 14, 1876, PRO FOCP
407/9, No. 158• p~ 971 Vivian to Derby• Oet. 27, 1876,
ibid., No, 164~ P• 100~
4A. R. n. Elliot, I, 173.

-
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bondholders, obtaining as much Government support as was
needed to see the discussions to a successful completion,
and to avoid the embarrassment that would attend him

should he author a scheme which would be rejected by
Downing Street.
The atmosphere of the negotiations was highly
charged from the outset.

Goschen and Joubert arrived

near the end of Ramadan, 1 generally a dangerous time
of year for Christians in Egypt, and despite articles

in the London journals depicting the Egyptians viewing
Goschen almost as some sort of epiphany, it appears that
both he and Joubert were kept under heavy guard by the
Consuls-General and were seldom seen in public. 2 Ismail,
too, found things unpleasant.

Des Michels with his

bullying bluster, as well as Mr. Vivian,3 provided backing
for their countrymen, while from the Prince of Wales and
the King of the Belgians came letters to the Viceroy expressing the hope that Goschen would meet with success. 4

1876.

1 Ramadan lasted from September 19 to October 17 in
2

Bouvier, p. 97.

3vivian to Derby, Oct. 27, 1876. PRO FOCP 407/9,

No. 165, P• 101.
p. 99.

4vivian to Derby, Oct. 15, 1876,

.!BJ&..• No. 160,
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A sense of urgency was communicated to the Cairo
Government through the decision of the Powers regarding
the Courts, for if the negotiations were to break down,
the Mixed Courts would be forced to arrange a settlement.

The Caisse, which had been quiescent until the

authority of the Tribunals had been clarified, now
brought the Cairo Government to court since it was
obvious to everyone, including Goschen, that "the
Viceroy is wilfully keeping back revenues pledged to
creditors by the late decrees, to an extent indeed so
gross, that he defeats his object." 1

Therefore, it was

no surprise that the Tribunals ruled in favor of the
Caisse, 2 whereupon, as if by a given sign, their coffers
began to fill.

But the stresses upon Ismail were even

more severe than this.

The Viceroy knew that the new

Sultant disliked him, and would probably remove him
as Khedive if at all possible,3 once again the avuncular
shadow of Halim was cast across his path and the negotiators

1 aoschen to Northcote, Oct. 21, 1876, Iddesleigh
Papers BM Add MSS 50021, P• 245.
2

The Times, Nov. 11, 1876, p. 6.

3Jacob M. Landau, "Prolegomena to a Study of
Secret Societies in Modern Egypt,•• (hereafter "Secret
Societies") Middle Eastern Studies, I (Jan., 1965), 149.
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even began to speak of Tewfik, Ismail•s eldest son, as
a man with whom it might be easier to deal. 1
Upon the commencement of their conversations,
Goschen found the Viceroy evincing "cynical indifference
to paying his creditors in full." 2

The Englishman•s

initial proposals were quite favorable to the.British
holders,3 but in the negotiations that followed, both
France and Egypt were to obtain concessions.

Ismail

exaggerated his liabilities, attempted to disown the
statistics given to Cave. and fought hard to reduce the
interest rate. all of which

Gosch~n

condemnedt

For my own part, I think it would be very dangerous
except in the case of 9Xtremity to consent to a
simple reductiqn
interest as a reward for extravagance and lying.

04

Yet both sides realized that a oompromise was necessary,
and slowly one was hammered out,

But before such an

arrangement could be promulgated, conf iden~e in the
Khedive--which had sunk markedly and which was vital for
1 Bouvier, P• 100.
2 Goschen to Northcote, oot. 21, 1876, Iddesleigh
Papers BM Add MSS 50021 1 P• 245,

JGoschen memorandum, Oct. 15, 1876, PRO FOCP
407/9. No. 160, P• 98,
4aoschen to Northcote, Oct. 21, 1876, Iddesleigh
Papers BM Add MSS 50021, P• 2*5•
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the success of the plan--had to be elevated,

A scape-

goat was selected. upon whom all blame for Viceregal
impecuniosity could be placed, and this unlucky person
was Ismail's own half-brother, the Minister of Finance
for the preceding three years, Sadyk Pasha.

He was cer-

tainly culpable, for Goschen had discovered that earlier
in the year he had used Parisian houses to manipulate the
price of securities and had ea.med over £800.000 for his
master, 1 who had ordered these transactions.

Sad1k was

removed from his office, spirited away at remail's command,
and was said to have committed suicide,
the Khedive was efficaeious1

This gambit by

within ninety minutes of

the announcement of Sadyk's dismissal on November 8 1
Egyptian stocks experienced a three point rise on the
Alexandria bourse. 2
Goschen had been correct when he thought that
stories would be rife at home during his absence.

The

rumor of Britain's occupation of Egypt was resurrected
and even began to worry Mr. Gladstone.J
1 council, The Eg,yptian Debt,
2

The bondholders

Mission, pp, 45-47.

The Times, Nov. 27, 1876, P• 7.

3Gladstone to Granville, Nov, 8, 1876, Agatha
Ramm, ed,, The Political Correspondence of Mrg Gladstone
and Lord Granville1 18z6-8t> (herea?ter. 76- 6){0X£0@1
At the Clarendon Press, 1962), I, 18.
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received palpable signs that all was not well during the
early stages of the negotiations.

Before leaving England,

Goschen stated that, although he had previously urged
holders not to send their bonds in for conversion, he now
thought they might do so since negotiations had reached a
point where that action would not be prejudicial to their
interests. 1

No sooner had Goschen arrived in Cairo than

the Paris bourse. reacting to Syndicate urgings, commenced
the quotation of the new

Egyptia..~

scrip, and to the public

it appeared that the French capitalists had renounced
Goschen and Joubert and had decided to force the implementation of their original scheme.

Perhaps the Syndicate

had gotten wind of Goschen•s initial proposals, or felt
that the Khedive would not yield or that Joubert would be
too malleable.

In any case, the move startled everyone.

including the Council.

E.

c.

Secretary Clarke pursued, with

Hardcastle, the London Manager of the Comptoir

d'Escompte, the question of the position of those investors
who had sent in their bonds for conversion. Receiving an
evasive answer, 2 the Secretary of the Corporation of
Foreign Bondholders published his correspondence with the
1 council, The Egyptian Debt, Mission, P• xviii.
2 The correspondence between Clarke and Hardcastle
is reprinted in The Times (Oct. 14. 1876, p. 7).

t
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comptoir, which did nothing to improve the image of the
Syndicate.

Fortunately for all concerned, the question

became moot upon the issuance of the "Goschen Decree"
of November 18, 1876.

Under this arrangement the Daira debts were
totally separated from the burden of the state and,
since time was short, only broad desiderata were agreed
upon,

The Khedive was willing to discuss a suitable in-

terest rate and sinking fund, and to cede to the holders
of the 1870 loan and floating debt his personal estates
to be controlled by three trustees, two of whom would be
Europeans,

The short loans (1864, 1866, and 1867) whose

combined value was roughly £4,250,000, would be repaid
at 80 instead of 100, would maintain their former interest,
and would have the Moukal>ala, which was again restored, as
their security.
The rest of the debt was composed of the 1862, 1868,
and 1873 loans and the Government Treasury bills, all of
which were combined and divided into two types of securities:

the Preference Bonds, equalling £17 million and

paying 5 per cent interest; and the Unified Stock, totalling

£59 million, giving 7 per cent.

Through this arrangement,

holders of the secured loans received 38.4 per cent of the
privileged debt and the remainder in "Unifieds"; therefore,
the Preference debt holders tended to be English, while
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the 7 per cent stock was widely held in France.

What

made the privileged stock special was its new position as
the first charge upon the revenue of the state, some
£850,000 the first years should its particular hypo-

thecated income {including the railway receipts and a
part of the harbor dues of Alexandria) fall short, funds
would be taken from the money set aside for the Unified
debt to make up the difference,

The Unified debt, with

a greater interest to maintain, was secured on the general
revenue and possessed a sinking fund which would eliminate
the encumbrance in sixty-five years,

For the next nine

years large drawings were to be held in an attempt to
decrease the pecuniary millstone so that, when the effects
of the Moukabala were felt by 1886, there would be sufficient revenue to maintain the debt. 1 For both the Preference and Unified stocks drawings would be made at par. 2
The holders of the floating debt, mainly the syndicate of French bankers, were given a bonus of 10 per cent
on the market price of their securities, and, as stated
above, were allowed to exchange them for Unified stock,
Thus, the new funded indebtedness of Egypt was placed at
1 For an explanation of the provisions of the
Moukabala, see above, Chapter 2. p. 131.
2.An English translation of the decree of November 18. 1876, is available in Council, The Egyptian Debt.
Mission {pp. 1-19).
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£91,276,444, of which £2,068,397 was the French bonus. 1
Neither the French capitalists nor

r1ir.

.I
!I

\\folff and his

i'

Anglo-Egyptian Bank had much to complain of since,

I

although the public was unaware of it, a segment of the
floating debt was left outside the plan.

The amount

withheld has been estimated at anywhere from four to
eight million pounds, which directly benefited the Credit
Foncier, Comptoir d'Escompte, and Anglo-Egyptian .Bank. 2
In addition, the 15 per cent founder's shares in the Canal
which the Viceroy had mortgaged remained in French hands.
It should not be supposed, however, that English interests
were slighted.

Greenfield and Company, the contractors

for the Alexandria harbor, were ably represented by George
Elliot.

This firm was owed £700,000, all of it profit,

for which they were granted the right to collect the
bulk of the Alexandria harbor dues.

Further, they were

given £2 million in Preference stock on which they could
collect dividends until the Khedive had repaid his debt
to them.

I

1 Hamza, p. 240.

2nouvier,in his article (p. 99), states that 100
million francs of the unsecured debt held by the Credit
Foncier was not included in the November plan, nor was
32.5 million francs of the Comptoir d'Escompte or
25.5 million francs of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank.

!

I
'
'

!
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Goschen and Joubert set Egypt's normal revenue
at more than £7 million, but when the Moukabala, railway income, etc., were added, this figure swelled to more

than £10.5 million.

The Egyptian Government would be

given £4.5 million yearly with which to operate, and the
annual interest payment was put at £6,180,000.

To have

this scheme succeed, maladministration had to be eradicated,
and, as Goschen wrote,

0

the increased introduction of the

European element is all important."1

The October promise

to retain the Caisse was honored, and the place for an
English member was eventually :f'illed. 2

A

board was also

created to administer the railroads and the port of Alexandria 1 here, too, British interests dominated, with two
Englishmen (one of whom was always to be president), one
Frenchman, and one native comprising the commission.

Final-

ly, a pair of "watchdogs" were placed over Khedivial finance-two controllers-general, one for receipts and the other
for expenditure, each to be selected by a Western Power.
A

general outline of the plan had found its way

into print as early as a week before the publication of
1 Goschen to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1876, Gladstone
Papers BM Add MSS 44161, LXXVI, 267•
2 The .Caisse ge J,a Dette Publique rerr.ained in
existence until 1940.
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the Goschen Decree and had a favorable effect upon Egypt's
stocks.

In fact, since the London financier had taken

affairs in hand, these securities had risen steadily,
leveling off on November 28, the day he formally presented
his project to a meeting of the bondholders summoned by the
Corporation. 1 On this occasion Mr. Goschen's speech lasted
almost two hours and was apologetic in tone.

It failed to

leave a positive impression, and Egyptian bonds began to
slip.

Obviously there were serious doubts in the minds of

many as to whether the Goschen Decree was workable,
The attitude of the Government toward this plan
was most painful to Mr, Goschen.

He had always warned the

Council that the bondholders ought not to expect the Foreign
Office to come to their aid.

figures1
Loan

Yet, while the negotiations

1 The Times (Nov, JO, 1876, p, 7) gives the following

Value Outstanding
(£)

July l, 1876
Price

Value
(£)

1862
1864
1866
1867
1868
1870
187J

2,559,000
2,1)2,000
l,531,620
1,157,600
10,722,500
6,932,380
Jl,JlJ.660

46
39

JB.25

946,SJO
8Jl,480
612,648
5.'.32,496
4,181,775
2,2Jl,980
11,977,475

To'tal

.55,448,760

J8.2.5

21,314,689

37

4g

37

November 27, 1876
Price

Value
(£)

5.5

1,407,450
l,428,440
1,225,296
717,712
6,004,600
2,955,866
17,222,51.'.3

55.75

J0,9.51,877

55

67
62
70

~~
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were in progress, he had written Northcote:
I am the last man to ask the Government for more
countenance than they think they can prudently give,
but pray go as far as you can.l
The Chancellor of the Exchequer had been sympathetic and
said, "I am sending your letter to Derby, and will urge
him to go as far as he can in giving support, 02 but in
the end the Foreign Office decided to withhold its recognition of the plan by not appointing the necessary Englishmen to the various posts created for them.J Although both
Northcote 4 and Vivian5 advocated British participation,
Goschen was forced to appear before the investors with
a plan that Her Majesty•s Government seemed to deprecate
and which did not have its cooperation.

Lord Derby him·

self was not optimistic that the Viceroy would keep his

bargain, and told Vivian that, if circumstances permitted,
Ismail would default at once. 6

1 aoschen to Northcote Oct. 21, 1876 Iddesleigh
1
Papers BM Add MSS 50021 1 P• 246,
2 Northcote to Goschen, Nov. l, 1876, ~.

P• 70 (copy).

50053,

3nerby to Vivian, Nov. 22. 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9,

No. 179, P• 115.

4Northcote to Tenterden. Nov. 16, 1876, Tenterden Papers PRO FO 363/2.
5vivian to Derby. Nov. 25. 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9.
No. 184, P• 128.
6 nerby to Vivian. Dec. 13 1876, ~•• No. 190,
1

p.

134.
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Even more fundamental than these disturbing
thoughts was the opinion expressed by many that the
scheme was impracticable.

In this respect the atti-

tude of The Times was crucial, for not only was its
financial staff sound and highly respected, 1 but its
views were assumed to have a semi-official character.
After an analysis of the Decree, the verdict came1
All that we contend is that the scheme here set
forth does not provide Egypt with the immediate
relief which is so obviously needful that it renders
at the very start borrowing indispensable, and is
therefore like a pyramid placed apex downward-it cannot stand. 2
The Morning Post remarked upon the change in attitude
toward the arrangements made in Cairo as soon as they
were fully explained.3

The J21!ilionist of November 18

argued that Egypt could not pay the burdensome interest
now placed upon her. 4 and even the Money Market Review
1 The City editor of The Times for almost two

decades after 1874 was Arthur Crump. He was ably assisted
by Alexander J. Wilson, who had worked with him on the
Economist and who went to the Pall Mall Gazette as financial editor in 1879•
2

The Times, Nov. 29, 1876, P• 7•

)Morning Post. NOV• 30; 1876; ACFB, Egypt, VI, 114.
4 Bullionist, Nov. 18• 1876; ibid., 14• Also sharing
this view were the Monetary: Gazette (Dec. 20, 1876, ibid.,
80) and the Spectator (XLIX [Dec. 2, 1876], 1505). ~
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thought that the plan was unfeasible and that the English financier had played into the hands of the French. 1
Mr. Goschen was rather upset over the attacks from the
press, especially when they were aimed at the credibility
of the Viceroy, for in his view the opposite tactic should

be employed and the Khedive made to feel that his violation
of the agreement would be a gross breach of public trust. 2
A division of opinion existed among those individuals fami-

liar with Egyptian finance.

Edwin de Leon, a former agent

in Cairo, made Sadyk Pasha the evil genius of the Egyptian
debacle, although warning that the Viceroy would do whatever he pleased in the future,J Sir Charles Rivers Wilson
felt the Goschen plan had a good chance of succeeding; 4
and

J. C. Mc Coan

wrote :

The best-informed opinion, both in London and Cairo,
• • • doubted the ability of the Egyptian exchequer
to pay 7 per cent. on £59,000,000 out of a reduced
revenue of about £?,750,000 • • • and was, therefore, in favor of a reduction of interest to a
unified 5 per cent. on all but the short loans.5
1 Money Market Review, XXXIII (Nov. 18, 1876), 496.
2aoschen to Northcote Dec. J, 1876, Iddesleigh
Papers BM Add MSS 50021, P• 249.
JnThe Khedive•s Egypt, and Our Route to India,"
Blackwood's Magazine, CXXII (Oct., 1877), 486.
4 wilson to W. H. Smith, Aug. 9, 1877, PRO FOCP
407/9, No. 254, P• 190.
5McCoan, p. 1,)8.

,.
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Naturally, the Council stood behind its representative, as did the great majority of bondholders and

ba~ks involved. 1

Backing

by

the press was often tepid,

as in the case of the Economist which saluted Goschen's

intentions and granted him some achievements, or that of
London which felt the plan to be a succesoful compromise of claims. 2

In general, those periodicals which

had most strongly urged holders to send in their scrip
for conversion, for instance the Daily Telegraph and
the Daily News, were now Goschen's firmest supporters.
w~ny

of the inhabitants of Alexandria also desired to

give the plan a cha.nee, and the correspondent for The
Times of London, the most widely-read paper in Alexandria, gave his employers at home a mild reprimand for
their negative utterances.3
1 T. c. Bruce, of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, praised
the settlement at that institution's meeting of June 27,
1877 (Money Market Review, XXXIV [June JO, 1877], 646).
Bramley-Moor of the Bank of Egypt also added his tribute
(The Times, Feb. 8, 1877, p. 7) 1 while the chairman of
the Angio-Egyptian, though pleased with the settlement,
remarked that "he did not think this scheme was the one
which he should have adopted" (The Times, Dec. 1 1 1876,
p. 7).
2 Eco:nomist, XXXI'! (Nov, 18, 1876), 13411 London.

Feb. 1, 1877, ACFB, :Egypt, VI, 402.

JThe Times, Dec. 19, 1876, p, 8.

\
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Undeterred, however, Mr. Goschen began to implement the terms of the Decree,

He wrote Sir Stafford

Iiorthcote and informed him that if the Government would
not appoint the needed officials, the Viceroy had empowered
him to select them. 1 With this as the topic for discussion, an interview was secured. 2

As will be noted later,

Downing Street did not actively make selections for these
posts but allowed Goschen to cull through the list of
available men.

Yet, the London M.P. felt constrained

to defend his project to Mr. Gladstone:
There is certainly a revenue leaving a large margin
for the creditors, The country is not ruined, and
there is no reason why the engagements should not
be kept.3
On December 13, after gentle proddings from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Office finally instructed their agent in Cairo to express their pleasure
on the arrangements which had closed the breach between
the Egyptian ruler and his creditors. 4 Still Goschen

P• 170.

1 rsmail to Goschen, Dec. 4, 1876, A. R. D. Elliot, I,

2 Goschen to Northcote, Dec.
Papers BM Add MSS 50021. P• 250.

J. 1876, Iddesleigh

3Goschen to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1876, Gladstone
Papers Bf\1 Add KSS 44161, P• 266.

4Derby to Vivian, Dec. 13, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9,
No. 190, P• 134.
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was under intense pressure and was forced to def end
his plan in the press, 1 since by this point Government silence was being interpreted as disa~proval. 2
The best Goschen could obtain was a general statement
from the Chancellor that his plan embodied the most
advantageous terms that could be procured under the
circumstances and that Government opposition to filling
the vacancies in Egypt was on general principle.

Al-

though the Cabinet would not participate, France and
:England were closer together with respect to Egypt
than ever before, and, as Freycinet wrote, from November 18, 1876, .Anglo-French co-operation was assured.J
There still remained the settlement of the
Khedive's private debt, the Da.ira, which had fallen
beyond the scope of the November Decree,

On December 12

a meeting of the Daira creditors was held, chaired by
R. B. I/artin and addressed by Goschen.
vised rapid action

a.~d

The latter ad-

recapitulated the general terms

which he and Joubert had obtained from the Viceroy.

On

this occasion Goschen•s words were followed closely in
Alexandria by telegraph, and as he spoke. the .Egyptian
l

The Times, Dec. 18, 1876, P• 7.

2Goschen to Northcote, Dec. 19, 1876, Iddesleigh
Papers BM Add MSS 50021, P• 251.
JRoberts, "Egypt," p. 62.
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funds danced until his conclusion, when they dropped. 1
Most of the floating debt of the Da.ira was held in
Paris and Alexandria1 2 Goschen thought that committees
should be formed of holders of the 1870 loan and the
Da.ira floating debt, and that representatives from
Paris and London should go to Egypt to examine their
property and treat with the Viceroy.

The consensus of

the assembly was that they would request the M.P. for
London to continue in his present capacity as their
plenipotentiary.

Goschen requested ttme for reflection,

and on December 16 he refused, stating that parliamentary
labors would not permit it but that he was still interested
in ·the matter and would help in the selection of a man to
act in his stead.J
Hampering the solution of the Daira debt was a
legal imbroglio which had begun in April of 1876.

By

ruling that the Khedive•s decrees were administrative
instruments, the courts had done much to drive the Viceroy

1 The Times, Dec. lJ, 1876, p. 7.

See above, Chapter J, P• 24i, ?or the Daira terms.
2 over half, or £1,580 000, of the floating debt
1
of the pa.ira was held by the Credit Foncier. A large
portion was also in the portfolio of the Anglo-Egyptian.

3cotp, For, Bondh, Re~., 1876, p. 22,
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into insolvency. 1

Holders had the right to sue for full

payment, and some 1200 cases were on the Tribunals' dockets
by November, enough work to keep them busy for the next
five years. 2 Under these circumstances, it was necessary
to act quickly in the courts to stop the dissolution of
the Viceroy's estates and, although none of the suing
creditors were obliged to accept an arrangement, at least
to acquire a solution in which all would receive something.
By early February, two gentlemen had been selected
to represent the creditors, from England came Thomas

c.

Sandars, a barrister, and from France, M. Joson. also

a lawyer.

After a personal inspection of the Daira by

Messrs, Joson and Sandars, pourpa.rlers were held in Paris,
including those two representatives of the bondholders,
emissaries from Alexandria, and M. Suarez for the Viceroy.

Out of these discussions emerged the final Daira

settlement.

The Corporation's role in these negotiations

was central, for, whereas Goschen had borne all the expense
of his mission, the 'Council' paid the bills for the settle-

ment of the Daira debt.J
1 colvin believed that the courts were the precipi-

tant of the Viceroy's financial collapse (Sir Auckland
Colvin, The M§ki~ of Mgdern ?zY3t (2d ed., New York1
E. P. Dutton and<'.io., 1906), p.j).
2 The Times, Nov. 28, 1876, P• 7.
3corp. For. Bondh. Rep., 1877, P• 7.
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On

May 3, 1877, the Council summoned the last

meeting of Daira bondholders, at which they were addressed first by Goschen and then by 3andars. 1
f

The

onner advised the holders that the agreement which

Mr. Sandars would elucidate would be all the more
binding if a proper mortgage on the Khedive•s estates
were obtained by them in the Mixed Tribunals.

This

suggestion was a sound one, and was clearly the best
course of action, 2 although the process proved long
and expensiva.3

Sandars presented the arrangement to

the assembled bondholders, and it was readily approved.
The contract which was signed on July 12, 1877,
between the creditors and the Khedive•s delegates, possessed many of the same concepts which were basic to the
Decree of November 18.

The total debt, £8,815,430, of

which £2 1 906,150 was unsecured, was consolidated into a
stock paying 5 per cent per annum with a 1 per cent sinking
fund. 4 Back interest would be paid at the rate of 5 per

1 The Times, May 4, 1877. p. 6.

This journal carried
a summary o~ the meeting of Daira holders.
2Wynne, p. 601, n. 92.
3s1nce fees were an important part of the Tribunals'
income, they were utilized to the utmost to produce revenue.
The Standara of February 27, 1877 (ACFB, ~. vr:, 8-10)
pointea to the case of an individual who was charged £14
for a copy of a judgment.
4 The interest would rise to 7 per cent when the debt
had been reduced to £5 million,

r
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cent and would be ready for the creditors by the end of
August.

European administrators were introduced to

dominate the board, audit the finances, and publish
periodic reports. 1

The bondholders• mortgage lay upon

the 435,000 acres of the Da.ira Sanieh and the 50.000
acres of the Da.ira Khassa estates, from which it was
estimated that, after all expenditures, a revenue of
£450.000 might be expected. 2 Less land was held by
Ismail than had been expected, for as early as 1875 he
had begun giving it away to his family to avoid just such
a loss.

Nonetheless, the Egyptian Government guaranteed

the 5 per cent interest.

As with the November conversion,

the floating debt creditors also obtained a 10 per cent
bonus3 which was financed by an issuance of bonds worth
£700,000, known as "Civil List" or "Khassa" bonds. The

Khedive pledged a portion of his own income to help in
may be found in

Da.ira Debt. Conana !amona Jouoert

Banking Company this 10 per
£J4J,OOO (The Times, June l,
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the repayment of these new obligations which also bore
a

5 per cent rate of interest.
The Council considered the settlement of the

Daira difficulties a clearcut victory for the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. 1

It had even taken upon

itself the cost of having the reports and contract
translated, printed, and distributed, a praiseworthy
service indeed, for as the eminent financier Henry
Drummond Wolff observed, "it is astonishing to find how
few Englishmen--even those dealing with foreign countries--know anything of modem languages." 2

With respect

to Egypt, the Council had done as much as possible to defend the English investors, and by selecting and backing
a strong protagonist had given the bondholders a foothold in that country,

Henceforth, the Corporation would

play a supportive role to the newly-appointed officials
and to Mr. Goschen for as long as he involved himself in
Egyptian affairs.

The Goschen scheme was condemned by

many as impractical, but for the present the English
creditors could thank the Council and the M.P. for London
for placing them in a position of strength.
1 .Money Marltet Review, XXXVI (May 4, 1878), 435.

2wolff, II, 59.

CHAPTER IV
THE ERA OF THE BONDHOLDERS
MAY 1877 TO JUNE 1879
The Success of the Goschen Decree
During the two years which followed the settlement of the Daira debt, the foreign creditors of Egypt
sought to keep their position in the Nilotic and to
maintain the annual payment of interest.

Another

adjustment of Egypt's finances was needed, which in
turn brought about a European ministry headed by Charles
Wilson and :fubar Pasha.

A dominant theme of this period

was the ever-increasing interposition of Europe, and
especially of the Western Powers, in the internal affairs of Egypt, which eventually not only increased
pressure upon the Cairo Government, but also eliminated
the private character of the officers appointed by
Mr. Goschen.

Thus, the English creditors almost from

the start found their cause being subverted by the men
whom Goschen had chosen to fill the vacancies.
Under Mehemet Ali, Europeans had entered the
service of the Egyptian ruler as experts occupying
264
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technical posts but exerting no influence whatsoever
upon the Government.

With Sald (1854-63) the number

of foreigners rose significantly as Egypt was thrown
open to traders and financiers of ever'3 kind. and their
employment in the ruler's service became less unusual. 1
rsmail Pasha, as already indicated, utilized the talents
of Westerners to a great degrees one source estimated
the number of Europeans added to the Egyptian Government service at 160 in 1864-70• 201 in 1871·75, 119
in 1876, 76 in 1877, and 131 in 1878. 2 Naturally there
was nationalist competition for these posts, for they
were a barometer which measured the political influence
of the various European countries within Egypt.

From

the outset French aggressiveness carried the day,
reaching its apogee in 1869 on the opening of the
Canal, when visitors to Egypt could readily observe
which nation was in t.he ascendancy.3

Although com-

paratively small, the British community in Egypt was
commercially important, and from the early 1870's the
1 John Ninet, "Origin of the National Party in

Egypt," Nineteenth Century, XIII (Jan., 188J), 117 a...,_d 120.
2 Rothstein, p. 64.
3Edward Dicey, The ~ypt o: the Future (London1
William Heinemann, 1907), P• •
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r-chedive began to enlist Englishmen in various capacities.
The first to attain high off ice was Sir Samuel Baker,
who from 1869 to 1873 fought the slave trade in the
Sudan. 1 George Gordon next took up the task and was
joined by others such as Malcolm Mackillop.

By 1876

the number of Englishmen in KhediYidal pay had risen
noticeably, especially in those departments involved
with communicationsr lighthouses, telegraphs, marine,
post office, and the viceregal packets were all dominated
by British personnel. 2 Such over-representation often
created hard feelings in the Europea~ colony.J

In many

cases these appointments were filled by individuals
selected by the English Government itself or at least
with its tacit approval, as the Cave p,11ssion illustrated.
1 T. Douglas Murray and Arthur Silva White,
Sir Samuel Bakers A Memoir (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1895), p. 203.
2Malet to Derby• May 18, . 1882 • Parliamenta;cy:
Papers, LXXXII, Egypt NO. 4 (1882), c. 1484, pp. 190213. Enclosed in that document is a list of all Europeans
in the pay of the Viceroy, with their dates of entry,
nationality, departments, and salaries.
3.An instance of this can be cited in the electi?ns for the assessors for the year 1877. These persons participated in the deliberations of the Mixed Courts
when commercial matters were involved. On this occasion
only two English merchants were returned, the same as
for the Dual Monarchy, Germany, and Russia, while the
Greek, French, and Italian representatives numbered
seven, six, and four, respectively (The Times, Feb, 28,
1877, p. 7).
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By complying with Ismail's request, En.gland not only
underpinned her own influence, but, as she argued,
contributed to the general progress of Egypt since,
as a writer of tha day observed, Egyptian officialdom
possessed
most of the usual Eastern defects--of apathy.
dishonesty, disregard of truth, and general disposition to do as little work as possible for the
largest possible sum of peculative gain,l
Central to Mr. Goschen•s thinking was the idea
that European administrators must be introduced, and
it was natural that he should take up the matter with
his Government.

Those who have studied the Egyptian

administration after 1882 have shown how important the
role of the Anglo-Indian official was in the operation
of the Cairo govern.ment, 2 It has also been suggested,
and quite rightly, that this "Indianization" had begun
prior to the British occupation,

In a letter to North-

cote on December 19, 1876, Goschen asked for Government

help in finding a man for the controllership, the most
sensitive of the available posts, and specifically re1

McCoa."t'l, P• 115,

2 Robert Tignor, "The •rnd1an1zation' of the
Egyptian Administration under British Rule," (hereafter
"Indianization") A,merican Historical Review, LXVIII
(April, 1963) 1 637,
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quested an ex-Indian or ex-colonial official. 1

Al-

though the Cabinet was not to be enticed into making
selections, the Chancellor did allow Goschen to confer
with one of the under secre·taries, who assisted him
in finding the right man. 2

The upper echelon of the

Indian civil service was highly paid, but as the
Khedive was to remit the salaries, this was not a
hindrance to Goschen.

A few of the new Egyptian

off ioials received stipends equalling that of the
president of the United States. and, in all, the new
employees cost the Viceroy £J),500 per year.3 The
English Cabinet•s position on these appointments
was ambivalent, for while not responsible for placing
such individuals as William Romaine or General Marriott, 4 they still allowed these men, as well as others,
to take extended leaves of absence from their duties in
1 aoschen to Northcote, Dec. 19, 1876, Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50021, p. 251.
2

Northcote to Goschen, Dec. 5, 1876, ~·

50053, p, 87 (copy),

3vivian to Derby, Feb. 2, 1877. PRO FOCP 407/9,
No, 207, P• 149. Of the above sum, £15,000 would go to
Englishmen.
4nerby to Vivian, Dec, 21, 1876, ~•• No.
195, p. 139.
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India. 1

Considering the sentiments of Secretary

Clarke and other members of the 'Council.' theselection of Anglo-Indian officials to represent the
bondholders seems to have been most congenially
accepted.
The most important of the posts to be f'illed
was that of Controller-General of Receipts; by early
December Goschen had a potential candidate. William
Romaine.

Goschen informed Northcote of this gentle-

man •a desire to secure the appointment and the Chancellor replied at once that filr. Romaine was a person
of strong character who deserved the opportunity~ 2
Before the year 1876 was out, the names of Romaine
and Baron de Malaret (representative of the Syndicate)
had been sent to Ismail as the bondholders' nominees
for the posts overseeing the Khedive•s expenditures
and revenues.

Time did not permit a careful culling

1 Hansard. Jd ser., Vol. 232. March 1.

1877,

cols. 1210-ll. In reply to a question about Mr. Gerald
Fitzgerald being named Deputy Controller-General of
Receipts in Egypt, Lord Hamilton said that the Indian
civil servant was on medical leave and had chosen to
spend it in Cairo.
2Goschen to Northcote, Dec. J, 1876, Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50021, p, 2491 Northcote to
Goschen, Dec. 5, 1876, ibid. 50053, p. 87 (copy).
William G. Romiliii (1815•93) became a lawyer
in 1839 and entered Government service, becoming Second
Secretary of the Admiralty in 1859, and Judge Advocate
in India later (1869-73) (!ill]., XVII, 177)•
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of the available individuals, for if it had, Romaine
might not have been selected.

He was not a young man,

nor easy to work with, and "was lacking in the critical
faculty," 1 but worst of all from the creditors' point
of view, he was unsympathetic to the bondholderss Sir C.
Rivers Wilson described him as "a good, well.,;mannered
man and a most honourable gentleman, but he has not
grit enough for his place." 2

As Goschen later recalled,

Romaine went to Egypt as a humanitarian, a champion of
the fellaheen, and "avowedly looked to reform in Egypt
more than to the interests of the bondholders.")

Al-

though well-intentioned, Romaine's gullibility made him
plastic in the hands of his Gallic counterpart and of
the Viceroy.

Vivian lamented this fact to the Foreign

Office:
It cannot be denied, I fear, that almost all the
influence which Mr. Goschen undoubtedly intended
to give to the English Controller-General has fallen
away from him into the hands of his French colleague. 4
1 Lawrence John Lumley Dundas Zetland, Second
Marquis Zetland, Lord Cromera Bein the Authorized Life
of Evelyn Barinf, First Earl of Cromer London: Hodder
and Staughton, 9J2), p. 63.
2 Wilson to his wife, April 29, 1878, Wilson, p. 121.
JGoschen to Granville, Sept. 19, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO J0/29/150 (copy).
4 vivian to Derby, Aug. 10, 1877, PRO FOCP 407/9,
No. 256, P• 191.
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Appeals were made to Goschen from many quarters for
Romaine's removals Cherif Pasha, a high-ranking Egyptian functionary, personally wrote to Goschen
that it would be advantageous both to Egypt

and her creditors if a younger and more ener-

getic man than IVIr. Romaine, professing a better
knowledge of the French language, were nominat~d
to the post of Controller-General of Receipts,l
This missive was inspired by Ismail, who felt both em•
barrassed and annoyed by the British Controller, and
who no doubt disliked having the balance of power tipped
too far to the advantage of Paris.

Complaints were

lodged with Goschen by fJ.lajor Evelyn Baring (later
Lord Cromer) who also advised Romaine•s withdrawal,
writing that that gentleman and Mr. Gerald Fitzgerald
had learned "next door to nothing of any use ... 2 But
these remonstances were in vain, and for the next two
years Romaine was a factor in Egyptian administrative
life.
Of more immediacy to the English creditors was
the man who would represent them on the Caisse,

The Times

of January 15. 1877, announced the appointment to that

p. 214.

1vivian to Derby, Oct. 2, 1877, ibid., No. 278,

2Baring to Goschen, Dec. 24, 1877, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 633/2.
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position of Major Baring, whose family was in the forefront of London finance. 1 Baring was a man of energy,
quick mind and strong principle. who in Egypt earned
for himself the soubriquet "OV'erbearing."

His politics

were Whiggish in tone, and he harbored an antipathy toward Lord Beaconsfield.

From 1872 to 1876 Baring had

served in India as secretary to his cousin, Lord Northbrook, and it was upon his return to England that he
was taken in hand by Sir Louis Mallet of the India

Office, who brought him into contact with Mr. Goschen. 2
When he assumed his duties on March 2, 1877. as a private
delegate of the British bondholders, Baring was sympathetic
to their interests.

However, as time passed his opinions

modified so that by the time of his elevation to the
Controller's post, his attitudes had become similar to
those of Mr. Romaine,3 which dazri.aged his popularity among
the bondholders.
'I

.1..The Times, Jan. 15, 1877, P• 9, Baring formally
accepted the pos!t!on in a letter to Goschen on January 4,
1877 (A. R. D. Elliot. I. 171).
2sir Louis Mallet (1823-90) was a free trader
and believed that the services, especially the Indian,
needed to be more responsive to the political and economic
needs of G~--eat Britain. He was made Permanent Under Secretary of State at the India Off ice in 1874, and sat on the
India Council for the next ten years (Sir Algernon We~t,
Contem ora
Portraits
en of
Da in Public Life LNew
Yorks E. P. ut on, n. , , PP•
•
3aoschen to Granville, Sept. 19, 1882, Granville
Papers J0/29/150 (copy).
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Selected as president of the board to administer
the railways and the harbor of Alexandria was General
lfarriott, and, as his deputy, Henry le Mesurier, both
Anglo-Indian recruits.

This board, which was responsible

for the securing of proscribed revenue for the Preference
stock, found its task all but impossible with the railway
on the verge of collapse, 1

The Cave Report had only

hinted at this decrepitude, 2 for it was inexact on several
accounts.

The board was forced to reduce freight rates

by twenty per cent to compete with barge traffics a
doubling of the harbor dues was also proposed,3
had

rt

bean supposed by everyone that ipso facto the placing

of European administrators over various departments would
miraculously bring reform as well as funds to pay the
debts.

The dismay was great when both the customs and

the railways, which had been placed in British hands, fell
far short of anticipated revenues for 1877; the deficit
of the latter increased thirteen per cent (£190,000) in

1cromer, II, :312. The author wrote that "few,
save those behind the scenes, have probably recognised
fully that the Anglo-French Agreement was only signed
just in time to prevent a complete breakdown of the Railway Administrations."
C,

"~Parliamentary
1425, p. 3,

Papers, LXXXII, Egypt No. 7 (1876),

JThe Times, March 26, 1877, p, 4,
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1877 as compared to that of 1876. 1 Mr. George H. Scrivnor's difficulties as Director of Customs were in part
caused by smuggling, which the English commander of the
coastguard could not eradicate, 2 but also by the quality
of the personnel.

Vivian reported home that the number

of youthful neophytes at the customs sheds was high,

and they were of little promisa, although their salaries
were "out of all proportion to what they would have earned
in England and • • • to the value of their services ... )
The last of the appointments were made in early
November when Alonso Money, former president of the Bank
of Bengal, and Count de Louvencourt, from the Bank of
Constantinople, were named commissioners of the Daira.
The Bullionist commented upon the British candidates1
The appointment of Anglo-Indian officials to
responsible posts in :Egypt must be regarded with
favor and cannot but tend to an improvement in
the management of the various departments of the
State.4

1statist. I (June 29, 1878), J46. The revenue
for 1877 for the railway amounted to £671,000, not the
estimated £1 million.
2ne Kusel, p. 107. The bulk of the illioi t
traffic was carried on by the Greeks. according to
de Kusel.
JVivian to Derby, Sept. 28, 1877, PRO FOCP
407/9, No. 275, P• 213.

4 Bull!onist. Nov. 17, 1877, ACFB, &gypt, VIII, 188.
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Despite these two European advisors in key positions,
as well as Mr. Anderson who directed the sugar mills,
the Daira estates were to operate in the red for the
next twenty years.

Here, even more than in other de-

partments, the provision of an Egyptian Director General
allowed the native officials to remain in full control,
and orders from the European hierarchy were usually
.
d•l
ignore
Such were the European administrators who were
to execute the Goschen Plan.

Before pursuing the results

of the Decree of November 18, 1876, it would be well to
return to the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders and
the settlement of the Egyptian tribute loan difficulties.
Throughout 1876 the Council was engaged in
solving all aspects of Egypt•e indebtedness, including
the so-called tribute loans, those offerings by Turkey
which had as their security the annual payments of the
Khedive to the Sultan.
and

After its bout with the press

the Palm&r Committee, the Council remained on the

sidelines, except for the comfort which it extended to
the Egyptian Tribute Bondholders• League. 2

The Cor-

poration's involvement in the debt difficulties of
1 sir Donald McKenzie Wallace.

Ee¥pt and the
Egyptian Question (New Yorks Russell and Russell, 1967,
first published in 188)), PP• J48-49.
2 see above, Chapter 2, PP• 153-54 et passim.
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Egypt in May of 1876 included an interest in settling
the tribute loan situation.

On IVIa.y 26, 1876, a meeting

of the 1854 loan holders was held

by

the Leagues chaired

by George Taylor of the 'Council,' it was also attended
by several men from Moorgate Street, among them Cornelius
Surgey and Hyde Clarke.
enumerateda

The steps already taken were

legal action to obtain the release of funds,

the dispatch of a man to gain assurance of the Viceroy's
continued cooperation, and the visits with Lord Derby
which had availed little. 1 But the determination to
take their case to Parliament was the most adventurous
step reported,
Indeed, the cause was not hopeless, for the
aid of Gladstone had been enlisted,

The Liberal states-

man replied to a letter from a holder in these most
positive terms1
When the appeal is made to Parliament, I shall
think it my duty--unless circumstances come to
my knowledge in the interval of a nature to alter
my view of the case--strongly to support the claim
of the bondholders of 1854 to the support of the
British Government in the matter of their claims
by every means short of force. I say short of
force, because I think it for the Government alone
to decide whether they shall or shall not make use
of force, which I consider to be entirely within
their right,2
1For accounts of the meeting. see ACFB, Turkey,

IX, articles from May, 1876.
2 The Times, May 27, 1876, P• 12.
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With such encouragement, a campaign to win adherents
in the House was motmted in which the Corporation of
Foreign Bondholders played a substantial role.

Still

opposing the creditors were the contractors and the
"Thtmderer," an alliance which annoyed the founder of'
the Egyptian Tribute Bondholders' League, Captain
Stewart, who complained that his organization "had
met with every opposition from Messrs. Dent and
Palmer, backed up as they had been in the most scandalous
manner by The Times newspaper." 1 Three htmdred letters
were sent to M.P.'s to garner support.

The •council'

threw its considerable influence into the balance by
participating in a committee which persuaded the Recorder
for London to assent to introduce their motion to Commons. 2
On July 21 1 1876, the question was broached whether France

was going to live up to her
1854 holders,
also requested.

moral responsibility to the

The moral support of the Government was
In the debate which followed, Gladstone

warmly defended the bondholders, and only after Northcote
had stated that the Government would pursue the subject
with Paris was the motion (calling for French action)
1 Hour, June 17, 1876. ACFB. Turkey, IX, 294.
2Money Market Review, XXXIV (April 14, 1877). J82,
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withdrawn. 1
Things had not improved by autumn, in fact, as
the press reported, some Turkish holders, blithely ignoring the hypothecations of fellow Englishmen, had
sent a memorandum to the Grand Vizier advocating a
seizure of Egyptian customs, or, if necessary, the
occupation of the entire province, in order that they
might be paid. 2

A

mission to Constantinople was under-

taken in October by representatives of the Egyptian
Tribute Bondholders• League, but this effort ended in
discomf'iture and frustration.

So the matter stood

until the new year.
With the return of Parliament in January, 1877,
new appeals to that body were made and a bill was prepared which would have established a committee for the
tribute loans with the power to distribute the interest
which had been accumulating in the Bank of England since
October, 1875.

The plan was not greeted with enthusiasm

by the journals, for Government interference in contracts,
and in the money market generally, was unpopular.J

The

1 ttansard, Jd ser., Vol. 2JO, July 21, 1876,
cols. 1728-61.
2Whitehall Review, Sept. 9, 1876, ACFB, E:gypt,

v,

200.

JNegative articles on the subject appeared in the
Economist (XXXV, [Jan. lJ, 1877], J2) and Money Market
Review (XXXIV. [Jan. lJ, 1877], 32).
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project was never presented, for many of the holders
as well as the Corporation were opposed• and besides,
a joint representation to the Sultan, by England and
France, wa.s finally presented on February 17, 1877. 1
Throughout the spring M.P.'s friendly to the creditors
periodically inquired in the House as to the progress
of affairs. 2
While the Corporation continued to work with
a Parliamentary group to reintroduce the motion of
July, 1876, Bouverie had begun a fence-mending operation
with the Palmer Committee.

In April of 1877 the Tribute

League placed itself under the aegis of Moorgate Street,
and an agreement was arrived at between Bouverie and
Dent, Palmer and Company to work for a common solution.
The chairman of the •council' saw quite clearly that
bondholder unity was the key to success.J

Such indeed

was the case, for Turkey, battered by war and economically
exhausted, especially wished to settle with her tribute
holders, since not only did the Sultan wish to raise

22).

1Most of this note is reproduced in Wynne (pp. 421-

2Among those who kept the issue before Parliament was Goschen (Hansard. Jd ser., Vol. 2JJ. March 23 1
1877 1 col. 378).
JMoney .Market Review, XX.XVI (May 4, 1878) 1 4J4.
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another loan using the unmortgaged portion of the
Egyptian tribute as collateral, but he also desired
a portion of the hard cash which was inaccessible to
both parties,

Hence, an agent was ordered to London

with whom Palmer and Bouverie were able to negotiate
a settlement, 1
On July

24, 1877, the holders assembled to

discuss the proposals offered by the Sultan, which,
after vituperative debate, were approved,

To the

chairman of the Corporation such proceedings were
unpleasant, for they illustrated the lack of harmony
within the •council.'

Both Surgey and Taylor op-

posed Bouverie and urged the holders to obtain better
terms. 2 Despite this internecine jealousy (for such
it appeared to be), the composition was ratified and
the necessary instruments were signed on September 17.J
Nonetheless, these occasional outbursts of resentment
of •council' members against the dominance of Bouverie
were to re cur.

ll12.1,g_,, XXXIV (May 26, 1877), 528,
2~., XXXV (July 28,

1877), 80.

JFor a discussion of the final arrangements,
consult Wynne (p. 42J).

281

One difficulty yet remained--the one shilling
per pound which had been voted by the Turkish holders
in the previous year. as the Corporation stated, "to
defray the expenses of, and the remuneration due to,
the different persons who have given their time and

services to the bondholders in the negotiations which
are now concluded ... l
nemesis, Mr. J.

c.

To this request the Col.trlcil's

McCoan, took issue, arguing that

the money was to go into the coffers of the Corporation. 2
The Turkish ambassador issued a public statement on
November 24, 1877. in which he declared that Turkey had
not authorized the contractors to withhold any fl.trlds
from the shareholders1 this paved the way for legal
action by a handful of holders captained by Mr, McCoan.J
While the litigation proceeded, the 'Col.trlcil•
was silent, and when the subject arose at the General
Court of 1878 it was ruled out of order by the Chairman.
In May, however, the Court of Common Pleas ruled in
favor of McCoan, which so annoyed the Council that it
considered a resolution to insert into ail future conventions to be negotiated by the organization a clause

1The Times, Oct. 12, 18771 P• 7~
)Money Market Review, XXXV (Nov. 24, 1877), 493.
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assuring that those who did not palpably assist the association should not reap the benefits. 1 The idea was discard.eds nonetheless, it bespoke the Corporation's awkward position, harried by disunity and financial
problems both in def eat and in success.

But even as

this arrangement was finalized, the Goschen Decree,
from which much had been expected, was proving unworkable, and Egyptian bankruptcy again loomed on the horizon.

The year 1877 was not as the framers of the
November Decree had anticipated--the first stage on the
journey to solvency. The Viceroy had but £1.4 million2
with which to run his government and also had a rigorous
schedule of interest payments to meet,J

Unpleasant

stori9s of a floating debt not included in the Goschen
arrangements were circulated, some placing it as high as
£15 million, 4 while much criticism was heaped upon the
Bank of Egypt for covertly, and in violation of the
Goschen Decree, advancing Ismail £160,000 in early
1 corp. For, Bondb,a Rep •• 1878, P• 7,
2vivian to Derby, Jan. 17, 1878, PRO FOCP
407/10, No, 10 1 PP• 7-8,

JA table of payment dates and amounts due may be
found in the Economist (XXXV, [July 21, 1877]. 848),
4

~•• (Nov, 10, 1877), 1335. The Economist
Francaise reported this story in early' November, but the
English journal gave it no credence.

28.3

January of 1877. 1

The necessity of such a transaction

so soon after the new composition gave pause to the
most sanguine.
By 1877 the flotsam and jetsam of the Porte's
domains in the Balkan Peninsula were ablaze with war,
and the Khedive as a loyal subject was called upon to
assist the Sultan.

Surprisingly. Ismail complied,

although it placed enormous strain upon his country,
The creditors of the Vicuroy generally opposed Egypt's
participation in the conflict since funds needed for
the coupons were endangered. 2

A special war tax was

imposed in May as the Egyptian Government made herculean

efforts to dispatch ll,000 troops to the front.

Even

Ismail was constrained to make many personal sacrifices
in his mode of living, although not all the splendor
had gone out of his life.3

Government officials found

1Economist, XXXV (Aug, 11, 1877), 950.
2 The English colony in Alexandria was generally
sympathetic to the Turkish cause, which ·added to their
popularity and influence (The Times, Nov. 17, 1877 1 p. 4),
JThe necessities of state went begging while
Ismail Pasha hosted his lavish entertainments, according
to a story in the Ec~o d'Orient quoted in The Times

(Feb. 27, 1877, P• 4 •
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their pay falling in arrears, a situation not as serious
for the Europeans as for the natives, who began to borrow
at high rates just to survive.

The decline in Egyptian

public health services, education. hospital services
and similar functions can also be traced from 187?. 1
Extraordinary means of raising revenue were employed,
such as selling crops while still in the ground. 2 By
June Alexandria afforded a gloomy spectacle with its
numerous liquidation notices evident on shop doors.3
But worse was on the wayr it was soon obvious to all
that the Nile would not be a good one and consequently
the outlook for the coming year was dark.
Since Goschen and Joubert had refused a new
loan to the Viceroy, his credit standing slipped.

The

haute bang!!!. had been fooled, for they had imagined that
it would be relatively simple to sell to the general

public their glut of £9,424,600 of Unified stock. 4 But
1

Tignor, "Indianization," P• 636.

2 By the sum.mer of 1877 Ismail had relapsed into
his old ways of collecting the land tax nine months in
advance (Mulhall. p, 528),

JMorning Advertiser, J\u1e 12, 1877, ACFB, Egypt,
VII, 254.

4Economist, XXXVI (Nov. 16, 1878), 1J47,
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investors were not eager to take up the Syndicate's
burden, and "unifieds" fell to J0, 1 The heaviest
loss was incurred by the

C~dit

Foncier which held a

reported 106 million francs in unsecured paper2 as
well as a large block of Unified stock.
The remainder of the Egyptian stock was likewise under pressure, although investors in some issues
refused to be frightened and hence staved off deoline,J
The English investor was also cautious due to the state
of the home economy, the depressed condition of most

securities, and a new Parliamentary investigation of the
Stock Exchange which was launched in

~arch,

1877,

As

usual, the journals disagreed as to the advice to be
given holders,

London gaily chirped that "our financial

guides , • • have turned around, and most of them now
take quite a rosy view of the future of Egyptian finance, .. 4
1 "The Difficulties of Egyptian Finance," Bankers
azine, XLIV (May, 1884), 484, In 1878 the Unified
stoc a most touched 25,
2Econom1st, XX:X:V (Nov. 10, 1877), 1JJ8.
3Ib1d,, 1J68. For example one year after the
Goschen Plan, the D1ir& loan of 186~ had risen from 52
to 68, and the Daira offering of 1870 had lost a point.
4London, April 14, 1877, ACFB, pigYpt, VII, 84,
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whereas the Public Leader soberly warnede
Let no bondholders build upon any of the brilliant
prospects held out with regard to future payment
of Egyptian coupons, and exercise caution in
reference to the counsel offered them by certain
City editors. It is not the business of these
gentlemen to advise the public where to invest. 1
The most convincing proof of economic soundness would
have been the prompt and complete payment of Egypt•s
interest and the successful operation of the Caisse
and the control.
Reflecting upon the utility of the Caisse
long after his service upon it had ended, Lord Cromer
wrote that this body had been an obstacle to progress,
had often promoted anti-British hostilities, and
whatever reforms have been accomplished with
the co-operation of the Caisse could have
been equally well and probably better accomplished
had the Caisse not existed.2
This body, which had first been established
Decree of

May

by

the

2. 1876, and which was included in the

Goschen settlement, had been very popular among all
classes of bondholders,

All payments for the servicing

of the debts--taxes, customs, tolls, and. dues--which

were to be turned over for distribution to the creditors
would be encashed with the Caisse. and no change in the

1Public Leader, March 3, 1877, ibid., 26.
2

Cromer, II, 309.
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amount of revenue nor any loan by the Government could
be executed without approval from this commission.
NJajor Baring joined his colleagues in the
Caisse on March 2, 1877, considering himself a private
individual whose function was to represent the interests
of English investors. 1

In time the holders began to prize

this institution more as it became clear that the controllers were of dubious utility.

As Mr. Goschen re-

marked,
It is a fundamental mistake to consider the
Controllers as Bondholders• men, so far as the
English are concernedA and this is almost equally
true of [the FrenchJ.~
The triad which was created for bondholder representation included Baring in F;eypt, and Goschen and the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders at home,

As long

as this trio remained in tandem, the Council found it
most desirable to leave well enough alone,

So long,

too, as Baring viewed Goschen as his mentor and cultivated his influence, there was harmony of purpose, but
slowly the younger man altered his principles. coming
to oppose the November Decree. and in so doing estranging
1

~.,

I, 14-15, 24-25.

2aoschen to Granville, Sept. 19. 1882, Granville Papers PRO FO 30/29/150.
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himself from both Goschen and Moorgate Street. 1

Despite

his private capacity, Major Baring kept the English
agent fully apprised and profited from the intimacy:
I always kept Vivian and Malet fully informed of
everything that went on, but I acted independently
of them. No doubt lI'f9 position was strengthened
by the impression which existed that in an extreme
case, the English Government would lend me a helping
hand, but I never used to employ language which
would encourage this impression.2
On

the other hand, Baring was willing, if the Govern-

ment desired it, to take any steps which they deemed
necessary, but until then he would work closely with
the Caisse,3

The polestar of Baring's policy was the

commonality of goals between the holders and the Cairo
Government:
I used constantly to point out that the interests
of the bondholders were really identical with
Egyptian interestss that what both wanted was good
govemment--and, in fact, whatever influence I
gained in Egypt was due to the fact--at least I
think so--that gradually the Ministers and others
really believed that I had the interests of the
country at heart.4

1cromer, I, J5.
2Baring quoted in Northbrook to Granville,
March 14, 1882, Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/1J8.
JBaring to Goschen, Feb. 25, 1878, Cromer Papers
PRO FO 633/2.

4Baring quoted in Northbrook to Granville,
March 14 1 1882, Granville Papers PRO FO 30/29/lJB.
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From the beginning the Caisse was in an unenviable position, with pressure from several directions
focused upon it.

M. Joubert, at the outset, urged the

commissioners to ignore the limitations of the November
Decree and to use all funds at hand to meet the January 15
payment date for the Unified stock.

But M, de

Bligni~res,

who was more honest and was a cosmopolite in outlook,
balked at this suggestion,

Observing these activities,

Mr. Vivian confidentially wrote homes
I should regret if the principle object of the
Egyptian Government and of the group of French
bankers represented by M. Joubert, was simply
to raise the value of Egyptian stock by providing
for the interest due on the next coupon without
regard to the exact execution of the Decree, or
to what may happen hereafter, whe11 they may have
realized the stock that they held. 1
Baron de .Ma.laret, the French Controller-General, also
busied himself to assure the adequate funds and attempted to have the interest due on England's Canal
shares postponed, but was met with British resistance.
Paris firmly backed her nationals and Vivian was disturbed over the futures
Whether any failure of Egypt to fulfill her
financial engagements would provoke the French
Government to push this support so far as to
1vivian to Derby, Dec. 23, 1876, PRO FOCP
407/9. No •. 199, P• 142.
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interfere politically for the protection of the
French bondholders is another question, but the
la~guage of the French here would almost warrant
the suspicion; and the Viceroy certainly apprehends the danger.l
To Ismail the Caisse was an l.mpleasant reality which
it was his duty to combat, so that payments made by
the commissioners were a product of their own tenacity
and not of the Viceroy's good will. 2
From England, also, criticism was leveled at
the Commission of the Public Debt.

One of the duties

of this body was the compilation of periodic statements
which were to be forwarded to Councilhouse.

These seem

to have been issued monthly in Alexa.ndria, and before
the year was out they were being published regularly
in England.

~he

reports were in turn distributed by

the Corporation to interested bondholders and to the
press.

The Times led the assault on the statements,

remonstrating that the Caisse had not explained how the
July coupon of the Unified stock was mete
Nothing could well be more unsatisfaatory • , •
than the way in which these statements are put
out now and again. we learn not one iota regarding
the outgoings on account of ordinary expenses, or

p. 174.

P• 149.

1vivian to Derby, Mav26, 1877,

..

~

No. 2.30,

2vivian to Derby, Feb, 2, 1877, ibid.' No. 207,

-
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indeed regarding anything but the amoW"l.ts
"encashed" on behalf of this or that loan.l
The Daily Hews in its support of the commissioners
quite properly retorteda
The Debt Commissioners were never provided with
powers to audit the whole revenues of Egypts
they sirnply have to deal with the amoW"l.ts
pledged to the bondholders which are paid in
to them.2
There is no doubt that The Times' questions helped
drive stocks down, but when the disclosure was made
of the highly irregular loan by the Bank of Egypt.
the "Thunderer" had real ammunitions
The Commissioners sent out to control the finances
of Egypt are either powerless to protect the interests of bondholders or they are not doing their duty,
for they have not helped the bondholders to a single
useful piece of information about the revenues of
Egypt since they took office,3
All the English personnel were placed in a bad light,
and the Khedive, as if to even sc-0res with the Bank of
Egypt for past policies, refused to honor the obligation.
The tide of confidence in the Goschen Plan
(if it had ever been such} had reached its low point by

late summer.

The author of the November· Decree had to

go before the public to defend his handiwork.

The

1 The Times, July 29, 1877, P• 10.
2Daily News, Aug. 15, 1877, ACFB, Egypt, VII, J66,
3The Times, Aug. s. 1877, p. 7.
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members of the Caisse, said Mr. Goschen were "inexorably
firm" and of "undeviating honesty," and the loan in
question had been transacted before the formal installation of the Commission, 1 Availing himself of
the opportunity of his open letter, the M,P, for London
sought to begin the process of disassociation of his
name from Egyptian finances in the eyes of the public,
Yet no matter how one saw Gosohen's personal involvement, it was clear that the Khedive•s creditability was
low.

The hardships of the year made another examination

a necessity, despite Goschen•s cpnviction that undoubtedly

"it would be a disaster for Egypt as well as for the bondholders, if the new organization should be allowed to
break down," 2 Some newspapers tried to argue that there
was no floating debt at all,J but the fact could no longer
be concealed.

Local tradesmen and government officials

called for payment, and the claimants who had won their
cases in the Mixed Courts also demanded compensation.
So confronted, the commissioners of the debt decided to
visit Europe personally to see what could be done to

VII, 390.
VIII, 14.

1 Economist, XX.XV (Aug. 17, 1877), 977.
2Moneta.ry Gazette, Aug. 25. 1877, ACFB, EgYpt,

JFor example, Daily News, Sept. 20, 1877, ~.,
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salvage the situation.
European creditors were most dissatisfied to
find an undisclosed floating debt of £4.5 million, and
dismayed by the rumors of reduced interest and/or the
creation of more Unified stock to eliminate the encumbrance.

Many were angry at this new development,

Truth, an outspoken organ, wrotea
Speaking generally, there is not, probably,
one single banker in Alexandria, who does
not deserve hanging. 1
Goschen advised the Caisse not to give way before
Ismail and to press for a complete inquiry of the new
debtr on no account was the Egyptian ruler to be allowed
to disown the figures given to him and Joubert.

It was

decided that the settlement of the small individual
claims should be postponed until after an inquiry and
that the payment date for the Unified stock should be
altered to conform with the harvest seasons. 2 Downing
Street was acquainted with all of these decisions.3
1

-

Truth, Oct. 24, 1877, ibid., 128.
.
2 0n. December 15, 1877, a Khedivial decree altered the payment dates of the Unified stock to the
first days of May and November. As with other matters
of interest to the bondholders, this decree was sent to
Bouverie for translation and dissemination.
JGoschen to Northcote, Oct. 24. 1877,
Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50021, P• 256.
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M. de Malaret, the French Controller-General,
had also departed Cairo to negotiate with the Parisian
Syndicate, and upon his own authority returned in
December with a plan to give the Viceroy some relief.
He proposed to do this by permanently removing the
15 per cent founder's shares in the Canal from Ismail's
possession, a plan which Vivian thought generally unwise. 1
Mr. Gerald Fitzgerald refused to consider the scheme,
and Baring, who had not seen the project, remained
aloof although agreeing that the Frenchman had gone
too far. 2 The result was de Malaret•s temporary
loss of influence and attempted resignation,
Ismail continued to speak of personal sacrifices, but he remained adamant on the point that any
new inquiry into his affairs should be made on his
terms.
pressed.

By year's end the economic picture was deThe Commission of the Debt successfully

turned back the suggestion of Egypt's Finance Minister
to collect taxes officially in advance,3 which made
Baring•s position difficult:
1vivian to Derby, Dec. 7. 1877, PRO FOCP
407/9. No, J24, P• 245.
2Baring to Goschen, Dec. Jl, 1877, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 63J/2.
3v1v1an to Derby, Dec. 1, 1877. PRO FOCP
407/9, No. 319, P• 24J.
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I wish to qualify in the Khedive•s mind the
supposed hostility of the Caissea at the same
time it is all-important that I should keep
well with my colleagues--de Bligni~res
especia.lly.l
One way out of the Khedive•s predicament, as Baring
saw it, would be a loan guaranteed by France and
Accordingly, he sent both Goschen and the

Britain.

Foreign Off ice a memorandum in which his plan was
elaborated, but received cool responses f:r;-om both. 2
As if Egyptian bondholders had not enough to
cast them into a lugubrious mood, the

Mi~ed

Egypt were also threatening the Caisse.

Courts of

Using the

Twycross vs. Dreyfuss case as a precedent, the Cairo
Court of Appeals ruled on December 10 that an employee
of the Egyptian Government, Mr. Keller,J should be
paid back salary and damages.

The Government argued

that its public creditors had first claims on the
Treasury, but the principle upheld was that the first
duty of a state is self-preservation, and that hence
1

Baril18 to Goschen, Dec. 19, 1877, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2.
2vivian to Derby, Dec. 22, 1877. PRO FOCP
407/9, No. 344, p. 266 (enclosure h Baring to Goschen,
Jan. 11, 1878, Cromer Papers PRO FO 633/2.
JKeller was an Austrian lawyer who served as
a legal advisor to the Egyptian Government. He sued his
employer for five months back pay, a termination of his
five-year contract, and damages.
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payment of its own officials was paramount.

After

such a ruling, it was felt by many that the funds in
the Caisse might be sequestered to meet administrative
expenses.

It was suggested that Keller had been in-

spired by the Khedive to bring the matter forward,
and subsequent events lend credence to this opinion. 1

Using this ruling as his justification, the Viceroy
stanched the flow of receipts into the ca;sse, immediately forcing that body into court.

Baring was correct

in assuming, however, that the Keller decision would
not impinge upon the activities of the commissioners,
they being pa.rt of the financial make-up of the Government.

As events unfolded, the Tribunals upheld the

position of the Cgisse in a decision of March 2, 1878,
and as expected, when the Egyptian Finance Minister

and his records were summoned to appear. money again
began to fill the empty Treasury.

The ruling was one

of the elements which forced the Viceroy to accept a commission of inquiry with broad powers.
Despite the dearth of good financial news from
Egypt in 1877, the year was marked by a second wave of
1 The British agent later reported that Keller
was reinstated in Khedivial service (Vivian to Salis-

bury, July 13, 1878, PRO FOCP 407/10, NO. 199t P• 190),
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English interest in the future of the Nile Valley.
During April the Russian army finally lumbered into
action against Turkey, and by late July had been
halted before Plevna, where it was to remain until
early December when the fortress eapitulatedt with
this obstacle removed, it was only a few weeks until
the Sultan sued for terms.

The first concern of

Downing Street was the Canal, although Count Peter
Shuvalov, Russian Ambassador to Britain, told Derby
that a Russian blockade of the waterway was "pure
phantasy." 1 On May 6, the Foreign secretary again
told st. Petersburg that the Suez Canal must remain
open, and at a meeting of the Compa.gnie Universelle
in early June, a letter was read to the holders assuring
English action should their property be endangered.
Prince Alexander Gorohakov, Russian Foreign Minister,
immediately replied that Russia neither possessed the
force nor the inclination to implement such designs. 2
Many members of the Government, by the spring
of 1877, were quite concerned over

.Egypt~

but only Lord

1 seton-Watson. P• 172. The remainder of this
paragraph is drawn from this work also (pp. 17) and 193).
2

~ ••

P• 19),
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Derby was unalterably opposed to an occupation.

The

Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury, who was
to take the reins of the Foreign Office in April, 1878,
harbored a dislike for Turkey and wrote in March that a
division of the Ottoman Empire was now possible. 1

In

appraising British policy in the Levant over the previous
two years, Salisbury wrotet
I would have devoted my whole efforts to securing
the waterway to India--by the acquisition of Egypt
or of Crete, and would in no way have discouraged
the obliteration of Turkey.2
Lord Beaconsfield's actions in Egypt were defensive
in character and contingent upon French maneuvering.J
Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, who was to resign his office in January, 1878, was still in favor
of occupying Egypt:
I desire that we should consider the occupation
of Egypt, and should have been perfectly ready to
incur considerable risks in such a case, but any
such suggestion, whether proceeding from me or
others, has • • • been always put aside. 4
1salisbury to Lytton. March 9, 1877, Cecil, I~ 130.
2 saiisbury to Lytton, June

15, 1877, ~.,145-46.

;Disraeli to Queen Victoria, Oct. 18, 1877 1
Buckle and Monypenny, VI, 188. The Prime Minister wrote
that should Bismarck encourage France to look toward the
Nilotic for compensation for 1870, England would have
to occupy Egypt,

4carnarvon to Northcote, Dec. 15, 1877, Hardinge, II, 365.
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Northcote 1fo{as also nervous and feared that a comb!nation of the Northern Powers might divide the Ottoman
dominions and gain France's adherence with the promise
of Egypt. 1

Aware of England's uneasiness, Bismarck

again introduced the theme of English hegemony over
the Nile Valley. 2
After the Goschen-Joubert arrangements, the
political influence of the Western Powers within Egypt
could be exercised by means of the recently-established
bondholder machinecy.

Such an outcome was inevitable,

since these newly appointed officials, especially the
British, felt little allegiance to the wishes of the
investors, and looked to Downing Street (in the case
of the English) as the source of their power.

Salis-

bury, as Foreign Secretacy, later explained that in
backward regions such as the Middle Ea.st, having Englishinen in the highest posts was a sine gua non for
success.3
1 Northcote to Disraeli, April 21, 1877, Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50018• P• 22 (copy).

Layard, June 25, 1878, Cecil.
II, 304.
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The bondholders might have obtained some
comfort from the wave of sentiment favoring the
occupation of Egypt which again rose in Britain in
1877•

The primary cause of this phenomenon was the

visit of Nubar Pasha to Britain in April when he
proposed English domination over his country in exchange
for her assumption of the Turkish tribute,

The Foreign

Secretary's answer was negative, for as Nubar later saida
Although he had been well received in the City,
at the India Clffice and the Treasury, Lord Derby
was impervious to his advances, arguing that if
En.gland added to her possessions! she could not
blame Russia for doing the same.
Yet his journey was not a total failure, for while in
the English capital he made the acquaintance of the
editor of the Observer, Mr, Edward Dicey. 2 Nubar•s
object was to launch a press campaign in England
to win public opinion for the idea of annexing Egypt
to the Empire.

The spearhead of the drive was a series

of articles by Dicey in the Nineteenth Century, extending into 1878, which was W9ll constructed and widely
l

Seton-Watson, P• 309.

2Edward Dicey (1832-1911) entered business but
soon turned his talents to journalism, becoming a permanent member of the staff of the Dai11 Telefrahh in
1862, From 1870 to 1889 he was the ed tor o t e
Observer, a weekly publication (DNB, Supp. 1901-1911,
I, 497),
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read. 1

Th~ themes of the articles were England's

maritime link with India, the Russian threat, and
the desire of the bondholders to receive fair treatment.

The

T~mes

made a sound observation, and one

which was to be equally true in 18821
Appeals are made to the patriotism of Englishmen in words which would have more weight if they
could be disconnected from the interests of the
Egyptian bondholders.2
National interest

is but a composite of many group

interests1 bondholder concerns were at least as important as imperial and mercantile considerations.
Gladstone, the defender of a "little England"
policy, added fuel to the fire of controversy with his
own pieces in the Nipeteenth Centw::r. but his efforts
were directed toward illustrating the hazards of an
Egyptian seizure, which he envisioned, quite correctly,
as the nucleus of an African Empire.

other writers

joined Dicey•s causes Grant E. Duff', M.P. (former
Under Secretary for India) was one who urged the acquisition of some real estate in the Ea.stern Mediter1 Baring to Goschen, Dec. 19, 1877, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 6'J/2. Even in Egypt these articles were
perused and discussed.
2The Times, Jan. 8, 1878, P• 9.
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ranean should Russia annex Turkish territory. 1

Con-

servative papers joined the campaign, as did such popular sheets as Truth, edited by the finano!er and Egyptian bondholder Labouchere. 2

Even at a meeting of the

African Section of the Royal Society of Arts. a political discussion arose when a paper on Egyptian commerce

was read.

It was agreed that the Canal should be well-

guarded, and the chairman, Sir George Elliot, remarked
that should Britain "stretoh out her arms to embrace
Egypt. he believed the people would not be unwilling
to be under English care."J
This movement was quite successful for a time,
gaining wide endorsement for Egyptian annexation* 4

1 Thompson, I, 180. Grant Duff was an M.P. who
joined the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders in the 188o•s.
His interest in Egypt was not only political, but economic
as well, since he was a shareholder in the Commercial Bank
of Alexandria (Share List of the Bank of Alexandria for

1877, BT Jl/2257/10783).

2Algar L. Thorold, Life of Hen:r;y La.bouchere
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 191j), pp. 160 and l98.
Truth, for example, praised Nubar as the Khedive•s only
enlightened minister (Truth, June 26. 1877, ACFB, §gypt,
VII, 282).

3Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXVI,
(March 22, 1878), J61.

4Halford L. Hoskins, British Routes to India

(New Yorkt Longmans, Green and Co., i92S), p. 476.
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E:ngland 1 s agent in Cairo was so concerned that he inquired whether there was substance to the rumor. 1
But this public support was mercurial, and as the
heroism of the Turks at Plevna became manifest, admiration for the underdog supplanted other feelings.
Still, Dicey's aid was appreciated.

Wilson and Nubar

first considered appointing their journalistic friend
to an Egyptian sinecure, but instead granted to him and
to the Imperial Ottoman Bank a concession for a

c~dlt

foneier which was eventually established. 2
The Commission of Inquiry
"I would put it thus--that economy on his

[the Khedive•s] part should precede sacrifices on the
part of the creditors"-such was the opinion of Major
Baring on his return to Cairo from his trip to Europe.J
Conversations with holders, as well as the discussions

at Goschen's home at Seacox, had formalized the view that
1vivian to Tenterden, July 1, 1877, Tenterden
Papers PRO FO 363/2.
'
2nicey, EgYpt of the Future, p. 16.
3Barir!.g to Goschen, Dec. 19, 1877, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 633/2.
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no relief should be extended to Ismail until there was
a full inquiry into his affairs.

Many pressures were

exerted upon the reluctant Khedive to comply with such
investigations, and among the most forceful was that of
the combination of Ca!sse, Corporation, and Goschen.
Ismail proved willing to permit a partial inquiry,1 but adamantly fought to keep his expenditures
beyond the pale of the examination.

Although German

and Austrian bondholders complained about the favoritism
shown the secured creditors, 2 their governments, as well
as those of England and France, supported the demand of
the Ca.isse, on January 9, 1878, for a complete inquiry.J

For the English commissioner, the survival of the Caisse
was at stake.
Unity of the various European administrators
would have aided the cause of the full inquiry, but
squabbles and personal antagonisms seemed to have marred
the entire period.

Although Mr. Money was content to

see a reduction of the taxes without an investigation,
1 Baring informed Vivian that Ismail's plans

for an inquiry were unsatisfactory (Bari;ng to Vivian,
Dec. 2J, 1877 1 Cromer Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2J.
2Baring to Goschen, Dec. 19, 1877, ~·
3cromer, I, 44. As this author indicated.
French support became lukewarm as it became clear that
a cut in interest to the bondholders would have to be made.
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the most persistent advocate of the unilateral violation of the bondholder agreement was Mr. Romaine.
This gentleman encouraged the Khedive to resist any
inquiry and proposed that Ismail declare bankruptcy. 1
To support his contention of F.gyptian insolvency,
Romaine compiled a report, monopolizing materials
which Baring needed for his own Compte Rendu for 1877,
and had it published in the Egyptian Journal Official
on February 7. 2 For the British bondholders this report
from Romaine acted as a depressant, as the Bondholders
Rpgister said, "·there is no room, therefore, for clinging
to the .hope that the views expressed by him (Romaine]

have been overcoloured."J

Baring, however, went to

the press to defend the proposition of a complete inquirya
The experience of the last two years has abundantly
proved how utterly unreliable are the estimates of
native Egyptian officials• and I venture to think
that it is wholly out of the power of a single

PRO FO

1Baring to Goschen, Dec. 21, 1877, Cromer Papers

6JJ/2.
2

rsmail was greatly amused by this report
(L. J. L, D. Zetland, p. 64J, and only permitted its
insertion in the Journal Off iciel to depress the creditors so that his own plans for a commission of inquiry
could be facilitated1 this at least was the o'!nion of
the Money lVlarket Review (XX.XVI fMarch 2, 1878 , 212).
It was quickly announced that the inolusion]o the document had been an error (iJ2.i4, LFeb, 9, 1878 , lJO).
JBondholders Register, Feb. 12, 1878, ACFB.
EgYpt, IX, io.

306

European official, however able or zealous,
sitting in an office in Cairo, to form a trustworthy opinion as to their reliability.l
Thus, friction in the Egyptian capital, including
de Blignieres' abhorrence of de Malaret, did not
further the goals of the Commission of the Public
Debt.
Although Baring won the journalistic joust
with Romaine, the Compte Rendu of 1877 was hardly a
success.

Telling against the report was its length

(sixty-eight pages), its incompleteness, and its
composition in the French format and language.

The

report showed that in 1877. after both the Preference
and short loans were paid, there was but £2 • .5 million
for the Unified stocks hence, £1.7 million had been
obtained from the Government by means which were
unknown to the Caisse, 2

Baring told Goschen1
I am rather inclined to think that a moment may
arrive--even if there is but little chance of
doing good--it would be desirable for you to
speak out in order that we may all of us afterwards think that no stone was left unturned to
bring the Khedive to reason,J

1 Economist, XXXVI (Feb. 23, 1878), 21J.
2 rbid., (March 9, 1878), 267,
)Baring to Goschen, Dec. 24, 1877, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2.

307
The moment arrived on January 27, 1878, when Ismail
elected to establish a commission. according to his
lights, and to beard the wrath of the bondholders.
Gosehen could not stand idly by and thus entered the
fray as the champion of the investors1
It will thus be seen that the decree has been
issued in the teeth of the strongest remonstrances,
and after a declaration of the Commissioners of
the Public Debt that they could not in any way
be parties to it.l
To the English financier the decree was a eausus bellia
I shall certainly not shrink from making every
effort and using all the influence I can command
to def eat the apparent attempt of the Egyptian
Government to institute an incomplete inquiry , • •
provided always I can feel that I am backed up
by public opinion in this course.2

In the ensuing struggle, The Times and other papers
closed ranks to oppose the Khedive.

Goschen•s diary

for February 20 1 1878, gives further testimony of
his endeavors for the bondholders1
Am now working to get the Khedive deposed if he
won't give way. Final telegram. Prepared letter
for the bondholders. All day Egypt. • • • Unsatisfactory interview with Tenterden, Everything appeared impossible to him.J .

l The Times, Jan.

Jl. 1878, p. 6.
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If their efforts led to Ismail's downfall• Baring
thought "it would be a monstrous good thing for
everyone concerned." 1 Goschen carried his cause not
only to Downing Street, but threatened on February 25
to bring the matter before the upcoming Berlin Congress, 2
Certainly other factors aided the British financier's
crusade, but it was with great satisfaction that Baring
informed Goschen of Ismail's capitulation in mid-March
of 1878.J
It was during this two-month period that Baring
decided that he had responsibilities which superseded
his allegiance to the bondholders, thus weakening the
influence of the English creditors.

In early February

the British commissioner wrotea
My duty is to do those things which the Decree

says I ought to do. Nevertheless I consider the
fellah quite as interesting, to use the French
phrase, as the creltors--perhaps more so.~
This alteration of views might have been partially
inspired by pique over the journalistic attacks and
1 Baring to Goschen, Feb. 15, 1878, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 6J)/2,
2

Rothstein, p. 53.

Jcromer, I, 44.
4Baring to Goschen, Feb. 8, 1878, L. J. L. D. Zetland, pp. 70.71.
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by his belief that not all the bondholders stood at
his backs
So long, however, as m.y_ conduct has the approval
of the intelligent anO:-well informed minority. I
shall bear the newspaper attacks with equanimity,
and shall certainly not attempt to answer them.l
Exercising complete candor, Baring spelled out his
views1x> the British shareholders1
For my own part, I wish most distinctly to say
that, whatever might be the views of the bondholders-and I believe that as a body they're perfectly reasonable on the subject--! should decline to make
myself the instrument of urging any claims on the
Egyptian Government which could fairly be characterised as over-exacting, or as necessarily involving the oppression of the people.2
On March 8, 1878, he informed Vivian that upon joining
any investigative body, he would, of course, be rep-

resenting the interests of the bondholders,J

However,

a fortnight later he wrotea
Remember that the moment I become a member of the
Commission I shall consider that I have wider
interests to think of than those of the bondholders, and shall act accordingly. 4
1 Baring to Go so hen, Feb, 8, 1878 Cromer Papers
1

PRO FO 6JJ/2 •
2 The Times, Feb. 21, 1878, p. 10.

)Baring to Gose hen, March 8, 1878, Cromer Papers
PRO FO 6JJ/2.
4Baring to Goschen, March 22, 1878, ibid.
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In addition to that of the Caisse, there were
other opinions proffered as to the necessity of an inquiry which hardly escaped the ear of the Khedive.

The

holders were seriously divided upon the question of an
investigations some foresaw a reduction of interest,
while others considered a steady albeit smaller income
a more desirable goal.

Pro-Khedivial literature was

available, yet most of the discourse in England was
uncomplimentary to rsmail. 1

Those in Egypt who wished

the inquiry to proceed categorically insisted that the
Caisse participate1 2 on the other hand, a committee
opposed to an inquiry was established in Alexandria in
early February, 1878, and delegates were dispatched to
Paris and London to gather support,

The French creditors

responded warmly to their Leva.ntine confreres with a
counter-contingent to EgyptJ in Britain, the committee
1 .An example of pro-Khedivial literature was a

pamphlet by w. Raston, "The Khedive and His Calumniators"
(ACFB, ~. IX, insert). On the other hand, in a speech
at Kens!ngt'O:~ in early 1878, Dilke told 'his listeners
that the Viceroy was "the greatest robber that ever sat
upon a throne" (Seton-Watson, P• 277).
2vivian to Derby, Sept. 27. 1877. PRO FOCP
407/9, No. 274, P• 21J.
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had to be satisfied with bombarding Goschen with a
series of notes.

Petitions and reports were likewise

composed and forwarded to any and all interested parties. 1

A bondholders' weekly bulletin was even published to keep
investors on the gui vive.

Baring did not like to keep

in contact with this ad hoc group, and justified his
polite inaccessibility by the fact that no Englishmen
were counted among them. 2
The British banks also meant to see an inquiry
carried through, and as Masterman of the Anglo-Egyptian
said a
The directors were assured of this one thing--that
their good friends across the Channel did not mean
to lose a farthing of their money, and this bank
was in the same boat with them. Frenchmen had a
great dislike to losing money--and they did not
mean to lose it.J
Both Mr. Dicey and Nubar Pasha, as well as the exiled
Prince Halim, encouraged the creditors. 4 Halim, a paragon of duplicity whose machinations knew little bound,
had revived his intrigues in Constantinople and had made
1 The protest which this committee· forwarded to

Mr. Vivian to transmit to the Egyptian Government was so
insulting that Vivian refused to notice it (Cromer, I, 4J).
2Baring to Goschen, March 1, 1878, Cromer Papers
PRO FO 6JJ/2,
JMoney Market Review, XXXV (Dec. l, 1877), 511.

4Edward Dicey, "The ~ptian Crisis," Nineteenth

Century, V (April, 1879), 671.
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a bid for his nephew to cease his objections to the
financial probe. 1 The implication was obvious: if
rsmail could not be depended upon, another could.
The Khedive had yet refrained from actually
commencing the investigation he had decided upon, as
a new convolution in his already complex affairs had
revealed itself.

If his floating debt. whieh had
risen ·to an estimated £11 million by early 1878, 2
could be converted by some financial combination into
a salable security, no investigation would be necessary.
Rumors reached Major Baring in early January that an
English group would attempt such a maneuver.

The plan

succeeded insofar as a shady stockbroker, Montgomery
Walker, did appear in Cairo with a letter of introduo ...
tion from Lord Derby.

His reception by the official

English commW'lity was frigid,

Vivian informed him

pointedly that no bonanza was to be found in Egypt,
and, in any oase, the creditors would have to approve

1 The missive first appeared on M&rch 29, 1878,
in Le Temps (Landau, "Secret Societies,•• P• 184, n. 198).
It was also reprinted in the weekly Bulletin of the Committee of ~yptian Gz;:tditors
Alexandria in early
Aprli {Stat st," I (Aprl1'~l. 1878], 143).
2vivian to Derby, Feb. 16, 1878, PRO FOCP
407/10, No. J6, P• 52.

in

JlJ
all new projects. 1

After tarrying a few weeks, the

unwelcome visitor departed.
Diplomatic pressure was also exercised upon
the Viceroy to make him keep faith with his creditors
and allow a full examination of his finances.

Britain

had advised this course, while also assuring the new
French Government, with Waddington as Foreign Minister,
that England had no designs on Egypt. 2 Baring warned
Goschen that the longer Britain postponed acting decisively in Egyptian inte:rnal affairs, the worse matters
would be for the financial situation and for the in•
habitants.

One such appeal came as late as March 8:

My own opinion is that by the display of a little

energy, English influence might be much strengthened
and the wholt thing put straight without any serious
disturbance.3
The French Government was not idle.

Her citizens still

held a considerable portion of Egypt's indebtedness, 4
1vivian to Tenterden, .March 23, 1878, Tenterden Papers PRO FO 36J/4.
2 Derby to Lyons, Dec. 21, 1877,.Newton, II, 122.
The new French Gove:rnment had only taken off ice the week
before.
J Baring to Goseh&n, warch 8, 1878. L. J. L.
D. Zetland, P• 62,
4 Mulhall, p. 529. As of April 1878, the debt
of Egypt was held chiefly in England c£42.2 million).
France (£JO.l million), and Egypt (£6.9 million).
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especially of the Unified stock.

In spite of Vivian•s

assessment of Egyptian finance--as impossible of becoming worse 1 --the cause of the Syndicate was still
warmly espoused by the Quai d'Orsay, 2 To London the
upcoming Congress of Berlin was the prime consideration,
for as Salisbury wrotea
I am afraid that if we declined to assist the
French to any extent in pressing the claims of
the bondholders, we should alienate France,
cause her to work against us prematurely, and
injure our future position seriously without
muoh helping either the Canal Shares or the
Tribute,J
As for the method to be employed to encourage the
Viceroy to pay the May coupon, the new Foreign Secretary felt that
the Khedive , •• can only be influenced by sheer
terror or necessity, The immediate prospect of
bankruptcy and of the political danger to himself that will follow it is the only mptive
strong enough to induce him to submit.4
By the end of March, the Caisse had but a quarter of
the necessary £2 million for the

407/10 1

May

coupon.5

The

1vivian to Derby. Jan. 11, 1878 ,· PRO FOCP
No, 7, P• 3.
2 cromer, I, '.37.

Jsa1isbury to Northcote, April 19, 1878,
Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50019, P• 66.
4

~.

5cromer, I, 35-JS.
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entire country was wrung out like a sponge to obtain
the last piastre for the payment.

The Caisse, dis-

approving of these tactics, on April 19 lodged protests
with the governments it represented, but accepted the
money when it was delivered. 1
had its limits.

c. R.

But even the scourge

Wilson, who had been recently

sent to Egypt, pressured everyone he could to raise
the payment, including viceregal confidants.

He

assessed the situation in mid-April as follower
My object was to put this indirect pressure on

the Khedive to induce him to pay the important
coupon due to the creditors on the 1st of May,
which is the great question of the moment. If
he does not pay, it is bankruptcy, but the money
is not yet in the hands of the Commissioners of
the Debt, and no one believes that it will come
in,2
The sum was amassed, however, after a number of wealthy
Egyptian families underwrote a loan at 10 per cent from
some French bankers, to make up for the deficiency.J
The Commission of Inquiry, which sat from
April J to August 19. 1878. was composed of the members
of the Caisse. as well as the President, ·M. de Lesseps,
1Baring to Gosehen. April 19, 1878 Cromer
1
Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2.
2wilson to his wife, April 15, 1878• c. R. Wilson, p. 115.
JThe Times,

May

15. 1878, p. 5.

316
who soon left the country, and Charles Rivers Wilson
and Riaz Pasha, both Vice·Presidents, the latter also
holding the office of Minister of Justice.

Downing

Street had insisted that Wilson take pre-eminence
after de Lesseps, 1 which made him acting president for
most of the Commission's life.

The adopted plan called

first for collecting evidence and submitting a preliminary report to the Viceroy,

Those claiming repay-

ment from the Government in excess of 100,000 piastres
were asked to come forward and document their demandss
government officials at all levels were interrogated
and records examined.

After great difficulty the deeds

to rsmail's land were procured, and the program of the

bondholders was considered, 2

One creditor was secure.

Others might have to make sacrifices, but .England would
not1
The payment

o~ the tribute and of the English
shares in the Suez canal are obligations of a
more binding character than any others, and , •

•

1nerby to Vivian, March 23, 1878. PRO FOCP
407/10• No, 79t P• 82.
2The main points of the bondholders• program
were the reduction of governmental revenue, the acceleration of the Europeanization of the Egyptian
administration. and the rejection of any cut in the
interest (Echo, June 14, 1878, ACFB, ;§g:Ypt, X, 32),
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H.M.G. have a special interest in their
punctual fulfillment. 1
Not all the Commission's work went smoothly,
for Mr. Wilson had difficulty working with both Baring
and

Vivian, which led to much acrimony.

Still, they

made headway and inspired a good deal of confidences
We are wonderfully supported so far by public
opinion. which attributes to the Commission the
great rise in stocks which have rejoiced the
hearts of the speculating and investing public
of Alexandria,2
Even Goschen--one of the severist critics of the
investigation-·wrote approvingly of Wilson's efforts.J
When the Khedive relented and offered his 917,000 acres
of land to the holders as a means of salvaging his
finances, the oountry•s stocks soared. 4 Since much of
this land was not mortgaged, a new loan was contemplated
using this acreage as security.
The Commission's preliminary findings, which
were presented to Ismail just as the members were pre1 sa1isbury

·co Vivian, Apri:J. 16. ·1a78, PRO FOCP
407/10, No, 127, P• 118.
2w11son to his wife, June 12, 1878, c. R. Wilson, P• 1.3:3 •
.)Ibid,, P• 146.
4 The Unified stock hit its low of 28 on March 29,
1878, but by late June it had climbed twenty-seven points.
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paring for their vacations, was hardly a document to
cheer the bondholders. 1 As Wilson wrote1
I think it may at first produce a certain disappointment among the common speculators, and the
unreasonable creditors, who build their hopes on
the Commission and who expect us to discover a
mine of gold.2
Nor was the impression given that Ismail was deserving
of any kudosa
Had his subjects been his worst enemies, and their
prosperity his perpetual eyesore• he could not have
been more ingenious at devising combinations tor
their sure and not~very slow reduction to insolvency and beggary.~
In the report, the blame for the failure of the Goschen
plan was placed on the Control, although no names were
mentioned.

It was disclosed that there was a floating

debt of &6,25 million (after all deductions), and that
the present year would show a deficit of £2,6 million.
After establishing a budget for 1879, the Commission
found a total imbalance equalling £9 1 243,928. 4

The

investigators did not view Egypt's revenue as optimis1 The discussion of the preliminary report of the
Commission of Inquiry is drawn from Wynne (PP• 594-96),
2 wilson to his wife, Aug, 18, 1878,

son, P• 152.

c.

R. Wil-

3The Times, Sept. 30 1 1878, P• 7,

4Economist, XXXVI (Sept. 21, 1878), 1121,
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tically as had Goschen and Joubert. although expenditures
remained about as high.

In addition, many suggestions
for internal reform were introduced. 1 The most important of these were the circumscription of the Khedive•s
power, the appointment of responsible ministers, and
the allotment to Ismail of a fixed civil list,
wardly the

Vice~y

out-

seemed willing to make even these

supreme sacrifices in his power, and on August 28, 1878,

he wrote to Nubar Pasha, a favorite among the Europeans,
urging him to hasten home to become the President of
the Council of Ministers. 2
For much of 1878 Ismail had been ill-disposed
toward France, and consequently English influence had
prospered.

This had not occurred with the total indif-

ference of London,

In December of 1877 the Cairo Govern-

ment and Britain had discussed the possible.appointment
of an Inspector-General who would enjoy power over the
collection of taxes and over the inferior eoµrts, but
these conversations were suspended until the question of
1 These included the elimination of the petty
taxes, the abolition of tax collection in advance and
in arbitrary amounts, proper government budgeting, and
a fair distribution of the ws,.ter supply, as well as court
and military reforms.
2 rsmail Pasha to Nub~r Pasha, Aug. 28, 1878,
C, R, Wilson, PP• 167-69.

r
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a Commission of Inquiry could be settled. 1
was

The topic

presented afresh by Mr. Wilson in early May, for it

had been determined to use the debt issue to force upon
the Khedive stricter supervision of his affairs.

But

Salisbury saw that both Cairo and Paris would be discontented with such an official, and eventually the
idea was abandoned, 2 Instead, the Viceroy offered the
post of Minister of Finance to Wilson on May 7, which,
when

a.~nounced,

sent stocks up on the bourses.

The

Cabinet's response to this offer was affirmative and
was made without French parity in mind•

"We agree

with you in thinking that you would be better without
a French 'double.'"J

The Khedive was honest insofar

as he desired to place Englishmen in posts of influence.
and the French creditors were not averse to seeing Egyp•
tian finance run properly, especially when the man had
French propensities.

Wilson saw Ismail's actions in

another light:
1 v1vian to Derby, Dec. 22, 1877, PRO FOCP

No. 344, P• 266.

II, JJO.

2salisbury to Vivian, May J, 1878, Cecil.

3r:orthcote quoted in Wilson to his wife,
May 31, 1878, c. R. Wilson, P• 129,
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I suspect that the sudden goodwill of the Khedive
to the English is owing to two circumstances: the
alliance between Nubar and myself, and the occupation of the Island of Cyprus, which proves to him
that we are going to be the big people of the future
in these parts, and not the French.l
Although England was not prepared to play a
lone hand in Egypt, she was ready to assert her prerogatives over those of France.

The English .Poreign

Secretary wished to maintain his freedom of action,
as the very least, and "if the screw is to be turned
piteously upon the I-:hedive we must take care that the
French have their full share in turning it." 2 Nevertheless, he saw the inevitable growth of British power
in the Nilotict

I told Goschen that we were very anxious to work
with the French, and that we intend to take no
violent means of placing ourselves in a position
which would make them subordinate. But I told him
I nevertheless had faith in the English influence
in Egypt drawing ahead, a result which in my belief depended, not on any formal acts, but on the
natural superiority which a good Englishman in
such a position was pretty sure to show.J
Hence, by the early autumn of 1878 a new
stage in Egypt's development had been reached.

The

intimacy between Goschen and Baring evaporated when the
1 w11son to
2salisbury
leigh Papers BM Add
3salisbury

his wife, July 20, 1878, !J21d.,, P• 147.
to Northcote, July J, 1878, IddesMSS 50019, P• 87,
to Lyons, Aug,, lo, 1878, Cecil, II, 335.

322

former joined the Commission of Inquiry, leaving the
latter as the chief spokesman of the English creditors.
The Council, it is true, was still available to the
holders, but it had been content to give Goschen full
rein and took his services for granted,

Baring had

kept the 'Council• supplied with all needed reports
and had afforded them cursory descriptions of a.f'fairs. 1
Yet the Corporation was clear enough on its role in

Egyptian finances
Although it was by the action of the Council that
negotiations for a settlement were initiated, they
had no part in the final arrangement, which was
accepted by the Bondholders as satisfaetory.2

Thus, Moorgate Street could lay to its credit positive
action in Egypt, but was not liable to be castigated
should the arrangements be unsatisfactory.

Neverthe-

less, the Council did defend the Goschen Decree and did
what it could to promote the work of Major Baring.3
But the Council was plagued with many difficulties by 1878, including a still declining stock
1 naring to Bouverie, March 2, 1878, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 6,J/2.
2porp, For. Bondh, Rep., 1877. P• 7 •
.3Ma'l1y influential journals called :for meetings
of the holders in February and March of 1878, to support
the cause of a commission of inquiry. The Corporation
made no move in this direction, perhaps rearing the
image which a divided and caviling assemblage would
project.

I\''
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market which kept the society busy on many fronts.
The perennial question raised at the General Courts,
that of the financial soundness of the institution,
was answered fairly directly by the chairman at the
1878 meeting.

Table 8 indicates the rough figures

presented.
Complaints were voiced that the certificates
were not being paid off rapidly enough, that almost
£2,000 went for testimonials, and that a great deal
of money was going to help holders where there was

little chanee for its repayment. 1

But greater out-

bursts than these were in the offing.

The Corporation

also underwent some changes within the 'Council.'

There

was a question of whether or not the bylaws of the organization prescribed that all 'Council• members were to
1From 1875 to 1878 the Corporation spent £22,838
in "advances made in prosecuting claims on foreign loans ..
(Money Market Review, XL (March 6, 1880], 280). Special
missIOns on behalf of the bondholders by 'Council' members consumed some of this revenue. The most important
of these journeys were undertaken by Robert Bourke (to
Constantinople, 1881), Roger Eykyn {to Madrid, 1874-75),
Isadore Gerstenberg (to Vienna, 1871, and to Geneva Congress on Inteznational Law, 1874), Hugh McCulloch (to
Virginia, 1874), and Sir Thomas w. Snagge {to Frankfort
and to the United States for the Alabama Committee, 187475).
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retire after five years.

The apparent disagreement

seems to have led to an acceleration of retirements
from the society's executive commencing in 1878, with
the result that many new faces were seen at Councilhouse.
After a decade of existence, the Council could
gaze back ruefully to its inception and to those groups
which had aided in midwifing the institution in 1868.
The press had soured since then, and, led by The Times,
found little flattery for the Corporation.

For example,

the "Thunderer" summed up the Council's labors thusa
"Beyond the organization of meetings and fathering of
schemes. the Council has, in fact, done little or nothing
calling for notice." 1 The contractors, too, who had been
helpful albeit suspicious, saw their worst chimeras realized, for a resolution which Mr. Bishop, a dissident
within the Corporation, wished passed in 1878 reads
In the opinion of this Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders, it would be of great use to the
public if the proposals for the issue of foreign
loans were submitted to their Council for examination, and to report thereon prior to .the issuing
of the prospectus to the public of any foreign
loans. 2
1 The Times, Feb. 27, 1877, P• 10.

2Money Market Review, XX.XVI (May 4, 1878), 4J6.
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The chair was quick to quash this statement. but with
such zealots in the organization the Corporation's
position among the contractors was undermined.

The

Stock Exchange had fallen on hard times also, and
Bouverie was a member of the Commission of 1878 to
investigate its activities.

Certainly Capel Court was

in need of reform, although without its friendly cooperation the Corporation would have been greatly weakened.
Secretary Clarke, writing in 1878, took the position
that although the Committee of the Stock Exchange had
been helpful, its machinery had quite often fostered
fraud. 1 It is interesting that the chairman of the
Corporation rarely appeared at the Commission's hearings.
In June of 1878 Hyde Clarke read a paper before
the Statistical Society (of which he was the vice-president) on the subject of foreign loans, in which were
raised many points of Council thinking.

The Berlin Con-

gress had just begun, and among the many rumors then in
circulation was one that the Egyptian tribute to Turkey
might be given to Russia as a war indemnity.

Clarke

addressed himself generally to the problem of debt priori ties as followsa

l Clarke, p. 8.
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The bondholders ought to have priority of claim
over any fresh debt, be this in the form of a
war indemnity or of any other charge posterior
to the creation of the original one.l
In consequence of this the 'Council' had been concerned
about any radical changes in the financial situation in
Egypt, for such an alteration would damage Egyptian
securities, especially those of the tribute loans. 2

The

only defenses the investors had, he argued, were the
Council and the Stock Exchange, and, perhaps eyeing the
Tribute Courts of Egypt, he observed that "the moral
action of these latter bodies would be much strengthened,
if the decision of a court of municipal jurisdiction
could be obtained."3
The Council's Secretary thought that the lack
of support from Downing Street encouraged refractory
conduct abroad toward English citizensa
The Foreign Office has had to contend with • • •
spasmodic restrictions by the doctrine of nonintervention and by epochs of national cowardice.
Thus the Foreign Office was led to abandon its
protection of our citizens to a very great degree,
and at length to proclaim to every petty State
that such was its avowed condition of impotence.
1IQ.1.9.., p.

41.

2Bouverie to Salisbury, June 4, 1878, cited in
Atkins, p. 168.
3c1arke, p. J9.
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There is consequently no such State, however
contemptible, which is not aware of its prerogative of defiance, and that it has only to
regulate the exercise of it by its own judgment. 1
The answer to such outrages was not far to seeks
The blockade of a port, the occupation of a
customhouse until the receipts provided an indemnity,
or the arrest of a Government vessel, would, in many
cases, put a stop to the proceedings of some of the
offenders, and be an example to others.2
In the brisk discussion which followed it was clear that
most of the members on hand felt that the Government had
no place in retrieving debts for the bondholders.J

The Wilson-Nubar Ministry
In August of 1878 Ismail Pasha was driven by
necessity into the arms of Nubar Pasha, who had been
exiled in Paris for some time.

Nubar, like Prince Halim,

was a consummate intrigant4 who had been pro-English since
186), when he had opposed the building of the Suez Canal.
France was not happy over Nubar's return to Egypt,5 and

1 Ibid., PP• J5-J6.
2

~ •• p, J6,

Jibid., PP• 44-49.

4 Nubar's schemings even led him to offer Colonel
Arabi his services as Prime Minister during that officer's
brief day of power. Nonetheless, he seems to have prospered financially since his estate was valued at £JOO,OOO
at the time of his death (Blunt, Secret History, p, 399).
5vivian to Tenterden, July 20, 1878, Tenterden
Papers PRO FO J6J/4,
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even less so over his imperious dictation of terms.

On

August JO, Nubar officially requested the services of
Wilson as Egypt's Finance Minister, and despite French
displeasure, London granted their controller of the
National Debt Office a two-year leave of absence.

The

new Egyptian President of the Council of Ministers did
not wish the inclusion of a Frenchman in his administration, nor did Downing Street.

But, as will be seen,

the off ice of Minister of Public Works was eventually
given to Paris as a sop to Gallic pride,

Although Wad-

dington was quick to assert France's equality with Britain,1 matters hung fire for some time.
The post which was finally accepted by de Bligniares was given some added luster by England, since
Nubar allowed Wilson to delineate the attributes of
the position,

But the Frenchman had little power, for

the English kept their hold on the various branches of
communications.

The Western Powers trusted that the

Viceroy would heed the advice of his new ministers since,
as they warned, "H[is] H[ighness] would seriously com•
promise his own position and that of his dynasty should
he act contrary to their demands." 2
1 Adams

to Salisbury, Aug. 30 1 1878, PRO FOCP
No, 224, P• 277,
2

c.

R. Wilson, p. 176,
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To some European states it appeared that arrangements would be made in the Nile Valley without their concurrence.

Italy was persistent in demanding that she be

given the portfolio of the Minister of Justice, and when
it was not forthcoming, she attempted to engender hostility toward Ismail. 1 Martino, the Italian agent in
Cairo, became the focal point of anti-government sentiment.

St, Petersburg likewise instigated a press cam-

paign built about the theme of the importance of Egypt
to Russia's China trade, while Austria tried to work
one of her nationals into the Department of Education.
All such efforts met with failure. 2
A severe and persistent critic of the finances
of Egypt, Sir George Campbell, in anathematizing the
Wilson-Nubar government called it a "Bondholders• Ministry," and attacked it upon the floor of the House as a
stockjobbing venture.J

It was true that, legally, Wilson

1 Lucien E. Roberts, "Italy and the Egyptian Ques-

tion, 1878-1882," (hereafter ''Italy") Journal of Modern
History, XVIII (1946), 315.
2 The Italian agent's hostility toward the Egyptian Gove!"nment was reported in a letter from Laseelles
to Salisbury, Oct. 25, 1878 ( PRO FOCP 407/10, No. 352,
p, J70). For the attitude of the Russian press, see The
Times (Oct. 23 1878, p. 5), Austrian interest in EgYpt
was discussed ln a letter from Salisbury to Lyons, Oct. 11,
1878 (PRO FOCP 407/10, No. J.02, P• JJO).
3s1r George Campbell, "The Situation in Egypt,"
Fortnightly Review, XXXI (April 25, 1879), 787.
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headed a mixed board under the general supervision of
the bondholders, who could be kept happy by prompt
payments of interest.

With great show, the Viceroy

had withdrawn himself from politics, while the British
Cabinet could tell Parliament that they had no control
over Egypt's Finance Minister.

The Prime Minister

told the Queen, "We have not only never aclmowledged
Wilson as an agent of yr. Majesty's Government, but have
always studiously and repeatedly disclaimed his being
so." 1 In reality, however, Downing Street was Wilson's
only sure pillar of strength.
It was confidently rumored, and was possibly
true, that Wilson had made an agreement with the French
creditors to keep up the coupon payments as long as
possible, since the Commission of Inquiry, which was
to resume sitting, would eventually advocate a reduction of interest.

This view takes on greater plausibility

when one considers the negotiations which revolved about
the Rothschild loan, to be discussed shortly.
sonally was also a factor.

Wilson per-

He possessed no particular

qualifications for his new post and could be enthralled
by charismatic individuals such as Nubar, or by sentiments
1 nisraeli to Queen Victoria, April 11, 1879,
Buckle and Monypenny, VI, 442,
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such as his favorable predisposition to those things
Gallic.

As one author remarked, "Rivers Wilson was an

ardent Francophyle and at least as much under the influence of the French as he was under that of the
British Government." 1 As long as he could. Wilson
attempted to keep the Goschen Plan alive, and if this
meant using the kurbash (an Egyptian whip) to obtain
needed revenue. the Minister of Finance would not
object. 2

Upon this point Paris agreed, and the Viceroy

was warned that no arbitrary cut in interest would be
permitted.J

Despite Vivian's opinion that Wilson's

policy seemed directed by the bourses of London and
Paris, 4 and that the Finance Minister was incurring
heavy responsibilities for economic collapse, the investors still insisted upon full support.5
The influx of Englishmen into Egypt also continued, with their high salaries being paid by Cairo.
l

Marlowe, p. 98.

2c. R. Wilson, p, 182.

Jvivian to Salisbury, Feb, 18, 1879, PRO FOCP
407/12, No. 49, P• 35.
4vivian to Salisbury, Jan, 11, 1879, cited in
Atkins, p. 157.
5salisbury to Vivian, Jan. 21, 1879, PRO FOCP
407/12, No, JO, P• 24.
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Wilson, whose job in England paid £1,500 per annum, now
received £8,000 in pay and allowances, 1 Some of those
joining the Government were Captain Richard Blomfield
as Director of the Port of Alexandria, Arthur Shee
(brother-in-law of Julian Pauncef ote at the Foreign
Office) in the Customs Office, Auckland Colvin from
India, 2 and some one hundred men to help in a general
cadastral survey.

The salaries of the surveyors amounted

to another £27,000 a year, considered an unnecessary expense by Lord Dufferin in his famous report of 1882,3
The greatest misjudgment of the new administration
was the treatment accorded the Khedive.

They assumed that

overnight Ismail's power could be broken and his wishes
ignored.

Lord Salisbury told Wilson that he was to win

the Viceroy's favor, but the Finance Minister's plan was
rather to trim the power of the Egyptian ruler and to put
his faith in Tewfik, the heir apparent. 4

Nubar openly

1 Atkins, p, 154.

2Auckland Colvin (1838-1908) was.born in Calcutta
but was educated in England. He returned home in 1858,
and by 1877 held the post of Commissioner of Inland Customs, In fact, the Indian Service seems to have been
favored by his family, as he had four brothers serving
in various capacities in the subcontinent. He arrived
in Egypt in January of 1879 and in May took Earing's post
on the Caisse (~, Supp. II, 395-96).
JAtkins, p.

154.

4For these views, see Wilson to his wife, June

22 and June 29, 1878,

c.

R. Wilson, pp. 1J6-J7.
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made derisive remarks about the Khedive. 1 which at best
was imprudent, and both Baring and the British Consul
General warned Wilson of the folly of such a course. 2
But Ismail remained silent until his ministers should
arrange a new loan.
When these negotiations began, the Khedive
still possessed an asset--the unmortgaged 426,000 acres
of Khedivial property henceforth called the Domains
(to distinguish it from Daira estates already under
European supervision)--which it was hoped Wilson's
friends the Rothschilds might be induced to use as
collateral for a loan.

A temporary loan of £250,000

from the Imperial ottoman Bank was raised upon the
Domains, but with the rising floating debt and with
the Caisse in need of £1.7 million a fortnight before
Unified interest was due,J a larger transaction was
imperative.

Wilson set out for Paris to take up the

discussions but found that political stumbling blocks
existed.

It had not yet been decided what powers were

to be accorded the Egyptian Minister of Public Works
l

Bell, P• 48.

2vivian to Salisbury, Feb. 21. 1878, PRO FOCP

407/12, No. 108, P• 59.

JThe Times, Oct. 15, 1878, P• 5.
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(a post to be held by a Frenchman), and until Paris
was satisfied, the loan proposition was held in
abeyance.

This impasse was broken when 3alisbury

informed Lyons that others besides the Rothschilds
were interested in the project, which removed the main
French bargaining point.

Besides, it was the French

bankers who would profit from the payment of the November coupon.

The Quai d•orsay yielded, and the public

works post, with its powers nominally extended, was
aecepted. 1
The Rothschilds, however, were not going to
participate in such an arrangement unless certain points
were clarified.

The firm would have liked to have ob-

tained an Anglo-French guarantee on the loan but, this
being out of the question, the Western Powers were nevertheless involved by their agreement to appoint administrators in overseeing the collection of the revenue of
the Domains.

Disraeli promised the contractors that all

money would go directly to them without passing through
Egyptian hands. 2 In the prospectus advertising the loan,
the position of the Foreign Office toward their appointment of a Commissioner of the Domains was expressed thus1
1Atkins, p. 144.
2

~.,

P• 146.
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They undertake his nomination in order to provide
to the creditors a security that the manager so
nominated shall not be divested of his functions
without their previous consent. 1
The man chosen by England for Commissioner of the
Domains was Francis Rowsell of the Middle Temple, who
had been director of naval contracts.

Despite the

statement by the Foreign Office that Britain had
assumed no financial obligations in case of default.
such an interposition was a departure from tradition.
Rothsehilds also wished to have an exact survey done of
the land ceded, which resulted in the arrival in Egypt
of Auckland Colvin and his team of surveyors.
On October )1, 1878, the contra.ct was signed
for the loan of £8.5 million at S per cent, of which
£5 1 992,000 went to Ismail. 2 The loan was issued at 7),
being purchased mainly in the United Kingdom.

Despite

the Daily News remark that the money was "borrowed at
a much lower rate of interest than Egypt has been accustomed to pay,"J the transaction cost the Cairo Government 11 per cent.
ironed out.

One further problem had yet to be

The Syndicate still held a large block of

1Economist, XXXVI (Nov. 9, 1878), 1JJ9.
2crouehley, PP• 12)-24.

3Daily News, Oct. 29, 1878, ACFB, Egypt, XI, 22.
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securities which, if it chose to sell, could ruin
the new offering in a flood of paper.

To avoid this,

in early November Wilson signed an agreement with these
bankers which drew from them a promise not to tap their
reservoir of stock for at least a year in exchange for
transfer of a large amount of Unified stock on which
the French would collect interest. 1
The loan did ve-ry well for Rothschild. 2

Some

English journals made sharp attacks upon the Cabinet
for intervening in the Egyptian offering, but this
participation plus the involvement of the great house
was an inducement to swell the lists of subscribers.
In addition, Wilson could rely on Mr, Dicey to do his
bests
Those who are in the habit of reading the Observer
must have been struck with the efforts made to
keep up the prices of these particular (.Egyptian]
stocks by every possible means,J
1 Economist, XXXVI (Nov, 16. 1878) lJ49,
1
2Alphonse de Rothschild to Granville, Sept, 21,
1882, Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/152.
JBullionist, Nov, 16, 1878, ACFB, ~. XI, 76.
According to Edward Ridsdale, in his pamphlit"Ii'>. In•
qui-ry into the Capacity of Egypt Paying the Interest
on Her Debt," 1878, only The Times and the Standard
were not puffing Egyptian securities (ACFB, !gYpt, XI,
insert).
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Yet not all contingencies had been considered.
The Rothschilds, neglecting to enter immediately upon
the long and expensive task of having the new estates
registered in the Mixed Courts, found that as soon as
Ismail promulgated his decree of October 29, 1878-relinquishing his land to the State preparatory to
the loan--a swarm of floating debt holders rushed to
the Tribunals, obtained first mortgages, and awaited
the Rothschilds' payments which they intended to
gobble up.

The contractor, therefore, suspended pay-

ments and the entire matter was thrashed out in the
courts.
The Goschen Plan was modified by a decree of
December 12, 1878, by which the controllers were replaced by the regime of Wilson and de Bligniares, with
the understanding that should Ismail dismiss his European ministers, the old system would automatically be
reinstated.

The Caisse was also strengthened by the

creation of its own auditing procedure which was placed
under Baravell!.

The Commission of Inquiry resumed its

work on December 14, 1878, to prepare a final report for
the Viceroy.

Egypt's financial future was not promising.

Neither Vivian, Baring, nor de Blignieres believed that
the coupon of

May

1879 could be met, and in fact the
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sinking fund for November had remained unpaid altogether.
Baring, in one of his rare missives to Goschen during
this period, thought that the holders had no complaints
against them except for the affair of the sinking fund,
concerning which an appeal to the courts had been deemed
inopportune. 1

The Compte Rendu for the year showed that

the bondholders certainly had little for which to be
happy.

The Moukabala had not quite covered the payment

of the so-called short loans, while the hypothecated
revenue for the Preference stock was lacking more than
£400,000 to meet the interest.

The total deficit for

the year stood at £1,392,994, which was some improvement over that of 1877.

The secured debt was now placed

at £84,732.000, but the floating debt of £9,135,000 indicated that Egypt's indebtedness had baen growing
steadily since the November Decree of 1876. 2

In closing,

the Caisse gave the bondholders something to ponders
The Egyptian bondholders are so numerous that our
conduct can hardly meet with the approval of all.
We alone are judges of our conduct, which will be
dictated by what is beneficial to the boudholders
and justifiable from all points of view,;
Baring left the Caisse on

May

24, 1879, and was replaced

1 Baring to Goschen, Nov. JO, 1878, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 633/2.
2

Econom1st, XXXVII (Feb. 22, 1879), 205-206.

JThe Times, Feb, 11, 1879, P• 5.
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by

Auckland Colvin.

He was not sad over severing his

ties with the investorsa
I was interested in the work of Egyptian reform;
but I had no wish to remain in Egypt as a mere
receiver of money for the bondholder~. I was
their representatives but my sympathi~s lay more
with the wretched taxpayers of Egypt.l

By February of 1879 Ismail had had enough of
ministerial insolence and reform.

The army had been

halved to 7,500 men and the officers, already in arrears
on salaries, were placed on half pay.

The Khedive in-

spired or at least made use of a military uprising on
February 18, which after a brief time he himself put
down. 2

After taking this action, the Viceroy manifested

the will of the people, so he said, in dismissing Nubar
and replacing him with Tewfik.

Wilson was outraged, and

complained that the demarche of the eighteenth was due
to Vivian's tepid assistance.3

Vivian was replaced in

early March by Frank Lasoelles (temporary British Consul General in Cairo), for Salisbury believed the former
to be excessively pro-Egyptian, 4
l

L. J. L. D. Zetland, P• 72.

2 NJany at the time laid the responsibility for

the uprising at Ismail's door (Bell, p. 50s Wallace,
PP• 64-651 C. R. Wilson, P• 187).

3viv1an denied this assertion (Vivian to
Salisbury, Feb, 20, 1879, PRO FOCP 407/12, No. 39, P• 59).

4salisbury to Tsnterden, June 23, 1879, Tenterden Papers PRO FO 363/5.
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London's first response to the Khedive•s
coup had been to instruct Wilson not to resign,
promising him full support. 1

It was decided to

allow the dismissal of Nubar to stand, but to work
with France to sustain their nationals.

Ismail de-

clared a willingness to allow his European ministers
the right of veto over financial affairs as long as
Nubar was excluded.

Despite this concession, Salisbury

indirectly advised Wilson to make greater use of the
carrot than of the stick, since "we cannot at present
act materially against the Khedive by occupying Egypt,
and if we cannot do it ourselves we certainly cannot
allow France to do it alone," 2
When these proceedings came up in the House,
Northcote stated that Wilson was an Egyptian official and
hence could be removed at any time by the Viceroy.J

There-

fore, on April 7 Ismail summoned the diplomatic community
to announce the formation of a native administration and
his intention to devise an economic solution to satisfy
his creditors,

The pretext for this move·was Wilson's

1 salisbury to Vivian, Feb, 21, PRO FOCP
407/12, No, 68, p, 41,
2salisbury to Lascelles, March 28, 1879. Cecil,
col. 851.

)Hansard, Jd ser., Vol, 244, March lJ, 1879,

I'

11
,11

i

I
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insistence that the coupon of the 1864 loan for
£240,000, due in early April, be put off for a month
since the Caisse possessed but

£44,ooo.

argued that this was bankruptcy.

The Khedive

However, the Com-

mission of Inquiry had completed its labors and presented
its final report on April 8. 1 Their opinion was that
the country had been bankrupt since April, 1876, and
that the Powers must form a Commission of Liquidation
which would make a final and binding settlement for
all parties.

The Commission made several other sugges-

tions, 2 including a reduction of the interest on the
Unified debt to 5 per cent, continuance of the Preference stock intact, and the payment of the floating debt
at 50 per cent of value in cash out of the available
assets.

The Commission resigned immediately upon the

Khedive•s release of Wilson.

In short order the Domains

Administration also reported to Rothschilds that they
could no longer perform their duties.J
1

Wynne, PP• 602-603.

2 The report advised that the OUchouri land pay
greater taxes, that the Khedive be placed on a civil list
of £300 1 000 a year. that the Moukabala be ended, and that
the Rouznameh loan of 1874 be converted into an internal
tax.
3vivian to Salisbury, April 10, 1879, PRO FOCP
407/12, No. 273, p, l5J.
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Wilson was enra.geds he wrote Salisbury. suggesting
the deposition of the Khedive and the suspension of all
funds by the Rothschilds. 1 The firm did, in fact, take
this course of action.

Ismail had promised frugality

for the months ahead, and Punch envisioned the commencement of economy in the "departure of

rra-. Rivers Wilson

and Mons. de Bligniires by deck-passage and third-class
night excursion train for Paris and London." 2
But the British Government found Wilson's continued presence in Cairo embarrassing, so that Disraeli
observed "the sooner Wilson disappears from the scene
the better.".3

Thus, for a second time Wilson retreated

from Egypt, to the delight of most of the Europeans, and,
significantly, Vivian was returned to his old duties.
As for Wilson, his reception at home was cold, and Northcote, who tried to speak well of him, was forced to admit
1Atkins, P• 170. Wilson freely expressed his
opinion in a letter to Blunt on April JO, 1879 (Blunt,
Secret History, P• 37)•
"You will I daresay have heard that I have been
upset by that little scoundrel the Khedive • • • •
Crepy Vivian is the cause and chief abettor of this
sudden overthrow of arrangements which he was instructed speci.ally to protect."
2Punch, LXXVI (April 19, 1879). 179.
;Disraeli to Salisbury, April lJ, 1879, Buckle
and Monypenny, VI, 44J.
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that "one may think that he has spoilt what appeared
to be a promising chance by a certain want of tact," 1
while the Foreign secretary busied himself trying to
mend matters. 2
On April 22 the Viceroy decreed into law his
new financial project which clearly favored the floating
creditors over the bondholders.

The interest on the

Unified stock was slashed to 5 per cent. as had been
proposed by the Commission of Inquiry, but it was recommended to pay the judgment creditors, those who had won
in the Mixed Courts, in full, 55 per cent in cash and
the remainder in bonds at 5 per cent payable in five years.
The Caisse, although forced to pay the

5 per cent for the

May coupon, immediately went into court challenging the
Khedive•s right to upset existing contracts.

The Vice-

roy's plan was to appeal to those creditors who were on
the scene, and run the risk of raising the ire of the
bondholders.

The floating debt was increased at a rate

of £80,000 a month3 and required attention, but in osten-

1 Northcote to Tenterden,
Papers PRO FO 363/2.

May

Jl, 1879, Tenterden

2 w11son was so loud and persistent in his own
defense that the Cabinet decided to reward him with a
Jrn.ighthood for his services in .Egypt,

3v1v1an to Salisbury,
407/12 1 No. 51), P• 358,

May

24, 1879. PRO FOCP

,,1

i
,,I
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tatiously ignoring the old investors the Khedive had
needlessly stirred up hostile sentiments.
There was a distinction made between speculators
and investorsa

the former were considered to be purchasers

for the short term, interested in immediate profits, and
often unencumbered by scruples.

The investor, on the

other hand, was considered respectable, placed his capital with a view to long-term income, and was less mindful
of market fluctuations.

When the Corporation of Foreign

Bondholders took up the dilemma of the Egyptian creditors
in 1876, a large number of investors cooperated to defend
their property from the caprices of the Cairo Government.
The fluctuations

i~

these securities had probably driven

many of these men out of the market, and it appears that
the preliminary report of the Commission of Inquiry was
particularly damaging in this respect.

The Financier

wrote in September of 1878s
Many holders, disgusted with everything Egyptian,
sacrificed their Bonds at half their previous value,
and even registered a vow never more to have anything to do with so disappointing an lnvestment.l
In the opinion of this journal, the previous three weeks
had seen a great exodus, or "to put the case broadly, the
l Financier, Sept. 11, 1878, ACFB, EgYpt, X, 308.

whole mass of old Egyptian Bondholders may almost
be said to have passed away, and their places to have been
taken by a new set of people." 1

In this way the Egyptian

market became less stable, with speculators selling when
the stocks rose, admitting continuous waves of new people.
Also, since the issuance of the Domains loan, Englishmen
were purchasing ever greater amounts of Egyptian stocks, 2
and this no doubt was accelerated by the activities of
England.

Besides the involvement in the Rothschild loan,

the Cabinet had loudly proclaimed its interest in the Nile
Valley which in the opinion of some financial editors had
directly stimulated

stock

purchases, .3

I'he volatile Egyp-

tian market quivered with every rumors it rose in January
of 1879 on hearing that Robert Lowe was to accept the
post of director of a national bank of Egypts it dropped
on the release of the report of the Caisses it panicked
over the dismissal of the Control by Ismail on April 28r
and it became buoyant as Ismail 1 s deposition approached.
Canards on the Exchange became so frequent that suspicion
was thrown on the Reuter service in Egypt; 4
1F!nancier, Sept. 11, 1878, ACFB, F.p;Ypt,

x,

JOB.

2 Ec9nomist, XXXVII (April 12, 1879), 421.

3statist, III (May
XII, 54.

J, 1879), 201,

4Pa.ll Mall Gazette, April 1, 1879, ACFB, Egypt,

I:
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The spring of 1879 witnessed a press campaicn
of sympathy for the Egyptian peasantry, sparked by
visits to Egypt of M.P.'s and by the Khedive•s difficulty in paying his creditors. 1 The holders were
portrayed as the villains who were ultimately responsible for grinding down the fellaheen.

Papers, such

as the Spectator, which lamented over the plight of the
fellah might also be in favor of the occupation of Egypt.
but on human! tarian rather than financial growi.d.s.

This

situation often arose, illustrating the combinations of
motives which could operate simultaneously.

The opinions

which the bondholders generally endorsed seem to have
vacillated between a desire for European intervention
for the removal of Ismail and the desire for an accommodation with the Viceroy lest the Sultan's authority
be re-established in Egypt.

But after the Khedive•s

decision to ignore the bondholders• rights, they seemed
to have opted for his ouster.
Pressure upon the Goveniment was applied through
various means by individual bondholders.

Letters to

House members such as George Campbell, a well-known
opponent of the bondholders, became numerous,

One such

1 see ACFB, EgyEt, XIII, for the press attitudes
on British action in Egypt,

347

letter writer, a clerk for twenty-five years, had invested £400 in Egyptian stocks he wrote Campbell1
I selected Egyptian oonds under the impression
that Etc;ypt was a rich and fertile country, producing
in great profusion the essential necessaries of life,
and quite capable of paying the interest I was to
receive if her affairs were properly managed. • • •
Your getting up now and again in the House, and lending
your influence to those who are interested in defrauding the bondholders, cannot but have a prejudicial effect on the governing power in Egypt.
No one advocates the position of the bondholders
in the House, and I am at a loss to see why you
should gp against them by encouraging Egypt to
default.l
In mid-April Lasoelles received a letter from a friend
in the Foreign Off ice saying that the bondholders were
putting great pressure upon the Government to act in
Egypt. 2 The press in this campaign was less active
than it would be in 1882, and not as homogeneous in
opinion.

The Times and some other leading journals

did not take up the cause of the holders, but this
does not mean that other organs were not iii. favor of
Government action, and this number seems to have increased as time passed.
The •council' of the Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders assumed a low profile as to these events,
with its chairman remarking merely that he hoped that
1 campbell, p. 792.

2Atkins, p. 169.
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the problems of the East could soon be settled. 1

As

individuals, Corporation members could and did air
their views on Egypt and its finances.

Mr.

w.

H. Bishop

released a circular in May, at the Stock Exchange, in
which he complained that the Foreign Off ice had done
little for the bondholders, and added1
English capital has been freely lent on conditions
that have tended to the welfare of Egypt and the
Egyptians. It would be a manifest and a fatal
neglect of considerations affecting the employment
of surplus capital in one country for the benefit
of another where capital is needful if that protection which the English Government is able to
afford were withheld,2
Also of interest were the observations of Hyde
Clarke, made when he chaired a meeting of the African
Section of the Royal Society of Arts.

He thought Egypt

was still able to pay its debt since Wilson would have
reduced the interest on the Unified stock if he had had
any doubts upon the subject.

Considering his position

in the Corporation, Clarke was reluctant to speak freely,
and therefore he cautioned the public, although personally
he was not pessimistic about Egypt's future.

Anglo-French

cooperation was desirable in Egypt but it appeared less
attainable as time passed, for as he observed,
1 Money Market Review, XXXVIII (March 8, 1879), 273.
2

I!?.!,g,., (May 24, 1879), 580.
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even during the last few months there had been
evidence that feelings of jealousy might prevail
between the two powers, and they must look forward
to a time when they must be in antagonism with
respect to this very country.l
Clarke still believed that a substantial part of the
Egyptian stock was held by solid middle class investors
and that it was a form of savings which deserved protection,

To the Secretary of the Corporation, Egypt

was not being administered properly for all concerned.
He disliked the quality of the Indian officials employed
as well as what they had accomplished.

Egyptians were

a "slavish people," he argued, over whom strong government must be maintained.

Such an approach, and not the

concoction of financial schemes, would pay the bondholders,
for
already there were grounds for fearing that the
new administration would not do all that was expected
of it, and it was a question even whether it had not
already slackened the bond of Government. 2
In closing, Mr. Clarke considered the position of the
holders a
The problem to be solved was, whether it was possible
to give the Fellaheen a greater proportion of the
produce which they raiseda but it really might be for
their benefit to have a smaller portion.3
1

(Jan. 24,
2

J~Mrnal

!;

the R9Yal Society of Arts, XXVII
79),3.

Ibid., 134.
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Although the majority of public opinion was not
in the camp of the bondholders, the British Foreign
Off ice could not totally disregard the demands of the
creditors, especially after the abrupt dismissal of
Wilson.

Lord Salisbury felt that

it may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to
the French Government to go into partnership
with the bondholderss or rather, to act as Sheriff's
officer for them. But to us it is a new and embarrassing sensation.l
This companionship with the creditors which the English
Foreign Secretary found so distasteful was not so easily
shaken off.

Despite the Khedive's coup, his new finan-

cial decree, and the efforts of the bondholdars, the
Western Powers had made no move in Egypt to regain their
lost position.

But a move from an unexpected quarter

altered affairs, for on May 18, 1879 1 Bismarck informed
the Viceroy that his decree of April 22 violated the arrangements establishing the Mixed Courts.

Ismail had

heretofore ignored the Anglo-French sputterings but
German demands gave him pause.

Salisbury felt that to

abstain from joining the protest was impossible, as it
would lay Government open to "reproaches from our own

II, J.52.

1 sa1isbury to Lyons, April 7 1879, Cecil,
1
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subjects who are creditors." 1
Berlin's motives in this instance were political, and were probably based on a desire to keep the
Western Powers acting in harmony, since Bismarck feared
a French courtship of isolated Russia. 2
was felt by

many

At the time, it

that where the bondholders had failed

in France and England, they had succeeded in Germany.
There were conjectures that perhaps the Rothschilds had
utilized their family influence in the German capital
to sway Germany's Chancellor, or that the court banker
Bleichroder, possessing Egyptian securities, had asked
for assistance.J

To Salisbury the Bleichroder story

seemed a plausible explanation for Bismarck's action. 4
The Conservative Kreutz Zeitung contributed to the
controversy by observing that Germans possessed
£4 million worth of Egyptian stocks and that the
1 salisbury to Lyons, May

Atkins, p. 177.

23, 1879, quoted in

2 william N, Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and
the Concert of Euro~e (Londona university of London,

Athalone Press,

195 ),

PP• 117-19.

JLittle credence is now placed in such motives
for Bismarck's actions by historians such as Medlicott
(pp. 118-19) and Langer (p. 261}.
4 salisbury to Odo Russell (British Ambassador
to Berlin), June 11, 1879, cited in Atkins, p. 175.
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nation was obliged to act in their behalf • 1
Disraeli was prepared to act firmly in Egypt,
and was anxious that his policy not be interpreted as

merely a bondholders• program.

Complications existed

in the diplomatic arena as both Italy and Russia took
the opportunity to fish in the troubled waters, 2 while
the Sultan saw in the deposition of the Khedive a chance
to regain lost power in the Nile Valley.

The task of

Downing Street was to encounter these problems successfully while keeping in step with France,

The Cabinets

of Paris and London soon decided that Ismail's departure
from Egypt would be best for all concerned, and therefore supported Bismarck's protest, in order "to push
the KheC.ive a little nearer the edge," as the British
Foreign Secretary said, "because until we get him thrown
over.., there will be no decent government in Egypt ... .3
1Morning Post July l, 1879, ACFB, ~. XIII, 22.
German holdings of Egyptian securities rema~low since
the Frankfort bourse did not commence trading in "unifieds"
until 1882, nor the Berlin bourse until ~he following year.
German investments rose substantially, however, to an estimated £15 million by the mid-188o•s (Charles K Hobson,
The Export of Capital (New Yorks Macmillan, 1914j, p. 146),
2 The Khedive•s abdication was probably postponed
due to the diplomatic support given by Italy and Russia
(Roberts, "Italy, .. p, Jl6).
3salisbury to Odo Russell, June 11, 1879, Cecil,
II, JSJ.
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Sensing his danger, the Viceroy immediately
began using his influence in Constantinople and dispatched an agent with a reported £10,000 to plead his
case before the Divan. 1 While applying pressure on
the Sultan, Britain attempted to bring about the abdication of the Khedive since the Foreign Off ice was
at a loss as to the results should both Cairo and the
Porte hold firm.

The Sultan yielded under intense

European pressure on June 26, 1879, whereupon the
Viceroy received a telegram from his suzerain• who
addressed him as "my dear Ex-Khedive."

The firman

which deposed Ismail placed his son, Prince Tewfik, on
the throne, and it was with little outward show of emotion that.the old ruler gathered up his seraglio and
whatever money there remained in the treasury. and took
ship to Brindisi.

So it was that "by anticipating

Keynes:ian economic policies in a country wedded to the
doctrines of Macawber," Ismail Pasha had in great
measure caused the ruin of his land. 2
1 Layard to Salisbury, May lJ, 1879, PRO FOCP
407/12, No. 472, P• 329.
2cedric J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialistsa
British Foreif? Policy 1878-1902 {Londona Routledge
and Kegan Pau , 1967), I, 41.

CHAPTER V
FROM CONDOMINIUM TO BRITISH OCCUPATION
JUNE 1879 TO SEPTEMBER 1882
Commission of Liquidation
The new Khedive. Prince Tewfik, who assumed his
father's dignities in June of 1879. was neither welleducated nor widely-traveled.

He was "perhaps not quite

so sharp [as his father), but infinitely more honest,"
and had "plenty of commonsense." 1 He knew full well
that the Western Powers had put him on the throne and
that they would protect his interests from encroachments by the Sultan.

Tewfik's loyalty, to London

especially, would lead him into considerable danger in
1882.
France and England faced a two-fold problem in
Egyptt

the arrangement of both a political and a finan-

cial settlement.

Charles Rivers Wilson, perhaps en-
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visioning his own return to Cairo, suggested to Northcote that European economic ministers were essential,
and for a time a plan was discussed which would have
allowed a division of Egypt into two spheres of influence. 1
Under this scheme England would have administered the
litoral of the country, which could easily be protected
by sea, while France would look after the interior.

Salis-

bury desired a situation where the strings of power were
concealed a
We want to have some hold over the government of
Egypt, though we do not want to assume any overt
responsibility. The great object seems to me to
be to have representatives inside the offices who
shall be able to report what the Government are
doing to the Agents, and shall be able to give
advice to the Government in accordance with the
instructions of the Agents.2
"But • • • after having a Khedive deposed," remarked the
Foreign Secretary, "the character of non-intervention is
not easy to retaina and any further prudery would be out
of place.".3

Downing Street intended to maintain English-

men in key posts, and as Salisbury informed Malet, his
new agent in Cairo, the Western Powers had decided that
1Lyons to Salisbury, July 9, 1879, PRO FOCP
407/12, No. 825, P• 499.
2salisbury to Lyons, July
7. 1879. Newton, P• 187.
3salisbury to Lyons, July 17, 1879, Cecil, II,
.356-57.
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no other nation was to be permitted a foothold in
Egypt. 1 In a further amplification of the Government's
Egyptian policy. the Foreign Secretary stated that native
authority must be bolstered, but that Britain must stand
first in influence,

Should a tour de force be necessary.

it must be Turkish, for an English occupation was a last
resort since the capitalists would be the beneficiaries. 2
In September of 1879 Waddington and Salisbury met
to work out an accommodation by which their interests in
Egypt would be safeguarded.

The main points of agreement

were that a commission of liquidation should be established
to deal with all aspects of the Egyptian debt (a point upon
which the English Cabinet had been particularly sensitive).
that native officialdom should be supported, that the continued life of the Mixed Courts should be carefully considered, and that the system of control be reinstated with
the concomitant appointment of Baring and de Blignieres,
These latter gentlemen drew up a decree which the Viceroy
issued on November 15, in which the powers and prerogatives
of the new controllers were delineated. -The controllersgeneral were no longer even under the nominal authority of
1salisbury to Malet, Sept. 19, 1879. PRO FOCP
407/lJ, No, 1219, P• 721,
2salisbury to Malet, Oct. 16, 1879, ~ •• No. 1304,
PP• 771-73.
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the bondholders, but were appointed and dismissed by
their governments. 1 They possessed ministerial rank
and had the power to inspect every aspect of finances
in the Council of Ministers their opinions were merely
advisory, although they could always appeal to their home
governments.

A

staff of the controllers' own choice was

provided, and all salaries were paid by Egypt.

To avoid

friction, it was deemed advisable not to differentiate
the duties of the two off ices so that on-the-spot accommodations could be made by Baring and de Blignieres. 2
Almost immediately the Western Powers were confronted
by an obstacle.

The judgment creditors, who from October 29,

1878, until Februa._1if J, 1879, had taken out mortgages on
the domains equalling some £1.7 million, had discovered
a new champion.

The Commission of Inquiry had suggested

that these mortgages be nullified, and Britain and France
had concurred.

Austria, however, now objected, and, seconded

1 The decree was based on a plan submitted to Eng-

land by Waddington, the French Foreign Minister. One of
the provisions was what the English Foreign Secretary called
a "novelty" which he dislikeda "The English Controller • • •
is to obey English orders. This is a considerable advance
in the direction of 'i~rence' over anything we did either
in the case of Rivers Wilson or Romaine" (Salisbury to
Lyons, July 17, 1879, Cecil, II, 356).
2 The main points of the decree are enumerated in
Wynne (p. 607).
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by Italy and Germany, took up the matter. 1

The new con-

trollers met in Vienna with Austrian officials who persisted in their demands for a third controller to def end
their interests.

The impasse concerning the establish-

ment of a European control in Egypt was temporary, and
such intermeddling merely solidified Anglo-French cooperation. 2
Salisbury wished to have a rapid liquidation
"because the creditors form a public opinion of very
respectable strength, and they have ready access to the
various Foreign Offices."J

As far as Downing Street was

concerned a
We desire that the creditors should get all that can
fairly 'be assigned to them1 but whether that is much
or little i~ a question which does not immediately
concern us,l.J.
1 out of the thirty-four million francs of judgment

debt, Austrian nationals owned approximately one million
francs, while Germans held somewhat more. One of the !arger
creditors of this class was the Bank of Egypt, with £190,000.
A list of the major holders appears in the letter of Adams
to Salisbury, Sept. 27 1 1879 (PRO FOCP 407/13 1 No. 1247,
p. 734).
.
2 Roberts,

"Italy," p. Jl6, Anglo-French cooperation
was advantageous to Britain since France promised neutrality
should war between England and Russia erupt in the East
(Lowe, I, 40).
Jsalisbury to Baring, Sept. 25, 1879, Cromer Papers
PRO FO 6JJ/2,
4 salisbury to Baring, Oct. 29, 1879, ibid,
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But it was doubtful that the English holders would tolerate
an imposed settlement, for such a demarche would. as Lord
Salisbury 1mew, probably lead to a general sell-off of
securities and the intervention of the Mixed Courts which
would be embarrassing. 1 The International Tribunals were
so disliked by the Foreign Secretary because of their
nationalistic bias, as well as their involvement in the
controversy over the public debt. that he even contemplated
the postponement of the Commission of Liquidation until the
Courts had expired.
The Egyptian investors soon discovered where the
sympathy of the controllers lay.

On

October 14, 1879,

Baring and de Bligniares, who were "bone of one bone and
flesh of one flesh" in their actions, 2 notified the President of the Council of Ministers that no funds should be
borrowed to meet either the Turkish tribute or the Unified
debt coupon, due in November,3

Consequently, the Egyptian

tribute bondholders were not paid, and the Caisse had only
enough on hand to remit 2 per cent for

th~

half-yearly pay-

1salisbury to Malet. Jan, 6, 1880, PRO FOCP 407/17,
No, 8, P• 4,
2Malet to Tenterden, Nov, 28, 1879, Tenterden
Papers PRO FO J6J/2.

441-42.

3Money Market Review. XXXIX (Oct, 25, 1879).
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ment on the Unified stock.

Faced by this breach of

contract, the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders felt
it incumbent upon them to act.

On

October 31 Secretary

Clarke "requested Mr. Goschen to inform them of the course
he proposed to take on behalf of those Bondholders whose
interests were thus detrimentally affected, 111

Mr. Goschen,

who since the Commission of Inquiry and the intervention
of France and England had disassociated himself from the
entire situation, replied two weeks later1
Since it has become apparent how competent the Commission of the Public Debt is to look after the interests of the Bondholders it would have been quite
out of place for me to interfere, nor could I have
doHe so with effect if I had wished • • • • But if
the Bondholders think that protests. beyond those
which, no doubt, will be made by the Commissioners
of the Public Debt, as to the coupons not being paid
in full, are necessary they have in the Council of
Foreign Bondholders a body well qualified to give
expression to their wishes and defend their interests
and with all the necessary experience.2
Hence the Council was forced to stand alone, but Goschen,
although removing himself from officially assisting the
English investors, remained a friendly observer,
The •council' acknowledged Goschen•s withdrawal,
but promised the bondholders that all steps adjudged necessary would be taken on their behalf.

The Corporation was

1corp. For. Bondh, Rep., 1879, P• 24.
2standard, Nov. 22, 1879, ACFB, EgYpt, XIII, 117.
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still regarded as the representative of the English investors, receiving all reports, budgets, and statements,
and it was their duty to take up the matter with the
Caisse. 1 Clarke wrote the Commission of the Public Debt
on November 24, "requesting the favor of their immediate
attention to the adjustment of the claims of the Bondholders, on the basis of the agreement of 1876." 2 In
response, Colvin informed the holders that the Caisse
had lodged a protest with the Egyptian Government, deeming
this action sufficient at present.

Not completely satis-

fied with this reply, Councilhouse continued to report
the deficits due on the Unified stocks in all its publications, and gave moral support to Sursook, who sued
for repayment in the Mixed Courts,

This case was lost in

the Alexandria Court of Appeals on April 22, but by then
a Commission of Liquidation had finally been assembled.
Goschen found it hard to remain altogether aloof,
and in January, 1880, he wrote Baring a long letter, urging
the maintenance of the Caisse as the "sheetanchor.. of the
situation and expressing his satisfaction with Colvin as
a strong personality, although the two had never corres1 rn November of 1879, the members of the Caisse
werea w. Mog, P. Baravelli, B. Bughas, and A. Colvin (who
was appointed by Britain).
2corp. For. Bondh, Rep., 1879, PP• 24-25.
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ponded.

After raking the mortgage creditors over the

cinders, Goschen concluded by chiding Baring over his
eagerness to sacrifice the material welfare of the bondholders in pursuit of an evanescent principle.

Were he

a creditor, wrote the M.P., he would be quite upset over
the many reductions made in the name of a final settlement. 1
But just such a settlement was being launched, and
in general it met with approval.

The Viceroy, the Western

Powers, and eventually the states of Europe agreed that a
liquidation commission should be established. 2

Rothschild

was likewise in favor of this plan and would not release
additional funds until all parties involved had given
their assent.J

A just arrangement was also to the advan-

tage of the bondholders, for as Bouverie said, only the
stockjobbers and loanmongers now profited.

He continueda

1 The remarks from Mr. Goschen are drawn from
a letter from Goschen to Baring, Jan. 17, 1880 (Cromer
Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2) •
·
2 Much to the annoyance of Riaz Pa.aha, the Egyptian

President of the Council, Italy withheld her approval of
the Commission of Liquidation the longest, which cost the
Malieh £1,JOO per day in accumulating interest (~alet to
Salisbury, March 15. 1880, PRO FOCP 407/17, No. 255, P• 196) •
.)Salisbury to Baring, Feb. 6, 1880, Cromer Papers
PRO FO 6JJ/2.
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I am quite sure that it is of far more importance for
all parties concerned--the state, and its creditors-to have a steady, fair equilibrium between the public
expenditure of Egypt • • • and the public revenue,
than to have fitful gleams of superabundant means-with corresponding extravagance, accompanied by high
rates of interest of doubtful stability.1
But on this occasion it appeared that the Chairman of the
Corporation ran into difficulties with his confreres.
Baring had privately written Bouverie requesting that a
letter be forwarded to Egypt in which the Council would
officially approve, in the name of the English bondholders,
modifications in the existing contracts.

Bouverie complied

on April 26, but trouble erupted at Moorgate Streeta
I had no o~portunity of submitting it to the Council,
before it Lhis letter] was despatched, and when I
did so afterwards one or two objected that I should
not have committed them and the Council to definite
views--which might be open to question if the letter
were published.2
Whatever course the Council chose, it was clear that
by 1880 the bondholders which it represented in England
were not one of the parties included in the negotiations,
and that no vestige of the authority granted by the Goschen
Decree remained, nor had they friends in .the Foreign Office.
Bouverie summed up the situation of his organization thusa
I do not think my city friends quite understand that
the question of the arrangement of the Egyptian debt
1 Bouverie to Baring. April 27, 1880• ~.
2Bouverie to Baring, May 7 1880, ~·
1

J64

is no longer one between debtor and creditors,
to be arranged between them alone, but is become
one of haute politigue which will be finally
decided, tant4bien Pue mal, by the representatives of the Great owers in the Commission-without t~e assent of the original parties to
the debt.
.
Delays in the commencement of liquidation proceedings were experienced because of the illness of
Lord Salisbury and the insistence of the new Khedive
that the French bankers be given special consideration,
De Bligniares was sent to Paris to complete an agreement
with the Syndicate.

In excess of IA- million of securities

were to be repaid by Cairo, a debt which had blossomed at
interest rates ranging from 10 to 28 per cents 2 in addition,
the 15 per cent founders shares were sold outright to the
C~dit

Foncier for twenty-two million francs, a move

condemned by Egyptophiles since it appeared that twice
this amount could have been obtained by remortgaging this
asset.

Wilson estimated these shares at over twenty-five

million francs, and thought they were likely to double in
value before long,

The controllers gave Britain an oppor-

tunity to purchase this stock at the same price which the
Syndicate was to pay later, but the offer was refused,J

l~.

2 The Times, Feb. 26, 1880, P• 10,

Jsalisbury to Malet, Jan. 22, 1880, PRO FOCP
407/17, No. 73, P• 57.

I
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This decision was probably based less upon concern that
difficulties would arise with the English shippers over
toll controversies than the placation of French sensibilities for the British acquisition of Cyprus, 1
The circular of March Jl, 1880, announcing the
Commission of Liquidation, was what the Western Powers had
desired, an agreement by the other states involved to abide
by whatever document would emerge from the proceedings,
The controllers had made preparations to def end stoutly
the Egyptian interest and thereby had alienated the bondholding community,

The Motikabala was ended by decree, and

a financial plan as well as a budget for 1880 was presented
to the Commissioners as a basis upon which to negotiate.
The Commission of Liquidation was composed of the members
of the Caisse, plus M. d'Airolles of France, Herr von
Trescow from Germany. and as England's choice for President, Sir Charles Rivers Wilson. 2
Some eyebrows must have been raised when the .QQ.server announced Wilson's new post in mid-February.
volte face had occurred in Government thinkings

A

in dis-

1 crabites, The Spoliation of Suez, pp. 201-202.
2salisbury to Malet, March Jl, 1880, PRO FOCP
407/17, No, J16, P• 242, London insisted that Wilson be
named President of the Commission.
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cussing the possibility of appointing Wilson, Salisbury
had informed Northcote that Baring was now opposed to
Wilson a
I have no conception what has produced the change
but taking it in connection with Tewfik's reiterated objection, I am inclined to think with you
that the appointment is undesirable and should
not be made.l
Baring persisted in his opinion, observing in February
that Wilson was unpopular in Egypt, and that neither he
nor his associate, Nubar, carried weight with any class
in the country. 2 Nonetheless, after a lecture from
Salisbury which stressed the necessity for good relations,
Wilson was packed off to the East.

Considering his pre-

vious performance, it seems hard to imagine this maneuver
unless there was intense pressure in his behalf.

This,

says Mr. Dicey, was the case, fer Downing Street submitted in the face of' "the strong opinion expressed in
favor of Sir Rivers by leading London financiers,")

The

arrangement for the Commission of Liquidation was the
last important business to be completed in Egypt under
the Conservative Government, for the Prime Minister had
1 salisbury to Northcote, Feb, 17, 1880, Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50019, p. 179.
2 Baring to Salisbury, Feb, 17, 1880, Cromer
Papers PRO FO 633/2 •
JDicey, "Egyptian Liquidation," p. 46.5.
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called for new elections. and the result was a changing
of the guard.
From the sixteenth to the twenty-fourth of March,
1880, Gladstone carried out his famous Midlothian Campaign,
and at the hustings won a surprising triumph, gaining 353
seats, to 258 for the opposition and 61 for the Home Rulers.
But the new Goveniment was weak, for it was divided into
various groups--the Radicals, the Irish, the Whigs--and
its leader Gladstone seemed more interested in popular
politics than in party unity or Parliament. 1 Neither
did Gladstone stand well at court, for Victoria considered
his assumption to the off ice of Prime Minister almost an
act of treason, and their ensuing relations were marred by
her hostility, particularly on imperial matters.

Cabinet

decisions were no longer reached by compromise among all
of the members, but merely by majority vote, which undermined Goveniment solidarity and hindered policy-making. 2
Gladstone promised a new direction in foreign policy and
spoke warmly of the concert of Europe just at a time when
alliances were being formed on the Continent.

The Liberal

1 Ramm, 1876-86, II, xvi.
2 rn 1882 Lord Derby joined the Liberal Government
as Colonial Secretary, which added another vacillating
member to an already indecisive Cabinet.
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leader had often attacked Beaconsfield's diplomacy, but
in imperial policy on the Nile, ••• the Ministry
formed to reverse Disraeli's policy became his
executors by an irony of contradiction seldom
seen,1
Great Britain kept Cyprus, expanded the Indian frontiers,
and occupied Egypt.

The differences between Gladstone and

Disraeli were not so great despite the bluster of the former,2

The Liberal Cabinet of 1880 exhibited continuity

with the previous Government in foreign affairs,

Seven

members of the new Government were Whigs or Moderate
Liberals who, like Hardington, had been in general accord
with the policies of the Conservatives,
In the flush of victory, Gladstone gave a sobering
assessment of Britain's position in the worldt
The gradual unravelling of the tangled knots of
the foreign and Indian policy will indeed be a
task for skilled and strong hands, if they can
be found,3
The man upon whom this responsibility devolved was
Lord Granville, ''the amiable and witty, but not
1 James L. Garvin, Life of Jose~h Chamberlain
(Londona Macmillan and Co,, Ltd,, 193 ), I, 442-43,
2Robinson and Gallagher, P• 91.
JGladstone to the Duke of Argyl, April 12, 1880,
John Morley, Viscount, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone
(New Yorks Macmillan Co,, i9oj), II, 615.
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efficacious Foreign Secreta?"'IJ. ,.l

From 1880 to 188J,

the Prime Minister and Lord Granville did not work in
tandem, and British diplomacy suffered because of this.
Nowhere was this more visible than in the handling of the
Egyptian crisis.

The English community in Egypt felt

uneasy over the change of government, and discussed the
impact it would have on the future of the Nile Valley. 2
On Aprll 17, 1880, the Commission of Liquidation

inaugurated its proceedings, which continued for three
months.

Because of the acrimony created by these investi-

gative discussions, no day-to-day account of the Commission's
activities were published, and its conclusions were simply
embodied in a decree,

Baring, until his departure for

India in May, as well as his replacement, Auckland Colvin,
was notable in the defense of Egyptian interests, while
the Commission, presided over by Charles Rivers Wilson,
was well-disposed toward the creditors,3

Lacking the

power to depose the Khedive should their proposals be
rejected, the Commission was obliged to make concessions.
The Western Powers placed their diplomatic strength behind
the controllers,
l Garvin, I,

As Malet saids

444,

2The Times, April 27, 1880, p, 10,
Jcromer, I, 162,
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My own instructions are very strong on the point
of making the satisfaction of the creditors subsidiary to an ample f rovision for the administration of the country,

In so doing, the English Cabinet opposed the ambitions of
some of the creditors, but such a course was inevitable
when economic and political affairs were so closely intertwined.
In the course of these thorny negotiations Wilson
often sided with the Italian, German, and Austrian delegates to form a majority in defense of the holders.

These

actions indicated to some that Wilson had perhaps made
promises at home which were impossible to fulfill. 2
Much
haggling had occurred over the amount of money to be granted
the Egyptian Government for ordinary administrative expenses.
The figure which was finally decided upon, £4.9 million,
was higher than the Commission had desired,

The Presi-

dent of the Commission def ended himself to Malet by asserting that he had been afforded complete freedom of discretion by Lord Salisbury,

Most of the other commissioners

agreed with Wilson that only by keeping revenue high and
administrative expenditures low could the bondholders hope
1 Malet to Granville, May 14, 1880, PRO FOCP
407/17, No. 437, P• 370,
2Ma.let to Tenterden, May 19, 1880, Tenterden
Papers PRO FO J6J/2,
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to receive just compensation. 1

Furthermore. should

native creditors be sacrificed. as with the revision
of the Moukabala, additional funds would be freed by
the bondholders.

This was just, Wilson argued, for

the country would gain greatly from the English presence. 2
Wilson's attention was not limited to Commission
business, for Nubar had been allowed to return to Egypt,
and Wilson hoped for the re-establishment of their old
ministry.

He broached the subject to Dilke in May,J

and, ignoring advice to the contrary, remained in constant communication with Nubar, heedless of Britain's
policy or of any crisis which might follow. 4

Wilson

admitted that Salisbury and Lyons had warned him to
avoid Nubar, yet the visitations continued, much to
Malet•s exasperation.5

Both indirect and direct appeals

were made to Wilson, although it was not until June,
when Nubar left Cairo, that tranquility was achieved. 6
l Cromer, I, 172.
2w11son to Granville, Aug, 14, 1880, PRO FOCP
407/17, No, 644, P• 509,
JGwynn and Tuckwell, I, 325-26,
4Malet to Granville, May 17, 1880, Granville

Papers PRO FO J0/29/159.

5Malet to Granville, May 27, 1880, lQ.1.9..

6Malet to Granville, June .3, 1880, ibid ••
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The.decree of July 17, 1880, implementing the
recommendations of the Commission of Liquidation, left
both the interest and the sinking fund of the Preference
stock undisturbed, while adding to its hypothecated
revenues.

However, £5.7 million was added to this

privileged debt and used in the repayment of floating
debt creditors.
As for the Unified scrip, its interest was permanently reduced to 4 per cent, it lost some of its
security. and was not redeemable by purchase on the open
market.

The so-called short loans were converted into

"unifieds" at a ratio of £133 of new scrip for £100 of
old.

Consequently, £2 million was added to this segment

of the debt.
The maximum interest to be paid on the Daira Sanieh
was 5 per cent, the Government assuring a 4 per cent minimum, and the outstanding debt was increased to £9.5 million with the absorption of the Daira Khassa bonds, 1
Some questions of procedure remained in doubt after the
settlement, which necessitated the successful intervention
of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders on behalf of
stated that things had come to such a pass that Tenterden
had written personally to Wilson, begging him to cooperate
with Malet {Dilke to Lord Ripon, May 21, 1880, Ripon
Papers BM Add MSS 43528).
1 see above, Chapter 3, pp. 261-63.
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the Daira holders, 1

The Commission did not tamper with

the Domains loan and it continued to pay 5 per cent interest,
The floating debt was subsumed under three categories a privileged, secured, and ordinary obligations,
In the first class were the tribute to the Porte, the
interest to Great Britain on the Canal shares, and the
claims of the judgment creditors who had obtained their
mortgages upon the domain lands before February J, 1879, 2
These claims were to be paid in cash and in full,

The

secured creditors were, in the main, contractors of
various sorts, and were likewise paid in cash, minus

7 per cent,

Excluded from this group was Greenfield and

Company, the contractor for the Alexandria harbor,

In

the summer of 1879 Sir George Elliot had written the
Government on behalf of the Greenfield claims, since
both Baring and Wilson seemed prone to give the firm
short shrift.J

By 1880, £500 1 000 was still owed these

1corp. For. Bondh, Rep., 1880, P• JO,
2Also included in the privileged class of creditors
were those who had deposits entrusted to the M&l'eh, and
charitable institutions,
)Appendices ) and 4 to PRO FOCP 407/13 contain
appeals by Elliot to the Prime Minister, Salisbury, and
Tenterden,
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contractorsr the Commission of Liquidation, however,
placed them among the ordinary class of creditors,
those possessing merely a pledge of good faith from
the Egyptian Government.

Since the company had al-

ready given up the administration of the harbor dues and
could show no cause why its case demanded special treatment, the ruling stood.

With this settlement a heavy

burden was removed from the State.
The ordinary creditors were paid JO per cent in
cash and the remainder in Preference stock at face value,
which accounted for the £5. 7 million rise in that portion
of the debt.

In this classification fell such claims as

the Rouznameh, which was dismissed, and the Moukabala.
Although the Egyptian Government had recently abolished
the Moukabala, the Commission desired some recognition
for those who had faithfully kept up their provisions of
the plan.

It was not sympathy for the natives which

brought about this compromise, but the threat of numerous
suits by Westerners, especially Greeks, who had paid the
Moukabala and would be disbarred from the benefits of
the law. Dicey reported that Nubar had taken up the cause
of these creditors, which might explain Wilson's position. 1
1 nicey, "Egyptian Liquidation," P• 468,
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One and a half per cent interest was grudgingly extracted
from the Malieh as an annual compensation to those who
had actually paid the Moukabala.

Here, as with the

judgment creditors, those who were on the spot and who
made the greatest stir received the most favorable
attention.
The final article of the decree declared that,
after the publication of this law, no one could pursue
claims against F.gypt on rights acquired before December Jl,
1879.

The Caisse was to be maintained and recognized as

the legal defender of the bondholders, Government loans
still needed the approval

~f

the Caisse, and, in the

case of breach of contract, appeals could be lodged with
the International Tribunals. 1 The Commission of the
Public Debt remained the cashier for the creditors, disbursing, in 1880, £2.J million on the Unified debt of
over £58 million at 4 per cent, and £1.2 million on the
Preference bonds of £22.7 million at 5 per cent per annum. 2
Most journals and interested institutions were pleased
with the Law of Liquidation.J

The Corporation of Foreign

1A copy of the Law of Liquidation appears in the
Parliamentary Papers (LIX, Egypt No. 4 (1880), c. 2662).
2Monet Market Review, XLI (Sept. 11, 1880), 297.
The figuresn the text above have been rounded off to
the nearest hundred thousand,
JPraise for the Law of Liquidation came, for example, from the Board of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank {Bankers
Magazine, XLI [Feb., 1881], 98).
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Bondholders, which published and circulated the new decree,
also lauded the Commission's effortsa
In Egypt, the Law of Liquidation, published on
the 19th of July, 1880, has finally adjusted, it
is hoped, the various difficult and complicated
questions between the creditors of F.gypt and the
State on the one hand, and between different classes
of Bondholders inter se on the other. • • • It is
impossible, when regarding the final issue of the
long and difficult transactions connected with
the arrangement of the Egyptian Finances, not to
be convinced of the eminent ability, skill, and
integrity which have been brought to bear in
effecting this successful result. 1
Unfortunately for Egypt, the spectre of the floating debt
was not laid to rest, for costs incidental to the liquidation, in conjunction with the damage done by revolutionary
upheaval in 1882, created an unsecured debt of £16,646,023
by December of 188J, 2
Improving Prospects in Egypt
In some ways the Anglo-French condominium in Egypt
worked well, for only through cooperative action could
the system have endured at all.

Nonetheless, below the

surface there ran cross-currents of national interest
which resulted in a continuous jostling for influence
between the Western Powers.

About 21,000 functionaries

were in the pay of the Egyptian Government, consuming
l Corp, For, Bondh. Rep •• 1880, p.

2 Ibid., 1884, P• 34.

7.
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£1,250,000 a year. 1

Some of these received as little

as £2 a month while others occupied well-endowed sinecures.

The upper-echelon positions were often filled

by Englishmen, but at the lower rungs of the service
Frenchmen predominated over Britishers in a ratio of
seven to two. 2 Englishmen who possessed patronage were
told by London to advance fellow nationals,J but Gallicization continued in many forms.

A returning visitor

to Cairo in 1881 remarked how spoiled the city was since
it had "become a tenth-rate French provincial town ... 4
Malet went so far as to woo the .American Consul General
for the establishment of some sort of English-speaking
I

confraternity.
The condominium spawned 111 will in the French
camp, particularly between de Blignieres and the Consul
General, de Ring.

The former was disliked by the French

1 wallace, PP• 1J8-J9.
2Malet to Granville, Jan, 31, 1881, quoted in
Atkins, p, 248,
JGranville to Malet, Feb, 17, 1881, quoted in
Atkins, p, 249,
4sir William Gregory to Layard, Nov. 27, 1881,
Sir William H. Gregory, Sir William Grefory, K,C.M,G.,
Formerly Member of Parliament and Somet me Governor of
Ceylon, An Auto§lograpfiY (Londons Johri Murray, 1894),
P• 37l.
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colony because he wouldn't "do their dirty work for them,"
reported Malet, who then opined, "For our interests I have
no doubt that M. de Blignieres is the man to keep." 1
The fears of the Foreign Secretary were not allayed.

He

had heard that Colvin did not have the strength of character to stand up to his French counterpart, 2 and that positions were still being filled by the Quai d'Orsay.

Malet

was probably correct when he assured Granville that the
French controller was not going out of his way to favor
his countrymen, nor was Colvin being manipulated.J
opinion seemed to bear Malet out.

French

M. Delafosse, a member

of the French Chamber of Deputies, moved that that portion
of the budget which contained the salary for their agent
in Egypt be eliminated.

He argued that

M. de Blignit!res seemed to consider hime:elf as a
cosmopolitan agent, and boasted that he represented Frances but he acted as though he considered the absorption of Egypt by England as a
matter of course • • • • French influence is being
persistently r::enaced by lflgland, who is making
daily progress in Egypt.
1 Malet to Granville, Jan. 26, 1881, Granville

Papers PRO FO J0/29/159.
2Granville to Malet, March 11, 1881, !!?.!S·
30/29/121 (copy).
;Malet to Granville, March 18, 1881, iQ!.9.,
J0/29/159.

4standard, July 7, 1881, ACFB, EgYpt, x:v, 88.
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On May 12, 1881, France moved upon Tunis, and on

the same day Granville, Dilke, and Hardington met to discuss countersteps, albeit fully aware that Salisbury had
approved this action before leaving office. 1 It was
natural that Egypt should come up in the conversations. 2
The Foreign Secretary continued to receive disquieting
communications. Queen Victoria wrote in late June that
she had
heard accidentally from a friend of hers that the
French were talking of Egypt as an ultimate object
and that Bismarck encouraged it. Lora'. Granville
said the other day to the Queen that this we could
not tolerate and she trusts that he will take care
that our unfortunate apparent acquiescence in ~
annexation of Tunis does not lead France and Europe
to believe we shall stand that.3

Wilson proffered the Government similar appraisals of

the expansion of French influence obtained through his
liaison with Nubar. 4

Thus Granville's reply to Victoria

1 sa1isbury had indicated Britain's disinterestedness in Tunis at the Berlin Congress in exchange for
France's recognition of the Cyprus Convention (Lowe, I, 41).
2 0n July 28, 1881. there took place the first meeting
of the committee "to consider the affairs of Egypt." Those
in attendance included Malet, Judge Scott, Wilson, Dilke,
and Tenterden (Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 4.50-.51).
JQueen Victoria to Granville, June 22, 1881,
Buckle, III, 22J.

4wilson to Granville, June 22, 1881, Granville

Papers PRO FO 30/29/168.
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was sobers
The dual arrangement in Egypt has led to great
prosperity in Egypt, and ought not to be lightly
disturbed, but our proportion of influence has
been diminished, and will require great vigilance
to maintain it for the future,I
Measures were taken to seek out British subjects with
a knowledge of French, 2 but the jockeying for influence
continued unabated into the period of upheaval.
For the bondholders, the Anglo-French partnership
was a bright episode in the turbulent financial history
of Egypt.

The English investor in Egyptian Government

stocks had earnod only 3.2 per cent per annum on his money
in the decade 1869-79, far less than the average 6,6 per
cent per annum yielded by similar securities, another
disadvantage of "Egyptians" was the wild fluctuation
which they experienced,3

Never.theless, optimism,

engendered by the dethronement of Ismail Pasha and
the establishment of the Commission of Liquidation,
began to pervade officials 4 as well as the investing
1aranville to Queen Victoria, June 28, 1881,
Buckle, III, 224,
2Granville to Malet, March 11, 1881, Granville
Papers PRO FO J0/29/121 (copy),
,
)Economist, XXXVII (Aug. 9 1 1879), 911. The income from F.gyptlan stock was estimated at £1 1 747,000 per
annum for the decade of the 1870's. The Economist carries a table illustrating the fluctuation mentioned above
(XL, (Oct. 7, 1882], 1237),
4Baring to Ponsonby, Dec. 29, 1879, Ponsonby, p. 222.
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community.

The rise in Egyptian stock prices was
dramatic between May 1879 and May 1881, 1 and in part
reflected improving economic conditions in England. 2
With the tranquility of the Nile Valley apparently
assured, capitalists no longer hesitated in making considerable investments in this region.

The resulting

prosperity benefited the bondholders by assuring the
prompt payment of the interest and by enhancing the value
of their holdings.
Journals that warned against the overpriced condition of Egyptian stocks were ignored,J for good tidings
dominated the news from

Cai~•

in the years 1880 and 1881

the Caisse accumulated a surplus of £1,083,515 with which
it purchased stock wor'th £1,454, 820 from the open market. 4
The Daira administrators likewise used this method to re1Economist, XXXIX (May 28, 1881), 660. In this
period the unified stock rose from 40-J/4 to 77, the
Preference from 61-1/2 to 98-1/4, and the Daira from
45-1/2 to 77,
2ooost loans on the British Exchange prospered
in these years and a large number of new offerings made
their appearance on the market. By 1880, Englishmen held
some £750 million in foreign securities, and earned an
estimated t.28 million a year ("An Estimate of British
Investments--Principal and Interest," Bankers M!gazine,
XLI (Feb,, 1881], 158).
3For example, Financier, Dec. 21, 1881, p. 5.
4 Wallace, p. 490, n, 1.

382

duce the outstanding debt, but in their case, land had
to be sold to raise the necessary capital, which displeased many holders. 1 Both the telegraphs and the
railways began to show profits which were used for muchneeded modernization.
The French bankers took advantage of the altered
situation and, upon the dissolution of the Grand Syndicate on January 2, 1880, 2 began unloading their store of
paper.

Consequently, the CI'i8dit Foncier, which held fifty-

nine million francs in "unifieds,n engaged, among others,
Louis Cohen and Sons (a firm long connected with the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders) to sell a portion of
its scrip in London.J

One can date the decline of interest

in Egyptian affairs among the French investors from this
period.

So successful were these operations for the Credit

Foncier that instead of showing a substantial loss, the
organization's report for 1880 indicated a slight profit. 4
1 corp. For. Bondh. Rep., 1882, p. J6.
In 1880,
for example, £241,400 of Daira stock was purchased {ibid.,
1881, p. 40).
2Economist, XXXVIII (Jan. J, 1880), 10,
Jibid •• (Feb. 14, 1880), 180. The absorption of
these securities by the British market was accomplished
with little difficulty (ibid., (March 20, 1880], JJJ).

4 The Times, Dec. JO, 1880, p. 6.
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For the English banks doing business in Egypt, the
golden days had ended with 1876.

The Anglo-Egyptian

Banking Company had suspended the payment of interest
for eighteen months in 1876, and when resumed, its rate
never exceeded 7-l/2 per cent per annum.

Its competitors

fared no better with respect to dividends and the depressed
condition of their shares. 1 Despite stockholder urgings,
none of these institutions increased their capital or
parted with a large percentage of their Egyptian securities when the situation improved.

Legitimate banking

business had become highly competitive by 1881 despite
the prosperity, while transactions with the Cairo Government were on a most modest scale. 2 This did not discourage
several now firms--most notably La Banque at;;neral d'igypte
(with a capital of sixty million francs) and a branch of
Joubert•s Banque de Paris et Pays-bas3~-from opening their
doors and adding to the superfluity of wealth then entering
1 The bottom was reached in February 1878, with
stock of the Anglo-Egyptian quoted at 9-J/4, the Bank of
Egypt at 19-1/2, and the Commercial Bank of Alexandria
at 2-J/8 {Bankers Magazine, XXXVIII [March, 1878], 284).
2 rn March, 1880, for example, the Anglo-Egyptian
Banking Company lent the Khedive's Gove!'l"lment £150,000
at 6.6 per cent (Malet to Salisbury, March 20. 1880,
PRO FOCP 407/17, No. 318, P• 24J).
3naily News, April 15, 1881, ACF3, :Egypt, XV, 59.
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Egypt.1
The revived Egyptian trade helped to stimulate
investments by Englishmen, so that Dilke (Under Secretary at the Foreign Office) was constrained to remind
the British agent in Cairo to keep a protective eye upon
British interests. 2 The infusion of new money was channeled into both commerce and agriculture.

It was esti-

mated that by 1882 Frenchmen had invested £57 million
in Egypt,3 while in the six-year period prior to the
British occupation. twelve English companies came into
existence in Egypt with a combined capital of £8 million,
a quarter of which was paid up. 4 The French firms were
diverse in charaeter,5 while English undertakings were
1From 1879 to 1886, £22,24J,OOO in gold and silver
bullion was imported into Egypt, while only £5,110,800
was exported. This meant that the Nilotic, with 1/240
of the F.arth's population, absorbed one-twelfth of the
world's yearly production of the precious metals (£2rl2..
For. Bondh. Rep., 1886, p. 47).
2Dilke to Malet, Aug. J, 1881, cited in Atkins,
P• 24J.

3cromer, I, )02-JOJ, n. 1.
4Atkins, p. 200. Hershlag (p. 99) states that by
1902 there were six French companies with a combined
capital of £11,548,000, while twenty-six British firms
possessed £9,977,000,
5These included sugar refineries in Alexandria
and land improvement societies such as de Bligniares•
Soci~tl d'Enterprisee et des Travaux Publiquee.
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generally concentrated in communications. 1 utilities, 2
and various aspects of trade, most especially cotton.J

Of even greater importance to Egypt was the influx
of capital into organizations designed to reap profits
from the vaunted alluvium of the Nile.

In June of 1878,

the Stand!rd remarkeda
1 The Duke of Sutherland, who had onoe told Disraeli that English capital must dominate the Nile Valley
(Atkins, p. 200), failed along with another group headed
by Sir George Elliot in a project to lease the Egyptian
railroads, which the controllers had opposed (Baring to
Salisbury, March 15. 1880, Cromer Papers PRO FO 63372).
Mor.e successful were the Public Works Company, established
January 3, 1881 with £400,000 capital for building canals,
roads, and bridges (Prospectus for the Public Works Company,
ACFB, Egypt, xv, insert), and the Oriental Telephone Company, also originating in 1881, with £300,000 capital.
2For example, the Alexandria Waterworks was purchased in 1880 by an English combination headed by the
Duke of Sutherland. In its first year it yielded 7 per
cent profit for its new owners (The Times, May 26, 1880,
P. 13).
JAmong these firms was the Anglo-Egyptian Coal
and Iron Company (BT 31/2800/15327), dealers in coal,
metals, and machinery, with a capital of £10,000, 26 per
cent of which was held by the parent firm, the AngloEgyptian Banking Companyt the Alexandria Market Company (BT Jl/2439/12369) with £25,000 capital in £20
shares, the Alexandria Cotton Pressing Company (BT
31/1573/5147) possessing £30,000 capital and dominated
by the same Lancashire spinners who operated the Commercial Bank of Alexandrias and finally, the Mansourah
Trading Company, a cotton ginning factory with assets of
£30,000 (BT Jl/2553/13289).

386

Considering the low prices at which land is now
being sold and the cheapness of agricultural labor,
there can be very little doubt that, with proper
management, Associations of this kind will have a
good chance of suceess.l
In January of the following year, the Daily Telegraph
urged the creation of a land and mortgage bank which
could borrow in England at 5 per cent and lend in Egypt
a.t 12 per cent, 2

By 1880 a land boom was in full flower.

with prices steadily rising,3
dividends

weJ.'"'e

The prospects for large

alluring and as Mr. Na.sterman told his

stockholders in May, 1880, "our fingers have rather
itched, I must say, at times, to venture upon that kind
of busineas," 4 Land and mortgage companies had been a
good investment in the previous decade, and despite the
drop in market prices of Egyptian crops, more land was
being brought under the plough.5
1 standard, June 18. 1878, ACFB, Egypt,

x,

46.

2Daily Telegraph, Jan, 28, 1879, ibid., XI, 137.
3The Times, Aug. JO, 1881, P• 6,
4 Money Market Review, XL {May 29,· 1880), 638.
5ca1rncross 1 Home and Foreign Investment. p. 229,
Table 53. Cairn.cross' believes that the British investor
earned 16 per cent return on his money in these securities
in the l870's. Despite the increasing amount of land being
cultivated, produce prices fell from 1880 to 1884 as follows1
cotton. 22 per cents cotton seed, 5.5 per cents wheat,
J4 per cents beans, 29 per cent (Corp. For, Bondh. ReE••
1885, P• 42).

387

Unlike other provinces of the Ottoman Empire,
Egypt permitted foreigners to own lands the mortgage
companies, with the International Tribunals to support
them, found it easy to dispossess the indebted fellah
of his farm.

Little wonder, then, that the peasants

hated the Mixed Courts as well as the irrigation projects
which inevitably led to a loss of acreage. l

The pros-

perity was therefore illusory, for the peasantry was
becoming impoverished and had increased its indebtedness
from £500,000 to £7,000,000 between the years 1876 and
1882. 2 Capital for these new operations was not only
drawn from EnglandJ and Prance, 4 but from Egypt as
1villiers Stuart,
t After the Wars Bein the
Narrative of a Tour of Inspect on Lon on1 John Murray,
188j), p. 56a w. Fowler to Granville, April J, 1882,
Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/150.
2 rssawi, P• 9, n. 17, This figure is also cited
by Lord Dufferin in his report of 1882.
JFor instance, the Duke of Sutherland's investments
included £14,ooo in the Bedruschen Land Company, £24,ooo
in the Land and Irrigation Company of Egypt, and £10,000
in the Soci~t' d'Industrielle du Delta du Nil. The Land
and Mortgage Company of Egypt, a purely English venture,
was born in early 1880, The organization planned to do
all sorts of land agency operations, and commanded a
capital of £1 million (half of which was called up) in
£20 shares (Prospectus for the Land and Mortgage Company
of Egypt, ACFB, Egyp~. xrv. insert).
· 4 The largest of all the mortgage organizations, the
Cri3dit Foncier £gyptien, by 1891 was the fifth largest
landowner in the country (Baer, p. 69). The assets of
the firm came to £EJ,2J8,000, and upon its board were
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well. 1
The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders viewed
the condition of Egypt in a positive light after the
promulgation of the Law of Liquidation.

Bouverie, at

the General Court of 1881, drew a parallel between their
success in Egypt and the Turkish situation.

"Egypt,"

said the chairman, "was now finally sound, after being
on the verge of national bankruptcy." 2 The 'Council'
seemed to have shared this optimism, for many of its
members took an interest in the new wave of investments
the Deputy Chairman, R. B. Martin, was a trustee for the
....

Egyptian Delta Land Company,> while Arthur Kinnaird owned
100 shares of Beltim Land and Irrigation Company. 4
directors from the major French houses and the Bank of
Egypt. Edward Dicey was also a director (Prospectus
for the Crt&dit Foncier lgyptien, ACFBP ~. XIV, insert),
since he possessed the concession for estii'blishing the
society as a reward for past services.
1 rn 1881, Nubar Pasha established La Socie~ .Anonyme
d'Irrigation dans le BehiSra with £200 1 000 capital dravm
from English, French, and Egyptian investors, and was
successful for some years (Baer, pp. 68-69).
2 Money Market Review, XLII (March 5, 1881), Jl6.
3Bullionist, Nov. 22, 1880, ACFB, Egypt, XIV, 202.

4The Beltim Land and Irrigation Company was created

to improve the land of Egypt as well as to lend money to
the cuitivators. Its capital was £240,000 in £20 shares
(BT 31/2732/14800),
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G. A. F. Bentinck was a heavy investor in this period,
holding 1,000 shares in the Oriental Telephone Company1
and 200 in the Land and Mortgage Company of Egypt.

Robert

Bourke, the Parliamentary Under Secretary to the Foreign
Office under Beaconsfield, joined the Council in 1880s
he took up 100 shares in the Land and Mortgage Company
of Egypt, becoming a fellow shareholder of John H. Daniell,
who owned 100 shares, and Walter Farquhar and William
Trotter, each with 20 shares. 2

When difficulties arose

in 1882, the Council, perhaps not surprisingly, was a
staunch supporter of strong Government measures.
Within the organization, divisions--which had long
hampered vigorous action--surfaced in 1880.

At a meeting

of the 'Council,' on December 2, 1879, it was decided to
amend the articles of the society which governed the
remuneration to the executive.3

The reason given for

this proposed revision was the sparse attendance at meetings.
Some members felt that after their £100 permanent certificates were drawn and paid, there was little reason to remain
1 oriental Telephone Company Share Lists, BT

31/2748/14922.

2 La:nd and Mortgage Company

BT Jl/14647/1)996.

of Egypt Share Lists,

Jcorp, For. Bondh. Rep •• 1879, p. 8.
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in the organization or to fulfill any 'Council' duties
they might have.

Bennoch remarked that "before the

introduction of that system [salaries for the •council']
great difficulty was experienced in getting a quorum. ,,l
This move might have helped in bringing up the attendance
of the •council,' but the General Courts remained small.
During a special meeting following the General Court of
1880 (when less than one-eighth of the membership, minus

the 'Council,' was present), it was resolved1
That this meeting authorizes and approves the payment to the Council, as remuneration for their
services, of the sum of £100 per annum in respect
of each member of the Council for the time being
(other than the Chairman), such sum to be divided
amongst them as the Council may determine.2
The proposal was passed, but only after a resort to
proxies by the chairman.

Thus, the 'Council' was

granted £2,000 a year to disburse as it chose, and it
appears that a portion of this money went to Secretary
Clarke's salary of £600 a year.
The dissidents within the Corporation were angry
over the timing of this demarche as well·as the mean.s
which the executive had discovered to benefit from the
1

Bishop, p. 15.

2corp, For, Bondh. Rep., 1880, p, 19.
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ever-growing fund, which amounted to £)8,000 by 1881. 1
Augustus Abraham was so incensed by these proceedings
that he forwarded a twelve-page epistle to the Board of
Trade, describing the 'Council's' misdeeds. 2 Mr. Chamberlain, the President of the Board of Trade, was not
sufficiently impressed to act, which irritated Mr. Abraham
and his associates, who felt frustrated and aggrieved.
Although a large surplus existed, they thought the
drawings of permanent certificates were ve-ry slow,J
and (to their minds) too much was spent for the agents
and the general Council expenditures. 4

Worse still, there

1 By 1897 this fund had grown to over £100,000
(Economist, LV (Nov. 20, 1897], 1624).
2Bishop, pp. 12-lJ.

JMonet Market Review, XLVIII (Feb. 23, 1884), 289.
The repaymen scheau!e of permanent certificates, excluding those returned upon incorporation, was as follows1
Year

Number of
Certificates

Year

1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879

so0

0

1880
1881
1882
188J
1884
1885

10

JO
50

Number of
Certificates
50
JO
50
103
120
12J

4 Bishop, p. 17. Through 1878, £7,400 was paid to
the Council's agents, and another £2,180 for testimonials.
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was a growing suspicion that all was not being administered
properly at Moorgate Street.

Rumors were widespread, as

the decade advanced, that settlements arranged by Councilhouse were not the most advantageous for the holders, and
that large commissions, the rewards for such negotiations,
were piling up in the coffers of the organization beyond
the reach of its members.

There were also charges con-

cerning the transfer of certificates.

It was alleged

that clerks sold certificates for what they would bring
or gave them gratis to friends of the Corporation. 1
The opponents of the 'Council' found their weak
position exacerbating.

When they threatened the society

with liquidation. they were told that in that event no
one would receive a penny, as the courts would not allow
its when they demanded a yearly dividend from the profits,
the chairman declared that legal opinion had been consulted,
and that no such course of action was possible.
at internal mutiny were likewise abortive.

Attempts

At the General

Court of 1880 Abraham moved that a committee be appointed
to investigate the workings of the Corporation.

The motion

1 rbid, pp, 28-29.
This author. toth a •council'
member an<f'"i' ~issident, and a friend of Mro Abraham, reported that thirty permanent certificates had been drawn
and never collected. In the face of such apathy, it is
possible that certain violations of trust had occurred.
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was negatived and even a request for more extensive
figures on the annual balance sheet was defeated. 1
The executive body of the Corporation became increasingly
touchy as to its rights, and according to

w.

H. Bishop,

all accounts of meetings by the press had to be submitted
to Councilhouse for approva1. 2 Mr. Bouverie and associates,
correctly or not, viewed those who disagreed with 'Council'
policy as enemies, which seriously impaired whatever influence remained to the institution.
Descent into Chaos1

September 1881

to September 1882
Although the prospects for Egypt appeared fair in
1881, there was a storm gathering which would upset many
calculations.

One of the last places on earth where one

might have looked for a revolution was in Egypt, and, in
fact, for some time after the September rising the British
journals of the day persisted in disregarding the telegraphic reports.

The grievances of the population were

certainly numerous,

Foreigners dominated the country's

trade, finances, government, and even the army, where
Turks occupied the highest ranks,

The dual control

1 Money Market Review, XL (March 6, 1880), 281,
2 Bishop, p. J4.
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produced many job dupl~~a.tio'1fJ which created in.flfflci9.·"\~y
1
'1:'.'ld waste.
A:nti-:.ihristian :feali:'l..qs had also been 1 1:.iildLl''

in.flue·'1.ce of' tha ::hedive was ebbinA:, and

-~hrour7 hout

'iorth

Africa provinces of the Ottoman Empire were slippin.P;' i1.to

European hands.
,Joining the revolut5.ona.ry movement were native
merchants, large la.."'1.dlo1·ds, constitutional liberals. and,

a.t the heart, the army.

There were· al~::>o external

slo:me~·1ts--

the ::)ul tan, Halim, and the :.t'ormsr '.'.hedi ve, all direrytin,;"·
thei:c ovm parties of intrip:anti:;--and it was said that
~uropea.ns,

wishing to return

-~o

evc'l().

the old-style f inancL1·"·

<'Y:t l maail' s heyda:/, gave succor to the im:;urgen.ts. J

Leadins the conspira.cy ware the colonels headad by Ara:-:.1

Jey • a fellah who had risen
Pasha.

L~

i:1

"che army under Ismail

The emeute oi' lebl"'Ual"".f t 1879, had given the

rnili tary a.t1 indication of what might be achieved h." the

threat of force were used, which led directly to tha z·iRlrv
1 ::;tuart, PP• 46l-6l.J..
£8515.000 per year.

.~uropean omplo~rees cost 3;,rr~,··ot

.,,e dli c o "'".
., -c , p • 7~-~, •

2111

)Landau, "Secret Sociatie3," p. li~R.

4 For a brief biography of Arabi, see 3lunt,
jj.St.Q.tu_ (p. 99).

6ec2'."et
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of September 9, 1881.
Although the explosive Egyptian situation was
temporarily defused by the Khedive•s concessions to
the army, Gladstone stated his opinion that in case
of a repetition of such events, all the Powers should
be discouraged from meddling, and that only the Sultan
had the right to employ force. 1
Turkish interYention under any

For the Quai d'Orsay,
eircumsta~ces

was an

anathema, a position which was to cause hard feelings
later.

Granville was not reassured that the troubles

in E,gypt were over, and expressed his uneasiness that
would be drawn ever deeper into EtSYptia.~ internal affairs. 2 Only if a state of anarchy existed in
En~land

Egypt, said the British Foreign Secretary, would England contemplate the use of force.J
The colonels were not long satisfied, and soon
demanded additional funds which, if granted, would unbalance the budget for the coming year,

Auckland Colvin,
the most pro-Egyptian expert Granville had, 4 submitted

1 Gladstone to Granville, Sept. 13, 1881, Ramm,
1876-86, I, 291,
2Granv11le to Gladstone, Oet. 4, lt81, ~., 298-99.
3Granville to Malet Nov. 4, 1881, PRO FOCP
407/18, No, 2.57, PP• 14:3-4 •
4 aranville to Gladstone, Sept. 21, 1882, Ramm,
1876-86, I, 427.

4
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a memorandum in late December in which he predicted the
exclusion of Europeans from the administration, a repudiation of the financial arrangements, and a neutralization of the Con·trol.

He thought that the Chamber, which

had been summoned, would insist on voting the budget and
would require a responsible ministry. 1

Tenterden and

Wilson pursued the Foreign Secretary as to what preparations were being made in case of hostilities, so that
Granville took up the matter in mid-December with Childers
and Northbrook.

Granville had again turned pessimistic.

"Egypt is our great stumbling block•" he wrote, "[and]
it seems quite on the cards that we shall soon have disorder there again." 2

In this frame of mind, Granville

agreed to a joint note with France, to be sent to Cairo,
holding out the possibility of intervention in support
of the Viceroy should there be a recurrence of trouble.

The note was delivered on January 8, 1882, and elicited
an unexpectedly hostile reaction, for as soon as it was
clear to the Egyptians that the maneuver,had been a bluff,
their wrath and disdain were kindled.
1 Malet to Granville, Jan. 2, 1882, PRO FOCP
407/19, No. 2, pp. 2-5 (enclosure).
2Granville to Dilke, Dec. 21, 1881, Gra_~ville
Papers PRO FO 30/29/121.
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Ma.let reported home on the ill eff eets of the
note, and observed that "there was a. cha.nee of arriving
at an understanding, but this is apparently now passed." 1
The British agent remained conciliatory, albeit vacillating,
on whether force was neoessary. 2

The Chamber succeeded

in obtaining a strong reply to the Western Powers, and
expected no reprisals, trusting to division in Europe
and to Gladstone, whose views on struggling nationalities
were well-publicized.
With this accomplished, the assembly turned to
the task of giving Egypt a constitution.

The financial

aspects of the resulting document were particularly sensitive, as the Chamber desired jurisdiction over all
contracts, concessions, and treaties, as well as the composition of the annual budget.3

Granville did not be-

lieve the Chamber competent to vote the budgets however,
caution was paramount. 4 Although the assembly agreed that
the debt settlement was beyond their purview, Colvin

1 Malet to Granv:tlle,. Jan. 9 188~,. PRO FOCP
1
407/18, No. J4, P• 27.
2Malet to Granville, Jan. 11, 1882, ibid., No, 77,

P• 41.
JThe important articles of the constitution a.re
Nos. 34 and J8s the text of the whole document appears
in Blunt, Secret History (pp. 390-96).

4Granville to Malet. Feb. 10, 1882, PRO FOCP
407/19, No, 212, P• 110.
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considered
that the right claimed by the Chamber. seriously
affects the guarantees given to the creditors,
because it necessarily transfers the conduct of
affairs from the Council to the Chamber.l
As for France, Gambetta strongly objected to native interference with the budgets still, Paris was not inclined
to take stern measures.

In a discussion on February 1,

the London Cabinet found itself divided, with the jingos
Hardington and Northbrook outnumbered by those who pre.
erred circumspection, which lead to a temporary feud
between Hardington and the Foreign Secretary. 2 It was
f

decided to propose changes in the Egyptian constitution
and to submit them to Europe for consideration, since the
Powers were involved in the guarantee on the secured debt.
Within the Government the strongest voice in defense of
bondholders'rights was Hardington's.

In early February,

Tewfik signed the new constitution into force, causing
a change of government, with Arabi Bey as the new Minister

of War.

For the bondholders the events of September, 1881,
brought down the curtain on the period of prosperity in
Egypt.

Letters from the region took on a frightened tone

flid.,

lMa.let to Granville, Jan. 12, 1882!
No. 45,
p. 291 Lyons to Granville, Jan. 12, 1882, _:e_., No. 46,
P• 29.

2Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 456.
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and an exodus of women and children began. 1

Like Colvin,

many investors feared that the Caisse would be swept

away

and

that the liquidation arrangements might not

be respected.

2

Anxiety increased as the Chamber pressed

new demands upon the controllers, whose authority suffered
in the Council of Ministers.

By February Egyptian finances

appeared as chaotic as in the era before 1876, and Colvin
warned of impending disaster.)
The shock wave of the September rising hit an already shaky market, immediately dropping the "unifieds"
1-1/8, and the Preference and Daira stocks l•J/4 points. 4

A syndicate wa.s formed in Alexandria to keep the Unified
scrip above 75 while speculators fished the turbulent
waters (a dangerous game when the bulk of "unifieds"-which made up 62 per cent of the entire debt--was still
in the hands of a few intermediaries).S

of

Sir John Pender,

Duffe~~r~af~~ ~~:~o~~a~~hn T~:~~ ~~O~': ~;sf~~

2Malet to Granville, Jan. 2, 1882, PRO FOCP
407/19, No. 2, P• 4 (enclosure).

)Cookson to Granville, March 6, 1882, ~·•
No. 352, P• 196 (enclosure).
4Finaneier, Sept. 13, 1881, ACFB, Egypt, x:v. 125.
5Pall Mall Gazette, Jan. 21, 1882, ibid., 240.
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as the head of the Eastern Telegraph Company, intercepted
a message supposedly from James Macdonald in England to
Cherif and the President of the Chamber, urging the reduction of the Egyptian debt by two-thirds, which if
acted upon or even published would have caused a panic. 1
Not even the knowledge that by January, 1882, the Caisse
possessed su:ff ioient money to meet the April and May coupons
could improve the prices of Egyptian stocks. 2

Across the

Channel, the opening of the year 1882 witnessed a crash on
the Paris bourse, and the concomitant wave of selling added
to the depressed condition of "Egyptians."'

At "bargain

prices" Egyptian securities began to flow to London, so that
by the time of the occupation an estimated two-thirds of
the entire debt of Egypt was in British hands. 4
From the start the English journals, and particularly
the f inaneial periodicals, were unsympathetic toward the
Arabist cause.

For example, the Bullionist wrote in

1 Pender to Granville, Feb. 3, 1882, Granville

Papers PRO FO ,30/29/1.52.
2

Economist, XL (Jan. 28; 1882), lll.

Jibid., (March 25, 1882), J46. The decline in
Egyptian stocks was considerablea from January 3, 1882,
to February 2, 1882, the Unified stock went from 71-1/2
to 64, the Daira from 72 to 64, and. the Preference from
92 to 88.
4~·• (Sept. 16, 1882), 1149,
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October, 18811
The Army, then, is masters but it cannot be permitted to remain so. '!'here must be reassertion of
the right to rule by the only defacto Government •
• • • It must, in fact, be England and France.l
The French press was also aroused against the colonels
and was widely quoted in England.

After the failure of

the January note, pressure was increased upon the Foreign
Office to take some action.

Punch interpreted the pre-

ferences of the investors in its "Egyptian Barometer"•
English Annexation.--Enthusiasm, white heat. Stocks, 150.
Anglo-French Intervention.--Delight, red hot. Stocks,
100.
Egyptian Independence.--Approval, summer heat. Stocks,

so.

Continental Interference.--Anger. blood heat. Stocks,
60.
Turkish Supremacy.--Hope, below zero. Stocks,
unsaleable.2
The banks filed with Downing Street their objections to the activities of the Chamber, while advice was
offered from many quarters.

One of the most persistent

correspondents was Edward Dicey, who wrote from Cairo through
his friend Rivers Wilson that
a new danger is presenting itself (which I have long
dreaded but never dared speak about), that an antilBullionist~ Oct. 15, 1881, ACFB, Eg.ypt, XV, 166.

2 Punch, LXXVII (Jan. 14, 1882), 14.
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taxpayer movement would declare itself. If that
happens the Bondholders will come to the front
again and pressure will be put upon the Foreign
Governments by the creditors to interfere and
enforce the provisions of the Law of Liquidation.l
Dicey suggested sending in the army. and in another
letter declared Ara.bi to be half fanatic, half knave. 2
England was aware, from the start, that the bondholders would not stand idly by if yet another "final"
arrangement were overturned.

Lord Lyons wrote home in

September of 18811
If we let either the Egyptians or Foreign Powers
suppose they can upset that [Law of Liquidationl,
we shall not be able to maintain the English and
French Controllers, and if they disappear, the
financial prosperity will disappear with them,
and we shall have the bon1holders, French and
English, on our backs again.J

Investors saw the British presence in the Nile Valley as
a guarantee of proper administration, and even Gladstone
recognized Britain's responsibilitiesa
I suppose we are entitled to hold the present position
so far as it is necessary to guarantee the pecuniary
interests on behalf of which we have in this somewhat
1 wilson to Granville, Jan, Jl, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO J0/29/168.
2Dicey to Granville, Jan. 22. 1882• ibid.
J0/29/1~9; Dicey to Granville, Feb. 6, 1882, ibid.

JLyons to Granville, Sept. JO, 1881, Newton, II, 258.
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exceptional case been acting with. 1
Besides, as Lyons observed, the Khedive "could not confront the mass of enraged bondholders if he abandoned
their interests," 2 especially if France chose to act.
On

February 19, 1882, the controllers dispatched

a letter to the Council of Ministers in which the attributes of their offices were restated for the Egyptian
Government.J

Colvin, who took an elevated view of his

duties, was greatly disturbed over the turn events had
taken1
The Ministry professes to regard the Control as an
institution existing solely in the interests of the
holders of the bonded debt, • • • We, on the other
hand, view the Control as intended to secure more than
a mere guarantee for the payment from year to year of
the interests in the bonded debt. Our business, as
we understand it, is to do this, but also to prevent
a possible recurrence of the difficulties which were
finally closed by the Law of Liquidation. 4
Since early February, Wilson had been working on a plan
for revising the Egyptian constitution, in order to gain
1 Gladstone to Granville, Jan, 11, 1882, Ramm,
1876-86, I, 32),
2Lyons to Granville, Jan. 19, 1882, Newton, II, 274.

3Malet to Granville, Feb, 9 1 1882 1 PRO FOCP
407/19, No, 267, P• 135.
4

~'1alet to Granville, Feb, 13, 1882, ~•• No, 142,

p. 273 (enclosure No. l).
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security for the foreign creditors.

His labors were em-

bodied in a memorandum of February 13, which formed the
nucleus of Granville's proposals passed on for European
consideration. 1 Arabi was master of the situation, and
Malet soon suspected that the Porte was flirting with the
colonels.

The French Foreign Minister Freycinet presented

modifications to Granville's plan, after which the assent
of the interested Powers had to be obtained.
Paris seemed to place little hope in England's
project, and entered into a policy which gave the impression of a weakening of Anglo-French solidarity.

Many dis-

quieting reports were brought to Granville's attention.
From Cairo came rumors of contacts between French agents
and Arabi and even stranger news that the ex-Khedive Ismail Pasha had gained the ear of the Quai d'Orsay.

At

the same time, Lyons reported that Freycinet was blaming
the situation in Egypt upon Tewfik's weak character and
suggesting his deposition in favor of Halim. 2 M. de Blig1Memorandum of c. Wilson, Feb. lJ, 1882, .!!?.!!!••
No. 126, P• 240.
2The French overtures to Arabi are reported ina
Cookson to Granville, March 15, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/19,
No. 374, p. 208. For Ismail's liaison with the French, sees
Wilson to Granville, March 18, 1882, Granville Papers PRO
FO 30/29/170. The removal of Tewfik was mentioned ina
Lyons to Granville, March 17, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/19,
No. 385, P• 214.
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nieres, who was anti-Arabist and pro-English in his
sentiments, was recalled in mid-March and replaced by
Bridif.

This move was part of a general program to

eliminate dissension in the French camp in order to give
their agent Sienkiewicz a stronger hand. 1 The English
Foreign Secretary found hazards on every side, and because
he did "not trust Freycinet much, •• 2 his ally, unbending
in outward diplomacy toward Arabi, afforded scanty comfort.
As April advanced, Downing Street became increasingly
anti-Arabist, and stronger measures were contemplated.J

The

Powers had agreed to the proposed modifications of the Egyptian constitution, but although the Chamber of Notables was
left with considerable influence, the time for compromise
had slipped past.

By

May

Tewfik undoubtedly had decided

that his only hope of weathering the future lay in following
the advice of the British agent.
On

May

11, Granville stated his willingness that

England join with France in a naval demonstration, which

1 Lyons to Granville, March 15 1882, PRO FOCP
1
407/19, No. 377, P• 209.
2Granville to Malet, March 17, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO J0/29/199 {copy).
JThe English envoy to Paris proposed a naval demonstration as early as mid-.A.Pril (Lyons to Granville•
April lJ, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/20, No. J4, P• 2J).
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was undertaken with W!alet•s concurrence. 1

On the following

day, Paris reluctantly agreed to allow Turkish troops to
be used in Egypt, should the need arise, which served as
a rejuvenating tonic to Lord Granville. 2 London decided
to call upon the Sultan•s troops, but was shocked when
the Quai d'Orsay executed a volte face,3

Dilke was quite

unhappy that "the French completely sold us, and we once
more realized the fact that they are not pleasant people
to go tiger-hunting with," 4
The arrival of the ships at Alexandria, in conjunction with firmness on the part of the Khedive who was supported by the British and French agents, brought the temporary resignation of the Egyptian ministers on May 27,5
Arabi declared the Sultan his only suzerain, 6 whereupon the
Viceroy, rapidly losing control, formally requested the
1 Granville to Lyons, May ll, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/~o,
No, 170, P• 85t Granville to Queen Victoria, May 12, 1882,
Buckle, II, 294,
2Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 457.

)Lyons to Granville, May 19, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/20,
No, J66, PP• 162-63,
4 Gwynn and Tuekwell, I, 458,
5Malet to Granville, May 27, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/20,
No, 538, P• 2)6,
p.

241.

6Malet to Granville,

May

27, 1882, !12.!!!•• No. 575,
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Turkish mission, which was dispatched on June J.

By the

end of May, Tenterden, Northbrook, and Dilke had joined
Hardington and others in desiring strong action, without
France if neeessary. 1

Granville, who had always striven

for compromise and strongly opposed occupation, was now
beginning to place his hopes in a European conferenee. 2
Panic reigned among Westerners in Egypt upon the
return of Arabi to power,J

Govemraent had ground to a

halt and economic chaos spread as lending institutions
ceased operations. 4 The Turkish commissioners proved
useless, expending energy on spying upon one another and
coquetting with both sides rather than aiding in a settlement.5

England found herself being isolated as the Italian,

Austro-Hungarian, and German consuls turned their support
to Arabi, and even the French were not averse to dealing
with him in a sub rosa fashion. 6
1 Atkins, p •

In one of his last

.357.

2aranville to Gladstone, May 29, 1882, Ramm, 18~6-86,
I, J75s Granville to Lyons, May .)0, 1882, .PRO FOCP 407/ O,
No. 678, P• 273.
P• 282.

P• 74.

JMalet to Granville, May 31 1 1882,

!.121!!•• No. 705,

4 Malet to Granville, May 2, 1882, ibid,, No, 147,

5For an account of this mission, see Wallace
(pp. 85-86).
6 Roberts, "Italy," p • .3221 Knaplund, p. 181.
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dispatches from Egypt, Malet observed that in his opinion
French and British policy had come to a dividing point in
the road. 1
As the Egyptian situation grew increasingly chaotic,
all those with a vested interest in the area came forward
to urge some course of positive action which would re-establish tranquility and prosperity.

Shippers, bankers, capi-

talists, imperialists, and Anglo-Egyptian officials all
found common ground upon which to stand.

Bondholders,

naturally enough, .formed an important element as well, but
they were not the major component in this combination.

Their

cause was more palatable to the E:nglish public when it was
heavily seasoned with the rhetoric of imperial defense
and the paramountcy of British trade.
Egyptian stocks, although having recovered somewhat
by March, 1882, from the effects of the Paris crash of
January, again began to decline.
advised its readers in early

The Bondholders Register

Maya

Under the existing uncertain conditions no person
ought to hold Egyptian Bonds who is not prepared to

.

1 Malet to Granville, June lC, 1882, PRO FOCP

407/20, No. 872, p, J44. Malet wrot• that after moving
from Cairo to Alexandria in early June, he fell seriously
ill, 2'?ld was removed to Italy (Sir Edward B. Malet, Shifti~
Scenes1 or Memories of Man Men in Man Lands fLondon1 Jo
Murray, 9
, p. o • He later ascr be h s i!lness to
a "c~p of coffee."
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view with equanimity the possibility of a sharp
fall in their market value,l
The banks, being the largest holders, were the most dissatisfied.

On

May

26, the Anglo-F.gyptian announced a loss

of £41,000 on its holdings for the half-year, while a

shareholder of the Bank of Egypt, which also suffered,
took the opportunity at its August meeting to place the
blame for the Egyptian difficulties on Lord Granville's
procrastination. 2

By the end of

May

many bondholders would

have agreed with the City man who remarked to the editor
of the Pall Mall Gazette, "what we want is 'unifieds'
at

so ... 3
The holders felt that if the Government insisted on

the fulfillment of the stipulations of the Law of Liquida·
tion and supported the European officials, all might be
saved.

The English Foreign Secretary had indeed been

trying to maintain the Control and throughout the spring
was engaged in defending the British position in the Egyptian Custom Service from the assaults of Arabi. 4 But as
1 Bondholders Register, May 9, 1882, ACFB, Egypt,
XVI, 149,
.
2Money Market Review, XLIV (June J, 1882), 8491
ibid,, XLV (Aug, 12, 1982), 259.
)Francis w. Hirst, Early Life and Letters of John
Morley (Londona Macmillan and Co •• Ltd,, 1927). II, 115.
4 Malet to Granville, March JO. 1882. PRO FOCP
407/20, No. 21 1 P• lJ.
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the colonels became more daring, and Granville's diplomatic efforts met with defeat, it was debated how far
England was prepared to retreat,

Europeans in Egypt called

for support, 1 and the French investors, who had reduced
their holdings in Egyptian securities, were reasonably
modest in their protestations.

As Wilson later observed1

I must • • • point out that the interest of the French
public in Egyptian Finance (e.g. as creditors of Egypt)
which was very great and very powerful in 1876 when the
Caisse de la Datte was established, has been immensely
reduced,2

The Liberals had no desire to champion the cause of
the foreign creditors of Egypt,

If the bondholders and

the Cairo Government could settle their difficulties without drawing in any Power, including London, and if the
entente with Paris could be maintained, the Prime Minister
would be well satisfied,3

Lord Granville strove for a

compromise although admitting that a tour de force might
be necessary at any moment. 4 As has been indicated, the
British Cabinet became less sympathetic towards Egyptian
1 Malet to Granville, Feb. 13 1882, Granville Papers
1
PRO FO J0/29/160,
2wilson to Granville, Nov. 5, 1882, ~·• 30/29/170,

JRobinson and Gallagher, PP• lOJ-104,
4 Granville to Dicey, March 18, 1882, Grenville Papers
PRO PO 30/29/149 (copy),
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nationalism.

In early February, Hardington, Harcourt,

and a few others were willing to support a strong policy
in Egypt, 1 and their number grew as Arabi's moderate
guise evaporated.

To avoid criticism, Granville kept

discussions of Egypt to a minimum, which at last drew
an irritated response from Hardington, the Secretary for

India, on May 27r
I wonder if any human being (out of Downing Street)
would believe that not a word has been said in the
Cabinet about Egypt for a fortnight, and I suppose
will not be for another week--if then.2

Granville's Egyptian experts generally held decidedly negative views on the Arabist movement, which colored
their counsel.

Wilson, for instance, provided the Foreign

Secretary with information from his many financial connections, while personally viewing Arabi as a doubtful patriot
and a disturber of the peace.3

In Egypt, Colvin was hostile

to Arabi, a fact which Blunt later considered one of the
prime causes for the British occupation. 4 Even Malet. who
had written early in the year, "I own to have a repugnance
1 Robinson and Gallagher, P• 100.
2

Hardington to Granville, May 27, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO 30/29/132.
3w11son to Sanderson (Granville's Private Secretary), March 28, 1882, .ill.S,. J0/29/170.
4 Blunt, Secret Histo;:y, pp. 151-52.
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to a war engaged on behalf of bondholders," 1 by May was
agre:eable to the arrival of the fleet and the employment
of Turkish troops.
The letter-writing campaign to Downing Street,
begun in early January. gained intensity, with numerous
appraisals of the situation being proffered.

Sir Samuel

Baker, a steadfast Egyptian bondholder~ believed that
Halim was behind the disturbances and advised that steps
"should be taken without a day's delay to nip in the bud
the pretensions of Arabi Bey before he should become the
dictator of Egypt."J

In May,

Baker called for the punish-

ment of Arabi, and in early June, for the separation of
Egypt from Turkey. 4 Goschen expressed his fear that the
ex-Khedive might somehow be reinstated,5 while the Rothschilds were confident that, whatever might come, some
intervention in Egypt was inevitable. 6
1 Malet to Granville, Jan. 11 1882, PRO FOCP
1
No. 77, P• 41.
2Murray and White, P• 264.
;Baker to Granville, Feb. 10, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO J0/29/148.
4 Baker to Granville, May 18 and June 2, 1882, ibid.
1
SGoschen to Granville, Feb. 16. 1882, ~· J0/29/510.

6The Rothschild comment was sent to Francis Rowsell

by cypher, and was communicated to the Foreign Office in a
latter from Malet to Granville, Jan. 18, 1882 (Granville
Papers PRO FO J0/29/160).
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Dicey, in Egypt, repeated the theme that the
threads of power in the new movement were being manipulated
by persons abroad, and that Arabi was bent upon destroying
the institutions which England had created since 1876. 1
Richard Milnes, Baron Houghton (father-in-law of Gerald
Fitzgerald, the head of the Egyptian Accounting Office)
and one of the founders of the Royal Colonial Society, 2
wrote. to Lord Granville advising the strengthening of
the Control.J

Members of Parliament also expressed their

view in this period.

Sir John Pender, M,P., who was deeply

concerned in Middle Eastern affairs, passed on gloomy reports to the Foreign Secretary, H.

v.

Stuart, M.P,, who

fought the pro-Arabists in the press, likewise kept
Downi.ng Street informed as to his viewss and E. Heneage,
M.P., wrote Lord Granvillea
I hold very strong views on the necessity of England
remaining paramou.~t in Egypt. • • • and of our duty
to try and settle the land and debt questions. 4
1Dicez to Granville, Feb, 27, 1882, Granville Papers
PRO FO J0/29/!49r Wilson to Granville, March 13, 1882,
ibid. 30/29/180, (enclosure).
.

2The Times, June 29, 1869, P• 5•
.)Houghton to Granville, Feb, 21, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO 30/29/150.
4
Pender to Granville, Feb. 4, 1882,
Stuart to Gra.~ville, April 1, 1882, ibid. JO
to Granville, June 2, 1882, ~. J072'97150,

jiiJ•
30/29/152,
9 1631 Heneage
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The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, which had
refrained from any action on the Egyptian matter, made
its views known at the Foreign Office.

Since Granville

had assumed his office, Downing Street had been helpful
to the Council in various ways, 1

Moorgate Street was kept

abreast of developments in the Levant by its agent Captain
Stab, and by General Goldsmid, who served as a commissioner
of the Daira. 2

In March the chairman of the Council wrote

to Granville, saying that the Sultan stood behind the socalled nationalists in Cairo, and submitted a letter from
Captain Stab which read in parts
The choice of leaders for the movement was made
in preference among the Arabs for a twofold reason.
first not to awaken any suspicion among certain
classes of the population--that the 'mot d'ordre'
was given at Constantinople but principally to
make it appear in the eyes of Europe that the
movement was spontaneous and national,J
The scheme had so far succeeded because of hopes, nurtured
in Egypt, that its financial burdens might be lifted, as
Captain Stab continueda
1 such assistance took the shape, for example, of
letters of introduction (Bouverie to Granville, June 28,
1882, ibid. J0/29/148),
2corp For. Bondh, Rep., 1882, p. 8, The British
Foreign Secretary also employed General Goldsmid as an
agent (Granville to Childers (secretaryforWarJ, Sept, 24,
1881, Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/118).
3Bouverie to Granville, March 11, 1882, ~·
30/29/148.
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I now come to the pith of the plot which is the
foreign Debt. Regarding this question the promoters prove to the national party that what was
done in Turkey might be done in F.gypt, whose international agreements concerning the Debt are no more
binding than the Berlin protocol was to Turkey.l
As Bouverie later said, all the talk of Egyptian rights
and national aspiration did not contradict the fact that
the colonels had intended to sieze control of the finances
of the country. 2

The bondholders found in the press an unaccustomed
though welcome ally.

Anarchy was a live issue in England

after the Phoenix Park murders in Ireland, and there seems
to have been some transference to the Egyptian situation.
Pro- and anti-Arabists utilized the journals to sway

opinion, but the attitudes of the papers were biased against
the Egyptian nationals for a number of reasons, not least
of all the personal motives of newspaper men.
Dwarfing all competition among English papers in
1882 was the powerful Times of LondonJ which wielded great
1 Ibid.
2 Money Market Review, XLVI (March J, l88J).

357-58.

3Hatton, p. 75. The estimated earnings of the
major dailies in 1882 werea The Times of Loudon, £1,000,000s
Daily Telegraph, e120,ooos standard, £g6,ooo, Dai].y News,

ejo,ooo.
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influence among both the European and the native populations of Egypt. 1 The editor of the "Thunderer" in
this period was Thomas Chenery, an Arabic scholar, who
was supposedly a holder of Egyptian bonds. 2 At the time
of the September rising of 1881, Chener;y felt that despite
the objections to evsry course of action, some policy must
emerge, and should there be procrastination, the Dicey
view--in favor of British annexation of Egypt--would grow
in popularity.3
From 1873 to 1882, Sir John Scott, the English
representative to the International Court of Appeals,
served as Egyptian correspondent for The Times.

He was

generally on good terms with Baring and others, and believed
that British annexation of the Nile Valley would be best for
all concerned. 4 Scott was replaced in the spring of 1882
by Charles Bell, who had worked in Alexandria as an agent
for both merchants and insurance fir.ns since 1875.

Blunt

1 Malet to Granville, Oct. 22, 1881, PRO FOCP
407/18, No. 247, P• 137•
2wilfred s. Blunt, Mr, Blunt and The Times
(London1 Chiswick Press, 1907, p. 5. Chenery was a
professor of Arabic at Oxford in 1868, and was the honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society (Hatton. pp.
8J-84).

3chenery to Granville, Sept. 17, 1881, Granville
Papers PRO PO J0/29/15).

4scott to Lascelles, July 4, 1879, Lasoelles

Papers PRO FO 800/4.
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thought him the representative of the monied interests,
and, in fact, The Times reporter was opposed to Arabi. 1
His stories were not always appreciateds
who replaced Malet, wrotea

Mr. Cartwright,

"We live in daily fear of the

extravagan·t accounts which Bell, The Times correspondent•
sends." 2 In September of 1881 the paper recommended cir•
cumspection,J but by May its attitude had altered1
If Egypt is not reorganised with a regard to our
interests, it will assuredly be so moulded as
to promote interests antagonistic to ours. 4
The Daily Telegraph and the Standard, the largest
Conservative papers, were both jingoist in outlook.5

The

owner of the former was Edwin Arnold, another Orientalist,
who had served as a school principal in India.

He joined

the newspaper in 1861 and brought with him a firm belief
in the maintenance of British power in the East~ 6

In nor-

mal times the Telegraph received its Egyptian intelligence
from Reuter•s in Alexandria, an agency whose reports did
not always inspire full confidence.7

The representative

1Blunt, Mr, Blunt and The Times, p. 6, Bell, P• 56.
2cartwright to Sander~on, July 27, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO 30729/161.
3chenery to Granville, Sept. lO, 1881, ~.

4The Times, May 15, 1882, quoted in Rothstein, p. 194.
5Hatton, P• 161,

6

~·•

P• llJ,

?Edward Vizetelly, From cJprus to Zanzibar b~ the
tian Delta1 the Adventures o a Journalist (Lon ona
Ar hur Pearson, 9
, Also, see be ow, p. 419,
n. J.
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for the Standard in Egypt was Albert Evans, the manager
of the Oriental Telephone Company in Alexandria and an
aspirant to a goveIT>.ment post with the Control. 1 His
paper supported strong action in Egypt beginning with
the joint note of January1
For ourselves, we can see no reason why the two
Powers who as a matte~ of fact direct the policy
of Egypt shoutd not give public notice of their
intention to maintain their influence and to
support the Khedive so long as he submits to it. 2
The largest of the Liberal papers was the Daily
News, with two of its three proprietors involved in Egyptian finance.J

The jouIT>.al withheld an attack upon the

Egyptian nationalists until the new constitution was
issued, then called for Downing Street to fortnulate a
policy independent of France in case that country's leaders
should be struck with indecision. 4 Reporting for the

!':!.!!!.!. were Hilary Skinner, who sought office on the International Tribunal, and J. C, Chapman, the agent for the

l~•• P• 66.
2standard, Jan. 17, 1882, ACFB, Eg.Ypt,

xv,

232.

3Henry Oppenheim was still interested in investing
in Egyptian projects, possessing JOO shares in the Land
and Mortgage Company of Egypt (BT 31/14647/13996), and
Labouchere was a substantial bondholder also.
4 Daily News, Feb. 2, 1882, ACFB, Egypt, XVI, 1.
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Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company. 1

The latter

was also a representative for the Cridit Foncier of Egypt
and a holder in the Land and Mortgage Company of Egypt. 2
Once again, those on the scene accused the press of exaggeration.

In May the Foreign Secretary was told that,

should a catastrophe occur in Egypt, it would be principally the fault of the news agencies and the Daily News.J
The Pall Mal,l Gazette, which had changed hands,
was a Liberal journal by 1882.

Nonetheless, even here

there was an unwillingness to allow British interests
to be neglected in the Nile Valley.

Its editor, John

Morley, wrote in Januarya
If Dizzy had had any pluck, he would have turned
the French out of Egypt, and it is a great pity
that it cannot be done now.4
In February of 1882, the paper obtained the services of
Auckland Colvin as their Egyptian correspondent.

The

1vizetelly, P• 66.
2Land and MOrt$age Company of Egypt, Share list

for 1881, BT Jl/14647/13996.

JPender to Granville, May 12, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO J0/29/152. Both the French and the British
news agencies, Havas and Reuter, respectively, were accused
of receiving a £1,000 annual subvention from the Control
(Blunt, Secret ~sto~, P• 134). In a Cromer memorandum
of 1891.1-, there
menion of such a sum having been paid
to Havas, but nothing conclusive can be proven (Atkins,

s

P•

332).

4Morley to Chamberlain, Jan. 19, 1882, Chamberlain
Papers. 5/54/439, quoted in Atkins, p. 337.
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Morning Post, whose City editor, Charles G. Warren, owned
stock in the Oriental Telephone Company, 1 wrote approvingly
of Britain and France "affirming their rights of interference in order to guard the interests of the bondholders,
and share holders of the Suez Canal." 2

Mr. Labouchere,

owner and chief contributor to Truth (and a proprietor of
the Daily News), urged the purchase of F.gyptian securities,
and as a member of Parliament 'strongly supported the use of
force in Egypt by the Government.3

Finally, in the finan-

cial press there was general agitation for actions one
spokesman for intervention was the Bu1lionist. 4
On June 11, 1882, a riot broke out in Alexandria

and before the day was done, fifty Europeans were dead.5
1 0riental Telephone Company, Share List, BT
31/2748/14922.
2Morn!ng Post, April 6, 1882, ACFB, Egypt, XVI, 116.

JThorold, P• 196. For Labouchere•s views, see
Truth, Feb. 16, 1882 (ACFB, Egypt, XVI, 35).

4Bullion1st! March 18, and

89 and 152, respect vely.

May

13, 1882, ibid.,
·

---

5This figure was given at the time, and has been
cited in most works on the subject. However, a newspaper
reporter of the time estimated the death toll at 200
(Frank Scudamore, A Sheaf of Memories [Londona T. Fischer
Unwin, Ltd., 1925], P• g2),
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The London Cabinet was convinced that Arabi was responsible
for this massacre and had now revealed his true oolors. 1
Everywhere the hawks were on the wing, and as tempers rose,
English citizens were speedily evacuated from Egypt. 2
Many ministers desired action, although few wished to be
tagged as bondholders• men.

Unlike Dilke and Chamberlain,

however, Hardington did not mind supporting the re-institution of bondholder control over Egyptian finance, yet the
Suez Canal was of even higher priority to him.J

The Secre-

tary for India. thoroughly annoyed with Paris, was the only
minister prepared for unilateral intervention in Egypt, and
urged a stiffer attitude toward the Porte .• 4 It was impossible to hold the Prime Minister's attention upon Egypt for
very long with the Irish question once again before the
House, and there was talk within the Cabinet of a break-up,5

1 Robinson and Gallagher, P• 107. In time some within the Government! such as Dilke, were to change their
opinion upon Arab •s culpability in this affair (Gwynn and
Tuckwell, I, 460).
2riJJaJ.et to Granville, June 21, 1882, PRO FOCP
407/20, No. 1334, P• 515. By this date, only 100 Englishmen remained in Egypt outside of Port Said.
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In the days previous to the bombardment of Alexandria,
Hardington was as important as the Foreign Secretary in
policy-making, for he and Northbrook (the First Lord of
the Admiralty) worked behind the scene to prepare for
any eventualities, 1 An informal committee within the
Government, including Granville, Hardington, Childers
(Secretary for War), and northbrook, was established to
act for the entire Cabinet,
Gladstone and Granville still placed hope in the
conference which opened in Constantinople on June 2J,

On

the twenty-first, the Cabinet decided that if the conference could not obtain a Turkish intervention, concerted
action by Europe should be taken to pacify Egypt, 2 Assistance from the conference, however, was not forthcoming.
The Triple Alliance was meddling in Egyptian affairs at
the Porte, and in

Alexa...~d~ia

the British agent had received

hints from his German and Auatrian colleagues that he should
depart with the fleet in order to avoid trouble,3

As for

1 Robinson and Gallagher, P• 106, Hardington alerted
the troops in India without informing the Cabinet generally
(Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 46J).
2Gladstone memorandum, June 21, 1882, Ramm,
1876-86, r. 3a1.
JDufferin to Granville, June 19, 1882 1 PRO FOCP

407/20, No. 1257, P• 486, Ma.let to Granville, June 14,

1882, ibid,, No. 98), P• J82,

423

France, it appeared by early July that she was prepared
to arrange some modus vive.ndi with Arabi. 1
Fear lest the Suez Canal be damaged was certainly
an important factor which aroused both the Government and
the public.

Still, concern over other matters such as
trade was also voieed, 2 in Parliament, Chamberlain pointed
out the necessity for protecting British trading interests,
and many on hand were in agreement.3

Cross and Bright,

M.P's who possessed large holdings in the Commercial Bank
of Alexandria, urged upon Downing Street the protection of

British property in Egypt. 4 Mr. J. Slagg, M.P. for Manchester, told the House how a delegation of his constituents
had met with him and had asked for Government help in the
1 Lord Charles Beresford, former M.P. and commander
of a gunboat in Alexandria, reported that French visits with
Arabi had become a daily occurrence before the occupation
(Beresford to Granville, Sept. 26, 1882, Granville Papers
PRO FO 30/29/148).

2Blunt, Segret ftstory, P• 255.

This author suggested
that poor economic eond~ions of the period were an important
cause in the British occupation of Egypt•
3Hansard, Vol. 272 1 July 26, 1882, col. 1801.

4Dilke to Ma.let, June 13 1882, PRO FO 78/3462.
1

In this case, as in that of the Cotton Pressing Company of
Alexandria, requests for special protection for British
property were passed on to the British agent in Egypt
(Granville to Cartwright, Jl.ll'le 29 1 1882, PRO FOCP-407/20,
No. 1563, P• 626).
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present difficulties in Egypt. 1

The mills of Bolton had

stockpiles of Egyptian cotton to last until October, but a
week after the massacre of June 11, prices rose .75d. a
pound. 2

Then, too, there was the destruction already

done in Egypt, about which the Earl of Fife wished clarification. 3

Upon this point the Foreign Secretary had

decided that Egypt would bear all costs, for as he wroter
"We shall require full reparation and satisfaction for
the outrages committed during the recent disorders." 4
The bondholders, too, were in a most unpleasant
position, and despite extensive purchases a panic gripped
the Exchange, driving Egyptian securities down sharply.
The payment of future coupons was doubtful and the weak
holders, those who had borrowed to purchase, were being
wiped out.5

There were many failures, with dealers in
"Egyptians" placed under intense pressure. 6 All Egyptian

1 Hansard, Vol. 270, June 15, 1882, col. 1255·
2Daily News, June 20, 1882, ACFB, EgYpt, XVI, 166.
J
'
Hansard, Vol. 271, June 2J, 1882, col. 185,
4 Granville to Malet, June 17 1882, PRO FOCP 407/20,
1
No. 1145, P• 440.
5Daily News, June 21, 1882, ACFB, .§gypt, XVI, 167.

6For a list of the dealers in Egyptian securities,
see the Statist, VII (May 28, 1881), 92-9J.
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bonds including the tribute issues were affecteds

on

Monday, June 19, there was an eight-point drop in the
"unifieds," and by week's end two jobbers had declared
bankruptcy. 1

Since the uprising of September, the value

of Egyptian investments had dropped 25 per cent, the
largest decline occurring in June. 2
For those institutions which could afford to clear
Egyptian securities from their portfolios, the experience
of June, 1882, was not wasted.J

The largest holders, the

banks, were paralyzed by the chaos and suspended payment
of interest to their stockholders.

They, like other or-

ganizations with investments in Egypt, did have members
in the House who could speak on their behalf, 4 Although
the Leader of the Opposition in Commons was under pressure
from his party to prod the Government with unpleasant
1

~·• IX

(June, 24, 1882), 698.

2Economist, XL (June 24, 1882), 77;. Despite an
improvement In the situation by June 2J, Egyptian investments had declined collectively £23 1 041 1 000 in value
since September 1, 1881.
JFor example, the Poreign and Colonial Trust Fund
sold off £6,350 in tribute loan of 18.54 £56,000 in
"unifieds,_" £50,000 in tribute loan of !871 1 ang £40,500
in ~ira ;:>anie.h stock (Bankers Magazine, XLIII LFeb.,

188jj. 202).

4Atkins (p. 405) estimates that there were thirty-

two in Parliament who were in some way connected with
Egyptian finance.
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questions, he refused to do so on patriotic grounds. 1
But those who had capital in the Nile Valley had no
such scruples.

The Economist wrote1

To the City and to businessmen, the matter presents
itself under an aspect not uncoloured by the interests of trade, To them the question is rather of
the prices of Egyptian securities, of rumours of
possible embarrassments connected with the hurried
closing of transactions in that country, of alarms
about the unprotected condition of the canal. The
eUlbarrassing the Government by putting in both
Houses questions which never should be asked, and
to which no reply should be given, is most strongly
to be deprecated. 2
Of those who spoke for the bondholders, none had more
weight than Goschen, who came out strongly in favor of
the employment of troops in Egypt, despite the loss of
political influence this

friend~hip

erstwhile Liberal colleagues,3

cost him among his

Gladstone, who disliked

Capel Court, surprised many investors and sent "unifieds"
climbing 3.5 points when he told Parliament•
1 Northcote to Childers, July 4, 1882. Edmund Spencer
Childers, The Life and Corres~ondence of the Right Hon.
Hugh C, E, Childers, 1821-1§2 {Londont John Murray, l90l},
II, 90.
2Eeonom&st, XL (June 24, 1882), 770.
JHansard, Vol. 272, July 25, 1882, cols, 1872-1889.
Chamberlain had expressed his unwillingness, in early July,
to serve in the same Cabinet with Goschen (Garvin, I, 449).
In September of 1882, Granville mentioned Gosehen as the
best man to be sent to Egypt to assess the situation, but
his bondholders "flavour" was a major objection (Granville
to Gladstone, Sept, 21, 1882, Ramm, 1876-86, I, 427).
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The ends we have in view • • • are well known to
consist in the general maintenance of all established rights in Egypt, whether they be those of
the Sultan, those of the Khedive, those of the
people
Egypt. or those of the foreign bondholders.

of

The pro- and anti-interventionists swung into
action, each side striving to drum up support in the
public.

The press remained jingoist in sympathy, and

even the fall Mall Gazette and the EconopU,st (both extremely Liberal in outlook) found themselves in support
of Ara.bi's removai. 2
An anti-bondholder element was predominant in those
organizations which opposed British involvement in Egypt.
The International Arbitration and Peace Association, for
example, sent Granville a memorandum in which they argued
that the only valid interest England had in Egypt was the
Suez Canal, which was not endangered.J

An ad hoe group

led by dissident Liberal M.P.'s set into motion the AntiAggression League, which circulated a petition in which
Gladstone's statement on the rights of the bondholders
was sharply criticized. 4 The League held a meeting with
Wilfred Lawson, M,P., in the chair, flanked by eight of
1 Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 460,
XL

2 Pall Mall Gazette, June 15, 1882, p. St Economist.

(July

l, 1882), SOl.

JThe Times, July 1, 1882, p. 10.
4~•• June 19, 1882, p. a.
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his confreres from the House. 1
Finally, some of the most strident criticism came
from the rJevvcastle Foreign Affairs Association, chaired
by George Crawshay, an investor in Turkish scrip.

In a

circular of June, 1882, the gentlemen of the Newcastle
group blamed the joint note of January, and British involvement generally, upon the Egyptian bondholders.

These

observations sprang perhaps just as much from jealousy as
from a concern for England's national interest, for as the
circular stated, "the Egyptian bondholders should have been
left to take care of themselves as the Turkish Bondholders
were." 2

The group•s efforts were focused upon the cir-

culation of petitions calling for the withdrawal of the
fleet at Alexandria and the commencement of amicable discussions with the Sultan.
The British people, however, were in an aggressive
mood.

The meeting of the Patriotic Society on July 8 drew

a throng which was treated to an oratorical display

by

a

platform crowded with peers and M,P.'s, including Robert
Fowler, a member of the •council' of the Corporation of
Foreign Bondholders.

The Government was called upon to

pursue a responsible and independent policy in the East
1

~••

June 27, 1882, p. 10.

2 circular of the Newcastle Foreign Affairs Association, ACFB, Egypt, XVI, 170 (enclosure),
f
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and to protect the property of Englisrunen. 1
The chairman of the Council of Foreign Bondholders
was not idle in advancing the cause of the Egyptian bondholders,

A large non-partisan assembly was arranged to

be held at Willie's Rooms "to invite the Government to
adopt at once those strong and vigorous measures to which
they have indeed already pledged themselves." 2 In fact,
the gathering was mainly a Conservative affair, and drew
such dignitaries as Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote,

Presiding over the event was E, P. Bouverie, sharing

the rostrum on the evening of June 29 were many who had a
financial stake in Egypta

the Duke of Sutherland, Mr.

Easton, Sir George Elliot, as well as fourteen others
from Westminster, and an array of aristocrats,

Bouverie

opened the proceedings by stating that the importance
of' the present issue was such that "the prosperity, the
greatness, and, perhaps, the very existence" of the country
were threatened,J

He touched on England's interest, in-

cluding the Canal, and the administration which had been
so carefully constructed, and added that the Government
1 The Times, July 10, 1882, p, 10,
2!sh.2. June 27, 1882, ACFB, Egypt, XVI, 172,
1

JAn account of the meeting may be :'ound in
The Times, June JO, 1882, p. 8,
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was like a "jellyfish" without a backbone.

He completed

his remarks by calling on the Libera.ls to act in the
spirit of Palmerston and not bet:ray British imperial
interests.

Sir Richard Temple also addressed the

meeting, and statedc
We had £Js,ooo,ooo invested in thriving industries
in Egypt, and we were bound to protect those who
had made their investments in reliance upon the
protection of the British Government,l
Easton also stressed the investments by Britishers as
well as the importance of the Nile Valley to the home

cotton mills.

EV'en Northcote in his speech acknowledged

the plight of the numerous Englishmen who had placed
capital in Egypt.
Perhaps the hall had been packed, as was charged,
since the tickets were distributed by the Duke of Sutherlands still, the conclave served the Conservative ends
while it gave the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders an
opportunity to demonstrate their support of the holders.
Thus, in the general agitation for intervention .the
Council played its part.
Events moved quickly in early July.

Admiral Seymour,

who commanded the British squadron at Alexandria. became
disturbed over the construction of earthworks and the im-
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placement of' shore batteries which he claimed endangered
his vessels.

His request f'or permission to present an

ultimatum to have these objects removed initiated heated
Cabinet discussions.

When Paris was questioned as to their

attitude toward a bombardment, they replied that the French
Chamber probably would not sanction such a step, and the
French f'leet departed f'or Port Said.

British troop strength

in the Mediterranean was augmented and Dilke secretly inf'ormed Tewf'ik of these preparations so that the Khedive
might take appropriate action. 1

By July 7 the Cabinet

had decided to run the risk of damage to the Canal, and
to allow the bombardment, and, if necessary, a military
expedition. 2 This decision has been described as a
"compromise between cross purposes•"J since the ministers
supporting the ultimatum did so for different reasons.
The Radicals, for example, supported the invasion in part
on the grounds that the f ellaheen would be freed from the
foreign creditors, a position which was later to create
problems after the collapse of Ara.bi,

The Prime Minister

submitted to the wishes of the Cabinet, whereupon Seymour

was given permission to present the ultimatum.

The

1 Gwynn and Tuokwell, I, 466.

2 Robinson and Gallagher, pp, 110-13.
graph is drawn from the cited pages.
3
.
Ibid,• P• 111.

This para-
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Admiral, however, went beyond these orders and demanded
the surrender of the forts guarding the harbor.

The

British Government did nothing to contradict him, and
on July 11 the English flotilla destroyed the defensive
installations, and marines were sent ashore to secure
the city.
This operation did not intimidate Arabi and his
followers, but rather aroused Egypt against all Europeans.
Arabi declared a holy war on the foreigners and menaced
their lifeline to the East by diverting salt water into
the Sweetwater Canal.

The British Cabinet was again i:n.

turmoil as to what to do.

Attempts to obtain a formal

mandate from the Conference to restore order were not
successful.

Hardington, who still led "the forward

party," told the Foreign Seeretary that England must
act, alone if necessary. 1 No one in the Government desired a protectorate over Egypt, nor did they know how
long an occupation might last, but on July 20 it was
decided to place Sir Garnet Wolseley at the head of an
expeditionary force, and to ask Parliament for £2,300,000
to finance the expedition.

On July 13, Freycinet had

agreed to join with England for the protection of the
1 Hardington to Granville, July 18, 1882, Granville
Papers PRO FO 30/29/132.
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Canal, which greatly comforted Downing Street. 1

The

French Chamber, however, was not willing to grant the
needed credits and, ignoring Gambetta•s plea to work
with London, voted down the authorization on July 29. 2 ·
France did not react negatively to Britain's restoration
of order,3 and only with the autumn did Paris begin to

press London as to its future plans in the Nilotic.
England sounded Italy as to her joining in the Egyptian
campaign, but Rome declined, believing it would be better
to work within the Conference at Constantinople. 4 The
Italiari response greatly relieved Lord Granville a
I ha.ve just received from Menabrea the refusal,
which delights me. We have done the right thingr
we have shown our readiness to admit others.5
The debate in Commons on the military bill was
led by the Prime Minister, who after the bombardment was
in a fighting mood. 6

Throughout the deb•tes the M.P.'s

1 Rob1nson and Gallagher, P• 113.
2 J. P. T. Bury, "Gambetta and England,"
in ~o-French Historx Dur~ the E;ahteenth,
and entreth Centuries, ed. y ll?re bovl11e
Temperley (Cambr!dges Xt the University Press,
PP• 122-23,

in studies
Nineteenth
and Harold

1935),

3cromer, I, 302.

4Roberts, "Italy," P• 326.
SGranville to Paget (British Ambassador to Rome),
July 28, 1882, Fitzmaurice, II, 271.
6Gwynn and Tuokwell, I, 468.
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shied away from specifying exactly what English interests
were being served by the invasion.

Gladstone believed

the bondholders had rights, covered by the Law of Liquidation, which England could not unilaterally disregard. 1
In no way did the Radicals wish to link national and
bondholder interests, but so long as the job was being
done,. investors seemed not to mind under what banner
they marched.

Sympathy for their cause we..s certainly
very low in the general publio, 2 but this did nothing
to dampen the ardor of the City, as the Economist observed:
There has never been a time when our commercial
and financial interests have been so eager to
embark in costly military operations as they
are now. There is comparatively little apprehension as to the cost--if the Government had asked
for twice £2,)00,000 the amount would have been
quite as readily voted, and the extra amount regarded
as an earnest of greater determination on the part
of the Government to prosecute the campaign with
vigour.3
The bill was passed on July 27, 1882, by a vote of 27.5
to 19, 336 M.P.'s not appearing. 4 Bondholder satis1Gladstone to Rev. Edwin Abbott, Sept. 13 1882,
1
Gladstone Papers BM Add MSS 44545/198-98 (copy).
2s1r Richard Temple, "Principle of British Policy
in Egypt," Contemporary Review, XLII (Oct., 1882), 505.
3Eoonomist, XL (July 29, 1882), 9J6-J7.

thos:~~a~teX0 I~ ~~;·aJ~~~lv!~ 8!ixc~!~. 2 !~6 h!a08 •

of
been, Council membersa Sir John Lubbock, Charles Ma.gniac,
Henry B. Sheridan, General Sir George Balfour, George de
Worms, and Robert Fowler.
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faction in Parliament's action was evident. as stock
prices slowly began a recovery which by mid-September
would place them above the mark reached before the
Paris crash. 1
The final scene of Arabi's revolt was played
out at Tel-el-Kebir on September lJ, and with his
defeat Khedivial authority was restored.

With the

sheathing of the sword came the return of the diplomats,
who would once again attempt to solve Egypt's economic
riddle1

prosperity for the inhabitants and payment

for the bondholders.

In

pursuit of an answer to this

conundrum, the bondholders continued to be assisted by
the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders.

1Economist, XL (Sept. 16, 1882), 1149.

CONCLUSION
By the autumn of 1882, the Corporation of
Foreign Bondholders stood at a threshold.

Before it

lay a turbulent period which would end in Corporation
reorganization by Parliamentary actt behind were years
which, while agitated, were marked by significant
achievements.

The accomplishments of this interest

group are all the more noteworthy considering the
variety of difficulties encountered and the unpopularity of such organizations at the time.

Some of

the problems were inherent to the concept of a bondholders• society operating for the public good, but
others arose from the hostility of various factions
of the investing community which felt threatened by
Moorgate Street.
Despite this situation, the Council was able
to play an effective role in safeguarding the interests
of British investors by serving as a rallying point, and
by providing much needed information, legal assistance,
and funds for missions on their behalf.

Among the

settlements arranged by the Corporation in its early
4J6
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history, none gave more satisfaction than that
undertaken for the Egyptian bondholders.
The guiding principles of the Corporation
in defense of the Egyptian bondholders were the equitable treatment of creditors by the defaulting government and the maintenance of the sanctity of contracts.
From the initial contact between Councilhouse and the
Cairo Government in 1870 when the Viceroy circumvented
the bond of the loan of 1868, to Council Chairman
Bouverie's activities .in 1882 when Arabi Bey threatened
unilaterally to abrogate the Law of Liquidation, the
Corporation was never intractable in its negotiations,
but once a settlement was reached, a strict adherence
was expected.
Certain members of the Council possessed a personal interest in the Nile Valley and its future, which
no doubt contributed to the organization's efforts toward
an accommodation.

These interests were quite varieda

there were those who saw Egypt as an important point
in imperial geometry between India and Britains others,
involved in the investment trust business, wished to
protect their firm's portfolios from erosions and there
were those who had purchased stock in companies which
would suffer by an Egyptian default.
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The decisive action of the Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders came in 1876 after the Disraeli Government
had turned its back upon the English investors, leaving
the French bankers in control.

Despite criticism from

many quarters, the Council took up the matter in a professional and efficient manner.

Since the treatment of

the recent Turkish default had shown the destructiveness
of bickering bondholders• committees, the Corporation
deliberately achieved the enlistment of the services of
Mr. George Goschen with a maximum of goodwill on all
sides.

In successfully defending British interests,

the M.P. for London also laid the base for eventual
Anglo-French intervention.

In a certain sense, there-

fore, the Council was responsible for the occupation of
Egypt by General Wolseley six years later.

In 1876 and 1877, the Council played a conspicuous part in the settlement of the Daira debt and
also took in hand the cause of the Egyptian tribute
bondholders.

When all of these arrangements were com-

pleted, Councilhouse was content to leave matters in
the hands of Mr. Gosohen and the representatives he
had selected for the creditors.
bondholders was short-lived.

But the rule of the

Both Major Baring and

Mr. Romaine disappointed the Council.

With Goschen

beginning to disengage himself from Egyptian affairs,
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the Decree of November 18 under attack, and the Western
Powers increasing their authority in Egypt, the Corporation found that the British bondholders had little choice
but to accept whatever terms the Khedive•s Government
offered.

The Commission of Inquiry and the Law of

Liquidation reduced the interest to be paid the bondholders, and finally the Chairman of the Council was
again forced into action to forestall the mutinous
colonels from seizing power, through letters to the
Foreign Off ice and participation in public demonstrations
which called upon the Liberal Government to protect
English interests.

Throughout, Bouverie rarely spoke

of the rights of the holders, preferring to justify
British intervention by moral and political arguments.
From the foregoing, it seems correct to say
that the bondholders were certainly not the prime movers
behind the occupation of Egypt, yet they cannot be dismissed as insignificant.

Their welfare was a single

but important component of the national interest, and
there is little doubt that during the period discussed
their affairs were well represented by the Corporation
of Foreign Bondholders.

APPENDIX
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TABLE 1
PARTICIPATION OF 'COUNCIL' MEMBERS
ON MAJOR BONDHOLDER COMMITTEES
'Co'lll'lcil' Members
and Sta.ff (*) on
the Committee

Committee
Name
Alabama and
Chatanooga
Bondholders•
Committee

Francis Bennoch
Augustus Abraham
*Aubry Moriarty
Sir Philip Rose
Maj. Gen. John
Vaughan

Bolivia
Bondholders•
Committee

Francis Bennoch
Lionel Bonar

Office Held
(If Any)

Chairman

Chairman

I·

Costa Rica
Bondholders•
Committee

Roger Eykyn
Francis Bennoch

Ecuador
Bondholders•
Committee

Francis Bennoch
Lionel Bonar
Adm. Sir Provo Wallis

Guatemala 1869
6 Per Cent
Loan Committee

Maj. Gen, Sir George
Balfour
George Taylor
Maj. Gen. John

Vaughan
George Wythes
Sir Francis Lycett
Joint Committee for
Ottoman
Loans of
1858 and 1862

Francis Bennoch
*Thomas Rumball
*Hyde Clarke

Chairman
Deputy
Chairman
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TABLE 1--Continued

Committee
Name

'Council' Members
and Staff (*) on
the Committee

Louisiana
Bondholders'
Committee

Maj. Gen. Sir George
Balfour
Francis Bennoch

Mexican
Bondholders'
Committee

Henry B. Sheridan
Francis Bennoch

Spanish
Bondholders'
Committee

Lionel Bonar
Adm. Sir Provo Wallis
Sir Philip Rose
Cornelius Surgey
Maj. Gen. Sir George
Balfour
Augustus Abraham
Francis Bennoch
Lionel Bonar
Roger Eykyn
Charles Magniac
John Paterson
*Thomas Rumball
Sir John Lubbock
Maj. Gen. John
Vaughan
George Wythes

Turkish Loan
of 1862
Committee

Sir Francis Lycett
John Paterson

Venezuela
Bondholders'
Committee

Maj. Gen. Richard
Beaumont
Maj. Gen. John
Vaughan
Adm. Sir Provo Wallis

Virginia
Bondholders'
Committee

Sir Samuel Montagu
William Trotter

Office Held
(If Any)

Chairman
Deputy
Chairman

Chairman

Chairman
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TABLE 1--continued
Notes Certain names recur frequently on these committees1 this is not coincidental. These gentlemen
were the officers of the Corporation and were members
of the Executive Committee of the 'Council,' and in
the last analysis it was in these half dozen that the
real power of the association resided. In addition,
the chairman of the Corporation (Isadore Gerstenberg,
and later Edward Pleydell Bouverie) was the chairman
ex officio of every committee, and Hyde Clarke, the
Secretary of the Corporation, was usually the secretary
of committees.
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TABLE 2
MEMBERS OF TP..E 'COUNCIL' OF THE CORPORATION
OF FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS, 1869-82
Years on the
•council'

Occupation

Augustus B. Abraham

1878-79

Gentleman

Maj. Gen. Sir George
Balfour, M.P.

187.3-82

Military

Maj. Gan. Richard
H. I. B. Beaumont

1869-74

Military

Charles Bell, M.P.

1869

Banker-Thomson & Bonar

Francis Bennoch
(Acting Chairman
of the 'Colmcil'
1873-76)

1873-82

Gentleman

Name

.....
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TABLE 2--Continued
Off ices Held in Financial
Organizations

Membership in Nonprofit
Organizations

Trustee--Foreign and Colonial Government Trust

Royal Colonial Institute

Chairman--Credit Foncier
of Mauritius
Director--Credit Foncier
of England
Director--Land Mortgage
Bank of India
Director--Atlantic and
Great Westeni Railway
Cha.irman--Tunisian Railways

Royal Society of Arts,
Indian Section
Royal Statistical
Society
Royal Geographical
Society
Royal Asiatic Society of
Great Britain and
Ireland

•

a

I

• • •

Director--Anglo-Italian
Bank

Royal Geographical
Society

Director--Debenture
Guarantee and Investment Trust
Director--Federal Fire Insurance Company
Director--City of Potsdam
waterworks
Director--Stanley Fireproof Lathing Company
Director--Venezuela Telegraph and Electric
Appliance Company
Director--London Steamboat Company
Chairman--Government Stock
Investment Trust
Trustee--Omnium Stock Trust

Royal Society of Arts
(life member)
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TABLE 2·-Continued
Years on the
•council'

Name

George A. F.

c.

Bentinck,

Occupation

1869-82

Lawyer

187J-82

Banker--Thomson &:. 3ona.r

Robert Bourke, Baron
Cannemara, M.P.

1880-82

Government
Official

Hon. Edward Pleydell
Bouverie
(Chairman of the
'Council' 1876-82)

1876-82

Gentleman

f,I. P.

Lionel

N.

Donal."

E. Philip Cazenove

I

1869-73

Broker--cazenove & Sons

Hyde Clarke
(Secretary of the
'Council' 1869-82)

I

1869-82

Gentleman

Henry Daniell

I

1873-82

I Broker--

Roger Eykyn, M.P.

I

1873-82

I Broker-Eykyn
Bros.

Mullens,
Marshall &
Daniell

..
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TABLE 2--Continued
Off ices Held in Financial
Organizations

Director--English and Australian Copper Co.
Trustee--Foreign and Colonial Government Trust

Membership in Nonprofit
Organizations

• • •

• • •

• • •

• • •

• • •

President--Trust and Loan
Co. of Canada
Director--Berks and Hants
Extension Railway Co.
Director--Peninsular and
Oriental Steamship Co.
Chainnan--Colonial Co.
Deputy Chainnan--Economic
Life Assurance Society
Director--Great Western
Railway

• • •
• •

•

• • •

Chairman--Alabama and Great
Southern Railway Co.

Royal Society of Arts

• •

•

Royal Colonial Institute
Royal Society of Arts
Royal Statistical Society

• • •

• • •
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TA3LE 2--contlnt:.cd
Years on the
•council'

Occupation

Walter R. Farquhar

1880-82

Ba.nker-Herries,
Farquhar
& co.

Sir Robert
Bart,

1873-78

Banker-Drewett &
Fowler, Dimsdale, Fowler
& co.

Isadore J. Garstenberg
(Chairman of 'Council')

1869-75

Broker

F'rederick Allers Hankey

1873

Banker-Consolidated
Bank

Grosvenor Hodgkinson, M.P.

1873

Gentleman

H. R. Jameson

1869.. 72

Merchant
(retired,
W, Gibbs
& co. of
Valparaiso)

Sir Arthur Kinnaird, Tenth
Baron Kinnaird and First
Baron Rossie, M. P.

1873-82

Banker, and
Partner-Ransome &
Bouverie

Name

N'.

Fowler,

,.
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TABLE 2--continued
Off ices Held in Financial
Organizations
• • •

Membership in Nonprofit
Organizations
Royal Geographical
Society

Trustee--Government Stock
Investment Co.

Bankers Institute
Royal Geographical Society
Royal Society of Arts
Royal Statistical Society

Director--.Anglo-Hungarian
Bank

Royal Geographical Society
Royal Society of Arts

Chairman--Scottish and
Australian Bank
Chairman--Consolidated
Bank

Royal Society of Arts

Director--Law Life Assurance Society
Director--London, Chatham
and Dover Railway co.
Director--Midland Railway
Co.
• • •

Chairman--Accidental
Assurance co.
Director--County Fire
Off ice

•

• •

• • •

Royal Colonial Institute
Royal Geographical Society
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TABLE 2--Continued
Name

Years on the
'Council'

Occupation

Sir Arthur Kinnaird-continued

Sir John Lubbock. Baron
Avebury, M. P.

1873-82

Sir Francis Lycett

1869-79

Banker
{retired,
Dent &
Allcroft)

Charles Magniac, M.P.

1873-78

Merchant-Matheson
& co.

Richard Biddulph Martin,
M.P.

1875•82

Banker-Messrs.
l'f.artin & Co.

Banker-Robarts
Lubbock

&
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TABLE 2--continued
Off ices Held in Financial
Organizations

Membership in Nonprofit
Organizations

Director--Madras Irrigation and Canal co.
Director--Railway Share
Trust Co.
Director--Railway Debenture Trust Co.
Direotor--Railways Passenger Assurance Society
Chairman--Trust and Agency
Co. of Australasia
Deputy Governor--London
Gas Light co.
Director--Pelioan Life
Insurance co.
Chairman--Anglo-Italian
Bank
Director--Bank of Montreal
Director--Phoenix Fire
Assurance Co,
Chairman--Universal Marine
Insurance co.

President--Central Assoc.
of Bankers
First President--Institute
of Bankers (1879-83)
President--London Chamber
of Commerce (1888-95)
Vice President-•Royal
Society of Arts (1876)
Royal Colonial Institute
Royal Statistical Society

Director--Star Life
Assurance co.

Royal society of Arts

Director--Russian Bank
for Trade
Chairman--National Bank
of New Zealand

President--London Chamber
of Commerce (188J)
Royal Society of Arts

Director--Municipal Trust
Director--United States
Land and Colonization
Co.

Treasurer--Royal Statistical Society
Royal Geographical Society
Bankers Institute
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TABLE 2--Continued

Name

Years on the
'Council'

Occupation

Richard Biddulph Martin,
M.P.--continued

Robert Martin

1873-75

Banker
(retired,
Messrs.
Martin & Co.)

Hugh McCulloch

1873-79

Banker-Jay, Cook, &
McCulloch

Alexander Melville. Earl
of Leven and Melville

1873-77

Banker and
Partner·Williams,
Deacon & Co.

Sir Samuel Montagu, First
Baron Swaythling

1873-78

Banker-Samuel Montagu & Co.

Thomas Moxon

1869-70

Gentleman
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TABLE 2--Continued
Off ices Held in Financial
Organizations

Membership in Nonprofit
Organizations

Trustee--Railway Accident
Mutual Assurance Co.
Chairman--Debenture Corp.
Chairman--.Anglo-American
Debenture Corp.
Chairman--Assets Realization Co.
Chairman--British North
Borneo Co.
Director--su.~ Insurance Co.
Director--sun Life Assurance Co.
Director--Notting Hill
Electric Lighting Co.
Director--Sun Fire Off ice
• •

•

•

• •

Trustee--Reliance Mutual
Life Assurance Society
Director--Nevile Reid and
Co. of Windsor

• •

•

• • •

•

• •

• • •

•

• •

• • •

• • •
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TABLE 2--Continued
Name

Years on the
•council'

Occupation

John Paterson, Alderman

1873-75

Merchant

Simon Reuter

1873-75

Gentleman

Sir John Rose, Bart.

1873-79

Banker-Morton,
Rose & Co.

Sir Philip Rose, Bart.

1869-78

Iawyer-Baxter, Rose I
Norton & Co.
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TABLE 2--continued
Off ices Held in Financial
Organizations
Trustee--Omnium Stock
Trust

• • •

Membership in Nonprofit
Organizations

• • •
• • •

Governor--Hudson's Bay Co.
Chairman--south Australian
Co.
Director--Bank of Montreal
Director--Bank of British
Columbia
Director--London and
Westminster Bank
Director--Royal Exchange
Assurance Corp.

Royal Colonial Institute
Royal Geographical Society

Trustee--Foreign and Colonial Government Trust
Director--London Bank of
Commerce
Direetor--Public Works
Construction Co.
Director--Eagle Insurance
Co.
Director--London, Brighton,
Southcoast Railway
Director--Tramways Union
Director--Submarine Continental Railway
Director--Debenture Trust
and Mortgage Co. of
England
Director--Alabama and
Great Southern Railway
Co.
Director--.Anglo-French
Fire Insurance Co.
Director--American Investment Trust Co.
Director--Railway Shares
Investment Trust Co.

• •

•
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TABLE 2--Continued
Years on the
•council'

Occupation

Hon. H. Dudley Ryder

1880-82

Government
Official
(retired)

George Schlotel

1869-73

Broker

Sir Edward H. Scott,
Fifth Baronet

1878-82

Banker-Sir Samuel
Scott & Co.

Henry B. Sheridan, m.P.

1869-70

Gentleman

Sir Thomas w. Snagge
(Legal Advisor 1874-81)

1882

Lawyer

Cornelius Surgey

187J-82

Broker-Lowndes,
surgey &
Woolly

c.

1876-82

Gentleman

187J-82

Broker-Capel & co.

Name

George

Taylor

William Trotter
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TABLE 2--Continued
Offices Held in Financial

Organizations

Director--Coults and Co.

• • •
.

.

IfJembership in Nonprofit
Organizations
• • •

•

• •

'

• • •

• • •

• • •

Director--north London
Railway

• • •

Director--London Joint

• • •

• • •

Royal Statistical Society

Stock Ba.11k

Director--Grand Junction
Canal co.
Director--London, Chatham
and Dover Railway Co,
Chairman--Halesovren Rail ...

way Co,
President--Varna Railway

co.

Director--American Investment Trust
Director--Foreign and
Colonial Governme~t
Trust

Royal Geographical Society
Royal Asiatic Society of
Great Britain and Ireland
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TABLE 2--continued
Name
Henry Tudor

Years on the
'Council'
1873-82

occupation
Broker-

Henry Tudor

& Sons
Captain Sir Henry w. Tyler,
Bart., R.N., M.P.

1875-82

Wdlitary

Major General John
Luther Vaughan

1876-82

Military

Admiral of the Fleet Sir
Provo William ParryWallis 1869-78
Thomas M. Weguelin, M.P.
(Deputy Chairman of the
'Council,' 1870-75)

1869-8~

Navy
Merchant Bank
er --Robarts
& Lubbock1
later with
Thomson, Bonar
& co.
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TABLE 2--Continued
Off ices Held in Flnancial
Organizations

..

·•

President--Grand Trunk
Railway of Canada
President--Chicago a.~d
Cirand Trunk Railway
Co. of Canada
Chairman-~Rhymney Iron Co.
Chairman-Buenos Aires and
Campana Railway
Deputy Chairman--Great
F.a.stern Railway Co.
Chairma.:n--westinghouse
Brake Co.
Director--National Mutual
Life Assurance Society
Director--Bristol Port
and Channel Dock and
Warehouse Co.
Director--Central Pacific Coal and Coke Co.
Director--Hamilton and
Northwest Railway Co.
Director--Tendring Hundred Railway co.
Director--Omnium Stock
Trust
Director--Nouveau Monde
Gold Mining Co.

• • •
Chairman--Bahai and San
Francisco Railway
Direotor--swedish Association, Ltd.

Membership in Nonprofit
Organizations
• • •

Royal Society of Arts

• • •
•

• •

Royal Geographical Society
Royal Society of Arts
Royal Statistical Society
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TABLE 2--continued
Name

Years on the
•council'

Occupation

Thomas M• Weguelin, M.P.-continued

George A. de Worms, Baron

1869

Banker-.Messrs. de
Worms & co.

George A. Wythes

1873-78

Railway
Contractor
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TABLE 2--Continued
Offices Held in Financial
Organizations

Membership in Nonprofit
Organizations

Director--Trust and Loan
Co. of Upper Canada
Direotor--Indenmity Mutual
Marine Assurance Co.
Director--Peninsular
Oriental Steamship co.
Director--General credit
and Discount Co.

•

Director--Publio Works
Construction Co.
Director--Argentine Land Co.
Director--Colohester, Stour
Valley, Sudbury and Halstead Railway co.
Director--swedish Association, Ltd.
Director--swedish Railway
Equipment Co.

• • •

• •
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TABLE

.3

THE MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAL DJ'STITUTIONS
IN EGYPT ON THE EVE OF DEFAULT

Institution
Cr6dit Lyonnaise
Imperial Ottoman Bank
Franco-Egyptian Bank
Anglo-Egyptian Bank
Austro-Egyptian Bank
Bank of Alexandria
socie~ General ottoman
Inda-European Bank
Soci~t• 6gyptienne
Bank of Egypt
Soci'tl Nationale
Italo-Izigiana

Amount of
Paid-Up
Capital
£),000,000
£2,500,000
£2,000,000
£1,600,000
£1,000,000
£800,000
£750,000
£.500,.000

£JOO,OOO
£250,000
£200,000
£120,000

~~4

INTEREST PAID BY ENGLISH BANKS IN EGYPT, 1869-75

Name of Bank

Number of
Shares

(£)

Bank of Egypt
Bank of
Alexandria
Anglo-~tian

(1871Jb

Per Cent Interest Paid Per Yeara

Price
per
Share

1869

1870

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

io.ooo
ioo.ooo

25

16

16

18

19

20

16

16

10

••

••

••

••

12.5

15

15

80,000

20

18

10

15

20

18

15

15

aFebruary for the Bank of F..gypt. and November for the y~her two banks
was the month marking the and of the fiscal year*
b\l'hen the Anglo-Egyptian Bank opened its doors in 1864. each share was
priced at e;o, but this price was reduced when the bank was reorganized.
Note1 Table 4 was compiled from various economic journals of the day.
principally Bankers Magazine and the Money Market Review.
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TABLE 5
PUBLIC LOANS OF EGYPT, 1862-?Ja
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and

84.5

1864

'5,704,000

7

93

1879

Dakalieh,
Sharkieh,
Beheira
and general revenue

4,864,06.J

86

8.20

1866

3,387,300

7

90

1881

Daira

2,750,000

81

8.60

first

an

J,000,000

7

92

1874

Railroads

2,640,000

88

8

Friihling
and
Goschen

1867

2.080,000

9

90

1881

New estates
and general
revenue

l,700,000

82

ll

Imperial
Ottoman
Bank

1868

11,890,000

7

75

1898

General
revenue
and certain taxes

7,193,334

60

11.56

Oppenheim

5,000,000

70

10

Bischoff sheim

19,973,658

6J

11

Oppenheim

1866
seccni

1870

7,142,860

7

75

1890

Dairas

1873

32,000,000

7

84.5
to
70

1903

Railroads,
customs,
.Moukabala,
etc •• and
general
revenue

.{:"

°'

\J\

aTable 5 is excerpted from Landes, Bankers and Pashas, pp. 339-40.

TABLE 6
DECLINE OF BANK SHARE PRICES, 1875-76
Price
Bank
Aug., •75

Nov., '75

Feb., '76

June, •76
-t::"

13

Anglo-Egyptian Bank

JS

JO 1/2

28 1/4

Ba11k of Alexandria

12 5/8

10 1/8

9 1/2

6 7/8

Bank of Egypt

39

39

• • •

Jl 1/2

°'°'

TABLE 7
DEPRECIATION OF EGYPTIAN SECURITIESa

Price

Loan
by

Issue
Year

Oct.
1875

March
1876

OCTOBER 1875 TO MARCH 1876a

Value of Stock
outstanding
(£)

Amol.ll'l.t of Depreciation
as of March. 1876
(£)

Oct.' 1875

March, 1876
..(::"

1862
1864
1866
1867
1868
1870
1873

73
8J
75
91
65
64.5
65

Total

• • •

523,000
335,000

52.25

1,860,000
2,120,000
1,.385,000
1,190,000
7,945,000
J,970,000
20,485,000

J,137,000
16,466,ooo

111,000
215,000
1,472,000
8JJ,OOO
4,019,000

• • •

38,055,000

J0,547,000

7,508,000

52.5
70
69.5
74.5

57.5
51

1,337,000
1,785,000
1,274,ooo

975,000
5,573,000

a.Economist, XX.XIV (April 1, 1876), 395.

°'
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TABLE 8
ACCOUNTS FOR THE CORPORATION OF FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS
187J-78a
Amount

Item

(~)

Receipts
Agency and commission • • • • • , • • • • • J6,8J6
Interest on stock held

• • • • • • • • • • 14.652
266
Subscriptions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Expenditures

Ordinary expenditures, including salaries
and testimonials • • • • • • • • • • • • 25,610
• •

7,484

Fifty certificates drawn and paid
with interest , • • • • • • , • • • • • •
House property • • • • • • • • • • • • • ,

5,995
J,106

Undivided profits • • • • • • • • • • , • • •

9,557

Losses and depreciation on investments

aMoney Market Review, XXXVI

{May

4, 1878), 435.
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187J}, 1294-95.
Financier.
Fraser's Magazine.
Gentleman's Maga§ine.
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A Journal of Practical Finance and Trade,

The Times of London.
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